STATE v. IDHEN (2026)

¶1 Charles Fabien Idhen appeals his Yellowstone County convictions of Endangering the Welfare of Children and Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. He challenges the Thirteenth Judicial District Court's refusal to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle and home, alleging that it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. We restate the issues on appeal:

1. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that law enforcement possessed particularized suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.

2. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that law enforcement did not impermissibly expand the duration and scope of a traffic stop by discussing a drug investigation and requesting consent to search the vehicle.

We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On July 10, 2023, Detective Steve Hallam of the Billings Police Department received a phone call informing him that Idhen was selling methamphetamine (“meth”) out of a black Cadillac Escalade, carried a handgun, and was on probation.¹ The caller alleged that they purchased meth from Idhen within the preceding two months. A few days before the call, Detective Hallam stopped the caller for possession of meth but promised to “sit on” their case if they provided information on individuals selling drugs in the area. Detective Hallam began investigating Idhen based on the call, corroborating that he was on federal probation and drove a black Cadillac SUV.

¶3 On July 17, 2023, Detective Hallam surveilled Idhen's home and, although he did not observe any obvious signs of drug trafficking, he saw a black Cadillac SUV and a GMC Yukon, both registered to Idhen, parked outside of the home. Detective Hallam observed someone enter the Yukon and drive away. He began “pacing” the Yukon and determined that the driver was traveling 45 miles per hour in a 35 mile-per-hour zone.² Detective Hallam initiated a traffic stop, introduced himself to Idhen as a detective, and informed Idhen that he was being stopped for speeding. Idhen responded that he was trying to get his girlfriend, Karilei Garcia, to work because she was going to be late. Garcia was sitting in the front passenger seat. Detective Hallam asked Idhen for his license, registration, and proof of insurance, and asked Garcia for her identification. After Detective Hallam received and began to review the documents, the following conversation occurred:

IDHEN: So you a detective?

DETECTIVE HALLAM: Yup.

IDHEN: So why was you—was you watching my house or something?

DETECTIVE HALLAM: Yeah.

IDHEN: Why?

DETECTIVE HALLAM: Because your name's come up in being involved in drug distribution again Mr. [Idhen].

IDHEN: But I'm not.

DETECTIVE HALLAM: Okay. Well, that's why I'm here. So, I pulled you over for a lawful reason. Okay. I absolutely did. Alright. You're speeding. Okay. It's 35 through there.

¶4 Detective Hallam then informed Idhen and Garcia that he was aware that they were both on probation and that Garcia had recently given birth to their child. Idhen responded:

IDHEN: But I ain't distributing nothing, haven't done nothing in years.

DETECTIVE HALLAM: Well, I'm not going to show my cards, right? That's not how this works, okay? I don't believe you one bit, because I have reason not to believe you. Alright? Not just on a whim, okay? Is there anything illegal in the car that I may be concerned about?

IDHEN: No.

DETECTIVE HALLAM: Okay. Do you give me consent to search the car?

IDHEN: Sure, if you want—if you would like.

¶5 This conversation was completed within three and a half minutes into the stop. After receiving consent to search the vehicle, Detective Hallam explained to Idhen that he “kn[ew] for a fact” that he was dealing drugs, even if he was not using, and that he possibly possessed a firearm.³ Detective Hallam advised Idhen and Garcia of their Miranda rights approximately five minutes into the stop, and Idhen continued to deny allegations of drug dealing. Detective Hallam then informed Idhen that he would contact his parole officer after the stop and reminded Idhen that he already consented to a search of the vehicle. Detective Matthew Bisterline, Detective Hallam's partner, arrived around this time.

¶6 Detective Hallam ordered Idhen out of the vehicle about six minutes into the stop after learning that he and Garcia lived together—a possible violation of Garcia's parole. Detective Hallam questioned Garcia, who was still in the vehicle, for about two and half minutes, and she denied that Idhen was involved in anything illegal. Detective Hallam then ordered Garcia out of the vehicle.

¶7 Detective Hallam then inquired: “Alright so, you both give me consent right, no threats or pressure or anything have been used against you—for searching your vehicle?” No audible confirmation or protest was captured on Detective Hallam's body camera. Detective Hallam began searching the vehicle about fifteen minutes into the stop and located a baggie of a substance he believed to be drugs hidden inside the fabric covering on the driver's side sun visor. Detective Bisterline placed Idhen in handcuffs immediately after Detective Hallam located the baggie.

¶8 While continuing to search the vehicle, Detective Hallam informed Idhen and Garcia that he would contact their parole officers and likely receive permission to search their home. Idhen denied that there were any drugs or firearms in the home. Detective Hallam called Idhen's parole officer, who did not give him permission to search the home. He then contacted Garcia's parole officer, who granted permission. Detective Hallam gave Idhen a written warning for speeding before he was transported to the detention center. Detective Hallam drove Garcia back to the home immediately after the stop.

¶9 Detectives Hallam and Bisterline searched the home and located a handgun, other weapons, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. On July 18, 2023, Idhen was charged with Endangering the Welfare of Children and with Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. On April 17, 2024, the State filed an amended information charging Idhen with two additional counts of Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Idhen pleaded no contest to Endangering the Welfare of Children and one count of Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and reserved his right to appeal the District Court's pretrial rulings.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 “When a district court denies a motion to suppress evidence, this Court reviews its findings of fact for clear error and determines as a matter of law whether the court applied the findings correctly.” State v. Summers, 2025 MT 109, ¶ 8, 422 Mont. 88, 569 P.3d 542. A “finding[ ] of fact [is] clearly erroneous if not supported by substantial evidence, the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or upon our independent review of the record we are firmly convinced that the court was otherwise mistaken.” State v. Panasuk, 2024 MT 113, ¶ 10, 416 Mont. 430, 549 P.3d 432. “Whether a lower court correctly interpreted and applied the pertinent law to the facts at issue is a question of law subject to de novo review.” State v. Rymal, 2024 MT 277, ¶ 9, 419 Mont. 144, 559 P.3d 839.

DISCUSSION

¶11 Issue 1: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that law enforcement possessed particularized suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.

¶12 Idhen argues that Detective Hallam lacked particularized suspicion to initiate a traffic stop because he used the “pacing” method to detect the speed of his vehicle. In response, the State argues that Idhen waived this argument by failing to present it to the District Court or, in the alternative, that Detective Hallam's use of pacing was sufficient to establish particularized suspicion for the traffic stop.

¶13 “[I]t is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider.” Becker v. Rosebud Operating Servs., 2008 MT 285, ¶ 17, 345 Mont. 368, 191 P.3d 435 (citations omitted). Therefore, this Court generally does not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Longfellow, 2008 MT 343, ¶ 19, 346 Mont. 286, 194 P.3d 694. “We have permitted parties to bolster their preserved issues with additional legal authority or to make further arguments within the scope of the legal theory articulated to the trial court.” State v. Tome, 2021 MT 229, ¶ 21, 405 Mont. 292, 495 P.3d 54 (citations omitted). The argument, however, must be a change in emphasis rather than an entirely new theory of the case. See Whitehorn v. Whitehorn Farms, Inc., 2008 MT 361, ¶¶ 22-23, 346 Mont. 394, 195 P.3d 836.

¶14 Idhen argued in his briefing before the District Court that the stop was impermissible because the “source of information” Detective Hallam relied upon when beginning to investigate Idhen for involvement in drugs was an anonymous, self-interested informant.⁴ He also argued that Detective Hallam lacked particularized suspicion to stop Idhen for drugs because he had nothing more than a “hunch” that drugs may be in the vehicle. He did not argue, however, that Detective Hallam's use of pacing was an insufficient means of establishing the requisite particularized suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Similarly, during the suppression hearing, Idhen challenged Detective Hallam's reliance on the “source of information” to launch the drug investigation and the legality of Detective Hallam's request for consent to search after the stop. He did not, however, challenge the use of pacing to establish particularized suspicion for a traffic stop. Instead, Idhen's counsel admitted during the hearing that Idhen was speeding and that the stop was for speeding. Given that Idhen did not contest particularized suspicion for the initial traffic stop or argue that Detective Hallam's use of pacing was flawed or inadequate, the theory that he now advances goes beyond a change in emphasis and instead presents an entirely new theory of the case. Idhen failed to preserve this argument for appeal, and we therefore decline to reach it.

¶15 Issue 2: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that law enforcement did not impermissibly expand the duration and scope of a traffic stop by discussing a drug investigation and requesting consent to search the vehicle.

¶16 Idhen next argues that Detective Hallam impermissibly expanded the scope and duration of the traffic stop when he discussed the drug investigation with Idhen and asked for consent to search the vehicle. The State responds that Detective Hallam's discussion of the drug investigation was permissible because it was initiated by Idhen and that the request for consent to search was a permissible, incidental request that did not extend the duration of the stop.

¶17 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution prohibit unreasonable government searches and seizures. Therefore, absent an exception, all government searches must be authorized by a valid judicial warrant. Summers, ¶ 9. One such exception is when a person gives voluntary consent for a government search or seizure. State v. Laster, 2021 MT 269, ¶ 40, 406 Mont. 60, 497 P.3d 224.

¶18 “[A] peace officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Section 46-5-401(1), MCA. A stop is “the temporary detention of a person that results when a peace officer orders the person to remain in the peace officer's presence.” Section 45-2-101(73), MCA. A brief investigative stop of a vehicle is generally a seizure of the occupants. State v. Kaufman, 2002 MT 294, ¶ 14, 313 Mont. 1, 59 P.3d 1166; see also Summers, ¶¶ 37-38. The permissible duration of a traffic stop is the “time necessary to address the traffic violation and any related safety concerns.” Summers, ¶ 11. Authority for the stop ends when “tasks related to the traffic infraction reasonably should have been completed.” Summers, ¶ 11.

¶19 Idhen argues that the traffic stop was merely a pretext and that Detective Hallam was simply carrying out a drug investigation disguised as a traffic stop. But “the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop ․ does not depend on the subjective motivations of the individual officers involved.” State v. Farabee, 2000 MT 265, ¶ 23, 302 Mont. 29, 22 P.3d 175 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)).

¶20 Once a driver is legitimately stopped, “[a]n incidental ․ request for consent to conduct an unrelated search, without new or expanded particularized suspicion of criminal activity” does not impermissibly expand the scope of a traffic stop so long as it does not “substantially prolong the duration of the stop.” Laster, ¶ 49; see also Panasuk, ¶ 31 (McGrath, C.J., concurring) (A request for consent to search is permissible if it occurs in the time period for the initial stop, but not if it occurs after an officer expands the traffic stop into a drug investigation.); State v. Snell, 2004 MT 269, ¶ 17, 323 Mont. 157, 99 P.3d 191 (Montana law does not require additional justification for requesting consent to search a vehicle, and voluntary consent is sufficient to justify a warrantless search.).

¶21 Idhen relies primarily on State v. Noli, 2023 MT 84, 412 Mont. 170, 529 P.3d 813, for his argument that Detective Hallam's admission that he was investigating Idhen for drugs, as well as his inquiry into whether there was “anything illegal” in the vehicle and his request to search the vehicle, amounted to an improper expansion of the scope of the stop. In Noli, an officer stopped Noli for a traffic infraction and then became suspicious that Noli and her passenger were involved in drug trafficking. Noli, ¶¶ 3-5. The officer subjected both Noli and the passenger to multiple rounds of questioning unrelated to the traffic infraction and instead specifically directed toward finding whether there were any drugs in the vehicle. Noli, ¶¶ 47-48. The officer in Noli also obtained consent to search the vehicle, but only after he repeatedly asked for consent over a span of twenty minutes, took advantage of Noli's confusion, and eroded her initial resistance to granting the consent to search. Noli, ¶¶ 21-22. This Court found that the officer's actions “far exceeded” a “single incidental request for consent to search.” Noli, ¶ 48.

¶22 We distinguished the officer's conduct in Noli when we upheld a consent search in Summers. In Summers, a detective stopped Summers for speeding and issued a warning. Summers, ¶ 30. Summers and the officer “engaged in nearly constant conversation,” and the officer “asked no questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop” until after he issued Summers a traffic warning. Summers, ¶ 34. Noting that the officer in Noli used a “prolonged and unlawful expansion of the scope and duration of the stop” to secure “a defendant's eventual, acquiescent consent,” we reiterated that “a single incidental question” or “request for consent to search [does] not substantially prolong the duration of [a] stop.” Summers, ¶¶ 31-32.

¶23 In both Noli and Summers, the officers initiating the traffic stops became suspicious of drug activity only after the stop occurred. Here, however, Detective Hallam already was aware that Idhen may have been involved with drugs at the time he initiated the traffic stop. Detective Hallam had reason to ask whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle. And he asked this question only after Idhen first asked why he was being investigated.⁵

¶24 Unlike in Noli, where the officer asked repeated rounds of questions over an extended period of time to wear down the driver's resistance and probe whether there were any drugs present in the vehicle, Detective Hallam asked one question within the first three and a half minutes of the stop. See Laster, ¶ 49. What is more, “[o]nce a stop has been made pursuant to a particularized suspicion, Montana law does not require additional justification for requesting consent.” State v. Clark, 2008 MT 419, ¶ 25, 347 Mont. 354, 198 P.3d 809 (holding that an officer may request consent to search a vehicle after the original purpose of the investigative stop has concluded); see also Snell, ¶ 17; Panasuk, ¶ 31 (McGrath, C.J., concurring). Idhen consented before the traffic stop could expand into a drug investigation. The District Court did not err when it found that Detective Hallam's single, incidental question in response to Idhen's unprompted assertion that he was not dealing drugs and the subsequent request for consent did not unlawfully expand the scope of the traffic stop.

¶25 Idhen maintains that his consent was involuntary on the sole ground that it was obtained when Detective Hallam unlawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop. “If a person is illegally detained when they consent to a search, the consent is tainted by the illegality” and does not justify the search. Summers, ¶ 25.

¶26 As we discussed under Issue One, Idhen's argument that the traffic stop was not based on particularized suspicion and was therefore an illegal stop and seizure was not preserved for review by this Court. As discussed above, Detective Hallam did not unlawfully expand the scope or duration of the traffic stop such that Idhen was illegally seized. Idhen does not argue that Detective Hallam used express or implied police coercion or duress to obtain his consent. See Laster, ¶ 40 (noting that consent must be a “ ‘product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice’ not influenced by express or implied police coercion or duress, however subtle.” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-34, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047-49, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973))). Nor does Idhen argue that, given his relevant characteristics, he was unable to grant voluntary consent, or that he was “naïve or unsophisticated regarding the nature, operation, or consequence of the criminal justice system.” Laster, ¶ 47. We therefore conclude that the District Court did not err when it found that Idhen's consent to a search of the vehicle was knowing and voluntary under the circumstances.

¶27 Idhen finally argues that the evidence found in his home was “fruit of the poisonous tree” branching from the traffic stop and subsequent consent search. We have concluded already that Idhen's consent to search was not the product of an illegal detention. Detective Hallam, based on a reasonable suspicion arising from information obtained during the stop, obtained permission from Garcia's probation officer to search the home. The search was not “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and the District Court properly denied Idhen's motion to suppress the evidence from his home.

CONCLUSION

¶28 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's order denying Idhen's motion to suppress. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Idhen moved to compel the identity of the caller, but the District Court determined that Idhen's interest in preparing a defense was outweighed by the State's interest in protecting the identity of the caller. Idhen does not appeal the denial of his motion to compel.

2.   “Pacing is when a police officer follows a vehicle suspected of speeding at a constant interval for a distance adequate to obtain a reading on [their] speedometer indicating a speed exceeding that posted.” United States v. Conner, ––– F.3d ––––, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1296, 12 n.1 (6th Cir. 2026) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

3.   Idhen tested negative for drugs during his check-ins with his federal parole officer prior to his arrest.

4.   The District Court found that the person who provided Detective Hallam with information about Idhen was a “source of information” and not an informant.

5.   Idhen argues that he is being blamed for expanding the scope and duration of the traffic stop because he asked Detective Hallam why he was being investigated. This Court looks to all of the circumstances surrounding an officer's conduct when determining whether the officer expanded the scope or duration of a stop. See Summers, ¶¶ 17-18.

Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We Concur: CORY J. SWANSON, C.J. JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA, J. LAURIE McKINNON, J. INGRID GUSTAFSON, J.