HALEY ANN MUELLER v. JEFFREY VINCENT HAASCH (2026)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Jeffrey Haasch (Haasch) appeals from the Eleventh Judicial District Court's January 16, 2026 order affirming the Flathead County Justice Court's December 5, 2025 Order of Protection issued in favor of Haley Mueller (Mueller). Haasch challenges the District Court's affirmance on multiple grounds: he contends the record is incomplete and unintelligible as to his testimony; that he was denied meaningful access to documentary evidence; that the Justice Court improperly admitted hearsay and excluded witnesses; that the Justice Court curtailed his testimony and otherwise committed evidentiary and procedural errors; and that he was entitled to a jury. We affirm.

¶3 On November 3, 2025, Mueller filed a petition for a temporary order of protection in Flathead County Justice Court. The Justice Court issued a temporary order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. The first hearing, held on November 24, 2025, was continued to December 4, 2025, to allow Haasch additional time to review evidence and for further testimony. At the December 4 hearing, Justice of the Peace Hummel found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Haasch's conduct constituted stalking and entered an Order of Protection effective for two years—the order included prohibitions against contacting Mueller and certain family members.

¶4 Haasch appealed to the District Court. After reviewing the briefs and the audio recordings of both hearings, the District Court affirmed the Justice Court's Order on January 16, 2026. Haasch appeals from the District Court's order affirming the Justice Court's issuance of the order of protection.

¶5 On appeal from a justice court of record, the district court functions as an intermediate appellate court confined to review of the record and questions of law. Hennon v. Weber, 2025 MT 260, ¶ 11, 425 Mont. 14, 579 P.3d 151; Cook v. Bodine, 2024 MT 189, ¶ 9, 418 Mont. 49, 555 P.3d 236. This Court reviews a district court's decision under the same standards as if the appeal had been filed here originally. Stanley v. Lemire, 2006 MT 304, ¶ 26, 334 Mont. 489, 148 P.3d 643. Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error; discretionary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion; and legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo. Stanley, ¶ 26. An order of protection may be continued, amended, or made permanent only if supported by substantial, credible evidence; this Court will not overturn such a decision absent an abuse of discretion. Hennon, ¶ 11; Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153, ¶ 8, 375 Mont. 301, 328 P.3d 631; Schiller v. Schiller, 2002 MT 103, ¶ 24, 309 Mont. 431, 47 P.3d 816.

¶6 Statutory criteria for an order of protection are set forth in § 40-15-102, MCA. A petitioner may obtain an order of protection if the petitioner is in reasonable apprehension of bodily injury by a partner or family member, or if the petitioner is a victim of certain enumerated offenses, including stalking as defined in § 45-5-220, MCA. Section 45-5-220, MCA, defines stalking as a course of conduct directed at a specific person that a reasonable person would fear for safety or suffer substantial emotional distress; “course of conduct” requires two or more acts, including communications. Section 45-5-220(1)-(2), MCA. Attempts to contact the person after actual notice that contact is unwanted constitutes prima facie evidence of purposeful conduct. Section 45-5-220(7), MCA.

The record contains substantial, credible evidence supporting the Justice Court's stalking finding.

¶7 The Justice Court found Mueller told Haasch to leave her alone on multiple occasions and that Haasch continued to contact Mueller and her family by text, email, and in person during October 2025. Mueller testified that between October 2 and October 4, 2025, Haasch sent her 31 text messages after she asked him to stop; she blocked his number on October 4 and designated his email as spam; yet she received additional emails and texts thereafter. Mueller also testified that Haasch emailed her parents revealing private information that caused them distress—those emails were introduced as evidence. Two witnesses called by Mueller described observing her in a state of fear after interactions with Haasch at the Blue Moon Nite Club in Columbia Falls. The Justice Court admitted text and email evidence and expressly found Mueller's testimony “very credible,” while finding Haasch's testimony lacking credibility.

¶8 Applying § 45-5-220, MCA, the Justice Court's findings satisfy the statutory elements of stalking. Mueller provided testimony of repeated—well more than two— unwanted communications and in-person contacts after she gave actual notice to Haasch that contact was unwanted. The statute treats continued contact after actual notice as prima facie evidence of purposeful conduct. Section 45-5-220(7), MCA. The Justice Court also had corroborating witness testimony and documentary communications admitted into evidence. The District Court reviewed the audio recordings and concluded the Justice Court's description of Haasch's testimony and conduct was “well supported by the record.” Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are entitled to deference on appeal. Boushie, ¶ 12.

¶9 Haasch's reliance on cases reversing where the record contained only untested allegations is inapposite. For example, Fritzler v. Bighorn, 2024 MT 27, ¶¶ 11-12, 415 Mont. 165, 543 P.3d 571, reversed a permanent order of protection where the petitioner presented no live testimony or corroborating evidence beyond the petition. Here, Mueller testified from personal knowledge, two witnesses testified, and documentary communications were admitted. That evidentiary showing satisfies the standard Fritzler requires for a permanent order.

¶10 Accordingly, the Justice Court's factual findings are supported by substantial, credible evidence and are not clearly erroneous.

The District Court correctly applied controlling law.

¶11 The District Court applied the correct standards of review and statutory law. It confined its review to the record and questions of law, reviewed factual findings for clear error, and reviewed discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Cook, ¶ 9. The District Court's conclusion that the Justice Court's findings were supported by the record and that the Justice Court did not abuse its discretion is consistent with Montana precedent. See Boushie, ¶ 8.

¶12 Haasch's contention that a jury trial was required is without merit. Montana law does not provide a right to a jury trial in order of protection proceedings; the statutory scheme contemplates prompt hearings to protect victims, and we have held that a jury trial is not required in such proceedings. Boushie, ¶ 13; § 40-15-202(1), MCA. The District Court correctly rejected Haasch's jury claim.

Haasch's procedural and evidentiary complaints do not demonstrate reversible error.

¶13 Haasch raises multiple procedural and evidentiary objections. We address the principal ones.

¶14 Access to evidence/email transmission. Haasch argues he was denied access to the texts and emails admitted against him. The Justice Court continued the first hearing to allow Haasch to review the evidence, and the court attempted to email the exhibits to the address Haasch provided and which the court confirmed on the record. The Justice Court found Haasch “purposely avoided receipt” of the emailed evidence and admitted the texts and emails after concluding Haasch had not taken steps to retrieve them. The record shows Haasch both declined ordinary service and stated he was “aware” of the temporary order, then participated in hearings and filed motions. A respondent cannot manufacture a due process violation by declining the access the court arranged. The District Court reasonably concluded Haasch was afforded opportunity to review the evidence and that any prejudice resulted from Haasch's own conduct.

¶15 Admission of texts and emails/hearsay. Haasch contends the texts and emails were inadmissible hearsay. The Justice Court addressed authenticity objections, continued the hearing to allow review, and admitted the communications with foundation and corroboration. The admission and the weight given to those communications were within the Justice Court's discretion; the District Court reasonably concluded any evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion. See Cook, ¶ 13 (stalking may be established by course of harassing contact and emotional distress even without physical violence).

¶16 Further, Haasch was familiar with the emails and texts presented as they were communications in which he participated. Haasch did not contend emails and texts purportedly sent by him were not sent by him and he cannot realistically claim surprise related to them.

¶17 Exclusion of witnesses/subpoena issues. Haasch complains that a witness (Stewart) was not called and that the Justice Court refused to consider statements about that non-party. The record shows the witness was not subpoenaed by either party and did not appear; the Justice Court excluded hearsay about the non-party and did not consider it. A respondent bears the duty to secure his own witnesses, and the Justice Court had no obligation to procure a witness for him. Because the order did not rest on that non-party's statements, Haasch suffered no prejudice from the exclusion.

¶18 Curtailment of testimony/courtroom control. Haasch asserts the Justice Court improperly curtailed his testimony. A trial judge has discretion to control the courtroom and to limit irrelevant or repetitive testimony to preserve the integrity of the record. See Masters Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, 2015 MT 192, ¶ 35, 380 Mont. 1, 352 P.3d 1101; see also M. R. Evid. 402 and 403. The District Court reviewed the audio and identified no instance of improper disallowance; rather, it found the Justice Court's interventions were appropriate responses to Haasch's repetitive and irrelevant testimony. That exercise of courtroom control was within the Justice Court's discretion and not an abuse.

¶19 Record completeness and Rule 8 procedures. Haasch argues the record is incomplete and unintelligible as to his voice on the audio. Montana appellate rules provide procedures (M. R. App. P. 8) for correction or supplementation of the record. Haasch did not obtain relief under those procedures in the District Court, and the District Court reasonably concluded the record before it permitted meaningful review. Where the district court itself finds the record inadequate, remand is appropriate; here the District Court reviewed the audio and concluded the Justice Court's findings were supported. See Hennon, ¶ 20 (distinguishing cases where the district court acknowledged the record was inadequate and remanded).

¶20 Taken together, Haasch's procedural and evidentiary complaints do not demonstrate that the Justice Court acted arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or beyond the bounds of reason. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in affirming.

Preservation and plain error review.

¶21 Haasch raises several issues that were not preserved below. This Court generally will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. George, 2020 MT 56, ¶ 4, 399 Mont. 173, 459 P.3d 854. Haasch asserts plain error review is appropriate. Under the plain error doctrine, an appellant bears the burden of firmly convincing this Court that (1) the claimed error implicates a fundamental right and (2) failure to review the alleged error may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice or compromise the integrity of the judicial process. George, ¶ 5. Haasch has not met that burden here. The record shows Haasch participated in hearings, filed motions, cross-examined witnesses, and obtained appellate review in the District Court. The totality of the circumstances does not demonstrate the exceptional case warranting plain error reversal.

¶22 The Justice Court's findings that Mueller was in danger of harm and that Haasch engaged in a course of conduct constituting stalking are supported by substantial, credible evidence of record. The District Court correctly applied the statutory standards and Montana precedent in affirming the Justice Court's Order of Protection. Haasch's procedural and evidentiary objections do not show reversible error.

¶23 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

¶24 Affirmed.

INGRID GUSTAFSON

We Concur: CORY J. SWANSON JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY JIM RICE