STATE OF MONTANA v. SETH JOSEPH JOHNSON (2024)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Seth Johnson appeals the April 4, 2023 Order entered by the Ninth Judicial District Court, Teton County. The Order denied Johnson's motion to withdraw admissions after Johnson admitted to violating the conditions of his suspended sentence.

¶3 Johnson was originally sentenced for sexual intercourse without consent and aggravated burglary on June 6, 2007. He was sentenced to 25 years in the Montana State Prison (MSP) with 20 years suspended on each count, running consecutively. His sentences were revoked in 2012 and 2014 for violating his sentencing conditions. In 2014, the District Court sentenced Johnson to 20 years at MSP with 15 years suspended. The court warned that any further violation of the sentencing conditions would not be tolerated and would result in a 15-year imprisonment.

¶4 In June 2021, the State filed a petition to revoke Johnson's sentence alleging 5 violations of the sentencing conditions, including that Johnson failed to provide information about his employment status, failed to report to probation on two occasions, tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine, was terminated from the 24-7 program for continued non-compliance, and failed to reenter sex-offender treatment.

¶5 On January 27, 2023, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the State's petition to revoke. Before evidence was presented, Johnson entered admissions to failing to seek and maintain employment and report that information to probation, failing to attend the 24-7 programming, and failing to reenter sex-offender treatment.

¶6 On March 7, 2023, the court held a disposition hearing. The State argued the court should sentence Johnson to prison for the remaining 15 years of his sentence. Johnson asked the court to put him back on probation, claiming he and the State agreed to leave the sentencing up to the court's discretion if he admitted to the violations. The court ultimately sentenced Johnson to 13 years in MSP, which acknowledged 2 years of street time.

¶7 After the disposition hearing, Johnson filed a motion to withdraw his revocation admissions. He claimed it was his understanding that if he answered true to the allegations, the County Attorney would leave the sentencing to the discretion of the court. However, it did not appear that the bargain was conveyed to the County Attorney at the hearing because she argued for the full remaining sentence to be imposed. The State filed a response to the motion. The court denied Johnson's motion on April 4, 2023, without holding a hearing on the motion.

¶8 The issues on appeal are whether the District Court erred by denying Johnson's motion to withdraw admissions and whether the District Court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing on Johson's motion to withdraw his admissions.

¶9 The District Court determined there was no governing authority permitting withdrawal of revocation admissions post-disposition—this was incorrect. State v. Jones, 2008 MT 331, 346 Mont. 173, 194 P.3d 86 reviewed a motion to withdraw revocation admissions under the law applicable to motions to withdraw guilty pleas. Here, despite the District Court's incorrect conclusion, it was harmless error considering evidence in the record supports the court's ultimate holding, as detailed below. Section 46-20-701, MCA (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).

¶10 Section 46-16-105(2), MCA, allows a district court to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea upon a showing of good cause. Good cause includes the involuntariness of the plea, but may include other criteria as well. Jones, ¶ 11. Accordingly, we review a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea de novo because the issue of whether the plea was entered voluntarily is a mixed question of law and fact. Jones, ¶ 12. We review the district court's factual findings to determine if they are clearly erroneous, and the court's interpretation and application of the law for correctness. Jones, ¶ 12.

¶11 “[A] plea is voluntary only when the defendant is fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.” Jones, ¶ 20, (internal quotations omitted). “Evidence indicating involuntariness includes, among other things, unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises.” Jones, ¶ 20 (internal quotations omitted).

¶12 The court's decision to deny Johnson's motion was correct. Based on the evidence in the record, there is no basis for the motion. For example, in his motion to withdraw, Johnson stated “[defense] Counsel does note that, although he thought he had some of these discussions with [the State] in writing, it does not appear that it was in writing.” The State responded to Johnson's petition denying any such conversations or agreements took place. The State provided emails discussing Johnson's recent violations, and one of the emails from the State to Johnson's probation officer states “[m]y intent is to ask that he be sentenced to MSP for whatever time he has remaining on his sentence, then give credit for time served and street time out of that sentence.”

¶13 Additionally, the State had prepared for the evidentiary hearing on the petition to revoke by preparing witnesses and evidence to prove Johnson violated his sentencing conditions. When Johnson admitted to some of the violations at the hearing, it took the State by surprise, considering it had prepared witnesses to testify. This tends to negate the claim that the State bargained for Johnson's admissions.

¶14 When Johnson entered his admissions at the evidentiary hearing, he acknowledged he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol that would impair his judgment. At the disposition hearing, although Johnson's counsel mentioned he thought he had an agreement with the State, counsel did not provide any other explanation or evidence to support his claim. Accordingly, we find the District Court reached the right conclusion albeit for the wrong reasons. City of Helena v. O'Connell, 2019 MT 69, ¶ 20, 395 Mont. 179, 438 P.3d 318 (“we will affirm the district court when it reaches the right result, even if it reaches the right result for the wrong reason”).

¶15 Next, Johnson asserts the District Court was wrong to deny his motion to withdraw admissions without holding an evidentiary hearing. Johnson asserts that because his recollection of facts differs from the State's recollection, the court should have held a hearing to discover additional facts about whether there was an agreement between the parties.

¶16 A district court's decision of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is discretionary and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Hanson, 1999 MT 226, ¶ 9, 296 Mont. 82, 988 P.2d 299. Except where mandated by Title 46 of the Montana Code Annotated, “the court has discretion to conduct a hearing on the merits of a motion.” Section 46-13-104(2), MCA. When a defendant does not request the court to hold a hearing on a motion to withdraw, the court is not required to hold a hearing sua sponte. “This Court has consistently stated that no set rule or standard exists under which a district court addresses a request to withdraw a guilty plea, and that each case must be considered in light of its unique record.” State v. Nelson, 274 Mont. 11, 13, 906 P.2d 663, 665 (1995).

¶17 Here, Johnson did not request a hearing on his motion to withdraw admissions. Because Johnson did not request a hearing from the District Court, we will not fault the District Court for not holding one sua sponte. Especially, as noted above, because Johnson's motion to withdraw did not establish a basis for his claim that his admissions were not voluntarily entered.

¶18 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

¶19 Affirmed.

Justice Laurie McKinnon took no part in the decision of this Opinion.

INGRID GUSTAFSON

We concur: MIKE McGRATH JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA JIM RICE