STATE v. KEPLIN (2026)

[¶1] Winona Keplin appeals from an amended criminal judgment ordering her to pay restitution of $5,882 following her guilty plea to burglary. She argues the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution for jewelry and cash that were not recovered on her person at the time of her arrest. We affirm.

I

[¶2] On August 2, 2025, a city of Minot law enforcement officer responded to a report of a residential burglary at a house in northeast Minot. A resident of the house told the officer he was sleeping and awoke to find a woman, a stranger, in his bedroom. The resident described the woman, including what she was wearing, which included one pink shoe and one green shoe. As the resident walked with the woman to the main door, he observed items in the residence had been gone through and items were all over the place. The resident explained he told the woman to empty out her pockets, and that when she did his roommate's prescribed medication and other medication were in her pockets. The resident told the woman to stay put while he grabbed his phone from his car to call 911. The woman then ran out the door and fled on foot. Upon looking around the house, the resident and his roommates realized their rent of $1,600 cash was missing along with a gold necklace, a gold bracelet, and two gold rings. A female roommate who owned the jewelry explained that two of her Adidas shoes, one pink and one green, were also missing.

[¶3] Approximately seventy-five minutes after the burglary, Minot Central Dispatch received a phone call to do a welfare check on a woman at a northeast Minot business. The responding officer observed that the woman was wearing two shoes—one pink Adidas shoe and one green Adidas shoe. She also matched the resident's description of the woman in his house. The officer identified the woman as Keplin. She admitted being in the house where she had taken a gold ring and the shoes she was wearing. The officer placed Keplin under arrest.

[¶4] The State charged Keplin with burglary and theft of property. Based on a plea agreement, Keplin pled guilty to burglary and the State moved to dismiss the theft of property charge. The district court accepted Keplin's plea to burglary and dismissed the theft of property charge. The State moved to include restitution for items missing after the burglary. The court reserved jurisdiction to determine restitution. The State requested a restitution hearing, which the court held on November 18, 2025.

[¶5] The State presented two witnesses, residents of the burglarized house, at the restitution hearing. The resident who initially discovered Keplin testified that he was home alone sleeping and awoke to find Keplin, a stranger, inside the house. He confronted her and directed her to empty her pockets by turning them inside out. He explained medications and his car keys came out of Keplin's pockets. He described what Keplin was wearing, including the mismatched pink-and-green shoes. He acknowledged Keplin was not carrying a bag. The resident explained that after Keplin fled he and his roommates “started picking up all the stuff that was thrown on the floor. It was clothes and everything. Like, actually, the whole room was a mess.” He testified that a drawer in his roommate's room where they kept the rent money was open and the money, $1,600, was missing. This occurred approximately fifteen minutes after Keplin fled the residence. The resident explained the drawer had a secret compartment where the money was kept, but that if you open the whole drawer you can see the compartment. He testified that the night before the burglary they collected $100 more towards rent and utilities and put it in the compartment in the drawer, so he knew $1,600 was in the drawer the night before Keplin burglarized the residence.

[¶6] The other resident testified that when he arrived he saw a woman running down the road. The resident explained when he went inside “everything was in disarray. She had upended everything that was in the—in the house.” The resident testified the intruder “took everything out. She took stuff out of the refrigerator, even. She just made an entire mess.” The resident testified about the jewelry and $1,600 that was missing. He explained the items and cash were in a drawer in his bedroom before the intruder entered the residence. He presented receipts showing the purchase price of the jewelry.

[¶7] Keplin called one witness, her care coordinator. The care coordinator testified that a search of Keplin's apartment found no jewelry and only $29 cash. She also testified Keplin could not have returned on foot from the burglarized residence to her apartment before her arrest because of the distance between them.

[¶8] After hearing oral argument, the district court found the State's witnesses credible. Addressing Keplin's argument that disposing of the items within such a short time was practically impossible, the court stated it “can think of a whole bunch of different scenarios about where these items may have been stashed.” The court also said it was “noteworthy that she was in a residence committing burglary and she took other—at least one other item of jewelry.” The court found the State met its burden of proof, that the total value of the missing cash and jewelry was $5,882, and ordered restitution in that amount. The court entered an amended criminal judgment ordering Keplin to pay restitution of $5,882.

II

[¶9] “When reviewing a restitution order, we look to whether the district court acted within the limits set by statute, which is a standard similar to our abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Harstad, 2020 ND 151, ¶ 7, 945 N.W.2d 265. “A district court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasonable determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id. (quoting State v. Kostelecky, 2018 ND 12, ¶ 6, 906 N.W.2d 77).

[¶10] “The ‘State has the burden of proving the amount of restitution by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” State v. Walker, 2019 ND 292, ¶ 5, 936 N.W.2d 45 (quoting State v. Rogers, 2018 ND 244, ¶ 23, 919 N.W.2d 193). “In determining the amount of restitution, the court shall take into account the reasonable damages sustained by the victim or victims of the criminal offense, which damages are limited to those directly related to the criminal offense and expenses actually sustained as a direct result of the defendant's criminal action.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08(4). “This direct relationship requires an immediate and intimate causal connection between the criminal conduct and the damages or expenses for which restitution is ordered.” State v. McAllister, 2020 ND 48, ¶ 33, 939 N.W.2d 502 (quoting State v. Clayton, 2016 ND 131, ¶ 5, 881 N.W.2d 239). “The determination of whether damages are directly related to a defendant's criminal conduct is a question of fact for the court to decide.” Id. “We will not set aside a court's finding of fact in a restitution hearing unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, when there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” State v. Cotton, 2025 ND 191, ¶ 8, 27 N.W.3d 450 (quoting Glasser v. State, 2023 ND 111, ¶ 13, 992 N.W.2d 7).

III

[¶11] Keplin argues the district court abused its discretion by improperly including in the restitution award losses not shown to be directly connected to her conduct.

[¶12] As noted above, a district court's determination whether damages are directly related to a defendant's criminal conduct is a question of fact that we will not set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. McAllister, 2020 ND 48, ¶ 33, 939 N.W.2d 502. Keplin does not argue the district court's findings are clearly erroneous. Rather, although never directly stated, she appears to argue the court's finding the ordered damages are directly related to her criminal conduct is based on an erroneous view of the law. She relies on State v. Harstad, 2020 ND 151, 945 N.W.2d 265, and references State v. Pippin, 496 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1993), to support her argument. Harstad and Pippin are distinguishable.

[¶13] In Pippin, the State charged Joan Pippin with possession of stolen property and charged her former husband with burglary. 496 N.W.2d at 51. Both pled guilty, and the district court ordered them jointly and severally liable for restitution for damages incurred by the burglary victims. Id. at 52. Pippin appealed, arguing her restitution was unlawful because the damages incurred by the burglary victims were not “directly related” to her crime of possession of stolen property and therefore were not a “direct result” of the commission of the crime. Id. This Court agreed, holding the restitution order violated N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08(1)(a), and the record did not indicate whether any of the stolen property possessed by Pippin was returned damaged or whether any damages were sustained as a result of temporary loss of use. Id. at 53. “Those damages, if any, and any others with a sufficient causal connection to Joan's offense, are the losses for which Joan may be ordered to make restitution.” Id.

[¶14] In Harstad, Harstad pled guilty to possession of a stolen vehicle, and the district court ordered restitution for personal property that had been inside the vehicle but was never recovered. 2020 ND 151, ¶¶ 2-3, 945 N.W.2d 265. This Court reversed, concluding the district court abused its discretion because the record did not establish an immediate causal connection between the unrecovered items and Harstad's possession offense. Id. ¶ 13. Harstad was arrested seven days after the vehicle was stolen and was not charged with the theft, rendering the inferential link between her conduct and the missing property too attenuated to support restitution. Id. ¶¶ 1, 13.

[¶15] This case is materially distinguishable from Pippin and Harstad. In Pippin and Harstad, the defendants were not convicted of the underlying theft that caused the victims’ losses. Here, Keplin pled guilty to burglary, and the missing jewelry and cash were taken during the very criminal act for which she was convicted. The evidence places her inside the residence uninvited, in possession of stolen items while inside the residence, and in possession of stolen items when she was found after she fled. The missing items were present the evening before and found missing immediately after the burglary. These facts support a reasonable inference Keplin took and later hid or discarded the cash and property that was not recovered. See Datz v. Dosch, 2013 ND 148, ¶ 28, 836 N.W.2d 598 (stating the district court is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from evidence); see also Int. of E.S., 2019 ND 12, ¶ 9, 921 N.W.2d 408 (“When one or more reasonable inferences can be drawn from credible evidence, this Court must accept the inferences drawn by the district court.” (quoting In re D.P., 2001 ND 203, ¶ 9, 636 N.W.2d 921)). The approximately seventy-five minutes from when she fled the residence and was arrested was more than sufficient time to hide or discard the stolen property. This establishes the direct causal connection absent in Pippin and Harstad. The restitution award here compensates losses that were the immediate and direct result of Keplin's own criminal conduct, not losses attributable to someone else's acts or to a more attenuated chain of causation.

[¶16] The district court's findings, based on the undisputed testimony of two witnesses that the court found to be credible, are not clearly erroneous. The court's finding the missing jewelry and cash are directly related to Keplin's burglary is not based on an erroneous view of the law. Thus, the restitution order is within statutory limits.

IV

[¶17] We affirm the amended criminal judgment.

Bahr, Justice.

[¶18] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese