IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF: MICHAEL ANTHONY GOMEZ (2026)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Respondent Michelle Lindsay Flynn formerly Gomez (“Michelle”) appeals the March 12, 2025 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Property, Support, and Parenting issued by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. The District Court's Order dissolved the marriage between Michelle and Michael Gomez (“Michael”) and distributed the property belonging to the marriage after considering Michael's circumstances, and ordered Michelle to pay Michael an equalization payment of $34,760 out of the equity of their home on Silo Drive in Helena (“Silo Drive property”). In summary, Michelle argues that the District Court abused its discretion by valuing the Silo Drive property at the date of dissolution rather than the date of separation, that the District Court lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for said valuation, and that the District Court abused its discretion when it justified how it would reduce Michael's share of the equity in the Silo Drive property.

¶3 Michael and Michelle married in 2010 in California. Michael and Michelle had one child together, A.M.G., born in December 2011. Michelle had a child from a prior marriage, A.G. They moved around from house to house, building equity. They moved to Billings, Montana in 2014 where they purchased a home on Lacey Road. About two years later, the parties moved to Helena, where they rented the house at issue on Silo Drive.

¶4 In May 2020, Michael was criminally charged with several offenses. The parties began separating following Michael's arrest. The parties remained on good terms for an additional six to eight months after Michael's arrest.

¶5 As the parties began untangling their finances, they sold their Lacey Road property in Billings, with $128,016.03 in net proceeds from the sale going into their joint account. Michelle used approximately $70,000 to $80,000 of the sale proceeds to pay off the credit card debt the marriage accrued. A few days before the proceeds of the sale of the home were deposited, Michelle opened a new account in her name only. Michelle withdrew $15,000 in cash from the marital account and transferred another $25,000 to her new account.

¶6 During that time, Michelle made an offer to purchase their Silo Drive property for $475,000. The down payment was $56,046.33, with roughly $20,000 or 36% coming from gifts, and the remaining 64% coming from funds obtained from the marriage. The offer closed in December 2020, and Michelle began paying the mortgage of $2,200 without any assistance from Michael.

¶7 The parties ceased contact in early 2021 when the nature of the charges became clear to Michelle. Michael filed for divorce several months later in December 2021. The case was consolidated with his petition for a parenting plan in January 2022. Michael was convicted of a felony offense and several misdemeanor offenses, and he was sentenced to Montana State Prison; he will not be eligible for parole until 2029.

¶8 Two hearings were held to determine the value of the marital assets. During the two hearings, it was apparent that by far the most valuable marital asset was the equity in the Silo Drive property. Though the Silo Drive property was in Michelle's name only, the District Court found that Michelle was only able to purchase the property through the benefits of the sale of the Lacey Road property, which was marital property. Accordingly, Michael had an interest in the Silo Drive property. Home prices in Helena rapidly appreciated since Michelle purchased the Silo Drive property. Michael offered the testimony of Sye White, a real estate agent for Century 21 Heritage Realty, to determine the value of the home. White viewed the home from the exterior, consulted similar listings, and reviewed the property information in the Montana Cadastral map to perform a comparative market analysis on the home in May 2023. He testified that the value of the home was between $700,000 and $730,000. Michelle offered no testimony or evidence in rebuttal. The District Court decided the midpoint was fairest and valued the home at $715,000 in the final decree.

¶9 The District Court calculated that the equity in the home was $303,000 based on the trial testimony. Michelle was awarded 36% of the equity in the home unencumbered to account for the portion of the down payment that was paid with non-marital funds, Michelle paying the mortgage without support from Michael, and the home being purchased post-separation. With 64% of the down payment coming from marital funds, the District Court reasoned that 64% of the equity in the home belonged to the marriage, or $193,920. Dividing the marital equity equally left Michael with a share of $96,960 of equity in the Silo Drive property.

¶10 The District Court heard testimony that the marriage had roughly $70,000 in credit card debt, with most of the expenses incurred by Michelle but many of them were for the joint benefit of the family. The strongest evidence for this was Michelle's testimony as to how much she paid. Michael admitted a lengthy bank statement as to the credit card debt, but no transactions were identified as debt payoffs or otherwise relevant to the valuation of the consumer debt. The District Court took Michelle's testimony at face value and valued the marriage's credit card debt at $70,000. Because Michelle incurred a substantial amount of the consumer debt, in part because of Michael's actions, the District Court assigned Michelle $42,000 or 60% of the consumer debt and Michael $28,000 or 40% of the consumer debt share.

¶11 Given the circumstances around Michael's incarceration, the District Court did not believe Michael would be able to pay child support, and that his share of child support must come out of his share of the marital assets. The Child Support Services Division entered a final temporary support order requiring Michael to pay $342 per month before he was incarcerated. The District Court calculated that Michael, due to his incarceration, would miss 99 months of child support until A.M.G.’s eighteenth birthday. The District Court chose that date because it was known with certainty. Family support guidelines give several reasonable avenues by which to impose an obligation, such as through high school graduation, eighteenth birthdays, or after 10 years of payments; whereas A.M.G.’s high school graduation is less certain because he could graduate high school earlier or not at all. This put Michael's child support obligation to be satisfied by his share of the marital estate at approximately $33,858.

¶12 The District Court found it would be equitable to reduce Michael's share in the Silo Drive property by $28,000 to account for his benefit from the credit card payoff. It also found it would be equitable to reduce Michael's share further by $33,858, the approximate child support obligation he would not pay while in prison. This reduced Michael's equity in the home from $96,960 to $35,102. The District Court ordered Michelle to pay Michael that amount to reflect his interest in the Silo Drive property. Michelle would receive $679,898 of the marital home's value, or 95% of the marriage's most valuable asset.

¶13 The marriage was officially dissolved on July 26, 2024. The District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution on March 12, 2025. Michelle filed a Combined Motion for Relief From Judgment And Motion to Alter Or Amend Judgment on April 9, 2025. Despite being awarded roughly 95% of the marital estate, Michelle argued that the District Court overvalued the proportion of the Silo Drive property that should be apportioned to both Michelle and Michael, that the District Court understated Michelle's contribution to paying off the debt, that the District Court failed to account for child support Michael would owe through A.M.G.’s high school graduation, and that failing to fix these three issues would cause her manifest injustice. The District Court did correct a clerical error as to the number of months of child support Michael would owe until A.M.G.’s eighteenth birthday, reducing Michael's share of the marital assets to $34,760. The District Court found that none of the substantive issues were supported by the evidence presented at trial, and if the District Court were to follow through with them, then it would cause a manifest injustice to Michael. Michelle now appeals.

¶14 Section 40-4-202, MCA, governs the distribution of a marital estate. The statute vests a district court with broad discretion to apportion the marital estate in a manner equitable to each party under the circumstances. Deschamps v. Deschamps, 2009 MT 431, ¶ 11, 354 Mont. 94, 223 P.3d 324 (citing In re Marriage of Bartsch, 2007 MT 136, ¶ 9, 337 Mont. 386, 162 P.3d 72). An equitable distribution is made “without regard to marital misconduct.” Section 40-4-202(1), MCA. This Court has long recognized that flexible, not cast-iron, rules govern courts of equity. Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc. v. Eyrie Shotgun Ranch, Ltd. Liab. Co., 2010 MT 63, ¶ 43, 355 Mont. 387, 228 P.3d 1134 (citing State ex rel. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Dist. Ct. of Third Jud. Dist. Co. of Powell, 267 Mont. 1, 24, 881 P.2d 594, 607 (1994)).

¶15 A district court's division of marital property is reviewed to determine whether the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct. Deschamps, ¶ 11. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial credible evidence, if the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if a review of the record leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that the court committed a mistake. In re Marriage of Edwards, 2015 MT 9, ¶ 9, 378 Mont. 45, 340 P.3d 1237. The district court's apportionment of the marital estate will stand unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion as manifested by a substantially inequitable division of the marital assets resulting in substantial injustice. Richards v. Trusler, 2015 MT 314, ¶ 11, 381 Mont. 357, 360 P.3d 1126. If the district court did not act arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceed the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice, the district court did not abuse its discretion. In re Marriage of Kotecki, 2000 MT 254, ¶ 9, 301 Mont. 460, 10 P.3d 828.

¶16 Michelle argues that the District Court abused its discretion by valuing the Silo Drive property at the date of dissolution rather than the date of separation. Michelle maintains the District Court failed to consider that the parties were separated and the Silo Drive property was purchased with non-marital funds. We disagree.

¶17 The date of dissolution is the general rule for valuation in Montana. In re the Marriage of Tipton, 2010 MT 144, ¶ 23, 357 Mont. 1, 239 P.3d 116; In re Marriage of Geror, 2000 MT 60, ¶ 14, 299 Mont. 33, 996 P.2d 381; In re Marriage of Swanson, 220 Mont. 490, 495, 716 Р.2d 219, 222 (1986). However, we have recognized that unique circumstances will permit deviation from the general rule. In re Marriage of Hochhalter, 2001 MT 268, ¶ 17, 307 Mont. 261, 37 P.3d 665.

¶18 Michelle argues that there were sufficient facts to warrant a deviation from the general rule for valuation in this case and cites significant factual similarity to Tipton as reason to do so. The Court in Tipton upheld a valuation date almost two years prior to the date of dissolution the district court used because the parties were no longer living in the same house or commingling their assets, holding that deviation from the general rule was not an abuse of discretion. Tipton, ¶ 24. Here, Michelle asks us to overturn a valuation date that did not deviate from the general rule. Additionally, while the parties were no longer living together, the parties’ finances were clearly still commingled to some degree and the asset was purchased using marital funds from the sale of the Lacey Road property after the date of separation. The Lacey Road property itself was purchased with a combination of proceeds from previous homes and gifts from family, and the District Court found both parties contributed to sustaining and maintaining that asset.

¶19 A district court is granted broad discretion to apportion a marital estate. The district court's primary charge is to make a distribution equitable to each party under the circumstances. Section 40-4-202, MCA. Under the standard of review, if it weighed the evidence presented and found that following the general rule would produce an equitable outcome for both parties considering their circumstances, then the district court did not abuse its discretion. We see no indication from the record that the District Court here acted arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeding the bounds of reason.

¶20 The second element of our standard of review requires that any abuse of discretion be manifested by a substantially inequitable division of the marital assets resulting in substantial injustice. Richards, ¶ 11. Michelle has not identified with any specificity the substantial injustice she would suffer if this valuation stands on appeal. Michelle's only specific complaint is that the valuation on the date of dissolution captures three years of mortgage payments after the parties separated. Michelle relies on In re Marriage of Wagner, 208 Mont. 369, 377-78, 679 P.2d 753, 757 (1984), for the proposition that the increase in an asset's value can create a risk of inequitable results, and that the asset should be excluded. That case is both a rare exception counter to the modern prevailing law on marital property distribution and is sufficiently distinguishable from the case at hand.

¶21 Our decision in In re Marriage of Funk, 2012 MT 14, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39, is informative. The Court in Funk noted the confusing nature of marital property distribution when trying to include or exclude property and liabilities based on inheritance or gift provisions, and that such provisions were not faithful to the language and intent of § 40-4-202, MCA. Funk, ¶¶ 15, 18. Accordingly, the Court held that the statute's directive for courts to “equitably apportion” all property and assets belonging to either or both parties, “however and whenever acquired,” must mean “everything owned jointly or by either party must be equitably apportioned by the district court in a dissolution proceeding regardless of when or how it was acquired.” Funk, ¶ 13 (emphasis in original).

¶22 In Marriage of Wagner, the wife established an entirely new, highly successful ranching operation with money borrowed from family and money awarded to her by the trial court after the parties separated. Wagner, 208 Mont. at 373-74. Meanwhile, the husband dissolved his operation and incurred more debt. Wagner, 208 Mont. at 374-75. We explained:

[N]either the husband's increased financial obligation, nor the wife's real estate and livestock purchases should legitimately be denominated “marital assets” for two reasons: (1) both were acquired after the marital relationship was irretrievably broken; (2) the disparity of the parties’ business acumen resulted in a change of either's financial status after the separation so that selection of the later date would create an unjust distribution.

Wagner, 208 Mont. at 379-80, 679 P.2d at 755.

¶23 Here, not only does Wagner’s proposition predate Funk, but it is not applicable. Michelle purchased the Silo Drive property while the parties were separated but Michelle did not cut off contact with Michael for another several months and, more importantly, neither party filed for divorce for another year. The down payment for the Silo Drive property included a majority of marital funds, where the wife's ranching operation in Wagner was entirely separate. The increase in value of the Silo Drive property is not attributable to Michelle's business acumen, but, as the District Court noted, a housing market in Helena that rapidly increased in value. Our case law required the District Court consider all the equity of the marriage, regardless of the fact it was acquired after the marriage.

¶24 We see no evidence in the record establishing a substantial injustice to Michelle from this judgment, nor that it would be a windfall to apportion Michael a share of an asset which his efforts helped the marriage obtain. The District Court accounted for the gifts from family and the burden of the mortgage by assigning 36% of the equity to Michelle outright, rather than including it in the marital estate. The District Court noted that any further reduction of Michael's meager share of the marital estate would work a manifest injustice against Michael, rather than Michelle.

¶25 Michelle also argues that the District Court had an insufficient evidentiary basis for determining the value of the Silo Drive property, as the District Court relied on testimony from a realtor who did not perform a complete inspection and appraisal of the home.

¶26 A district court may adopt any reasonable valuation of property supported by the record. In re Marriage of Haberkern, 2004 MT 29, ¶ 13, 319 Mont. 393, 85 P.3d 743. A district court may assign any value to an item of property that is within the range of values offered into evidence. Hochhalter, ¶ 33; Hutchins v. Hutchins, 2018 MT 275, ¶ 50, 393 Mont. 283, 430 P.3d 502. If the valuation of property in a dissolution is reasonable considering the evidence submitted, we will not disturb the finding on appeal. Geror, ¶ 18.

¶27 In this case, only Michael presented evidence of the Silo Drive property's value. Sye White's testimony of his exterior examination and comparative market analysis placed the value of the home between $700,000 and $730,000. As no other evidence was offered of the home's value, the District Court was satisfied with the competency and credibility of White's testimony. The District Court assigned a value of $715,000 to the Silo Drive property, as the midpoint of the range of values with which it was presented. The valuation of the property is within the range of values offered into evidence and no argument is presented as to why it is unreasonable in light of the evidence submitted. The District Court had a sufficient evidentiary basis for the valuation of the home. Therefore, the District Court did not commit clear error in its finding of the home's value, and it did not abuse its discretion when it accepted the value as accurate.

¶28 Michelle argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it incorrectly understated the amount of consumer debt belonging to the parties and committed reversible error in characterizing a minor child's high school graduation date as uncertain for purposes of determining duration of child support obligations. Michelle argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it justified its apportionment by using these two figures to calculate how the equity in the marital estate would be apportioned. We address each of Michelle's claims in turn.

A. Consumer Debt

¶29 Michelle argues that the District Court ignored undisputed documentary evidence in favor of a range provided by testimony and contends that the District Court should have given her credit for paying off $80,000 rather than $70,000 of the debt. This argument is based on the parties’ bank statement admitted into evidence by Michael. However, the District Court did not use the lengthy bank statement to calculate the consumer debt payoff because it was not annotated or edited in such a way that the District Court could readily determine which transactions were debt payoffs. The District Court instead relied on Michelle's own testimony and the number she also acknowledged in her final disclosure, which placed the amount at $70,000. We conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion.

B. Child Support Obligations

¶30 Michelle argues that the District Court's finding and order of child support through A.M.G.’s eighteenth birthday would result in a manifest injustice to her. Evidence indicated that A.M.G. was in seventh grade at the time of the hearing. The District Court explained itself further in its order on Michelle's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. The District Court was apprehensive about assigning the obligation through A.M.G.’s high school graduation, as that milestone was far into the future and A.M.G. could graduate early, graduate later, or not at all. The District Court again opted for the midpoint of dates as it was the only certain milestone it had, A.M.G.’s eighteenth birthday. The District Court was also careful to say that it was not ordering child support, as Michael's child support obligation had been discharged by the Child Support Enforcement Division since he would not be able to meaningfully provide support even if he were ordered to do so while incarcerated. The District Court considered what Michael would have owed had he not been incarcerated when it apportioned Michael's share of the marital estate.

¶31 Michelle argues that this finding resulted in a substantial injustice by depriving her of the full credit necessitated by Michael's permanent inability to provide support. Given the foregoing analysis and thorough consideration the District Court performed on the matter, we are not convinced. The District Court did not abuse its discretion nor commit any reversible error in how it considered Michael's child support obligations.

C. The Calculated Apportionment

¶32 The District Court took the previous two figures into consideration to calculate Michael's share of the marital estate. As the District Court noted and our case law supports, this process is not mechanical. It is an exercise of its equitable power, and equity is by design flexible.

¶33 In its 22-page order, the District Court particularly considered Michael and Michelle's occupations, their respective roles in accumulating marital funds, their marital liabilities, the custody arrangement of A.M.G., and the needs of both Michael and Michelle. A review of the District Court's orders demonstrates that the District Court carefully considered all the factors under the statute, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. The facts of the case are such that the District Court found it was equitable to give Michelle a 95% share of the marital estate. The District Court was also conscientious of its statutory charge that this distribution be made without regard for marital misconduct, and its rationale is restated here:

[A]n equitable distribution is made “without regard to marital misconduct.” Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-202(1). This Court does not minimize the gravity of Michael's offenses or the harm they have caused his family, but the purpose of an equitable distribution is not to punish him or provide recompense for that conduct—that is the subject of his criminal sentence—but rather to ensure that each parties’ contributions and needs are fairly incorporated into the distribution of marital property.

¶34 We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it followed Montana's general rule and valued the Silo Drive property at the date of dissolution. We conclude that the District Court had a sufficient evidentiary basis to determine the value of the Silo Drive property and that Michelle's failure to provide rebuttal evidence precludes her from challenging the District Court's determination. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion or engage in reversible error in its justification for how it apportioned the equity of the Silo Drive property.

¶35 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review. The District Court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. The District Court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion.

¶36 Affirmed.

LAURIE McKINNON

We Concur: CORY J. SWANSON BETH BAKER INGRID GUSTAFSON JIM RICE