STATE OF MONTANA v. MICHAEL CHRISTIAN ECHEVERRIA (2026)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Michael Christian Echeverria appeals from the December 22, 2023 Order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon review, we have determined that our precedent, particularly our decision in Peterson v. State, 2017 MT 165, ¶ 4, 388 Mont. 122, 398 P.3d 259, compels the conclusion, as argued by the State in the District Court, that Echeverria's motion was untimely filed. Thus, we affirm the District Court's denial of Echeverria's motion on this alternative basis.

¶3 On or about September 6, 2017, a lengthy violent altercation between Echeverria and his girlfriend, B.S., led to B.S. sustaining serious injuries. During the altercation, Echeverria texted and called members of B.S.’s family to convey berating messages. This incident led to eight charges against Echeverria, two misdemeanor and six felony counts, including Aggravated Kidnapping, Aggravated Assault, and Sexual Intercourse Without Consent.¹

¶4 In August 2018, the parties entered into a plea agreement under which Echeverria agreed to plead guilty to Aggravated Assault and Criminal Mischief, and nolo contendere to Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence, all felonies, in exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining charges. The State agreed to not recommend a particular sentence, but reserved in the plea agreement the right “to advise the [c]ourt of the facts and any mitigating or aggravating factors it considers relevant at the time of sentencing.” The District Court accepted Echeverria's plea and dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice.

¶5 A dispute arose during the sentencing hearing over whether the State's presentation exceeded its reservation in the plea agreement and thus breached the agreement. The District Court overruled defense counsel's objection and sentenced Echeverria to a total 40-year prison term, with 20 years suspended, and a 10-year parole restriction.

¶6 In February 2019, Echeverria appealed his conviction, but on December 10, 2019, moved this Court to dismiss his appeal without prejudice, offering that “during the course of review, it was discovered material evidence was not disclosed,”² and requesting the case be “return[ed] to the trial court for [a] motion to withdraw plea” to be filed. On December 26, 2019, this Court granted Echeverria's motion and dismissed his appeal without prejudice. See State v. Echeverria, No. DA 19-0107, Order (Mont. Dec. 26, 2019).

¶7 Over a year later, on March 8, 2021, Echeverria filed motions to compel production and to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging the State had failed to provide potentially exculpatory evidence and had “breached the plea agreement by constructively making [a] recommendation to [the District] Court.” In its response, the State argued that Echeverria's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was untimely under the one-year period of limitation in § 46-16-105(2), MCA, explaining in its briefing that:

The Supreme Court only allowed Defendant to come back to the trial [c]ourt for a motion to withdraw on the basis of previously undisclosed evidence. The Supreme Court did not include allowing Defendant to once again argue the State violated the plea agreement.

․

Defendant had one year in which he could file to withdraw his guilty pleas. As is evidenced by [the Supreme Court's order], the one-year period began to run starting December 26, 2019 as that is the date the Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and ordered he must file a motion to withdraw his pleas with the trial court. Defendant had until December 26, 2020 to file his Motion to Withdraw. Defendant failed to meet that deadline as he filed his motion on March 8, 2021. Defendant's motion was filed two months and 10 days or seventy-two days past the one-year deadline. Defendant's motion is time barred[.]

In reply, Echeverria asserted he was entitled to an additional 90 days under § 46-16-105(2)(b), MCA, which provides that a judgment is final for purposes of the one-year limitation period, “if an appeal is taken to the Montana supreme court, when the time for petitioning the United States supreme court for review expires[.]” Echeverria argued the one-year period was extended by the 90 days allowed for petitioning the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, thus giving him until March 26, 2021, to file his motion to withdraw a plea.

¶8 The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on Echeverria's motions on December 6, 2022, and February 9, 2023. Thereafter, noting that it had “heard procedural arguments regarding the timing of Defendant's motion,” the District Court nonetheless denied the motion to withdraw on its merits. Echeverria appeals.

¶9 We review a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea de novo. State v. Montgomery, 2010 MT 193, ¶ 6, 357 Mont. 348, 239 P.3d 929 (citing State v. Brinson, 2009 MT 200, ¶ 3, 351 Mont. 136, 210 P.3d 164). “ ‘We will affirm the district court when it reaches the right result, even if it reaches the right result for the wrong reason.’ ” Dolan v. Ceartin, 2026 MT 73, ¶ 32, 427 Mont. 316, 586 P.3d 1208 (quoting State v. Marcial, 2013 MT 242, ¶ 10, 371 Mont. 348, 308 P.3d 69). “We may uphold a judgment on any basis supported by the record, even if the district court applied a different rationale.” Rooney v. City of Cut Bank, 2012 MT 149, ¶ 25, 365 Mont. 375, 286 P.3d 241.

¶10 Generally, a defendant must move to withdraw a guilty plea “within 1 year after judgment becomes final.” See § 46-16-105(2), MCA. The time bar under § 46-16-105(2), MCA, “is a threshold issue.” Montgomery, ¶ 13. A judgment becomes final for purposes of the one-year period:

(a) when the time for appeal to the Montana supreme court expires;

(b) if an appeal is taken to the Montana supreme court, when the time for petitioning the United States supreme court for review expires; or

(c) if review is sought in the United States supreme court, on the date that that court issues its final order in the case.

See § 46-16-105(2)(a)-(c), MCA.

¶11 We have explained that the timeline to move to withdraw a plea pursuant to § 46-16-105(2), MCA, is “tolled during the pendency of the appeal,” because the “deadline for motion to withdraw plea is one year after appellate process has expired.” Peterson, ¶ 4. The question here—how the one-year period is applied when a defendant initiates an appeal, moves to dismiss the appeal, and this Court grants the dismissal motion without prejudice—was addressed in Peterson.

¶12 There, Defendant Peterson's written judgment was entered on November 23, 2009. Peterson, ¶ 3. Peterson filed a notice of appeal on January 22, 2010, exactly 60 days after entry of the written judgment. Peterson, ¶ 12. Peterson then filed a motion to dismiss his appeal without prejudice, which this Court granted on November 5, 2010. Peterson, ¶ 4. Thereafter, Peterson filed a motion to withdraw his plea on November 22, 2010, which was ultimately denied and affirmed on appeal. Peterson, ¶ 4. Then, Peterson filed a petition for postconviction relief. Peterson, ¶ 5. We first explained that the one-year time bar worked the same under either § 46-16-105(2), MCA, for motions to withdraw, or § 46-21-102(1), MCA, for postconviction relief:

[A] judgment becomes final under § 46-16-105(2), MCA, under the same circumstances that a conviction becomes final under § 46-21-102(1), MCA. Because a “conviction” is a judgment or sentence entered upon a guilty plea, a no contest plea, or a guilty verdict, see § 46-1-202(7), MCA, no meaningful distinction exists between the terms “judgment” and “conviction” as used in §§ 46-16-105(2) and 46-21-102(1), MCA. Thus, the deadlines for moving to withdraw a guilty plea and petitioning for postconviction relief run concurrently from the exhaustion or expiration of a defendant's right to direct appeal from the conviction.

Peterson, ¶ 9 (emphasis added). We then explained that “[a] defendant challenging the validity of a guilty plea as involuntary, unknowing, or unintelligent has essentially three options: a direct appeal from the conviction, a motion to withdraw the plea, and a petition for post-conviction relief.” Peterson, ¶ 10. However, we cautioned that not all of these options toll the time for appeal:

By operation of §§ 46-16-105(2) and 46-21-102(1), MCA, filing a direct appeal from the conviction delays the deadline for filing a plea withdrawal motion and a petition for postconviction relief. Conversely, filing a motion to withdraw a plea or a petition for postconviction review does not toll the deadlines for any of the other options. If a defendant files only a motion to withdraw a plea, without pursuing direct appellate review or a concurrent petition for postconviction relief, she risks the expiration and waiver of her rights to direct appeal and postconviction relief. This is precisely what happened here.

Peterson, ¶ 11 (emphasis added). Although the district court in Peterson had denied relief on other grounds, this Court, applying these statutes, affirmed the denial of Peterson's postconviction relief petition as time-barred on a “right result, wrong reason” rationale, and even though we had dismissed his earlier appeal without prejudice:

The [d]istrict [c]ourt entered its written judgment on Peterson's pleas on November 23, 2009, thereby starting the clock on his right of direct appeal to this Court. He had 60 days from the entry of the [d]istrict [c]ourt's written judgment to file a notice of appeal. M. R. App. P. 4(5)(b)(i). Peterson timely filed his notice of appeal on the 60th day, January 22, 2010. Because he filed his appeal on the last possible day, no time was left to refile his appeal after he requested and obtained dismissal of his appeal on November 5, 2010. Although we did not dismiss his appeal with prejudice, his right to appeal expired that day by operation of the 60-day deadline of M. R. App. P. 4(5)(b)(i) and his voluntary withdrawal of his timely filed appeal. Peterson's conviction thus became final on November 5, 2010, under § 46-21-102(1)(a), MCA. Pursuant to § 46-21-102(1), MCA, Peterson's deadline to file a postconviction petition was November 5, 2011.

Peterson, ¶ 12 (emphasis added).

¶13 Here, the District Court entered Echeverria's written judgment on December 18, 2018. The 60-day period to appeal under M. R. App. P. 4(5)(b)(i) ran 60 days, through February 19, 2019, and Echeverria filed his notice of appeal on that same day, leaving essentially no additional time within the 60-day period. M. R. App. P. 4(5)(b)(i); Peterson, ¶¶ 4, 12. When this Court granted Echeverria's motion without prejudice on December 26, 2019, Echeverria's conviction became final on that day for purposes of the application of the one-year limitation period under § 46-16-105(2), MCA, as there was no time left in the 60-day appeal period, and at that point the direct appeal process, during which the one-year period is tolled, had ended. See Peterson, ¶ 12. Echeverria therefore had “1 year after judgment becomes final” or until December 26, 2020, to move to withdraw his guilty plea. Section 46-16-105(2), MCA.³ However, he did not file the motion until March 8, 2021.

¶14 Echeverria defended against the State's time bar argument by arguing he was entitled to another 90 days under § 46-16-105(2)(b), MCA, to allow for “the time for petitioning the United States supreme court for review.” See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (a petition for writ of certiorari is “timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry of the judgment”). Echeverria's argument thus treats this Court's December 26, 2019 order dismissing his appeal without prejudice as an “entry of judgment” that triggered the 90-day certiorari period. This is incorrect under the extensive analysis we provided in Peterson about the effect of the same dismissal order. See Peterson, ¶¶ 8-15.

¶15 Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude Echeverria's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was untimely filed on the basis of Peterson. The State raised the time bar in response to the motion, and Echeverria responded with the request for an additional 90 days. The District Court acknowledged that it “heard procedural arguments regarding the timing of Defendant's motion,” but instead decided the matter on other grounds. The timeliness of the motion to withdraw his plea was preserved in the record. See Montgomery, ¶ 13. “We may affirm a trial court on any ground supported by the record, regardless of its reasoning.” State v. Wilson, 2022 MT 11, ¶ 34, 407 Mont. 225, 502 P.3d 679. “We will affirm a district court decision that reaches the right result even if for the wrong reason.” Peterson, ¶ 21. Therefore, we affirm the District Court's denial of Echeverria's motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the alternative ground of timeliness.

¶16 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

¶17 Affirmed.

Justice Laurie McKinnon, dissenting.

¶18 Echeverria seeks to appeal what he alleges was a breach of the plea agreement by the State. He initially appealed in February of 2019 but filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice so that he could pursue a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the District Court. We granted his motion and dismissed his case without prejudice to refiling.

¶19 Echeverria then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in District Court, but his motion was denied because it was untimely, likely because he took an appeal. Echeverria then filed the instant appeal. The State has not raised that the District Court determined Echeverria's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was untimely and the State has not asked this Court to base its decision on the timeliness of Echeverria's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. That issue is not before the Court. Presumably, the State understands that Echeverria's initial appeal, which was dismissed without prejudice, raised the same issues as Echeverria currently seeks to have addressed.

¶20 Echeverria has never been able to have reviewed the fairness of his sentencing and the alleged breach of his plea agreement. I would not decide this on an issue neither party mentions––timeliness of his motion to withdraw––because it was understood that his merits appeal was dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, I dissent from the Court's decision to affirm Echeverria's conviction because his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not timely––an issue never raised or addressed by the parties.

¶21 Finally, to say that Echeverria has been denied due process is an understatement, at best.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Count I, Aggravated Kidnapping, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-303(1)(c), MCA; Count II, Aggravated Assault, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-202, MCA; Count III, Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence, a felony, in violation of § 45-7-207(1)(a), MCA; Count IV, Criminal Mischief, a felony, in violation of § 45-6-101(1)(a), MCA; Count V, Privacy in Communications, a misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-8-213(1)(a), MCA; Count VI, Privacy in Communications, a misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-8-213(1)(a), MCA; Count VII, Privacy in Communications, a felony, in violation of § 45-8-213(1)(a), MCA; and Count VIII, Sexual Intercourse Without Consent, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-503, MCA.

2.   Though served, the State did not respond to the motion, which did not indicate that the State had been contacted or the State's position thereon.

3.   An exception to the one-year time bar under § 46-16-105(2), MCA, applies “when a claim of innocence is supported by evidence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Echeverria does not challenge the District Court's denial of such a claim on appeal.

JIM RICE

We Concur: CORY J. SWANSON JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA BETH BAKER KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY INGRID GUSTAFSON