State of North Dakota, Petitioner and Appellee v. S.S., father, Respondent and Appellant (2026)

[¶1] S.S. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights. S.S. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights because reasonable efforts to reunify were not proven by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.

I

[¶2] S.S. and T.C. have three minor children together: L.S., W.S., and T.S. Based on the parents’ drug use and domestic violence, L.S. and W.S. were removed from the home in February 2018, prior to the birth of T.S., and placed in the care of the Mountrail McKenzie Human Service Zone (MMHSZ). The children were reunified with S.S. and T.C. shortly after T.S. was born in 2018. All three children were placed in MMHSZ's care in 2020 and reunified with S.S. in 2021. In 2023, the children were placed under a guardianship through Stark County social services. Four days after the guardianship expired, law enforcement responded to reports of drug use in S.S.’s home, where the children were residing. On January 8, 2024, the children were removed from S.S.’s home and again placed in MMHSZ's care.

[¶3] On January 9, 2025, the State petitioned to terminate S.S. and T.C.’s parental rights. Following a trial on the petition, the juvenile court entered an order terminating parental rights. S.S. timely appealed.

II

[¶4] S.S. argues reasonable efforts to reunify were not proven by clear and convincing evidence. In support of his argument, S.S. references the juvenile court's failure to make a finding on whether reasonable efforts were made.

A

[¶5] This Court reviews a juvenile court's findings of fact in a termination proceeding under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Int. of A.C., 2022 ND 123, ¶ 5, 975 N.W.2d 567. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, on the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Int. of J.C., 2025 ND 217, ¶ 6, 29 N.W.3d 598. A court errs as a matter of law if it fails to make a required finding of fact. In re J.N., 2012 ND 256, ¶ 8, 825 N.W.2d 868.

[¶6] Section 27-20.3-20, N.D.C.C., governs termination of parental rights proceedings. Under subsection 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(1), a juvenile court may terminate parental rights if certain requirements, not relevant here, are met. Subsection 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2) allows a court to terminate parental rights if a child is in need of protection and the court finds “[t]he child has been in foster care, in the care, custody, and control of the department or human service zone for at least four hundred fifty out of the previous six hundred sixty nights.” The party seeking termination of parental rights must prove all statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence. S.L.W. v. C.M.T., 2026 ND 21, ¶ 3, 31 N.W.3d 286.

[¶7] In its order terminating parental rights, the juvenile court concluded:

In this case, there is no serious dispute that the children are in need of protection․

․

As of the date of the trial, the children had been in care for 737 days of the last 737 days.

The findings clearly demonstrate the court based termination of S.S.’s parental rights on the number of nights the children spent in care and the children being in need of protection. See N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2).

[¶8] This Court has not previously addressed whether juvenile courts must make explicit findings on reasonable efforts where parental rights were terminated based on the children having been in need of protection and in care for the requisite number of nights. See, e.g., In re R.L.-P., 2014 ND 28, ¶¶ 23, 29, 50, 842 N.W.2d 889 (stating a finding that the children have been in foster care more than 450 of the previous 660 nights, along with a finding of deprivation [now a child in need of protection], is sufficient to terminate parental rights and concluding the court made an implied finding that reasonable efforts to unify were made which was not clearly erroneous).

[¶9] S.S. relies on Interest of A.P., 2022 ND 131, 976 N.W.2d 244, for the proposition that a finding on reasonable efforts is required. In A.P., the juvenile court terminated parental rights after finding the children were in need of protection and had been in care for the required number of nights. Id. ¶ 2. The court also made a finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the parent and the child. Id. This Court concluded the findings were not clearly erroneous and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion terminating parental rights. Id. We did not state a finding on reasonable efforts was required; rather, we affirmed the above findings and concluded it was unnecessary to address the juvenile court's other findings on harm to the children. Id. ¶¶ 3 -4. S.S.’s reliance on A.P. is misplaced. A plain reading of N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20 does not require the court to make a specific finding that reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parents must be made.

[¶10] We also consider whether a specific finding of reasonable efforts is required under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-18. Section 27-20.3-18, N.D.C.C., provides, in relevant part:

1. As used in this section, “reasonable efforts” means the exercise of due diligence, by the agency granted authority over the child under this chapter, to use appropriate and available services to meet the needs of the child and the child's family in order to prevent removal of the child from the child's family or, after removal, to use appropriate and available services to eliminate the need for removal, to reunite the child and the child's family, and to maintain family connections. In determining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child under this section, and in making reasonable efforts, the child's health and safety must be the paramount concern.

2. ․ [R]easonable efforts must be made to preserve families, reunify families, and maintain family connections:

a. Before the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the child's home;

b. To make it possible for a child to return safely to the child's home;

c. Whether and, if applicable, to place siblings in the same foster care, relative, guardianship, or adoptive placement, unless it is determined that such a joint placement would be contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings; and

d. In the case of siblings removed from the home of the siblings who are not jointly placed, to provide for frequent visitation or other ongoing interaction between the siblings, unless it is contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings.

․

5. Efforts to place a child for adoption, with a fit and willing relative or other appropriate individual as a legal guardian, or in another planned permanent living arrangement, may be made concurrently with reasonable efforts of the type described in subsection 2.

6. Removal of a child from the child's home for placement in foster care must be based on judicial findings stated in the court's order, and determined on a case-by-case basis in a manner that complies with the requirements of titles IV-B and IV-E of the federal Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 620 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. 6701 et seq.], as amended, and federal regulations adopted under this federal Act, provided that this subsection may not provide a basis for overturning an otherwise valid court order.

[¶11] Under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-18(6), a judicial finding in a court order is required to remove a child for placement in foster care, determined on a case-by-case basis, to comply with the requirements for federal benefit programs. A judicial finding is also necessary to extend a foster care order under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-16(4)(d)-(e), which provides,

If a child is in need of continued foster care ․ the court shall make the following judicial determination:

․

d. That it is in the best interest of the child to remain in or return to foster care;

e. That reasonable efforts were made in accordance with subsection 7 of section 27-20.3-18[.]

The orders removing the children from the home and placing or continuing them in foster care are not at issue here. Subsection 6 of section 27-20.3-18 specifically provides: “[T]his subsection may not provide a basis for overturning an otherwise valid court order.” Like N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2), section 27-20.3-18 does not require the juvenile court to make a finding of reasonable efforts at the time of termination of parental rights; rather, it requires reasonable efforts to be made by the agency granted authority over the child prior to seeking termination of parental rights. Contra N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(2) (stating, “the court shall find that active efforts have been made” to prevent breakup of family when Indian child is involved (emphasis added)). While the best practice would be for the juvenile court to make a finding on whether reasonable efforts were made to ensure qualification for federal funding for the human service zone, it does not invalidate the court's order.¹

B

[¶12] S.S. also argues that because MMHSZ did not make reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children, the juvenile court abused its discretion in terminating parental rights.

[¶13] “[W]hen the statutory elements to terminate parental rights are met, the court has discretion, but is not required, to terminate parental rights.” In re J.C., 2024 ND 9, ¶ 22, 2 N.W.3d 228. When a juvenile court exercises its discretion to terminate parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1), we review the court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Int. of B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶ 13, 23 N.W.3d 718. “A court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasonable determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id.

[¶14] As previously addressed, the juvenile court was not required to make a specific finding that reasonable efforts were made. However, we must also review whether the court's findings provide support for its discretionary decision to terminate parental rights.

[¶15] In its order terminating parental rights, the juvenile court made findings on social services’ efforts including offering initial supervised visits, enrolling the children in therapy, transitioning from unsupervised to supervised visits, scheduling regular phone calls following suspension of visits, establishing a case plan, offering and emailing the parents their case plan, inviting the parents to child and family team meetings held every three months, and requesting drug tests. The court also made credibility findings regarding the social workers who testified that reunification was not appropriate and explained why termination was necessary. These findings indicate the juvenile court considered the efforts social services made to reunify S.S.’s family and applied its discretion prior to termination.

[¶16] To assist in appellate review in determining whether a juvenile court abuses it discretion, it may be helpful for courts to make a finding on whether the agency engaged in reasonable efforts to reunify. However, based on the court's findings, we are able to discern how the juvenile court reached its determination. The findings are sufficient under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52 to understand the factual basis for the court's decision to terminate S.S.’s parental rights and are not clearly erroneous. See In re Griffey, 2002 ND 160, ¶ 8, 652 N.W.2d 351 (when specific findings are not statutorily required, a decision “should not be upset when valid reasons are fairly discernible, either by deduction or inference”). The findings made support the court's decision, and we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating S.S.’s parental rights.

III

[¶17] We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating S.S.’s parental rights.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(1)-(2) (2026) (discussing the need for a judicial determination of reasonable efforts for a title IV-E agency to qualify for payments while the child is in foster care).

Fair McEvers, Chief Justice.

[¶18] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese[¶19] The Honorable Jerod E. Tufte recused himself after oral argument and did not participate in this decision.