STATE v. BOYNTON (2026)

[¶1] Dreashun Maurice Boynton appeals from a criminal judgment entered after he pleaded guilty to providing false information to a law enforcement officer under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03. We conclude the factual basis in support of Boynton's plea is insufficient under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3). We reverse the judgment and remand to allow Boynton to withdraw his guilty plea.

I

[¶2] On August 7, 2023, law enforcement encountered Boynton in Stark County. Boynton provided an officer a driver's license bearing a false name. The State charged Boynton with one count of false information to law enforcement under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03, a class A misdemeanor. Boynton first pleaded not guilty, then changed his plea to guilty. At the December 2025 plea hearing, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: All right. Well, then, specifically to the charge of false report[ ] to law enforcement officers. How do you plead?

THE DEFENDANT: No contest

THE COURT: No. It's either guilty or not guilty, sir.

THE DEFENDANT: All right. Guilty.

THE COURT: All right. Well, is it true? It looks like on August 7, 2023, in the State of North Dakota, you, in fact, gave false information to a law enforcement officer, wherein, apparently, you provided a false name to them, trying to conceal your identity. Is that true?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: What name did you give them?

THE DEFENDANT: Casey.

THE COURT: Casey?

THE DEFENDANT: Casey. Yes.

THE COURT: Boynton?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. No. Casey Wiggum.

․

MS. PIKOVSKY: In fact, he provided a false driver's license with the name Casey Wiggum.

THE COURT: Casey Wiggum.

MS. PIKOVSKY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: A false driver's license, correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. I'll accept the plea of guilty.

[¶3] The district court accepted the plea and sentenced Boynton to 360 days with credit for 107 days of pretrial custody. Boynton appeals.

II

[¶4] Boynton claims the district court committed obvious error when it accepted his guilty plea without establishing a sufficient factual basis under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3). He argues the plea colloquy failed to develop facts supporting the third element of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03(1)(a) that requires the false information “may interfere with an investigation or may materially mislead a law enforcement officer.” We agree.

[¶5] Rule 11(b)(3), N.D.R.Crim.P., requires:

Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.

In State v. Littleghost, 2025 ND 65, 18 N.W.3d 858, this Court explained the requirements of Rule 11 and the implication of a failure to obtain a factual basis in accepting a guilty plea:

Paragraph (b)(3) requires that the court not enter judgment on a plea of guilty without making an inquiry to ensure that there is a factual basis for the plea. Rule 11 provisions are mandatory and substantial compliance is required to ensure a defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters a guilty plea. The court must find that the factual basis satisfies all elements of the crime charged. The factual basis may be established by statements from the defendant or the attorneys, from a presentence report, or by whatever other means are appropriate.

Id. ¶ 6 (internal citations omitted).

[¶6] To comply with Rule 11(b)(3), the district court “must ascertain that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged” and “should compare the elements of the crime charged to the facts admitted to by the defendant.” Littleghost, 2025 ND 65, ¶ 8 (quoting Eaton v. State, 2011 ND 35, ¶ 8, 793 N.W.2d 790; Kremer v. State, 2020 ND 132, ¶ 17, 945 N.W.2d 279). “The factual basis cannot be implied from the fact that the defendant entered a plea, but must appear on the face of the record and ‘must be precise enough and sufficiently specific’ to demonstrate that the accused committed the charged criminal offense.” Id. ¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 1992)). Although a court may consider many sources to obtain a factual basis—such as statements from the defendant or counsel, a presentence investigation report, the complaint, or other appropriate means—the basis must appear on the face of the record. Id. ¶¶ 6, 13.

[¶7] If the record does not facially provide a factual basis, this Court has identified ways a factual basis can be established. A district court may: ask the defendant directly about performing the acts which constitute a crime, allow the defendant to describe their own conduct, question the defendant, or counsel may make an offer of proof. Littleghost, 2025 ND 65, ¶ 11; Mackey v. State, 2012 ND 159, ¶ 12, 819 N.W.2d 539. Although no bright-line requirements exist for how to develop a factual basis, N.D.R.Crim.P. 11 requires the court to establish a record in order to accept a plea. Littleghost, ¶ 14. Further, an adequate factual basis is necessary to ensure meaningful review on appeal. Id. ¶ 16; see also Combs v. Lund, 2015 ND 10, ¶ 19, 858 N.W.2d 311 (“The findings are inadequate to understand the basis for its decision, and a remand for adequate findings is necessary.”).

[¶8] The factual basis requirement, like the rest of Rule 11’s requirements, is “mandatory and substantial compliance is required to ensure a defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters a guilty plea.” State v. Brame, 2023 ND 121, ¶ 4, 993 N.W.2d 338 (quoting State v. Yost, 2018 ND 157, ¶ 17, 914 N.W.2d 508). Substantial compliance with Rule 11 requires the district court actually make an inquiry to determine there is a factual basis. Littleghost, 2025 ND 65, ¶ 14.

[¶9] Boynton acknowledges he did not object to the district court accepting his plea despite the lack of factual basis. The failure to object limits this Court's review to obvious error. State v. Studhorse, 2024 ND 110, ¶ 4, 7 N.W.3d 253; State v. Hamilton, 2023 ND 233, ¶ 10, 999 N.W.2d 214. To establish obvious error, the appellant must show “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” State v. Miller, 2001 ND 132, ¶ 25, 631 N.W.2d 587. “To constitute obvious error, the error must be a clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under current law. There is no obvious error when an applicable rule of law is not clearly established.” Littleghost, 2025 ND 65, ¶ 5 (quoting State v. Pemberton, 2019 ND 157, ¶ 8, 930 N.W.2d 125).

III

[¶10] Boynton claims the district court erred in accepting his plea because the record does not show the false information provided to the officer satisfied the materiality element. The offense of providing false information to a law enforcement officer is governed by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03. Subsection (1)(a) states an individual is guilty of a class A misdemeanor when the individual:

Gives false information or a false report to a law enforcement officer which that individual knows to be false, and the information or report may interfere with an investigation or may materially mislead a law enforcement officer.

[¶11] Both parties agree Boynton gave false information to a law enforcement officer and he knew the information was false. The State argues the fictitious driver's license “may materially mislead a law enforcement officer” and therefore the plea was proper. The State further argues that when Boynton provided the fictitious driver's license to the officer, he was “trying to conceal [his] identity” and this establishes “[Boynton's] intent was to materially mislead a law enforcement officer.”

[¶12] In State v. Houkom, 2021 ND 223, ¶ 1, 967 N.W.2d 801, this Court reversed a guilty verdict because the record did not establish the materiality of the false information. “The official proceeding or matter in which the false statement was made directly controls whether the falsification can be said to be material.” Id. ¶ 12. We determined:

[N]o investigation of Houkom was underway when she provided the false name, so the false name cannot be said to have been made in an official proceeding or matter relating to her since any suspicion about her began as a result of the statement. Because there is no testimony explaining any possibility that Houkom's false name may have misled [the officer] in his attempt to locate the [suspect], on the specific facts of this case no reasonable factfinder could find the required materiality to be satisfied. We conclude there was insufficient evidence to find Houkom's falsification to be material to the search for the male suspect.

Id. ¶ 15.

[¶13] In Houkom, a “false statement was made [during] Officer Oldham's original investigation to find the man upon whom he was attempting to serve a warrant.” 2021 ND 223, ¶ 12, 967 N.W.2d 801. Houkom's false statement would have been material if it “could have affected the course or outcome of the search.” Id. This Court determined the record was insufficient to satisfy the materiality element because “[a]t no time did Officer Oldham explain how Houkom's false name could have affected the course or outcome of his original investigation of finding the man he was seeking to locate.” Id. ¶ 13.

[¶14] Like in Houkom, the record does not provide any facts showing how Boynton's false information was material. The record contains no facts to establish an investigation or official proceeding was underway, why the officer was speaking to Boynton, if Boynton was a suspect, or how Boynton's fictitious name could have affected the officer's course or the outcome of his duties. Here “the record does not reflect the basis of the court's determination there is a factual basis for the plea” and would not survive our review for either clear error or an abuse of discretion. Littleghost, 2025 ND 65, ¶ 16. The district court erred in accepting Boynton's plea because the record did not contain a factual basis supporting interference with an investigation or materiality of the false information.

IV

[¶15] For Boynton to obtain relief under obvious error, the error must be plain and must affect his substantial rights. “We exercise our power to notice obvious error cautiously, and only in exceptional circumstances where the accused has suffered serious injustice.” State v. Dahl, 2022 ND 212, ¶ 12, 982 N.W.2d 580 (quoting State v. Yineman, 2002 ND 145, ¶ 22, 651 N.W.2d 648). “We have said we exercise our discretion only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Pemberton, 2019 ND 157, ¶ 9, 930 N.W.2d 125).

[¶16] The standard to determine whether an error is plain is well established. An error is plain when it constitutes a “clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under current law.” State v. King, 2025 ND 174, ¶ 6, 26 N.W.3d 695 (quoting State v. Majetic, 2017 ND 205, ¶ 16, 901 N.W.2d 356; State v. Tresenriter, 2012 ND 240, ¶¶ 12-13, 823 N.W.2d 774). In Littleghost, this Court held the failure to develop a factual basis for each element of the pleaded offense was plain error requiring withdrawal of the plea. 2025 ND 65, ¶¶ 17-22. Failing to establish a factual basis is a clear deviation from the requirements of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3). See also State v. Haskins, 2026 ND 23, ¶¶ 27-28, 31 N.W.3d 265 (holding although the defendant admitted to the crime, the district court's failure to establish a factual basis for the crime constituted plain error).

[¶17] For an error to be obvious it must affect substantial rights. Haskins, 2026 ND 23, ¶ 29 (citing State v. Chambers, 2025 ND 178, ¶ 7, 26 N.W.3d 700). “An error only affects substantial rights when it is prejudicial, or affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. In Littleghost, this Court determined the plain error affected appellant's substantial rights and his burden was met through a direct challenge to adequacy of the factual basis supporting a guilty plea. 2025 ND 65, ¶¶ 4, 22 (“Because the court's failure to comply with Rule 11 in this case goes to the very essence of the knowing and voluntariness of Littleghost's guilty pleas, we conclude the court's error affected his substantial rights.”).

[¶18] Boynton met his burden to show the plain error affected his substantial rights. No facts establish the materiality element of the pleaded offense. The element of materiality is required to distinguish between criminal and noncriminal activity. Houkom, 2021 ND 223, ¶¶ 14-15, 967 N.W.2d 801; see also Littleghost, 2025 ND 65, ¶ 7 (“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) is designed to prevent a defendant who committed no crime from pleading guilty to one, and to prevent a defendant who is guilty of a lesser offense from pleading guilty to a higher charge.”); compare N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03 (providing it is a class A misdemeanor to provide false information to law enforcement officers) with N.D.C.C. § 39-06-40 (providing it is a class B misdemeanor to possess or display a fictitious driver's license). Boynton has shown the plain error affected his substantial rights. We exercise our discretion to grant relief because the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Woodman, 2025 ND 12, ¶ 5, 16 N.W.3d 164.

V

[¶19] The facts presented to the district court did not establish the materiality element. Accepting Boynton's plea without a factual basis supporting each element of the offense violates N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. The error was plain and affected Boynton's substantial rights, and we conclude it constituted obvious error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b). We reverse the judgment and remand to allow Boynton to withdraw his guilty plea.

Friese, Justice.

[¶20] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese