IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF: BRET DAHL (2026)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Bret Dahl (Bret) appeals from the January 9, 2026 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decree of Marital Dissolution establishing the parties’ final parenting plan and dividing and distributing the parties’ assets and debts between them. We affirm.

¶3 Jordan Dahl (Jordan) and Bret were married on May 28, 2022. Bret and Jordan have one natural child together, N.P.D. (born in 2020), and Bret adopted Jordan's child, N.F.D. (born in 2009), in February of 2023. N.F.D has special needs and is diagnosed with cerebral palsy, nonverbal, and quadriplegic. She therefore utilizes a wheelchair and requires full-time care. N.P.D. has been diagnosed with autism. Bret and Jordan are joint owners of their business, Dahl Wheel Repair, LLC, established in October 2022. Bret performs most of the day-to-day labor for the business as his primary source of income, and Jordan has primarily served as N.F.D.’s full-time caretaker. Bret petitioned for dissolution of the marriage on April 17, 2025.

¶4 On May 22, 2025, Jordan submitted a Notice of Intent to Move to Alliance, Nebraska, with the two children. The District Court entered an interim parenting plan on June 17, 2025, permitting Jordan to move to Nebraska with the two children. Following a two-day trial on November 10 and 12, 2025, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decree of Marital Dissolution containing provisions for a final parenting plan on January 9, 2026. It provided for both children to primarily reside with Jordan in Nebraska and for Bret to have parenting time with both children during the summer, either Christmas or Thanksgiving break alternating years, and upon giving two weeks’ notice during the school year otherwise, as agreed by Jordan.

¶5 Bret contends the District Court erred in allowing Jordan to change residencies with the children to Nebraska and adopting Jordan's proposed holiday schedule in the final parenting plan because the court did not apply the factors in § 40-4-219(1)(b), MCA. Bret also contends the District Court erred in ordering him to pay child support to Jordan from September 2025 to December 2025 because Bret continued to deposit all of his income into their joint account which Jordan had access to and in ordering Bret to continue to pay child support for N.F.D after she attains the age of majority because the court should have assessed whether N.F.D. would continue to be financially dependent on Jordan past the age of majority. With regard to the dissolution of marriage, Bret argues the District Court failed to equitably apportion the parties’ marital property in valuing the parties’ assets and ordering Bret to begin making equalization payments before the sale of the marital home when he did not have the required monthly funds available.

¶6 Jordan, contrarily, asserts the factors in § 40-4-219(1)(b), MCA, do not apply and the District Court properly applied the factors in § 40-4-212(1), MCA. Jordan also asserts the District Court appropriately used its discretion to weigh conflicting evidence as to whether Bret paid child support from September to December 2025 and that the grant of child support for N.F.D. is supported by the language of § 40-4-208(6)(b), MCA. Further, Jordan argues the District Court properly exercised its broad discretion in apportioning the marital estate, especially in giving more weight to her expert's valuation of the business.

¶7 We review a district court's parenting plan determinations for a clear abuse of discretion. Bessette v. Bessette, 2019 MT 35, ¶ 13, 394 Mont. 262, 434 P.3d 894. “An abuse of discretion occurs if a court exercises granted discretion based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous conclusion or application of law, or otherwise ‘acts arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.’ ” Bessette, ¶ 13 (quoting In re D.E., 2018 MT 196, ¶ 21, 392 Mont. 297, 423 P.3d 586). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous ‘if it is not supported by substantial evidence, the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or our review of the record convinces us that the district court made a mistake.’ ” Woerner v. Woerner, 2014 MT 134, ¶ 11, 375 Mont. 153, 325 P.3d 1244 (quoting In re Marriage of Crowley, 2014 MT 42, ¶ 24, 374 Mont. 48, 318 P.3d 1031). This Court accords trial courts considerable discretion in child custody matters, as trial courts are in a better position to resolve these issues. Bessette, ¶ 13; Malcolm v. Malcolm, 196 Mont. 477, 478, 640 P.2d 450, 451 (1982). We review awards of child support for an abuse of discretion. Stevens v. Stevens, 2011 MT 106, ¶ 6, 360 Mont. 344, 253 P.3d 877. “We review a district court's division of martial property to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct.” In re Marriage of Hutchins, 2018 MT 275, ¶ 7, 393 Mont. 283, 430 P.3d 502. “The apportionment made by the District Court will not be disturbed on review unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion as manifested by a substantially inequitable division of the marital assets resulting in substantial injustice” or clearly erroneous factual findings. Holston v. Holston, 205 Mont. 470, 473, 668 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1983); In re Marriage of Funk, 2012 MT 14, ¶ 6, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39.

Parenting Plan

¶8 Bret argues the court should have applied § 40-4-219, MCA, to consider the availability of alternative housing in Montana, Jordan's previous reluctance to facilitate a relationship and contact with Bret, Bret's inability to relocate to Nebraska, the difficulty of Bret visiting the children in Nebraska, and the likely detriment the relocation will have on Bret's relationship with the children.

¶9 Section 40-4-212(1), MCA, provides a court shall determine the parenting plan in accordance with the best interest of the child and sets forth factors—the wishes of the children and parents; the children's relationships with other family members; the children's adjustment to home, school, and community; the developmental needs of the children; continuity and stability of care; the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; physical abuse or threat thereof; and chemical dependency or abuse by a parent—a court may consider in determining a final parenting plan “in accordance with the best interest of the child.” Section 40-4-219(1)(b), MCA, meanwhile, dictates factors a court must consider “in addition to all the criteria in [§] 40-4-212” in evaluating the best interests of the child for the amendment of a parenting plan.

¶10 As this is an original parenting plan proceeding, not an amendment proceeding, the issue here is whether the District Court sufficiently considered § 40-4-212, MCA, factors, in ordering its final parenting plan.

¶11 Although the District Court could have more fully delineated each factor under § 40-4-212, MCA, with more detailed analysis, we determine the District Court's findings of fact and parenting plan are minimally sufficient and supported by the record. There is no dispute that Jordan has served as primary caretaker for N.F.D., a child with extensive special needs. Bret did not set forth a viable plan for him to care for N.F.D. on a primary basis upon Jordan relocating to Nebraska. Instead, he desired Jordan remain in Billings and continue to be N.F.D.’s primary caretaker. Given N.F.D.’s special needs and Jordan's interaction and relationship with N.F.D. as her primary caretaker, it is clear the District Court gave great weight to maintaining continuity and stability of care with Jordan as N.F.D.’s primary caretaker. Further, Bret does not contend that the District Court did not adequately analyze the § 40-4-212(1), MCA, factors but asserts it did not consider specific factors under § 40-4-219, MCA—which the court is not required to do, as this case did not involve amendment of a prior final parenting plan.

¶12 Bret further argues that, even if the District Court permissibly allowed Jordan to relocate to Nebraska, it nevertheless abused its discretion by adopting Jordan's proposed holiday and summer schedule. He contends the schedule is unworkable because it requires him to assume full-time care of N.F.D.—a child with extensive medical and physical needs—during extended summer periods despite the fact that he resides in Montana and the child's primary residence, medical providers, and daily-care infrastructure are now in Nebraska. Bret asserts that the District Court should have crafted a schedule that more realistically accounted for the logistical and caregiving burdens created by the relocation.

¶13 We acknowledge the practical difficulty Bret identifies. The record reflects that N.F.D. requires full-time care, uses a motorized wheelchair, and has significant medical needs. The District Court expressly recognized these realities and, in fact, relied on them in determining that Jordan must remain N.F.D.’s primary caretaker. Bret has historically provided appropriate care for N.F.D. during his parenting time, has the ability to safely transport her—including her wheelchair—and he has sought substantial parenting time with both children notwithstanding the relocation. The court further found that extended summer parenting time with Bret would preserve continuity of the parent-child relationship and allow Bret and both children meaningful time together, particularly given the distance created by the move.

¶14 Under § 40-4-212, MCA, the District Court was required to balance continuity and stability of care with the children's need for ongoing and substantial contact with both parents. The court reasonably concluded that the summer schedule—beginning two weeks after school ends and ending two weeks before school resumes—struck an appropriate balance. Although the arrangement imposes logistical challenges, those challenges were fully presented to the District Court, which exercised its broad discretion to weigh them. We cannot say the resulting schedule is arbitrary, unsupported by the record, or outside the bounds of reason. See Bessette, ¶ 13.

¶15 Accordingly, the District Court's decision to allow Jordan to move to Nebraska with both children and its allocation of Bret's parenting time under the parenting plan are adequately supported by the record and were not an abuse of discretion.

Child Support

¶16 Bret next contends that the District Court erred in ordering him to pay child support for September 2025 through December 2025 because he had continued to deposit all of his income into a joint checking account that Jordan had access to and used over those months. Contrarily, Jordan asserts Bret did not deposit all the money he received from the business into their joint accounts, that he denied grocery and gas assistance requests by Jordan, and that he had spent a substantial amount of money on marijuana over that period.

¶17 A court may sometimes order child support payments accruing as far back in time as the parties’ separation, taking into consideration when the paying party was put on notice of a potential child support obligation. In re Marriage of Di Pasquale, 220 Mont. 497, 499, 716 P.2d 223, 225 (1986); Brinley v. Brinley, 2010 MT 260, ¶¶ 10-12, 358 Mont. 314, 244 P.3d 339. Bret filed for dissolution of the marriage on April 17, 2025, and Jordan first requested that Bret pay child support in her Motion for Interim Relief on April 29, 2025—all well before September 2025. Thus, Bret was reasonably put on notice that Jordan sought child support during the period which he contests. The parties submitted conflicting testimony on the degree to which Bret supported the children from September 2025 through December 2025. The District Court weighed the conflicting evidence and considered all relevant facts—such as the parties’ relative financial means, earnings abilities, and other financial information—as it was required to pursuant to § 40-6-116(5), MCA. After doing so, the court adopted the child support calculations submitted by Jordan but prepared by the Montana Child Support Services Division, which utilized extensive financial information from both parties.¹ Further, the court, in consideration of Bret's financial situation, conscientiously provided a payment plan for Bret's child support arrearage. The District Court appropriately ordered child support consistent with the Montana Child Support Guidelines and a payment plan for arrearages in consideration of Bret's financial situation. We find no abuse of discretion.

¶18 Bret also asserts the District Court erred in ordering him to continue to pay child support for N.F.D. after she attains the age of majority, insisting the order's language makes his obligation if N.F.D later received public benefits unclear and that the District Court should have gauged the likelihood of N.F.D. qualifying for state services after the age of 18. The District Court's order is grounded in a clear trigger in the language of § 40-4-208(6)(a)-(b), MCA: so long as N.F.D. is financially dependent on Jordan. Bret's concern that the existence of the District Court's order may cause N.F.D. to lose the opportunity to access public services she would otherwise be eligible for after the age of majority is speculative, at best. The District Court was not under any obligation to try to estimate N.F.D.’s eligibility for public benefits later in life. It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to weigh circumstances known at the time. Bret may request modification of the child support arrangement if circumstances change. See § 40-4-219(1), MCA.

Marital Estate

¶19 Finally, with regard to the marital estate, Bret asserts the District Court failed to equitably value and apportion the parties’ marital assets. The District Court may exercise broad discretion in determining the value of property in a dissolution proceeding—provided it is reasonable and supported by the record, “we will not disturb the finding on appeal.” In re Marriage of Funk, ¶ 28 (quoting In re Marriage of Alexander, 2011 MT 1, ¶ 16, 359 Mont. 89, 246 P.3d 712). The District Court carefully considered the parties’ respective incomes and debts, the use of each vehicle, and the qualifications of each party's business valuation experts and reports, amongst other evidence, in setting forth its basis for an equitable distribution. The District Court properly exercised its broad discretion and rooted its decision in the record in distributing marital assets.

¶20 Bret, in essence, requests this Court re-weigh the evidence presented and substitute his judgment for that of the District Court. We decline to do so.

¶21 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

¶22 Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Bret does not dispute the child support calculations prepared by the Montana Child Support Services Division. He only disputes the District Court's order that he pay arrearage from September to December 2025 and continue to pay child support for N.F.D. past the age of majority.

INGRID GUSTAFSON

We Concur: CORY J. SWANSON JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA BETH BAKER JIM RICE