STATE v. EYSTAD (2026)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Corbin James Eystad, appearing pro se, appeals from the January 8, 2025 Order Denying Defendant's Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Appoint Counsel and the February 18, 2025 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider issued by the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County. We affirm.

¶3 On April 13, 2021, the State charged Eystad with felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Eystad entered a plea agreement and pled guilty on October 18, 2021, and the court entered judgment on February 24, 2022. In his Acknowledgment & Waiver of Rights and Plea Agreement, Eystad waived a number of rights when he pled guilty, including the right to have the charge proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to appeal a finding of guilty. The District Court accepted the plea and imposed a five-year suspended commitment to the Montana State Prison (MSP).

¶4 Following a probation violation and subsequent arrest in March 2024, the court revoked the suspended sentence and resentenced Eystad to four years at MSP. On November 18, 2024, Eystad filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that body-camera footage demonstrated an illegal stop and search and that his appointed counsel failed to move to suppress the methamphetamine found in his backpack. As Eystad stated in his motion, “[a]rresting officer ‘Scheffler's’ body-camera demonstrates the State's use of illegally obtained evidence.” The District Court denied the motion as untimely under § 46-16-105(2), MCA, concluding that “nearly 3 years has passed since the judgment became final” and that Eystad “presented no evidence” supporting a claim of innocence. On January 21, 2025, Eystad filed a Motion to Reconsider, seeking reconsideration of the court's denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea “based on the evidence forwarded I.E., ‘Body Cam footage.’ ” The District Court denied this motion, noting it “fails to demonstrate any legal basis for reconsideration.” Eystad appeals.

¶5 Withdrawal of a guilty plea is governed by § 46-16-105(2), MCA. Under that statute, a court may permit withdrawal of a guilty plea for good cause shown if the motion is filed (1) before judgment, (2) within one year after judgment becomes final, or (3) after one year only when a claim of innocence is supported by evidence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A judgment becomes final when the time for appeal to the Montana Supreme Court expires. M. R. App. P. 4(5)(b)(i); § 46-16-105(2)(a), MCA.

¶6 This Court reviews the voluntariness of a guilty plea de novo as a mixed question of law and fact, reviewing underlying factual findings for clear error. State v. McFarlane, 2008 MT 18, ¶ 8, 341 Mont. 166, 176 P.3d 1057. McFarlane also explains that the Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1472 (1970), voluntariness standard governs plea withdrawal claims and that case-specific considerations—such as the adequacy of the plea colloquy, the benefits obtained from a plea bargain, and the timeliness of a withdrawal request—bear on whether a plea was voluntary. McFarlane, ¶¶ 16-19. When ineffective assistance of counsel is asserted as the basis for plea withdrawal, the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), framework applies in the plea context: the defendant must show counsel's performance fell below the range of competence demanded of criminal attorneys and that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty. McFarlane, ¶¶ 11-12.

¶7 The District Court's denial of Eystad's motion must be affirmed because the motion was untimely and Eystad did not invoke the statutory exception for claims of innocence supported by evidence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

¶8 The judgment in this case was entered on February 24, 2022. Pursuant to M. R. App. P. 4(5)(b), the time to appeal to this Court expired 60 days later, on April 25, 2022, and the one-year window to file a motion to withdraw under § 46-16-105(2), MCA, therefore closed on April 25, 2023. Eystad's motion was filed on November 18, 2024—more than eighteen months after the statutory deadline. The District Court correctly characterized the motion as untimely: “nearly 3 years has passed since the judgment became final.”

¶9 An untimely motion may be considered only if the defendant asserts a claim of innocence supported by evidence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Section 46-16-105(2), MCA. Eystad's filings do not assert innocence. He does not deny possession of the methamphetamine; rather, he contends the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress. The State correctly observed that Eystad “does not contest that he possessed methamphetamine” and therefore is not making a statutory claim of innocence. Under the plain language of § 46-16-105(2), MCA, suppression arguments and claims of ineffective assistance that do not assert actual innocence do not trigger the miscarriage-of-justice exception.

¶10 The McFarlane decision reinforces this statutory framework. There, the Court explained that while ineffective assistance can constitute “good cause” for withdrawal when it renders a plea involuntary, the timeliness of the motion and other case-specific considerations remain relevant. McFarlane, ¶¶ 11, 16-19. The McFarlane court also emphasized that a defendant who waits an extended period before seeking withdrawal—particularly where the record shows awareness of the consequences of pleading guilty—weakens a claim that the plea was involuntary. McFarlane, ¶¶ 18-19. Here, Eystad waited more than two years after judgment became final to seek withdrawal and, in the interim, accepted the benefit of the plea process and later had his suspended sentence revoked after a probation violation. Those circumstances weigh against finding the plea involuntary.

¶11 Eystad's reliance on body-camera footage does not alter the statutory analysis. The District Court found that Eystad “presented no evidence” supporting a claim of innocence when he filed his motion. The record shows that the body-camera recording was not before the court at the time the motion was decided and that Eystad later sought reconsideration after the recording was filed; the court denied reconsideration because the motion “fails to demonstrate any legal basis for reconsideration.” Even if the footage later became part of the record, Eystad's theory remains that the evidence should have been suppressed—not that he did not possess the contraband. The statutory exception requires a claim of innocence supported by evidence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice; suppression of evidence, standing alone, does not satisfy that requirement.

¶12 The plea agreement itself further undercuts Eystad's arguments. By entering the plea, Eystad acknowledged waiver of several rights and the direct consequences of pleading guilty. The Acknowledgment & Waiver of Rights and Plea Agreement reflects that he “acknowledged that he was waiving his rights, including the ‘right to have the charge(s) proven beyond all reasonable doubt ․ and to appeal a finding of guilty.’ ” A valid guilty plea ordinarily waives pre-plea constitutional challenges to the admissibility of evidence unless the plea was involuntary. See McFarlane, ¶ 16 (discussing Brady voluntariness standard and the relevance of the plea colloquy and benefits of the bargain). Eystad has not shown that his plea colloquy was inadequate or that he lacked understanding of the plea's direct consequences; he does not contend he was threatened or misled at the plea hearing; and he expressly acknowledged the waiver of rights in the plea documents. Under McFarlane, those facts weigh heavily against finding the plea involuntary.

¶13 Finally, to the extent Eystad asserts ineffective assistance of counsel as an independent basis for relief, the record before the District Court did not establish the two Strickland prongs—(1) that his counsel's advice fell outside the range of competence demanded of a criminal attorney and (2) but for counsel's deficient performance, he would not have entered a guilty plea—in the plea-withdrawal context. McFarlane, ¶¶ 11-12. Eystad's motion alleged counsel failed to move to suppress, but he did not present evidence demonstrating counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable or that, absent counsel's alleged failures, he would have insisted on going to trial. The District Court therefore did not err in concluding Eystad failed to establish good cause for withdrawal based on ineffective assistance.

¶14 For these reasons—the untimeliness of the motion, the absence of any asserted or supported claim of innocence, the plea waiver, and the lack of record support for an ineffective-assistance of counsel showing—the District Court properly denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

¶15 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

¶16 Affirmed.

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We Concur: LAURIE McKINNON, J. JIM RICE, J. BETH BAKER, J. JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA, J.