STATE OF MONTANA v. JASON PAUL KELLY (2026)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Jason Paul Kelly appeals from the Justice Court's denial of his motion to dismiss his pending criminal charge for failure to hold a trial within six months of the arraignment, following his motion to change his requested jury trial to a bench trial and to reset the trial at the earliest convenience of the Justice Court. On his appeal, the District Court affirmed the Justice Court's denial of the motion.

¶3 Kelly was charged with misdemeanor indecent exposure in Lewis and Clark County Justice Court. He was arraigned on September 1, 2023, entering a not guilty plea. He requested a jury trial, and at the omnibus hearing on October 4, 2023, the Justice Court scheduled the jury trial for February 20, 2024, within the six-month period for misdemeanor trials and about ten days prior to the expiration of that period on March 1, 2024. See § 46-13-401, MCA. The Justice Court set a Jury Confirmation hearing for January 29, 2024.

¶4 On January 25, 2024, Kelly's counsel filed a Motion to Set Bench Trial & Vacate Jury Confirmation Hearing. The motion explained that Kelly “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently wishes to waive his right to a Jury Trial and wants a Bench trial instead,” and thus Kelly “moves to set this matter for a Bench Trial. Counsel requests that this Bench Trial be set on the date of earliest convenience for the Court.” The motion also requested the Jury Confirmation hearing to be vacated, and noted that the County Attorney's office “has been contacted concerning this request and does not object to this motion.”

¶5 Kelly's motion included an attached proposed order. The proposed order stated that “Defendant moved to set this matter for a Bench Trial. There appears to be good cause for this request, the motion is granted.” That was followed by a provided paragraph, stating:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Bench Trial is set for the _____ day of _________, 2024, at ___:___, ___.m.

The proposed order provided a line over the words “Hon. Michael Swingley, Justice of the Peace,” for signing. Judge Swingley signed the order on January 26, 2024, and in the blanks provided, noted above, the date and time of the 22nd day of March, 2024, at 10:30, a.m., was inserted by handwriting. The order also vacated the Jury Confirmation Hearing set for January 29, 2024.

¶6 On the afternoon of March 21, 2024, the day prior to the scheduled bench trial, Kelly moved to dismiss the charge for lack of speedy trial. His briefing in support of the motion stated:

Mr. Kelly's trial has not occurred within six months from his entry of plea at no fault of his own․ Mr. Kelly has not made any motions that would create an incidental or direct postponement of his trial and the State has not demonstrated good cause for the delay.

․

Mr. Kelly's only pretrial motion was a request to set this matter for a bench trial and to vacate his Jury Confirmation Hearing, as the Jury Confirmation Hearing was no longer required for the resolution of this matter. This motion did not have any effect on the [c]ourt's schedule. If anything Mr. Kelly's Motion to Set a Bench Trial was filed four days before his Jury Confirmation Hearing, which provided the [c]ourt more time compared to if he had simply expressed his wish for a bench trial at his Jury Confirmation Hearing․ Mr. Kelly did not contribute to the delay of his trial, either directly or incidentally.

¶7 On the morning of March 22, 2024, prior to trial, the Justice Court heard oral arguments from the parties. The Justice Court stated, “So I am somewhat concerned about – when you read something that says [at] the [c]ourt's convenience, when the [c]ourt puts it on the calendar as fast as they can. That seems a little disingenuous to me, that word.” Then, noting that the time was over 180 days, the Justice Court incorporated a constitutional speedy trial analysis and reasoned that the 22-day-delay beyond the six-month period had not prejudiced Kelly, and orally denied the motion. No written order was entered.

¶8 Kelly appealed the denial of his speedy trial motion to the District Court, which affirmed the Justice Court. The District Court reasoned that Kelly's motion to reset the matter for a bench trial at the Justice Court's convenience “had the incidental effect of delaying his trial beyond the six-month time limit,” and “did ‘postpone his trial’ for purposes of” application of § 46-13-401(2), MCA, and thus Kelly was not entitled to dismissal of the charge. Also addressing the statutory good cause exception to the six-month rule, the District Court reasoned that, while there was nothing in the record indicating that the State had advised Judge Swingley “that the fastest date the Justice Court could set the requested ‘earliest convenience’ bench trial was past the March 1, 2024 six-month statutory speedy trial deadline,” based upon the totality of the circumstances, including the effect of Kelly's motion and the Justice Court's effort to reset the trial as soon as it could, that good cause had been satisfied. Kelly appeals, challenging the denial of his motion.

¶9 On appeal from a justice court, the district court functions as an intermediate appellate court. Section 3-5-303, MCA. In its appellate capacity, the district court is confined to review of the record and questions of law. Section 3-6-110, MCA. “When reviewing the decision of the district court in such an appeal, we review the case as if the appeal had originally been filed in this Court, applying the appropriate standard of review.” City of Helena v. Heppner, 2015 MT 15, ¶ 9, 378 Mont. 68, 341 P.3d 640. “Whether the statutory right to a speedy trial has been violated is a question of law.” City of Red Lodge v. Pepper, 2016 MT 317, ¶ 12, 385 Mont. 465, 385 P.3d 547. “We review the trial court's legal conclusions to determine whether the court's interpretation of law is correct.” Pepper, ¶ 12.

¶10 Kelly argues that the Justice Court and District Court misapplied legal authority by referencing the Ariegwe ¹ speedy trial analysis, rather than focusing on the statutory misdemeanor speedy trial statute, § 46-13-401(2), MCA. He also contends the Justice Court and District Court erred by “determining that [he] had waived his misdemeanor speedy trial right” by filing his motion to reset the trial at the court's earliest convenience, because within his motion he waived only his right to a jury trial, not a speedy trial. Lastly, he argues the State did not carry its burden to demonstrate good cause for the delay.

¶11 Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, provides:

After the entry of a plea upon a misdemeanor charge, the court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the prosecution to be dismissed, with prejudice, if a defendant whose trial has not been postponed upon the defendant's motion is not brought to trial within 6 months.

(Emphasis added.)

¶12 We have explained that this “statute's protections are not available to a defendant when the trial was postponed upon the defendant's motion, or the State showed good cause for delaying the trial,” thus illustrating that a delay can be justified by a trial postponement caused by a defendant's motion, or upon other good cause. Heppner, ¶ 12. In Pepper, ¶ 18, we reasoned that, because the defendant had “filed a motion to vacate the scheduling order which included the trial date, he may not avail himself of the statutory protections afforded by § 46-13-401(2), MCA.”

¶13 Kelly's trial was set for February 20, 2024. He filed a motion “to set this matter for a Bench Trial,” and waived his right to a jury trial. He requested “that this Bench Trial be set on the date of earliest convenience for the [c]ourt,” and stated that the County Attorney had no objection to the motion. The motion provided a proposed order for the Justice Court to insert a date and time of its earliest convenience, and the Justice Court did, setting the bench trial for March 22, 2024, about three weeks beyond the statutory deadline, which it later explained was “as fast as” it could set the new trial. Kelly notes that nothing in his motion expressly waived the right to speedy trial, but the motion was broadly worded nonetheless, offering nothing about scheduling concerns and requesting the Justice Court to set the bench trial “on the date of earliest convenience for the [c]ourt.” The proposed order was submitted in blank for the Justice Court to conveniently fill in the new trial date and time. One can only read Kelly's documents by the words they use: Kelly asked for a new trial to be set on the date of the earliest convenience for the court, and facilitated it.

¶14 We have declined to adopt a rule that a “justice court must ‘convert’ a scheduled jury trial into a bench trial so as to accommodate the defendant's right to be brought to trial within six months.” State v. Luke, 2014 MT 22, ¶ 19, 373 Mont. 398, 321 P.3d 70. “[A] justice court ‘must retain a measure of flexibility over scheduling to hear cases on its docket.’ ” Luke, ¶ 19 (internal citation omitted). Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, permits dismissal for exceeding the six-month time period if the “trial has not been postponed upon the defendant's motion.” Here, Kelly submitted a motion that requested rescheduling the trial and invited the Justice Court to schedule at its earliest convenience. We concur with the District Court that the motion had the incidental, if not intentional, effect of postponing the trial. While Kelly correctly notes that an Ariegwe analysis was inapplicable here, given that no constitutional speedy trial claim was asserted, he was not entitled to the relief of dismissal under the statute. We need not address the good cause exception.

¶15 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

¶16 Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815.

JIM RICE

We Concur: LAURIE McKINNON KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA BETH BAKER