WHITE STAR ROYALTY COMPANY LLC LLLP LLP KMP LLC SOOL JCS LP v. Melissa McGahey, Defendant and Appellant (2026)

[¶1] Defendant Melissa McGahey appeals from a judgment that quieted title to certain overriding royalty interests (“subject ORRI”) at issue in the Plaintiffs’ (collectively, “White Star”) action; that provided defendants McGahey Oil LLC, Melissa McGahey, Randy McGahey, Peter McGahey, Richard G. Dix as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marvin L. McGahey, and Elena Marie Koebel f/k/a Elena M. McGahey have no interest in the subject ORRI; that dismissed White Star's remaining claims with prejudice; and that awarded White Star attorney's fees of $11,164 against Melissa McGahey. McGahey also appeals the presiding judge's final findings and pre-filing order designating her a vexatious litigant. After this Court's temporary remand, the district court entered an amended judgment that also provided defendant Marathon Oil Company has no interest in the subject ORRI. We summarily affirm the amended judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1), (6), and (8). We summarily affirm the pre-filing order designating McGahey a vexatious litigant under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(4) and (7). We order Melissa McGahey to pay White Star costs and attorney's fees of $22,999.50 under N.D.R.App.P. 38.

I

[¶2] On appeal, McGahey argues, among other things, that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a federal oil and gas lease interest and the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this action; that the court committed reversible error by entering summary judgment and final judgment against McGahey Oil LLC, while the entity was without legal representation; that she was denied due process; that the integrity of the appellate record is fundamentally compromised; and that she was deprived of a fair proceeding.

[¶3] To the extent McGahey argues that McGahey Oil LLC owns the subject ORRI, that White Star's assignment is invalid, and that White Star lacked standing to bring the action, McGahey does not cite to the record to show these issues were raised in the district court, or state her grounds for seeking review of the unpreserved issues. We conclude McGahey has failed to preserve these issues for appellate review and thus waived these issues, and we decline to address them. See N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(7)(B)(ii) (requiring for each issue “citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved for review; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved”); Bauer v. Adam, 2026 ND 67, ¶ 6, 33 N.W.3d 1; see also Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Cnty. Farm Bureau, 2004 ND 60, ¶ 23, 676 N.W.2d 752 (“[A] failure to object to a party's standing in the trial court and on appeal results in a waiver of the issue”); Judson PTO v. New Salem Sch. Bd., 262 N.W.2d 502, 505 (N.D. 1978) (holding question of plaintiff's right to sue was waived under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(h) when defendant failed to make a proper motion); Vermeer Indus. of N.D. v. Bachmeier, 486 N.W.2d 506, 508 (N.D. 1992) (“Lack of capacity to sue is not a jurisdictional defect, and a failure to raise the issue during the proceedings results in a waiver of the defense.”).

[¶4] As to McGahey's argument that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a federal lease, on this record, we conclude the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. White Star Royalty and Marathon Oil responded to McGahey's subject matter arguments with citations to relevant authority. See BTU W. Res., Inc. v. Berenergy Corp., 442 P.3d 50, 54 (Wyo. 2019); Wallis v. Pan. Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 70, 86 S.Ct. 1301, 16 L.Ed.2d 369 (1966); see also Bolack v. Underwood, 340 F.2d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 1965) (“There is no federal statute governing disputes between private individuals regarding rights to federal oil and gas leases, and in such instance, where no right of the federal government is involved, state law governs.”). McGahey did not adequately brief and support her arguments on subject matter jurisdiction, particularly in response to White Star's and Marathon Oil's arguments and legal citations supporting jurisdiction. See Diop v. Altepeter, 2025 ND 196, ¶ 3, 27 N.W.3d 704 (“This Court does not address inadequately briefed issues.”); State v. Gomez, 2025 ND 60, ¶ 18, 18 N.W.3d 829 (“A party waives an issue by not providing supporting argument and, without supportive reasoning or citations to relevant authorities, an argument is without merit.” (cleaned up)).

[¶5] To the extent McGahey argues the district court committed reversible error by entering summary judgment and final judgment against McGahey Oil LLC, while the entity was without legal representation, McGahey is not a proper party to represent or raise issues on behalf of McGahey Oil, and her arguments on appeal are frivolous and without merit. See Wetzel v. Schlenvogt, 2005 ND 190, ¶ 11, 705 N.W.2d 836 (“[A] corporation may not be represented by a non-attorney agent in a legal proceeding.”). Further, to the extent McGahey argues that she was denied due process “through a communications blackout, refusal to file her motions, and cancellation of trial without notice”; that the integrity of the appellate record is “fundamentally compromised by systematic clerk misconduct”; and that she was deprived of a fair proceeding by “ex parte communications, an undisclosed conflict of interest, and a pattern of attorney irregularities,” we conclude her arguments on appeal are inadequately briefed and are frivolous and wholly without merit.

[¶6] We summarily affirm the amended judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1), (6), and (8).

II

[¶7] McGahey appeals the district court's pre-filing order entered by the presiding judge and argues the vexatious litigant designation must be vacated because it rests on an inflated and inaccurate motion count and was entered without jurisdiction.

[¶8] Unlike interlocutory orders, “[a] pre-filing order entered by a presiding judge designating a person as a vexatious litigant may be appealed to the supreme court under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02 and N.D.R.App.P. 4.” N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58(6)(a). Under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58(3)(a), “[a]t the request of a party or on the court's own motion, the presiding judge may designate a litigant as a vexatious litigant.” See also N.D.C.C. § 28-36-04 (“The supreme court shall adopt rules to implement this [vexatious litigation] chapter.”); N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 2(2) (“The presiding judge is responsible for all court services of all courts within the geographical area of the judicial district.”). “This Court reviews pre-filing orders issued under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58 for an abuse of discretion.” In re Emelia Hirsch Tr., 2022 ND 224, ¶ 3, 982 N.W.2d 617 (citation omitted). We conclude the presiding judge had jurisdiction to enter the pre-filing order and the court did not abuse its discretion by designating Melissa McGahey a vexatious litigant and issuing the pre-filing order. We summarily affirm the pre-filing order under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(4) and (7); see Bauer, 2026 ND 67, ¶¶ 11-12, 33 N.W.3d 1.

III

[¶9] White Star moves this Court for an award of costs and attorney's fees for defending a “frivolous and bad faith appeal not grounded in fact or law.”

[¶10] Under N.D.R.App.P. 38, this Court “may award just damages and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's fees” if we determine an appeal is frivolous. See Carpenter v. Southbay Homeowners Ass'n, 2025 ND 114, ¶ 25, 23 N.W.3d 118 (“[W]e consider whether there is such a complete absence of facts and law that a reasonable person might not have thought this Court would render a favorable judgment on appeal.” (citation omitted)). “An appeal that is flagrantly groundless or devoid of merit is frivolous.” Id. “Where the appellant's arguments are both factually and legally so devoid of merit that [the appellant] should have been aware of the impossibility of success on appeal, an assessment of costs and attorney fees is proper.” Id. (citation omitted). “If a party seeks more than a token amount of attorney fees, an affidavit documenting the work performed should accompany the request.” Solberg v. Hennessy, 2024 ND 91, ¶ 4, 6 N.W.3d 820 (citation omitted). We conclude this appeal is frivolous and award costs and attorney's fees. White Star's attorney submitted an affidavit of costs and attorney's fees and an itemized statement, documenting $22,999.50 in attorney's fees. We award White Star costs and attorney's fees in the amount of $22,999.50 for defending this frivolous appeal.

IV

[¶11] We have considered the remaining arguments and conclude they are either without merit or unnecessary to our decision. We summarily affirm the amended judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1), (6), and (8). We summarily affirm the pre-filing order designating Melissa McGahey a vexatious litigant under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(4) and (7). We order Melissa McGahey to pay White Star costs and attorney's fees in the amount of $22,999.50 under N.D.R.App.P. 38.

Per Curiam.

[¶12] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr James S. Hill, D.J.[¶13] The Honorable James S. Hill, D.J., sitting in place of Friese, J., disqualified.