CITY OF JACKSON v. MAXIE AS NEXT FRIEND OF (2025)

¶1. Defendants City of Jackson and Jackson Public School District (JPS) appeal from the trial court's order denying their motions for summary judgment against Plaintiff LaQuita Maxie, parent and next friend of M.Y., a minor, who had alleged injuries sustained from an open manhole located on a high school lawn. Based on our review of the record, Plaintiff does not present or point to any evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact that a dangerous condition existed on either Defendants’ property of which Defendants had actual or constructive notice and time to correct or warn against. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred by denying Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We reverse and render summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Plaintiff filed a complaint on behalf of her minor son M.Y. in the Hinds County Circuit Court. The complaint alleged that on October 14, 2021, M.Y., a ninth grade student at Wingfield High School in Jackson, Mississippi, was celebrating homecoming with other students and faculty on the school's lawn. During the events, M.Y. fell in an open manhole on the school's lawn causing injuries to his right leg. M.Y. did not see the open manhole, “as it was just covered with grass.”

¶3. The complaint asserted negligence, gross negligence, premises liability, and res ipsa loquitur. And it sought compensatory and punitive damages for M.Y.’s injuries. Both Defendants filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, which the trial court denied.

¶4. Afterwards, a scheduling order agreed to by the parties was filed in November 2022. The order set forth that all discovery, including all evidentiary and expert depositions, was to be completed no later than July 1, 2023. Subsequently, discovery was extended to August 15, 2023, by agreement of the parties.

¶5. Discovery ensued, after which both Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming Plaintiff had presented no evidence as to who owned the manhole or that either Defendant had been notified of its condition. The City attached an affidavit to its motion from Andrew Boon, “Manager of the 311 Action Line for the City of Jackson, Mississippi.” Boon said he had reviewed all complaints relating to an “open manhole” on the campus of Wingfield High School for the time period of January 2019 to October 2021 and found “no complaints or notifications of such defect.”

¶6. Plaintiff responded to the motion, arguing that

Though the Defendant City may not have had actual notice, it did have constructive notice. Defendant City knew or should have known through regular inspections and maintenance of Defendant City's infrastructure that there was a manhole on its land at Wingfield High School. As Defendant City is aware, Homecoming is a yearly event that every high school holds which causes a substantial number of students and staff to occupy space on the high school's lawn. At the least, Defendant City could have inspected the premises before such to ensure it was free from any hazardous or dangerous condition. Upon such inspection, the manhole would have been discovered and covered.

¶7. The trial court entered an order denying Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. According to the trial court, the evidence presented shows there are genuine issues of material fact as to Plaintiff's claims for negligence, gross negligence, premises liability, and res ipsa loquitur. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff that the City has a duty to maintain the manhole, as part of its infrastructure, in a reasonably safe condition, and thus it can be held responsible for Plaintiff's alleged injuries. The trial court also agreed that JPS, as an abutting landowner, can be held liable to the extent evidence is presented that JPS contributed to M.Y.’s alleged injuries by having some involvement with the manhole's being left uncovered. The trial court said it is unable to determine at this stage of the litigation how the manhole became uncovered or if it was left uncovered by one of the Defendants.

¶8. Additionally, the trial court considered the two-part public-policy-function test used to determine whether a governmental entity enjoys discretionary-function immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The trial court noted this Court's explanation of the test in Wilcher v. Lincoln County Board of Supervisors, 243 So. 3d 177 (Miss. 2018). First, the trial court “must ascertain whether the activity in question involved an element of choice or judgment.” Id. at 187 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Montgomery, 80 So. 3d 789, 795 (Miss. 2012), overruled by Brantley v. City of Horn Lake, 152 So. 3d 1106 (Miss. 2014), overruled by Wilcher, 243 So. 3d at 185). Second, “[i]f, so, [the trial court] also must decide whether that choice or judgment involved social, economic, or political-policy considerations.” Id. (citing Montgomery, 80 So. 3d at 795).

¶9. The trial court found that the alleged tortious act in this case was leaving a manhole uncovered, and “this act involves a choice or judgment, and thus meets the first part of the two-part, public policy function test.” As to the test's second part, the trial court found that “maintenance of the City's sewer infrastructure certainly involves economic considerations.” But leaving a manhole uncovered does not involve an economic consideration entitling a government entity to discretionary-function immunity. Thus, the trial court found discretionary-function immunity inapplicable. The trial court concluded that Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and denied their respective motions for summary judgment.

¶10. Both Defendants appeal from the trial court's order, claiming that Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that either Defendant had notice of the alleged condition; thus, they claim immunity from suit under the MTCA.

DISCUSSION

¶11. This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment de novo. Monsanto Co. v. Hall, 912 So. 2d 134, 136 (Miss. 2005) (citing Hataway v. Nicholls, 893 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (Miss. 2005)). This requires examination of all evidentiary matters in the record, including admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits and exhibits. Turner v. Johnson, 498 So. 2d 389, 391 (Miss. 1986).

¶12. “[T]he moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Anderson v. Wiggins, 331 So. 3d 1, 4 (Miss. 2020) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Moore v. Delta Reg'l Med. Ctr., 23 So. 3d 541, 544 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). To prevent summary judgment, “the non-moving party must establish that a genuine issue of material fact within the means allowable under [Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure].” Gorman-Rupp Co. v. Hall, 908 So. 2d 749, 754 (Miss. 2005) (citing Richmond v. Benchmark Constr. Corp., 692 So. 2d 60, 61 (Miss. 1997)).

¶13. Plaintiff's claims against the City and JPS are governed by the MTCA. Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(v) exempts a public entity and its employees from liability

[a]rising out of an injury caused by a dangerous condition on property of the governmental entity that was not caused by the negligent or other wrongful conduct of an employee of the governmental entity or of which the governmental entity did not have notice, either actual or constructive, and adequate opport

¶14. Here, Plaintiff maintains on appeal that while Defendants may not have had actual notice of an open manhole on the lawn of Wingfield High School, they had constructive notice of it. For the City, Plaintiff argues that the City should have known through regular inspections and maintenance of its infrastructure that there was a manhole on the land at Wingfield High School. For JPS, Plaintiff likewise argues that JPS should have known through regular inspections and maintenance of its premises that there was a manhole on its land.

¶15. Based on our review of the record, no evidence has been presented to establish that a dangerous condition existed on either the City's or JPS's property of which either entity had constructive notice and time to correct or warn against. There are no exhibits regarding the alleged manhole; there is no evidence or information as to its location; and despite the claim that the “entire school was present” when the alleged incident occurred, there is no incident report from Wingfield High School;¹ and there is no witness or deposition testimony contained in the record that supports Plaintiff's claims. Defendants, on the other hand, have presented evidence that there have been no complaints or notifications of an open manhole on the campus of Wingfield High School.

¶16. As this Court has explained, summary judgment is a procedure by which a moving party is able to pierce the allegations made in the opponent's pleadings and place the nonmoving party in a position to show “via discovery documents (depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, etc.) and/or sworn affidavits that there are genuine issues of material fact which require resolution by ․ trial before the trier-of-fact.” Stuckey v. The Provident Bank, 912 So. 2d 859, 866 (Miss. 2005). This procedure “roots out mere accusation and conjecture in favor of merit and ultimately functions to force a non-movant to present some modicum of material evidence.” Id.

¶17. Similar to what this Court found in Stuckey, Plaintiff here relies solely on the complaint, along with case law illustrating premises liability principles, to avoid summary judgment. Rule 56 provides, however, that “parties may not simply rely on their pleadings, nor may they escape summary judgment by outlining what they might discover later.” Franklin Collection Serv., Inc. v. Kyle, 955 So. 2d 284, 291 (Miss. 2007).

¶18. As noted above, Plaintiff had adequate opportunity to pursue discovery following the trial court's denial of Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions. But no probative evidence has been elicited or submitted to establish a genuine issue of material fact that a dangerous condition existed on either Defendants’ property of which either Defendant had constructive notice and time to correct or warn against. See City of Jackson v. Locklar, 431 So. 2d 475, 479-80 (Miss. 1983) (“Mere proof of a defective condition in the streets, no matter how dangerous, is not sufficient to show breach of the City's duty to maintain its streets safely. A would-be plaintiff must go further and show that the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect.”); see also Hawkins v. City of Morton, 119 So. 3d 1104, 1107 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (summary judgment proper when plaintiff failed to provide evidence that defendants possessed actual or constructive notice of dangerous condition); Serrano v. Laurel Hous. Auth., 151 So. 3d 256, 259-60 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (same); Clein v. Rankin Cnty, Sch. Dist., 78 So. 3d 384, 390 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (same); Howard v. City of Biloxi, 943 So. 2d 751, 755 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (same); Hodges v. Madison Cnty. Med. Ctr., 929 So. 2d 381, 384 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (same); Jenkins v. Miss. Dep't. of Transp., 904 So. 2d 1207, 1212 (Miss. 2004) (same).

CONCLUSION

¶19. For these reasons, Defendants were entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and we render summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

¶20. REVERSED AND RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to the complaint, “the entire school was present during M.Y.[’s] fall,” and “[i]t was reported by the school's security guard that M.Y. attempted to get up and walk but after trying, he fell back to the ground.”

SULLIVAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., MAXWELL, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE, GRIFFIS AND BRANNING, JJ., CONCUR.