MICHAEL CATHEY v. ALLEN VASHON TANKSLEY (2026)

¶1. The Democratic primary election for alderman of Ward 3 in Senatobia, Tate County, Mississippi, ended in a narrow victory for Allen “Vashon” Tanksley, who received 132 votes, over Michael Cathey, who received 131 votes. Cathey alleges that there were irregularities in the determination of which absentee ballots were counted, that absentee ballots failed to be properly distinguished from election-day ballots, that the ballot box was not properly secured, and that he was denied the opportunity to timely examine the ballot box. Cathey contested the election results, and the circuit court found that Cathey failed to meet his burden of proof on all claims and declared Tanksley the winner of the election. Cathey appeals the circuit court's decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On April 1, 2025, the Democratic Primary Election was held in Senatobia in which Cathey and Tanksley were the sole candidates for alderman of Ward 3. The election was conducted by the Tate County Democratic Executive Committee (DEC), the city of Senatobia, and the Senatobia city clerk, and the parties entered into a written agreement beforehand to organize the conduct and responsibilities of the election. Tanksley won the election by one vote, finishing with 132 votes to Cathey's 131.

¶3. On the morning April 28, 2025, the DEC held a hearing and determined that due to the irregularities in the election process, a new election was needed. That afternoon, the Chancery Court of Tate County set aside the DEC's order for a new election and granted an injunction for the city of Senatobia.

¶4. On May 1, 2025, Cathey filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Tate County, Mississippi, contesting the results of the election. Cathey alleged that the city clerk wrongfully denied the DEC the timely opportunity to canvass the ballot box and certify the election. Cathey also alleged that the city clerk intentionally delayed its response to the request and denied him the opportunity to review certain materials.

¶5. Cathey contended that there were numerous irregularities in the handling of the absentee ballots. Specifically, Cathey alleged that two properly cast absentee ballots were wrongfully not counted, that one improperly cast absentee ballot was wrongfully counted, and that these inconsistencies deprived him of his deserved victory. Cathey also contended that the absentee ballots failed to be properly distinguished from election-day ballots as required by Mississippi Code Section 23-15-679 (Rev. 2018). Cathey further argued that the Ward 3 ballot box was improperly kept because the seal had been broken by the city clerk without the approval of the DEC, and the absentee ballots were not included in the ballot box. Cathey sought review by the circuit court and requested a recount of the votes and a declaration of the correct winner.

¶6. On May 27, 2025, the circuit court held a hearing in front of a tribunal composed of four election commissioners. After hearing the arguments and testimonies, Special Judge Albert B. Smith, III, entered an order finding that Cathey failed to meet his burden of proof on all allegations and declaring Tanksley the winner of the election. The circuit court found that the written agreement entered into by the DEC, the city of Senatobia, and the Senatobia city clerk to be a valid contract in which the DEC assigned the right to canvass the ballot box and certify the election to the city clerk. Thus, the DEC was not denied its right to canvass the ballot box and certify the election. The circuit court also found that Cathey was not denied the opportunity to timely investigate the ballot box and was not entitled to access the other election materials.

¶7. Regarding the issue of the failure to properly distinguish the absentee ballots, the circuit court found that Cathey failed to show that the lack of proper distinguishment affected the election results in any way.¹ On the issue of the three absentee ballots in question, the circuit court similarly found that Cathey failed to show that he knew who any of the voters put on their ballot and thus failed to prove that counting the three votes would affect the election outcome. The circuit court found no issues of fraud, malice, or any sort of tampering with the ballot box, and Cathey's contention that the votes had the opportunity to possibly be tampered with was insufficient to meet the burden of proof. Accordingly, the circuit court found that Cathey failed to meet the burden of proof to overturn the election or, alternatively, to void the election results.

¶8. On June 19, 2025, Cathey filed an appeal to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9. This Court reviews questions of law in election contests de novo. Harreld v. Banks, 319 So. 3d 1094, 1105 (Miss 2021). “When a trial judge sits as a fact finder, his or her findings are reviewed for manifest error, and the verdict will not be disturbed unless it ‘is a result of prejudice, bias, or fraud, or is manifestly against the weight of credible evidence.’ ” Boyd v. Tishomingo Cnty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 912 So. 2d 124, 128 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 108, 111 (Miss. 2004)). The petitioners bears the burden of proof in an election contest and must prove “both the existence of illegal votes and that enough were cast to change the election's outcome.” Harreld, 319 So. 3d at 1106 (citing Boyd, 912 So. 2d at130). Mere technical irregularities in voting procedures are insufficient to invalidate the results of an otherwise valid election. Id. at 129. For this Court to void an election, there must be a “total departure from the fundamental provisions of the [voting] statute[s] as to destroy the integrity of the election and make the will of the qualified electors impossible to ascertain.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Riley v. Clayton, 441 So. 2d 1322, 1328 (Miss. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Griffith, 664 So. 2d 177 (Miss. 1995).

DISCUSSION

¶10. Cathey raises three arguments on appeal: (1) the agreement between DEC, the city of Senatobia, and the Senatobia city clerk was incorrectly construed to be a contract and incorrectly interpreted; (2) the three absentee votes in question were inconsistently and incorrectly counted; and (3) the compromised integrity of the ballot box warranted a new election. This Court finds that the compromised integrity of the ballot box warrants a new election.

(1) The Agreement

¶11. Cathey argues that the agreement between DEC, the city of Senatobia, and the Senatobia city clerk is not a contract. Cathey did not raise this argument at trial and, in contrast, repeatedly referred to the agreement as a contract in both the initial complaint and in the hearing. This Court does “not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.” Stratton v. McKey, 384 So. 3d 499, 503 (Miss. 2024) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Bay Point Props., Inc. v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 201 So. 3d 1046, 1055 (Miss. 2016)). Thus, we decline to address this argument.

¶12. Cathey also contends that the judge wrongfully interpreted the agreement to confer exclusive power in “all authorities” to the Senatobia election commission.² The circuit court never made such a finding. The circuit court found that the “[DEC] assigned the right to receive and canvass the returns to the City of Senatobia and the Senatobia City Clerk.” The court reached this conclusion by looking to article 5 of the written agreement, which states:

The City of Senatobia and the Senatobia City Clerk shall meet within the time fixed by law after primary election and shall receive and canvass the returns and declare the results, and announce the name of the nominees for City offices and the names of those candidates to be submitted for the Democratic Primary runoff election to be held on April 22, 2025 if needed. The City of Senatobia and the Senatobia City Clerk shall timely report election results to the Mississippi Secretary of State if required by law in such manner as the law requires. A copy of the recapitulation reports also will be provided to the Tate County Democratic Executive Committee.

(Emphasis added.) This Court finds that the circuit court was correct in its interpretation because the language of article 5 clearly assigns the city and the city clerk the right to “receive and canvass the returns and declare the results.” Cathey has failed to prove that the circuit court's interpretation “[was] a result of prejudice, bias, or fraud, or is manifestly against the weight of credible evidence.” Boyd, 912 So. 2d at 128 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Johnson, 873 So. 2d at 111). Thus, this argument has no merit.

(2) Absentee Ballots in Question

¶13. Cathey argues that the votes of the three absentee ballots in question should have all been counted or, alternatively, that none should have been counted. Mississippi Code Section 23-15-633 provides the requisites for signature compliance on ballots and states that “the signature lines and the signatures shall be in the boxes across the flap of the envelope to ensure the integrity of the ballot[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-633 (Supp. 2025). The Democratic resolution committee was responsible for determining whether voters’ signatures crossed the flap of the envelope to comply with Section 23-15-633. The determination of whether a voter's signature crossed the flap of the envelope is a finding of fact. Mississippi Code Section 23-15-933 provides that “[i]f the findings of fact have been concurred in by all the commissioners in attendance, provided as many as three (3) commissioners are and have been in attendance, the facts shall not be subject to appellate review.” Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-933 (Rev. 2018). Four election commissioners served on a tribunal during the hearing, and the commissioners unanimously found that the three absentee votes in question were properly counted by the resolution committee. Thus, because the determination of whether the signatures of the three absentee ballots in question crossed the flap is a finding of fact, it is not subject to review by this Court. See § 23-15-933.

(3) Ballot Box Integrity

¶14. Cathey argues that the city clerk's breaking the ballot box's seal on April 4, 2025, has the “entire election in question.” “Ballot box security is essential to producing an election result in which not only the voters, but the candidates themselves, can be confident.” Waters v. Gnemi, 907 So. 2d 307, 329 (Miss. 2005). Mississippi Code Section 23-15-911 controls the keeping and examining of ballot boxes, and it states in part:

(1)(a) When the returns for a box and the contents of the ballot box and the conduct of the election have been canvassed and reviewed by the county election commission in the case of general elections or the county executive committee in the case of primary elections, all the contents of the box required to be placed and sealed in the ballot box by the poll managers shall be replaced therein by the election commission or executive committee, as the case may be, and the box shall be forthwith resealed and delivered to the circuit clerk, who shall safely keep and secure the same against any tampering.

Miss. Code. Ann. § 23-15-911 (Rev. 2018) (emphasis added). After the ballot box was delivered to the city clerk, she had a duty to keep the box sealed and secured.³ See § 23-15-911. When Cathey questioned the clerk as to why the seal was broken, she reportedly told him that it was for the runoff election. There was, however, no runoff election, which raises suspicion as to why the seal was broken.

¶15. The suspicion is furthered by the handling of B.J. Jackson's ballot. On the night of the election, Jackson's ballot was not counted for failing to sign his name across the flap. When Cathey later reviewed the ballot box, after the seal had been broken by the city clerk, Jackson's vote had been counted. Lauren Jones and Avis Newsome were two of the five members of the resolution committee responsible for determining which votes should be counted. Jones testified that Jackson's ballot was not counted on election night, and Newsome testified that the committee voted to reject Jackson's ballot on election night and that her notes reflected the committee's decision.⁴ Yet Jackson's absentee ballot was marked as accepted, to which Jones and Newsome deny responsibility. Jones and Newsome repeatedly testified that they and the rest of the committee rejected Jackson's ballot, and for Jackson's vote to have been counted, someone else would have had to alter the results. In an election decided by a single vote, this discrepancy has created concerning amount of suspicion. No testimony was provided as to how or why Jackson's vote was counted.⁵ No party has taken responsibility. To add to the confusion, Cathey testified that when he left on election night, before Jackson's vote was counted, he was one vote behind, and after Jackson's vote was counted, he still finished one vote behind. Indeed, as Cathey stated, “[t]his entire election is in question.”

¶16. “Ordering a special election is indeed an extraordinary remedy and requires a careful balancing of many competing factors.” Waters, 907 So. 2d at 333. For this Court to order a special election, there typically must be “(1) enough illegal votes ․ cast for the contestee to change the result of the election, or (2) so many votes ․ disqualified that the will of the voters is impossible to discern.” Id. at 334 (quoting Noxubee Cnty. Democratic Exec. Comm. v. Russell, 443 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (Miss. 1983)). Alternatively, irregularities in the election process caused by significant violations of election law or fraud will warrant a special election. Id.; see also Straughter v. Collins, 819 So. 2d 1244, 1252 (Miss. 2002) (“[M]ere technical irregularities in the casting of a ballot are not grounds for invalidation absent evidence of fraud or intentional wrongdoing.” (citing Campbell v. Whittington, 733 So. 2d 820, 826 (Miss. 1999); Wesley v. Washington Cnty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 235 So. 3d 1379, 1385 (Miss. 2017) (“[A] showing of fraud or similar activity is not required in order for a new election to be warranted.”). “Our precedent is quite clear in this regard, and the key consideration in making this decision [to order a special election] is whether there is such a radical departure from our election laws so as to require a special election or that alleged illegal votes are attended by fraud or willful violations of election law.” Harpole v. Kemper Cnty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 908 So. 2d 129, 137 (Miss. 2005).

¶17. In Waters, this Court found that “the evidentiary value of the sealed ballot boxes was lost the moment the seal was broken on the ballot boxes” and exposed the boxes to the possibility of fraudulent activity. Waters, 907 So. 2d at 331. In this case, the city clerk similarly failed to maintain the security of the ballot box as required by Section 23-15-911, as the seal was broken when Cathey examined the votes. § 23-15-911. This failure to secure the ballot box provided the opportunity for tampering, “and the ability of the county executive committee, the candidates, and the voting public to detect the existence of voter fraud and/or any other type of impropriety or miscalculations was lost.” Waters, 907 So. 2d at 335.

¶18. Finding that Cathey failed to show that the box had been tampered with,⁶ the circuit court held that Cathey did not meet his burden of proof. This Court in Waters, however, held that a showing of fraud in these circumstances is not required:

When, as in this case, there has been a total departure from the mandatory provisions of the [the statute] with respect to time, manner and conditions under which the ballots were counted, the contestee cannot successfully claim that the contestant has failed to show the will of the electors could not be ascertained or has not shown the existence of fraud in connection with such counting. The departure complained of deprives him of the very means by which the fraud could be detected if any exists.

Waters, 907 So. 2d at 334 (emphasis added) (quoting Clark v. Rankin Cnty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 322 So. 2d 753, 757 (Miss. 1975)). In Waters, the contestant provided no proof of fraud nor made any allegations of fraud, and this Court held that a special election was nonetheless warranted because the “gross deviation and total departure from mandatory election procedure” undermined the election, “as all indicia of reliability were compromised.” Id. at 335. In this case, this Court finds that the city clerk's failure to maintain the security of the ballot box has similarly deprived the election of all credibility. While Cathey has not proved any instance of fraud, such proof is not required, as “it is [his] inability to even be able to detect fraud that mandates today's extraordinary remedy.” Id. Thus, this Court finds that a special election is warranted due to the city clerk's gross violation of Section 23-15-911.

CONCLUSION

¶19. When deciding whether a special election is warranted, we recognize competing interests which must be weighed and balanced. While the voters are not parties to this contest, their interests are paramount. Special elections are a great expense for the county and its taxpayers. Beyond that, the turnout for a special election is never as great as when there are a number of candidates on the slate. By contrast, we feel that the rights of the individual candidates cannot be allowed to overshadow the public good.

As far as the public good is concerned, the rights our law gives losing candidates to contest elections form a double edged sword. While they serve to prevent the fraudulent manipulation of the public will, they necessarily provide a way for the unsuccessful candidate to use innocent human errors to his own advantage, thereby winning a second chance.

Russell, 443 So. 2d at 1197. This Court has weighed and balanced the competing interests and finds that a special election is warranted. The breaking of the ballot box's seal by the city clerk destroyed the sanctity of the election and opened the door for corruption and fraud. While it is unknown if any fraudulent activity occurred in this election, the blatant violation of Section 23-15-911 has destroyed all trust in the election's credibility. The handling of B.J. Jackson's ballot is symptomatic of a larger problem: a looming suspicion that taints the validity of the election. To relieve this uncertainty and restore faith, this Court finds that a special election should be conducted.

¶20. Accordingly, the judgment of the Tate County Circuit Court is reversed, and judgment is rendered that the governor shall call a special election for the office of Ward 3 alderman for Senatobia in accordance with Mississippi Code Section 23-15-937 (Rev. 2018) and applicable law governing municipal special elections. Moore, 962 So. 2d at 567.

¶21. The clerk of this Court shall mail a certified copy of this opinion to the governor, the attorney general, the secretary of state, the city of Senatobia election commission, and the city of Senatobia clerk.

¶22. REVERSED AND RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 23-15-679 provides that “absentee voter ballots shall be prepared and printed in the same form and shall be of the same size and texture as the regular official ballot except that they shall be printed on tinted paper of a tint different from that of the regular official ballot.” While the absentee ballots were not tinted differently, they were marked by a yellow stripe to distinguish them from the election-day ballots.

2.   The Senatobia election commission is under the city of Senatobia.

3.   While the terminology of Section 23-15-911 discusses county elections and circuit clerks, this Court has also applied Section 23-15-911 to city elections and city clerks. See Moore v. Parker, 962 So. 2d 558, 563 (Miss. 2007).

4.   Newsome testified that her notes were left with the city. Her notes were not offered as evidence in this case.

5.   Although Katie Harbin, the Senatobia city clerk, was summoned for the hearing, she did not testify.

6.   Cathey was denied the opportunity to fully investigate for tampering, as he was refused access to the election day poll book and voting machine tallies. The circuit court found that Cathey was rightfully denied access to these materials, finding Smith v. Webster, 233 So. 3d 242 (Miss. 2017), instructive. Smith provides that Section 23-15-911 “grants a candidate ‘the right of full examination of [the ballot] box and its contents[.]” ’ Smith, 233 So. 3d 248 (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-911(1) (Rev. 2015)). This Court finds that the issue of whether this denial was proper is dependent upon if the election-day poll book and voting-machine tallies were inside the ballot box. The record is devoid of these materials’ whereabouts, and with the box's seal broken, it is impossible to know if these materials were ever inside the box.

ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN AND BRANNING, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.