IN RE: The MARRIAGE OF: Zoe Leigh EXE (2026)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Appellant Jason Leroy Exe (Jason) appeals the Fourth Judicial District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decree entered October 8, 2025, following a final hearing on August 20, 2025. Jason challenges the District Court's apportionment of the marital estate, arguing (1) the court awarded property owned by third parties to him; (2) the court misvalued marital assets (ATM inventory and a reloading station); (3) the court erred in treating $160,000 as Appellee Zoe Exe's (Zoe) non-marital inheritance; (4) the court improperly adopted Zoe's proposed findings; (5) the court failed to consider best-interest factors for the children when apportioning the marital residence; and (6) the court should have classified the marital residence as Jason's inheritance. We affirm.

¶3 The parties were married June 9, 2012, and have two minor children. Zoe filed a petition for dissolution on November 14, 2024. The parties mediated and entered an Agreed Parenting Plan on June 24, 2025. The District Court held a final hearing on property division on August 20, 2025, and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decree on October 8, 2025. The marital estate principally consisted of the residence on Springhill Road, Frenchtown, Montana, a business (Business Resources Group/ATM Services), and personal property. The District Court ordered the residence listed for sale and provided a distribution scheme for the sale proceeds. The court also ordered sale of business inventory and division of proceeds, allocated personal property, and identified certain items as premarital and awarded them to the party found to own them. Based on Zoe's testimony, which was not disputed by Jason, the District Court expressly found that Zoe's parents provided an advance of approximately $160,000 on her inheritance. She asserted these funds were used in connection with the purchase of the home, while Jason thought the money had been invested in the parties’ business. The decree further provided, “Upon sale of the home, the proceeds shall be distributed as follows: costs of sale, payment in full to the mortgage, Zoe shall receive $152,000 for contribution from her inheritance to the marital home/business minus her share of the marital debt, and the remainder of the proceeds shall be split between the parties.” The court found the marital debt to total approximately $16,000 and that each party be responsible for half of the debt, with Zoe's share reduced from her reimbursement from the sale of the real property for her inheritance.

¶4 Montana law vests the district court with broad discretion to equitably apportion the marital estate. See § 40-4-202(1), MCA. On appeal we determine whether the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct. In re Marriage of Funk, 2012 MT 14, ¶ 6, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial credible evidence, if the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if a review of the record leaves the appellate court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Paschen v. Paschen, 2015 MT 350, ¶ 17, 382 Mont. 34, 363 P.3d 444; see also In re Marriage of Cline, 2026 MT 108, ¶¶ 15-16, 428 Mont. 158, ___ P.3d ___ (discussing standards for review of property division and motions to set aside default decrees). We defer to a district court's credibility determinations because the trial judge had the opportunity to observe witness demeanor. Paschen, ¶ 42.

Whether the District Court apportioned non-marital property belonging to third parties.

¶5 Jason contends the District Court “awarded” to him a motorhome, two cargo trailers, and a Honda Ridgeline that are owned by third parties (his father and sister), and that the court therefore exceeded its authority and produced an inequitable distribution.

¶6 The District Court's Findings of Fact identify certain items as premarital and award them to Jason: “the RV bus, the two trailers, the 2013 G3 Boat, the Honda pickup, the 12 gauge shotgun, and the 30-06 Springfield.” The record shows the court treated those items as premarital property and awarded them to Jason. The court's classification of property as premarital is a factual determination. Jason bore the burden at the hearing to prove third-party ownership or otherwise to show the items were not his. The transcript shows Jason had the opportunity to testify and to present evidence; he did not present live testimony from the purported third-party owners at the hearing. Jason later submitted affidavits on appeal and in post-decree motions; the District Court correctly refused to consider hearsay affidavits submitted after the hearing in lieu of live testimony and cross-examination. See Paschen, ¶ 42 (appellate court defers to trial court's credibility determinations where witnesses were observed). Because the District Court classified the items as premarital and awarded them to Jason, and because Jason failed to present admissible evidence at the hearing establishing third-party ownership, the court's classification is supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous. The court did not “award” third-party property as marital assets; it awarded to Jason items it found to be his premarital property.

¶7 Further, even if we assume the items were owned by third-persons rather than being Jason's premarital property, such does not affect the overall distribution as the District Court classified these assets as Jason's premarital assets and did not count them against his equitable share of the marital estate.

Whether the District Court incorrectly valued marital assets.

¶8 Jason argues the court incorrectly adopted Zoe's valuations for ATM machines and other business inventory despite his contrary testimony and business records.

¶9 The District Court heard competing testimony about the ATM inventory. Zoe testified about purchase prices and resale values; Jason testified the inventory consisted of older trade-ins with lesser value. The court expressly ordered the ATM machines sold and the proceeds split. The court did not adopt a fixed dollar valuation for the machines; it directed sale and division of proceeds. Where the court orders sale and division of proceeds rather than fixing a contested valuation, the court's approach is a permissible exercise of discretion. See In re Marriage of Funk, ¶ 28 (district court has broad discretion to adopt any reasonable valuation supported by the record). As to the reloading station, Zoe testified it had been purchased for $20,000, and the court ordered it sold with proceeds divided. The court again avoided adopting a contested fixed valuation and instead required sale and equal division. The transcript reflects the parties’ conflicting testimony and the court's decision to resolve valuation disputes by sale and division rather than by adopting one party's dollar figure. That approach is supported by substantial evidence, provided there is an equal distribution between the parties, and is not an abuse of discretion.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in determining $160,000 was non-marital property belonging to Zoe.

¶10 Jason argues the $160,000 from Zoe's inheritance was not used for the home but rather deposited into the business. In this assertion he relies on post-hearing affidavits and mortgage closing documents.

¶11 The District Court expressly found Zoe's testimony that her parents provided an advance of $160,000 on her inheritance that was used in connection with the purchase of the home credible. The transcript contains Zoe's sworn testimony to that effect. Jason does not dispute Zoe contributed an advance of $160,000 on her inheritance, but only asserts he thought the funds were used in connection to the business. Jason's assertions were presented at the hearing but were not supported by admissible documentary proof at that time. Jason's attempt to introduce mortgage closing documents and an affidavit from a third party for the first time on appeal or in post-decree filings does not permit this Court to reweigh credibility or to overturn the District Court's finding. See Paschen, ¶ 42; In re Hamilton v. And Carol A. Mitchell, 254 Mont. 31, 37, 835 P.2d 702, 705 (1992) (property given to one spouse may be excluded from division unless the other spouse demonstrates contribution to any related increase in the property's value). Such also does not negate the District Court's authority to award Zoe her pre-inheritance funds. The District Court accepted Zoe's testimony and gave her a credit for the inheritance in the distribution scheme. Similar to awarding Jason his premarital assets, the record supports the District Court's determination to award Zoe her pre-inheritance funds.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in adopting Zoe's proposed findings.

¶12 Jason contends the court's near-verbatim adoption of Zoe's proposed findings demonstrates failure to exercise independent judgment.

¶13 A district court may adopt a prevailing party's proposed findings so long as the findings are sufficiently comprehensive, pertinent to the issues, and supported by the evidence. In re Marriage of Crilly, 2005 MT 311, ¶ 38, 329 Mont. 479, 124 P.3d 1151. The District Court's findings here are detailed, address the statutory factors set forth in § 40-4-202(1), MCA, and reflect the evidence presented at the hearing. Jason points to no specific finding that is unsupported by the record, but instead relies on post-hearing materials and affidavits not presented for live testimony. Where the record contains testimony and documentary evidence supporting the adopted findings, adoption of proposed findings is not reversible error. In re Marriage of Crilly, ¶ 38. The District Court's adoption of Zoe's proposed findings therefore does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Whether the District Court erred by not addressing best-interest of the child factors when apportioning the marital residence.

¶14 Jason argues the court should have applied the best-interest factors of § 40-4-212, MCA, when dividing the marital residence because the children have special needs and housing stability is critical.

¶15 Section 40-4-202(1), MCA, sets forth the factors the court must consider in apportioning property, whereas § 40-4-212, MCA, governs best-interest determinations for parenting plans. The District Court approved and adopted the parties’ Agreed Parenting Plan. The court considered custodial provisions and the needs of the parties in its property division as required by § 40-4-202(1), MCA. The statute does not require the court to perform a separate § 40-4-212, MCA, best-interest analysis when apportioning property. Under § 40-4-202, MCA, the District Court expressly considered custodial provisions and the parties’ needs and structured the disposition of the residence to protect the parties’ interests: it ordered the home listed for sale, required joint participation in sale decisions, provided for maintenance and showings, and allocated proceeds with a credit to Zoe for her inheritance contribution. The court's approach balanced the competing interests and provided mechanisms (e.g., expedited court resolution of disputes) to address practical concerns. The District Court did not err in declining to perform a separate § 40-4-212, MCA, analysis in the property division context where the Agreed Parenting Plan was adopted and the court considered division of property provisions under § 40-4-202(1), MCA.

Whether the District Court erred by failing to classify the marital home as Jason's inheritance.

¶16 Jason asserts the marital home was his inheritance and should have been classified as his separate property.

¶17 The District Court found the home was purchased during the marriage and that Zoe's parents advanced $160,000 on her inheritance toward the purchase. The court credited Zoe's testimony that the $160,000 came from her parents as an advance on her inheritance and that the parties incurred debt (HELOC and mortgage) to complete the purchase. Jason's contrary claim that the home was his inheritance was not supported by admissible evidence at the hearing. The District Court's factual finding that the $160,000 was an advance on Zoe's inheritance and that the home was purchased during the marriage is supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous. Under § 40-4-202(1), MCA, the court properly considered the source of funds and gave Zoe credit for her inheritance contribution in the distribution. The court did not err in declining to classify the home as Jason's separate inherited property.

¶18 The District Court's findings of fact are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record, and its conclusions of law correctly apply § 40-4-202(1), MCA, and controlling Montana precedent. The court exercised conscientious judgment in apportioning the marital estate, resolving valuation disputes by sale and division where appropriate, crediting Zoe for the inheritance advance she testified to, and adopting an equitable distribution consistent with the statutory factors. Jason's post-hearing affidavits and documentary materials submitted for the first time on appeal do not provide a basis to overturn the District Court's credibility determinations or factual findings. See Paschen, ¶ 42; In re Marriage of Funk, ¶ 28; see generally In re Marriage of Cline (discussing standards for review and the limited circumstances in which default or post-decree relief is warranted). Accordingly, the District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decree entered October 8, 2025, is affirmed in all respects.

¶19 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We Concur: CORY J. SWANSON, C.J. JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA, J. LAURIE McKINNON, J. JIM RICE, J.