Grand Forks County Human Service Zone, Petitioner and Appellee v. and (2025)

[¶1] M.P., the father, and A.O., the mother, appeal from orders terminating their parental rights. After a detailed colloquy to ensure M.P. and A.O. understood the effect of termination of their parental rights and that their consent was voluntary, both M.P. and A.O. signed written consents to termination of their parental rights in the presence of the juvenile court while represented by counsel.

[¶2] On appeal, M.P. and A.O. argue the juvenile court erred in terminating their parental rights because they did not voluntarily and knowingly consent to the termination. “The court by order may terminate the parental rights of a parent with respect to the parent's child if ․ the written consent of the parent acknowledged before the court has been given.” N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(d). “Whether there was written consent is a finding of fact.” In re C.D.G.E., 2017 ND 13, ¶ 6, 889 N.W.2d 863. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, there is no evidence to support it, or if we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. (quoting In re G.R., 2014 ND 32, ¶ 6, 842 N.W.2d 882).

[¶3] The juvenile court's findings M.P. and A.O. knowingly and voluntarily provided written consents to termination of their parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(d) were not clearly erroneous. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

Per Curiam.

[¶4] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. Daniel J. Crothers Lisa Fair McEvers Jerod E. Tufte Douglas A. Bahr