REIERSON v. REIERSON (2026)

[¶1] Dustin Reierson appeals from a contempt order entered on August 26, 2025, and an amended judgment entered November 3, 2025. Kayla Reierson moved to dismiss the entire appeal as untimely. We conclude Dustin Reierson's appeal of the contempt order is untimely, but that his appeal of the amended judgment, which in part awarded him less attorney's fees than he requested, is timely. We dismiss in part, affirm the attorney's fees award, and deny Kayla Reierson's request for attorney's fees on appeal.

I

[¶2] Dustin Reierson and Kayla Reierson divorced in June 2021. Their divorce judgment awarded equal residential responsibility for their two children on a week-on, week-off schedule. In the fall of 2023, tensions arose when Kayla Reierson withheld the children from Dustin Reierson for several days following an incident during school drop-off and the discovery of a note written by one of the children. A social worker found no evidence of abuse or neglect and advised Kayla Reierson there was no reason the children should not go to Dustin Reierson's home, but Kayla Reierson withheld them nonetheless. Both parties filed competing motions. Before an evidentiary hearing, the parties signed a partial stipulation for an amended judgment, resolving all issues except contempt and attorney's fees, which were reserved for judicial determination. The partial stipulation for amended judgment provided in part that “[t]he parties waive any and all right of appeal from the Amended Judgment entered herein.”

[¶3] After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the district court entered an order finding Kayla Reierson in contempt, concluding she had intentionally withheld the children from Dustin Reierson and made a false allegation of harm to a child. As part of the contempt order, the court awarded Dustin Reierson attorney's fees under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.5 in the amount of $10,731.73—ten percent of total attorney's fees billed plus costs for the hearing and closing brief—finding it “impossible to parse out” which charges were incurred in responding to Kayla Reierson's false allegation versus the broader modification litigation. Notice of entry of the contempt order was filed the same day, August 26, 2025. On November 3, 2025, the court entered an amended judgment incorporating the partial stipulation and the August 26, 2025 order finding contempt and awarding attorney's fees. Dustin Reierson filed his notice of appeal on November 25, 2025.

II

[¶4] In his appeal of the contempt order, Dustin Reierson contends the district court improperly limited its consideration to a single false allegation—the one involving the note—rather than the several he claims Kayla Reierson made. Under N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.3(3), “[a]n order ․ finding a person guilty of contempt is a final order ․ for purposes of appeal,” and N.D.R.App.P. 4(c) requires that a notice of appeal in a contempt case be filed “within 60 days after entry of the judgment or order being appealed.” We have repeatedly emphasized the final nature of contempt orders and their appealability under a special statute. See Ronngren v. Beste, 483 N.W.2d 191, 193 (N.D. 1992); Kettle Butte Trucking LLC v. Kelly, 2018 ND 110, ¶ 9, 910 N.W.2d 882; Ted J. Boutrous, L.L.C. v. Transform Operating Stores, LLC, 2023 ND 35, ¶ 40, 987 N.W.2d 350. Notice of entry of the contempt order was filed August 26, 2025. Dustin Reierson did not file his notice of appeal until November 25, 2025—91 days later. Incorporating a final contempt order into a subsequent amended judgment does not restart the appellate clock. The appeal of the contempt order is untimely.

III

[¶5] Dustin Reierson also challenges the limited amount of attorney's fees the district court awarded him as part of the contempt order, subsequently incorporated into the amended judgment. Although the award of attorney's fees was part of the contempt order, it is not subject to the same appellate strictures as the finding of contempt itself. See N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.3(3) (stating the “finding ․ of contempt” is the “final order or judgment for purposes of appeal”). Here, the court awarded attorney's fees pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.5. The statute governing the appeal of contempt orders does not apply to an award of attorney's fees under section 14-09-06.5. Thus, the question whether attorney's fees awarded as a sanction under the contempt statute can be separately appealed from the finding of contempt itself is not at issue here. Because the contempt statute does not govern the attorney's fees awarded by the court, section 27-10-01.3(3) did not prevent the court from subsequently incorporating its attorney's fees award into the amended judgment. Dustin Reierson's timely appeal from the amended judgment preserved his challenge to the award of attorney's fees under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.5.

[¶6] Notwithstanding Dustin Reierson's timely appeal of the limited award of attorney's fees, Kayla Reierson contends Dustin Reierson waived his right to appeal from the amended judgment in the partial stipulation for an amended judgment. Dustin Reierson responds by contending the appeal waiver was not incorporated into the amended judgment, and that Kayla Reierson's counsel participated in the preparation of the amended judgment.

[¶7] This issue does not turn on whether the appeal waiver was incorporated into the amended judgment, or whether both parties’ attorneys participated in the preparation of the amended judgment. In Wagner v. Wagner, 1999 ND 169, ¶ 10, 598 N.W.2d 855, we said “[a] contractual stipulation which is wholly incorporated into a divorce judgment ceases to be independently enforceable and is merged into the divorce judgment.” We also said “[a] stipulation not wholly incorporated into a divorce judgment remains, to the extent not incorporated, a contract.” Id. ¶ 11. The appeal waiver, despite not being incorporated into the amended judgment, remained a contract between the parties.

[¶8] Under contract principles, this Court must read the stipulation between the parties as a whole to determine the parties’ intent. Thompson v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 466 N.W.2d 115, 117, 119 n.3 (N.D. 1991); see also N.D.C.C. § 9-07-12 (“A contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was made and the matter to which it relates.”).

[¶9] The partial stipulation was a document whose sole purpose was to memorialize the issues the parties had agreed to resolve short of trial—it expressly carved out contempt and attorney's fees for judicial determination. Reading the appeal waiver in that context, its reference to the amended judgment most naturally refers to the judgment implementing the parties’ agreements, not to the portions of the judgment resulting from contested issues reserved for hearing. It would be anomalous for a clause embedded in a settlement of agreed-upon issues to simultaneously extinguish appeal rights over issues the parties had failed to settle.

[¶10] In addition, a “[w]aiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known existing advantage ․ .” Gale v. N.D. Bd. of Podiatric Med., 2001 ND 141, ¶ 14, 632 N.W.2d 424. Dustin Reierson could not have known his rights or advantages regarding the contested issues of contempt and attorney's fees before the district court had ruled on those issues. Finally, the right to appeal in North Dakota is governed by statute, and waivers of the statutory right are narrowly construed. See, e.g., Lizakowski v. Lizakowski, 2017 ND 91, ¶ 7, 893 N.W.2d 508. Kayla Reierson has not clearly established the waiver was intended to extinguish the right to appeal from the contested issue of attorney's fees that was reserved for judicial determination.

IV

[¶11] Dustin Reierson challenges the district court's decision to award him just ten percent of his requested attorney's fees. We review the court's award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 2005 ND 47, ¶ 7, 693 N.W.2d 29.

[¶12] The district court's core finding—that it could not parse which attorney's fees were incurred in responding to the false allegation versus the broader modification litigation—is a factual determination entitled to deference. Lynch v. Sweeney, 2007 ND 81, ¶¶ 11–12, 732 N.W.2d 377, demonstrates that a proportional award can be affirmed when billing spans multiple issues without adequate segregation. Dustin Reierson's billing spanned nearly two years and encompassed a show-cause motion, modification motions, a cross-motion for primary residential responsibility, a parenting investigator appointment, and a two-day evidentiary hearing. Dustin Reierson bore the burden of segregating his attorney's fees between issues and failed to do so. The court did not abuse its discretion in the award or the amount.

V

[¶13] Kayla Reierson seeks attorney's fees on appeal under N.D.R.App.P. 38 and N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2). The genuine jurisdictional questions this appeal presented preclude a finding of frivolousness. We deny the request for attorney's fees on appeal.

VI

[¶14] We dismiss the appeal of the contempt order as untimely. We affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amended judgment. We deny Kayla Reierson's request for attorney's fees on appeal.

Jensen, Justice.

[¶15] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese