IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF: LAURA MCDONALD SAGE (2026)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Appellant, Andrew Steven Sage (Andrew), appeals from the District Court's February 2, 2026 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and the Amended Final Parenting Plan ordered contemporaneously therewith. We affirm.

¶3 This appeal arises from the District Court's amendment of a stipulated parenting plan entered by the parties on October 23, 2024, to provide for the care and custody of the parties’ three children. The stipulated plan contemplated a phased transition to an approximately equal, alternating-week schedule (Stage 2) once certain conditions tied to resolution of Andrew's criminal matter were satisfied. The parties’ stipulated plan and related settlement documents were filed and incorporated into the dissolution proceedings.

¶4 The matter returned to the District Court's active docket in spring 2025 after a series of events that materially affected the parties’ ability to implement the stipulated transition. On April 14, 2025, Petitioner/Appellee, Laura Sage (Laura), filed a Verified Motion to Appoint a Guardian ad Litem (GAL), seeking appointment of a GAL to investigate and make recommendations concerning parenting and the children's welfare. The court set that motion for hearing on April 29, 2025, and on April 30, 2025, the court entered an Order Appointing Guardian ad Litem, appointing Christina Larsen to investigate and prepare a report. The court's appointment order expressly tied the GAL's role to the parties’ deteriorating relationship and the impact of that deterioration on the children.

¶5 The GAL thereafter conducted an investigation, issued interim recommendations, and ultimately filed a Final Report and Recommendations together with a proposed Amended Final Parenting Plan (AFPP) on January 22, 2026—six days prior to the January 28, 2026 hearing date previously set by the District Court to consider objections to the GAL's final report and recommendations. At the January 28 hearing, both parties appeared and testified, the GAL testified, and each party had the opportunity to present witness and documentary evidence and to cross-examine the GAL. The hearing transcript reflects the court opened the hearing by stating, “we're here for a contested hearing to get a final parenting plan in place.” The court limited the scope of the hearing to the GAL's recommended parenting plan and the parties’ objections to it. Because the GAL's Final Report had already been filed with the court, the court declined to read the report into the record, explaining that it's already part of the file and that duplicating its contents orally was unnecessary. The court similarly declined to address each of the minor inconsistencies or lesser-important complaints Andrew raised about the report. The transcript shows the court repeatedly steered the discussion back to the substantive issues and emphasized that the purpose of the hearing was to evaluate the GAL's recommendations and determine an appropriate parenting plan. The record further reflects that when Andrew attempted to pursue tangential or inconsequential discrepancies—such as wording choices, minor timeline disputes, or collateral matters not relevant to the statutory best-interest factors—the court redirected him to focus on evidence bearing on parenting time, communication, and the children's needs.

¶6 Ultimately, the court focused on the core recommendations contained in the GAL's Final Report: a mother-primary residential schedule, gradual increases in Andrew's parenting time without a path to the previously agreed 50/50 schedule, and ongoing parenting-coordinator oversight. The court's decision to disregard immaterial inconsistencies and concentrate on the substantive evidence supporting or undermining these recommendations reflects a proper exercise of its discretion and a reasoned approach to resolving the contested parenting plan.

¶7 On February 2, 2026, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and the AFPP. The court expressly relied on the GAL's investigation and recommendations, the testimony of the GAL, and evidence from teachers and therapists in concluding that the prior stipulated 50/50 schedule was not in the children's best interests and therefore the AFPP's changes were necessary. The AFPP replaced the Stage 2 equal-time schedule with a mother-primary schedule, reduced Andrew's residential time and vacation days, and required the parties to utilize a parenting coordinator for future disputes.

¶8 Andrew filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the February 2, 2026 order and AFPP. He also filed post-judgment motions seeking to strike the GAL report and for a contested hearing. Those motions were filed after entry of judgment and were denied by the District Court.

¶9 Andrew raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the District Court erred in amending the stipulated parenting plan, failing to make the threshold findings that a change in the children's circumstances had occurred since entry of the prior plan and that amendment was necessary to serve the children's best interests as required by § 40-4-219, MCA.

2. Whether the District Court erred by relying on a GAL report served six days before the hearing, thereby denying Appellant a meaningful opportunity to test the report.

3. Whether the AFPP unlawfully delegated judicial authority to a parenting coordinator.

¶10 “We review the underlying findings in support of a districts court's decision regarding modification of a parenting plan under the clearly erroneous standard.” In re Parenting of G.M.N., 2019 MT 18, ¶ 10, 394 Mont. 112, 433 P.3d 715. “We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine if they are correct.” In re Parenting of G.M.N., ¶ 10. We have consistently held that in parenting plan matters district courts have broad discretion:

A district court has broad discretion when considering the parenting of a child, and we must presume the court carefully considered the evidence and made the correct decision. It is not this Court's function to reweigh conflicting evidence or substitute its judgment regarding the strength of the evidence for that of the district court. Rather, the ultimate test for adequacy of findings of fact is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision, and whether they are supported by the evidence presented. Accordingly, absent clearly erroneous findings, we will not disturb a district court's decision regarding a parenting plan unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.

In re Parenting of G.M.N., ¶ 11 (internal citations omitted).

¶11 Under § 40-4-219(1), MCA, a court may, in its discretion, amend a prior parenting plan upon finding facts that have arisen since the prior plan (or that were unknown at the time of entry of the prior plan) that constitute a change in the children's circumstances such that amendment is necessary to serve the children's best interests. Bessette v. Bessette, 2019 MT 35, ¶ 16, 394 Mont. 262, 434 P.3d 894.

¶12 We address each issue, giving due deference to the District Court's factfinding and to its broad discretion in parenting matters.

The District Court made sufficient findings and had substantial evidence to support amendment under § 40-4-219, MCA.

¶13 Andrew contends the court failed to identify qualifying post-plan changes in the children's circumstances and therefore lacked authority to amend the stipulated plan. The statutory standard requires the court to find facts arising after the prior plan (or unknown at the time of entry of the prior plan) that constitute a change in the child's circumstances and find that amendment is necessary to serve the child's best interests. Section 40-4-219(1), MCA.

¶14 Here the record demonstrates multiple intervening facts that were not part of the parties’ October 2024 parenting plan stipulation that materially affected the children's welfare and the feasibility of the stipulated transition to Stage 2. Most notably, (1) Andrew's criminal and the parties’ protection-order proceedings arising from a July 23, 2024 altercation between Andrew and Laura, which occurred in the presence of all three children, for which Andrew was charged with felony Strangulation of Partner or Family Member. This incident culminated in Andrew's plea to amended charges of felony Criminal Endangerment and misdemeanor Partner or Family Member Assault. Andrew was sentenced on these offenses in May 2025. The criminal proceedings and the court's comments at sentencing (which the District Court considered) bear directly on parental accountability and the children's safety. The sentencing transcript reflects the court's concern about Andrew's statements in the presentence investigation and the risk of repeating harmful conduct; (2) the children's counselor, Rhea Simonson, who had been designated in the original stipulated plan to recommend implementation of Stage 2, withdrew from that role in March 2025 because of Andrew's harassment, his refusal to follow recommendations, and his allegations of professional misconduct. Simonson informed the court and counsel that she would not implement Stage 2 under the circumstances and recommended appointment of a GAL. The counselor's withdrawal removed the mechanism the parties had agreed would govern progression to equal parenting time under the prior stipulated plan; and (3) the GAL's investigation, conducted after appointment on April 30, 2025, documented ongoing communications and behaviors by Andrew that professionals found concerning for the children's welfare, including communications that the GAL characterized as inappropriate and potentially violative of the protection order. The GAL's interim recommendations and emails (filed in November 2025) alerted the court to continuing problems in the parties’ interactions and the children's needs.

¶15 The District Court previously denied motions to reopen or modify the stipulated plan in late 2024 and again in November 2025. Those denials reflected the court's conclusion that, at those earlier points in time, Andrew had not presented sufficient grounds to justify modification. Such rulings, however, do not preclude the court from revisiting the plan when new, materially different facts later emerge. Parenting plan determinations are inherently fluid, and the court retains continuing jurisdiction to adjust the plan when circumstances affecting the child's best interests change. Section 40-4-219, MCA.

¶16 After the GAL completed her investigation, gathered new information, and formulated final recommendations, the court recognized that the GAL's findings set forth new facts warranting further judicial review. The November 20, 2025 Order Setting Contested Hearing expressly directed the GAL to file a final report and set a hearing to consider objections to that report. By doing so, the court exercised its authority to revisit the parenting plan. The court's decision to proceed to a contested hearing reflects a proper response to the emergence of new information relevant to the children's best interests.

¶17 Taken together, these developments—counselor withdrawal, the GAL's investigation and interim findings, Andrew's criminal case and sentencing, and the documented communications and conduct—constitute facts that arose after the October 2024 stipulated plan that materially affected or changed the children's circumstances, thus satisfying the threshold requirement for amendment under § 40-4-219, MCA. The District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law expressly reference the GAL's “thorough investigation,” the GAL's recommendations, and corroborating evidence from teachers and therapists in concluding that a 50/50 schedule was not in the children's best interests. Those findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and are not clearly erroneous.

¶18 Andrew, in essence, asks this Court to reweigh the evidence and to credit his view that there were no changed circumstances to trigger amendment such that the stipulated plan should have been implemented as written. That is not our role. We will not substitute our judgment for the District Court's where the court's findings are supported by substantial credible evidence and the court applied the correct legal standard. Bessette, ¶ 13; In re Parenting of G.M.N., ¶ 11.

The District Court did not violate statutory procedures governing GAL reports, and Andrew waived any challenge to the timing of the GAL report.

¶19 Andrew argues the GAL's Final Report and proposed AFPP were served only six days before the January 28 hearing, in violation of §§ 40-4-205(5) and 40-4-215(3)–(4), MCA, which require the GAL to mail the report to the parties at least 10 days before the hearing and provide parties the right to access the investigator's file and to call consulted persons for cross-examination. He contends that the court therefore relied on untested hearsay. We are not persuaded by Andrew's argument.

¶20 First, the District Court provided the hearing that its November 20, 2025 order promised. The court opened the hearing by stating, “we're here for a contested hearing to get a final parenting plan in place,” and the record reflects that the parties and the GAL participated in the contested proceeding. The hearing transcript shows the GAL testified and was cross-examined and both parties were given the opportunity to testify and present other witnesses and documentary evidence regarding their respective positions on the proposed AFPP. At the hearing, Andrew testified at length, cross-examined the GAL, and introduced exhibits, including a letter from Tom Gutschenritter.

¶21 Second, and critically, Andrew did not preserve a timely objection to the somewhat late service of the GAL report. He did not move for a continuance, did not object to the timing of service, and did not request additional time to prepare. Instead, he proceeded to cross-examine the GAL, to testify, and to present evidence. It is well settled that to properly preserve an issue for appeal, a party must timely object. In re Parenting of K.P., 2005 MT 297, ¶ 15, 329 Mont. 337, 124 P.3d 1091. “Untimely objections are not heard on appeal, as the time for correcting the error has passed.” In re Parenting of K.P., ¶ 15. Failure to make a timely objection constitutes waiver of the issue for appeal. In re Parenting of K.P., ¶ 15.

¶22 Finally, Andrew's own conduct undercuts his present complaint. He said at the January 28 hearing that he was the one who had suggested appointment of Christina Larsen as GAL. A party who sought the GAL's appointment, participated in the GAL's investigation, and then participated in the contested hearing without objection has waived any claim of prejudice from its somewhat untimely service.

The AFPP's parenting-coordinator provisions do not unlawfully delegate judicial authority.

¶23 Andrew contends the AFPP unlawfully delegates judicial authority by authorizing a parenting coordinator to mediate or arbitrate contested matters, to modify the residential schedule on an interim basis, and to issue decisions that are immediately binding on the parties. He argues such provisions improperly transfer judicial power to a private actor.

¶24 Montana's statutory framework permits courts to adopt mechanisms for resolving future parenting disputes outside of court. Section 40-4-234(2)(i), MCA, authorizes parenting coordinators as a method for resolving disputes concerning parenting plans other than by court action. The AFPP's parenting-coordinator provisions operate within that statutory authorization—they create a structured, court-ordered process for the parties to resolve future disputes, with the court retaining ultimate authority to review or modify coordinator decisions. Section 40-4-234(2)(i), MCA. The AFPP requires the parties to refer disputes to the parenting coordinator before filing court action and grants the coordinator authority to mediate or arbitrate certain matters, but the AFPP does not strip the court of its power to review or to intervene when necessary.

¶25 The record supports the court's decision to employ a parenting coordinator. The parties’ history shows repeated, escalating disputes; multiple filings; and professional concerns about Andrew's communications and accountability. The GAL's investigation and interim recommendations documented ongoing conflict and professional concerns that made a court-supervised, non-judicial dispute resolution mechanism appropriate to manage future issues and to protect the children's stability. Under these circumstances, the District Court acted well within its discretion in ordering a parenting coordinator consistent with § 40-4-234(2)(i), MCA.

Attorney Fees and Costs

¶26 Laura requests an award of attorney fees and costs, asserting that Andrew's repeated filings, refusal to comply with the stipulated parenting plan, and continued pursuit of meritless or vexatious positions have unnecessarily expanded the litigation and caused her to incur substantial legal expenses. She points to the District Court's prior warnings—such as its December 31, 2024 order noting that motions to amend a parenting plan may be vexatious when a parent fails to comply with the plan's provisions—as evidence that Andrew's conduct has imposed needless burdens on both her and the court. Andrew maintains that his filings were made in good faith and were necessary to protect his parental rights, and he denies that his conduct warrants any fee shifting. After reviewing the record, we decline to find a basis for awarding attorney fees or costs. The District Court did not make findings supporting a statutory or equitable fee award, and the circumstances presented do not persuade us that such should be awarded. Accordingly, Laura's request for attorney fees and costs is denied.¹

¶27 The February 2, 2026 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and the Amended Final Parenting Plan are affirmed.

¶28 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In a September 8, 2026 Order and after the matter had been sent to the Court, this Court awarded Laura's request for attorney fees and costs for having to respond to Andrew's emergency motion for relief. He has since filed a petition for rehearing of that decision, and Laura has responded in opposition. We deny Andrew's petition for rehearing and decline to award Laura attorney fees and costs for responding to Andrew's petition.

INGRID GUSTAFSON

We Concur: JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY LAURIE McKINNON JIM RICE