SANDNESS v. State of North Dakota, Statutory Real Party in Interest (2026)

[¶1] Aaliyah Smith appeals from a second amended judgment granting Chaunce Sandness primary residential responsibility of their children and final decision-making authority on major decisions, an ex parte interim order, and an order denying her motion for change of venue.

[¶2] Smith asserts the district court erred in entering the second amended ex parte interim order, which temporarily restricted Smith's parenting time, and in relying on the order as a basis for awarding primary residential responsibility to Sandness. “An interim order is interlocutory and subject to revisions prior to a final order.” Froehlich v. Froehlich, 2021 ND 133, ¶ 8, 962 N.W.2d 588. The interim order is not a final order from which an appeal may be taken. Id. ¶ 11. “Upon an appeal from a judgment, the court may review any intermediate order or ruling which involves the merits and affects the judgment appearing upon the record.” N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(2). The second amended ex parte interim order temporarily restricting Smith's parenting time did not involve the merits of the action. Nor has Smith argued in her brief with any specificity how the interim order affected the judgment. See N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(7)(A) (requiring appellant's brief to contain “appellant's contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”). Instead, Smith seeks an advisory opinion on whether the interim order was issued in accordance with N.D.R.Ct. 8.2(a) and whether its parenting time restrictions were contrary to law. Because we do not render advisory opinions, Lovett v. Lovett, 2022 ND 37, ¶¶ 11-12, 970 N.W.2d 193, Smith presents no justiciable issue arising from the second amended ex parte interim order.

[¶3] Smith argues the district court erred in granting Sandness primary residential responsibility and final decision-making authority, and denying her change of venue motion. The court's decisions on primary residential responsibility and decision-making authority are findings of fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. Kinden v. Kinden, 2025 ND 68, ¶ 16, 19 N.W.3d 811 (primary residential responsibility); Rath v. Rath, 2018 ND 138, ¶ 8, 911 N.W.2d 919 (decision-making responsibility). “A motion for a change of venue on grounds of convenience of the witnesses and furtherance of the ends of justice is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal unless the court has abused its discretion.” Flattum-Riemers v. Flattum-Riemers, 2003 ND 70, ¶ 19, 660 N.W.2d 558. We conclude the court did not clearly err in awarding Sandness primary residential responsibility and final decision-making authority on major decisions, and did not abuse its discretion by denying Smith's motion for change of venue. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).

Tufte, Justice.

[¶4] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese