STATE v. FOWLER (2026)

¶1 Eric Bruce Fowler appeals the Seventeenth Judicial District Court's April 15, 2025 sentence on revocation of his prior Valley County suspended sentence. He challenges the court's refusal to credit additional elapsed time and time served for the periods he spent incarcerated in other jurisdictions. We affirm in part and remand for the award of four additional days of credit for time served.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Fowler was charged in Valley County District Court on September 5, 2013, with Felony Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, Misdemeanor Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, Failure to Register as a Violent Offender, Driving while License Suspended or Revoked, and Failure to have a Child Properly Restrained. While this case was pending, Fowler was convicted of Felony Driving Under the Influence in Sheridan County, Montana, and was committed to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for thirteen months, followed by a four-year suspended sentence.

¶3 On December 2, 2013, Fowler pleaded guilty in Valley County to Felony Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, Failure to Register as a Violent Offender, and Driving while License Suspended or Revoked. The court sentenced Fowler to a four-year DOC commitment for the criminal possession offense, with 222 days of credit for time served, and to a consecutive five-year suspended sentence for failure to register, also with 222 days of time served credit.

¶4 Fowler was paroled to an addiction facility in November 2014 while serving his four-year sentence. He escaped from the facility on January 19, 2015, and was apprehended on March 20, 2015. The State petitioned to revoke Fowler's five-year suspended sentence after his escape but dismissed the petition after Fowler was sentenced to three years at the Montana State Prison for Felony Escape. Fowler also was incarcerated on various state and federal charges while the four-year Valley County sentence and the thirteen-month Sheridan County sentence continued to run.

¶5 Fowler's five-year suspended sentence was set to begin October 1, 2020, while Fowler was incarcerated on separate federal charges for drugs, paraphernalia, firearms, and ammunition. Fowler was released from federal custody on November 30, 2023. He was then arrested on January 23, 2024, by federal and tribal authorities and returned to federal custody for possession of drugs, firearms, ammunition, and paraphernalia. Fowler was released from federal custody on May 23, 2024, at which point he became subject to the supervision of State Probation and Parole (“P&P”) for the conditions of his suspended five-year Valley County sentence.

¶6 The State filed a second petition to revoke the suspended sentence on June 13, 2024, based on positive drug testing and Fowler's earlier federal arrests. The District Court issued an arrest warrant that day. He was served with the warrant on August 1, 2024, at the Valley County Detention Center. Fowler posted bond on August 2, 2024. A condition of his release was that he would not leave Valley or Roosevelt Counties. Fowler was arrested in North Dakota on September 15, 2024.

¶7 Fowler failed to appear at his Valley County revocation hearing on October 21, 2024, because he was incarcerated in North Dakota. The District Court issued a bench warrant for Fowler's arrest on October 21, 2024. On February 4, 2025, Fowler appeared by Zoom for his revocation hearing while located in a North Dakota detention facility. The District Court revoked his five-year suspended sentence and set a dispositional hearing for March 6, 2025. The hearing was rescheduled to April 7, 2025, after Fowler was transferred directly from North Dakota to a federal facility in Oklahoma.

¶8 The State filed a motion to revoke Fowler's bond on March 25, 2025, based on its belief that Fowler would soon be released from federal custody. The District Court issued another bench warrant; Fowler was released from federal custody that day. Fowler was served with the October 21, 2024 and March 25, 2025 warrants on March 25, 2025. It is unclear from the record where Fowler was located when he was served. Fowler again was served with the two warrants on March 28, 2025, while detained in the Valley County Detention Center.

¶9 At the April 7, 2025 dispositional hearing, Fowler's P&P officer testified that he did not believe Fowler was owed any elapsed time credit due to numerous violations of the conditions of his sentence but agreed that Fowler was owed eighteen days of credit for time served. The State argued that Fowler should not receive the 222 days of time served credit from the 2013 sentencing because those days had been applied to the four-year sentence he already had served. Fowler argued that, in addition to the 222 days of credit from the original sentencing, he should receive credit for all time that he spent incarcerated in other jurisdictions, as well as elapsed time from November 30, 2023, through January 23, 2024; May 23, 2024, through July 25, 2024; and August 2, 2024, though September 15, 2024. The District Court sentenced Fowler to five years at the Montana State Prison, awarding him 401 days of credit: 222 days from the prior sentence, eighteen days of time served, and 161 days of elapsed time.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 A trial court's statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review for correctness. State v. Crazymule, 2024 MT 58, ¶ 8, 415 Mont. 536, 545 P.3d 66. “Calculating credit for elapsed street time and time served is not a discretionary act, but a legal mandate.” State v. Keech, 2025 MT 169, ¶ 9, 423 Mont. 226, 573 P.3d 311 (citations omitted). “A district court's calculation of credit for time served is reviewed for legality and we exercise de novo review.” Crazymule, ¶ 8. Because revocation decisions involve both legal and factual findings, we review a district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error; accordingly, “findings of fact regarding a probationer's credit for elapsed time or time served are reviewed for clear error.” Keech, ¶ 9.

DISCUSSION

¶11 On appeal, Fowler argues that he is entitled to credit for all the time that he served in other jurisdictions from October 2020 until his sentencing on April 7, 2025. He contends that he was incarcerated for all but 117 days between October 2020 and November 2023 and is entitled to credit for the duration of that period, along with additional periods during the intervening months prior to sentencing. Fowler seeks credit for the following periods: October 1, 2020, through November 30, 2023; January 24, 2024, through May 23, 2024; September 15, 2024, through October 21, 2024; October 21, 2024, through March 24, 2025; and March 25, 2025, through April 7, 2025.

¶12 “A person incarcerated on a bailable offense against whom a judgment is rendered must be allowed credit for each day of incarceration prior to or after conviction, except that the time allowed as a credit may not exceed the term of the prison sentence rendered.” Section 48-18-403(1)(a), MCA (2023).¹ “When imposing a sentence under this section that includes incarceration in a detention facility or the state prison, ․ the court shall provide credit for time served by the offender before trial or sentencing.” Section 46-18-201(9), MCA.² “Credit must be allowed for time served in a detention center or for home arrest time already served.” Section 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA.

October 1, 2020, through November 30, 2023

¶13 “[A] defendant begins to serve time when ‘the sentencing court gain[s] jurisdiction over the offender and the offender [is] detained subject to that jurisdiction.’ ” State v. Pillans, 2025 MT 100, ¶ 20, 422 Mont. 1, 568 P.3d 885 (quoting State v. Risher, 2024 MT 309, ¶ 14, 419 Mont. 395, 560 P.3d 1203). To determine whether a defendant was under the sentencing court's jurisdiction, we look only to the record in the sentencing court. Pillans, ¶ 20.

¶14 Fowler's suspended sentence was set to begin on October 1, 2020, but he was in federal custody for unrelated charges at that time. The court did not issue a warrant for Fowler's arrest during this time, there were no pending revocation proceedings, and he was not under the supervision of P&P. Therefore, although Fowler was incarcerated, there is no indication that the District Court was exercising jurisdiction over Fowler or that he was being detained subject to that jurisdiction. Instead, Fowler was incarcerated in an entirely separate correctional system on unrelated charges.

¶15 Fowler argues that this Court's opinion in State v. Mendoza, 2021 MT 197, 405 Mont. 154, 492 P.3d 509, requires that he be awarded credit for the time he was in federal custody. In Mendoza, this Court reiterated that a defendant must be credited for time served even if they also are incarcerated on another, unrelated matter. Mendoza, ¶ 12. But unlike Mendoza, while Fowler was incarcerated on another, unrelated matter, he was not also being held for the matter at issue in this case. Instead, as explained, he was at no time detained subject to the authority of the District Court. Mendoza is thus inapposite. Fowler is not entitled to any credit for the time he was in federal custody from October 1, 2020, through November 30, 2023.

¶16 Fowler claims entitlement to elapsed time credit during this same period of time. When imposing a sentence on revocation, a court must “first, ‘consider any elapsed time’; second, ‘consult the records and recollection of the probation and parole officer’; third, ‘allow all of the elapsed time served without any record or recollection of violations as credit against the sentence’; and, fourth, state the reasons for any denial of credit for elapsed time in the order.” State v. Pennington, 2022 MT 180, ¶ 26, 410 Mont. 104, 517 P.3d 894 (quoting § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA (2019)).

¶17 Fowler did not argue before the District Court that he was entitled to credit for elapsed time during this period. We generally do not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Pajnich, 2025 MT 101, ¶ 9, 422 Mont. 12, 568 P.3d 562. This Court will review an allegedly illegal sentence, however, even if the defendant did not object before the District Court. Williams v. Green, 2025 MT 102, ¶ 12, 422 Mont. 17, 568 P.3d 549 (citing State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 341, 602 P.2d 997, 999 (1979)). A “sentence is not illegal if it falls within statutory parameters”; “a sentencing court's failure to abide by a statutory requirement rises to an objectionable sentence, not necessarily an illegal one that would invoke the Lenihan exception.” State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, ¶ 13, 335 Mont. 344, 151 P.3d 892. “A district court's failure to state the reason for the discretionary decision to grant or deny credit for street time ․ is a waivable statutory defect if the sentence imposed was facially legal and did not exceed statutory mandates.” State v. Youpee, 2018 MT 102, ¶ 11, 391 Mont. 246, 416 P.3d 1050. “Failure to object to the district court's denial of elapsed time credit without stating its reasons for doing so would not render an otherwise valid sentence facially illegal ․” Williams, ¶ 11 (citing Youpee, ¶ 11).

¶18 “[A] district court cannot be expected to provide reasons for denying elapsed time when no argument for elapsed time was ever made.” Pajnich, ¶ 12 (emphasis in original). Fowler's assertion that he is entitled to credit for elapsed time during this period was not preserved for appeal, and we therefore do not consider it. See Pajnich, ¶ 13.

January 24, 2024, through May 23, 2024

¶19 Fowler was in federal custody on unrelated charges during this period. As with the prior period, the District Court did not issue a warrant for his arrest, he was not under the supervision of P&P, and there were no pending revocation proceedings. Therefore, for the same reasons explained above, Fowler is not entitled to credit for time served for the time he was in federal custody from January 24, 2024, through May 23, 2024. Fowler did not argue before the District Court that he was entitled to credit for elapsed time during this period. For the same reasons explained above, this argument was not preserved for appeal. See Youpee, ¶ 11; Pajnich, ¶ 9; Williams, ¶ 11.

September 15, 2024, through October 21, 2024

¶20 Fowler was in custody in North Dakota on unrelated charges during this time. He relies primarily on Crazymule to support his argument that he should receive credit for the time he was incarcerated in another state. We disagree.

¶21 In Crazymule, the defendant was in tribal custody at the Rocky Mountain Regional Detention Center when the Montana district court issued a warrant for her arrest. Crazymule, ¶¶ 4, 12. Once the defendant completed her Northern Cheyenne Tribe sentence, she was immediately transported to the Rosebud County Jail and served with the warrant. Crazymule, ¶¶ 7, 12. Because the warrant acted as a detainer, Crazymule was entitled to credit for time she served in tribal court detention from March 18, 2021, to September 3, 2021, after the issuance of an arrest warrant and the filing of a revocation petition, notwithstanding that the warrant was not served until September 3, 2021. Crazymule, ¶ 12. Crazymule clarified the event triggering a sentencing court's jurisdiction over a defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction. It did not, however, modify the two-part rule that a defendant begins to serve time once the sentencing court gains jurisdiction and the defendant is detained subject to that jurisdiction. Pillans, ¶ 20.

¶22 Here, the District Court issued an arrest warrant on June 13, 2024, when the State petitioned to revoke Fowler's suspended sentence. Pursuant to Crazymule, this warrant was an assertion of the District Court's jurisdiction over Fowler. Fowler was not, however, detained subject to that jurisdiction. Unlike in Crazymule, Fowler was not incarcerated at the time the District Court issued the warrant. Instead, although Fowler was initially detained under this warrant, he was later released on bond.³ Then, after his release, he was arrested in another state for reasons completely unrelated to the June 13 warrant. His detention was not a result of the District Court's assertion of jurisdiction over him—it was the result of North Dakota's exercise of jurisdiction. Ultimately, even though Fowler was incarcerated during this period, it was not due to the District Court's exercise of jurisdiction over him, and Fowler is not entitled to time served credit from September 15, 2024, through October 21, 2024.

¶23 Fowler did not argue before the District Court that he was entitled to credit for elapsed time during this period. For the same reasons as explained above, his argument that he is entitled to elapsed time credit for this period was not preserved for appeal. See Youpee, ¶ 11; Pajnich, ¶ 9; Williams, ¶ 11.

October 21, 2024, through March 24, 2025

¶24 Fowler was in custody in North Dakota and then transferred to a federal facility in Oklahoma during this period. The District Court issued a warrant for Fowler's arrest on October 21, 2024, after he failed to appear because he was incarcerated in North Dakota. As discussed more fully above, although this warrant was an assertion of jurisdiction over Fowler by the District Court, Fowler was not detained subject to this warrant for the same reason that he was not detained subject to the June 13 warrant. Fowler was transferred directly from the North Dakota facility to the federal facility in Oklahoma. The transfer and the time Fowler spent incarcerated in Oklahoma were unrelated to the October 21 warrant or to the present case. Because the October 21 warrant did not act as a detainer, Fowler is not entitled to any credit for time served from October 21, 2024, through March 24, 2025. Pillans, ¶ 20.

¶25 Fowler did not argue before the District Court that he was entitled to credit for elapsed time during this period. His argument that he is entitled to elapsed time credit for this period was therefore not preserved for appeal. See Youpee, ¶ 11; Pajnich, ¶ 9; Williams, ¶ 11.

March 25, 2025, through April 7, 2025.

¶26 Fowler discharged his federal sentence on March 25, 2025, and he was sentenced in the present case on April 7, 2025. He was incarcerated under both the October 21, 2024 warrant and the March 25, 2025 warrant during this time. The District Court began calculating credit for this period on March 28 rather than on March 25 and credited him ten days of time served rather than fourteen days. The State concedes that Fowler should have been awarded fourteen days of credit rather than ten. Fowler is entitled to four additional days of credit for time served from March 25, 2025, through March 28, 2025.

The Sentencing Court's Award of 222 Days’ Credit

¶27 The State contends on appeal that the District Court erroneously awarded Fowler 222 days of credit on his revocation sentence because he already had received that credit against the custodial portion of his sentence. The State requests the Court to remand with instructions to amend its dispositional order to include only 183 days of total credit—161 days’ elapsed time credit and twenty-two days’ credit for time served. The State, however, did not cross-appeal the District Court's judgment, and we accordingly do not consider its argument. City of Missoula v. Robertson, 2000 MT 52, ¶ 19, 298 Mont. 419, 998 P.2d 144 (“[A] party must cross-appeal if the party seeks to change any part of the judgment below.”). See § 46-20-103(2)(h), MCA (scope of State's appeal includes appeal from sentence contrary to law).

CONCLUSION

¶28 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part the District Court's calculation of Fowler's time served and elapsed time credit. We remand to the District Court with instructions to credit Fowler with four additional days of time served from March 25, 2025, though March 28, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Legislature amended § 46-18-403(1)(a), MCA, in 2025. Because the amendments became effective on July 1, 2025, but Fowler was sentenced on April 15, 2025, we apply the 2023 version of the statute, which is identical in all material aspects to the 2019 version that Fowler cites in his brief. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the 2023 version of the MCA.

2.   The Legislature repealed § 46-18-201(9), MCA, on July 1, 2025. Because Fowler was sentenced before this date, the statute applies in this case.

3.   The District Court gave Fowler credit for the time he was detained under the June 13, 2024 warrant until released on bond.

Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We Concur: JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA, J. KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY, J. INGRID GUSTAFSON, J. JIM RICE, J.