STATE v. REYNOLDS (2026)

[¶1] Trista Reynolds appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found her guilty of domestic violence. She argues the district court committed obvious error by not dismissing the case due to delay in bringing her to trial. We affirm the judgment holding Reynolds has not established a violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08 or N.D.R.Crim.P. 48.

I

[¶2] On September 18, 2024, the State charged Reynolds with domestic violence, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-01.2. Reynolds moved the district court to order an evaluation of her fitness to proceed. On October 8, 2024, District Court Judge Cynthia M. Feland, the judge assigned to this case, granted her motion and ordered staff at the North Dakota State Hospital (“NDSH”) to evaluate Reynolds. Reynolds also faced felony and misdemeanor charges in two other cases. See Case Nos. 08-2024-CR-00420; 08-2024-CR-03251.

[¶3] On January 21, 2025, District Court Judge Bobbi Weiler, the judge assigned to one of the other cases, held a combined status conference. She asked Reynolds's counsel about the status of the fitness to proceed evaluation. He responded:

We've had further discussions and she kind of revoked the permission and kind of wants to—she doesn't want to do the eval anymore and that's kind of where we're sitting at right now.

Reynolds personally informed the court she had already done an evaluation and expressed concerns about signing a release of her medical records. She told the court:

I want to make sure if that happens, we're able to put a restraining order on those records to prevent any release in all three cases to—per the open records law, and I'm—I'll authorize everything.

Reynolds agreed to release her medical records after the court informed her they would not be available to the public.

[¶4] On February 10, 2025, District Court Judge Weiler held another hearing. Reynolds failed to appear. The court again asked Reynolds's counsel about the status of the evaluation. He responded:

Every time we, me and Ms. Reynolds, come to court, it's explained to her about the confidentiality of all the records, that they're just going to be sent to the North Dakota State Hospital, and that nobody really has access to those open records requests or anything like that.

Then when we leave court, she retracts kind of where she was at with everything and says I'm not sending anything. So ․ I've reached out to the North Dakota State Hospital, I've told them that I do have some records from a specific hospital, but then she kind of retracts the authorization so I'm not able to send them.

The court expressed concern about the delay and questioned the assistant state's attorney:

THE COURT: So here's my problem, Mr. Togni. The statute says I have to dismiss these cases. You'd think that the State would have an interest in trying to make sure things are—are running along smoothly here, because I have 180 days to have her—her—her get this eval done.

So I'm shocked that I haven't been given a subpoena. I talked to all the parties at the last status conference about getting me a subpoena if they needed medical records sent to the state hospital. I have not gotten that from anybody. And—and so I'm not understanding if you need medical records and that's what the state hospital is waiting for, why a subpoena has not been requested at this time.

I also am frustrated to the fact that nobody's asked me for a warrant. If we want her sent to the state hospital to have these evals, is—is a warrant what we need, Mr. Togni?

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued a bench warrant ordering Reynolds to be held until a fitness to proceed evaluation was completed.

[¶5] On March 31, 2025, a NDSH report was filed opining Reynolds was fit to proceed. On September 24, 2025, after a number of continuances and substitution of defense attorneys, a jury found Reynolds guilty. The district court issued a sentence including 30 days of incarceration with credit for 30 days already served. Reynolds appeals.

II

[¶6] Reynolds argues the district court erred by not dismissing the case. She asserts dismissal was warranted under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08 and N.D.R.Crim.P. 48 because of the delay in bringing the case to trial. She acknowledges she did not raise these issues in the district court and requests we review them for obvious error.

[¶7] “An obvious error or defect that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b).

To establish an obvious error, the defendant must show: (1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error affects the defendant's substantial rights. To constitute obvious error, the error must be a clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under current law. There is no obvious error when an applicable rule of law is not clearly established. When a defendant proves obvious error occurred, this Court has discretion whether to rectify it and will only do so when the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. In analyzing obvious error, our decisions require examination of the entire record and the probable effect of the alleged error in light of all the evidence.

State v. Kennedy, 2025 ND 130, ¶ 7, 23 N.W.3d 878 (quoting State v. Woodman, 2025 ND 12, ¶ 5, 16 N.W.3d 164).

A

[¶8] Reynolds argues a dismissal deadline under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08 expired while she was awaiting a determination as to whether she was fit to proceed to trial. She claims she was detained in excess of the maximum amount of time allowed by that law.

[¶9] Our standard for interpreting statutes in a criminal case is well established:

This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation under a de novo standard of review. Construction of a criminal statute is a question of law, fully reviewable by this Court. Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless defined by statute or unless a contrary intention plainly appears. We interpret statutes to give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence, and do not adopt a construction which would render part of the statute mere surplusage.

State v. Lonechild, 2023 ND 112, ¶ 5, 992 N.W.2d 4 (cleaned up).

[¶10] Section 12.1-04-08(2), N.D.C.C., provides in relevant part:

If the court determines based upon a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant currently lacks fitness to proceed ․ and the report as required under section 12.1-04-07 indicates a likelihood the defendant will attain fitness within a specified period of time from the date of the finding upon completion of a course of therapeutically appropriate treatment, the proceedings against the defendant must be suspended ․ For a defendant charged with a class B misdemeanor under chapter 12.1-17, [which includes charges of domestic violence,] the proceedings must be suspended for a period no longer than the maximum term of imprisonment for the most serious offense charged. When the court determines, after a hearing if a hearing is requested, that the defendant has regained fitness to proceed, the proceeding must be resumed. If prosecution of the defendant has not resumed or it is determined by the court, after a hearing if a hearing is requested, that the defendant will not regain fitness to proceed within the allotted time, the charges against the defendant must be dismissed.

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08(2). Unlike domestic violence charges under N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-17, other types of misdemeanors must be dismissed upon a finding that the defendant lacks fitness to proceed. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08(1).

[¶11] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08(2) confirms it is not applicable absent a finding the defendant lacks fitness to proceed. The first sentence of the law employs the word “if” to specify the occurrence of a condition: “[i]f the court determines ․ the defendant currently lacks fitness to proceed[.]” When that condition occurs, the court must suspend proceedings, and the dismissal deadline is triggered. The dismissal deadline was not triggered in Reynolds's case because the court did not find she lacked fitness to proceed. Reynolds has failed to satisfy the first prong of the obvious error standard, the occurrence of an error, because she has not demonstrated the court failed to comply with N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08(2).

B

[¶12] Reynolds argues N.D.R.Crim.P. 48 “provides additional support” for the proposition that the district court obviously erred by not dismissing her case. Rule 48(b)(4) states the court “may” dismiss a case when there is “unnecessary delay” in “bringing a defendant to trial.” Although a district court's decision to dismiss a case under Rule 48 is discretionary, State v. Erickson, 2011 ND 49, ¶ 12, 795 N.W.2d 375, there must be a “significant legal basis” to dismiss a criminal charge. City of Jamestown v. Snellman, 1998 ND 200, ¶ 9, 586 N.W.2d 494. Dismissal “is the most stringent sanction,” and should be “used sparingly, only in extreme situations.” Id. “Public policy favors cases be disposed of on their merits.” Id. ¶ 12.

[¶13] Reynolds has not identified any precedent where a court dismissed a case under Rule 48 in analogous circumstances. Nor has she provided any explanation as to how the delay in this case affected the outcome. An error cannot be obvious when there is no clearly established legal rule, Kennedy, 2025 ND 130, ¶ 7, 23 N.W.3d 878, and error must be prejudicial or affect the outcome of the proceeding to affect substantial rights. State v. Wegley, 2008 ND 4, ¶ 14, 744 N.W.2d 284. Absent deviation from a clear legal rule or demonstration of prejudice, Reynolds has not established an obvious error occurred.

III

[¶14] The N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08(2) dismissal deadline was never triggered because the district court did not find Reynolds lacked fitness to proceed. North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 does not set out a clearly established legal rule applicable to this case, and even if it did, Reynolds has not demonstrated noncompliance caused her prejudice. Obvious error did not occur. The judgment is affirmed.

Jensen, Justice.

[¶15] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese