BROWN v. MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS (2025)

¶1. On November 5, 2024, Joanne Pearson, a Republican candidate for Madison County Election Commissioner in District Three, defeated Walter Young, Jr., a Democratic candidate, by a vote of 5,772 to 3,917. See Summary Results Report 2024 General Election November 5, 2024, madison-co.com/sites/default/files/election_summary_report.pdf (last visited June 13, 2025).

¶2. In January 2024, Joanne Pearson filed her application to qualify as a candidate for the office of election commissioner in Madison County, Mississippi. At a regularly scheduled board of supervisors meeting that February, the Madison County Board of Supervisors (the Board) voted three-to-one to approve Pearson's candidacy. Five aggrieved citizens, Callie Mae Brown, Mary Margaret Judy, Rebecca Travis, Johnny Washington, and Veronica Washington (collectively, “Brown”) appealed the Board's decision to the Madison County Circuit Court. On appeal, Spence Flatgard, attorney for the Madison County Election Commission, entered an appearance on behalf of the Board. Brown moved to disqualify Flatgard, contending that a conflict of interest had arisen from Flatgard's representation of the Board in a matter concerning the election commission. The circuit court denied Brown's motion to disqualify and affirmed the Board's decision approving Pearson's candidacy. Brown appealed both decisions to this Court. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. On January 29, 2024, Joanne Pearson filed a “Qualifying Statement of Intent” to run as a candidate for county election commissioner with the Clerk of the Board and Chancery Clerk of Madison County, Ronny Lott. The information provided in Pearson's qualifying statement included her name, the office she sought, her date of birth, address, phone number, signature, and a certification that she met “all constitutional, statutory and other legal requirements to hold office.”

¶4. On January 30, 2024, Pearson also filed with Lott a “Certification of Candidate Petition Signatures County Registrar.” Attached was Pearson's “Candidate Petition,” of which the Madison County Circuit Clerk and Registrar, Anita Wray, certified that the “55 signatures on the attached petitions are the names of qualified electors of Madison County, Mississippi as it existed in the year 2024.” The information contained on each page of Pearson's candidate petition included her name, the office that she sought, the county in which she would appear on the ballot, and the appropriate district number for the position she sought, District Three, which corresponded to the supervisor's district in which she resided.

¶5. On February 5, 2024, Walter Young, Jr., addressed the Board regarding Pearson's qualifying papers, contending that the Board should disqualify her candidacy based on the incompleteness of her application. Mike Espy, attorney for the Board, agreed that Pearson's application was incomplete on its face. The Board at that time decided to remove the item concerning Pearson's candidacy from the meeting agenda and to review Pearson's application at a later date following an investigation and recommendation on the matter by Espy.

¶6. At a regularly scheduled board of supervisors meeting held on February 20, 2024, Espy advised that

The statute [Mississippi Code Section 23-15-213 (Supp. 2024)] provides that candidates for election commission must be approved by the board of supervisors and then passed on to the Madison County Election Commission for names to be put on the ballot. ․ [I] recommend to this Board that they approve Mrs. Pearson's candidacy ․ On her qualifying statement of intent ․ several areas left blank․ On the candidate petition, [however,] it has the county, position, name, and her district, and at least 55 [signatures] that were certified as viable electors of [district three]․ Mrs. Pearson's first document appears to be incomplete․ [But] [i]f you read the statute [Mississippi Code Section 23-15-213], [it] talks about [the] elements [the candidate] must provide. [The candidate] must reside in [the] district, file [the] necessary paperwork by deadline, [the candidate] must present [their] petition personally signed by deadline ․ and [the candidate must] declare that [the candidate is] not otherwise unqualified. If [you] look at both documents together, she filed on time, she declared that she was not disqualified to run, her name is there, [the] position is there in [her] petition, and [she] resides in the district. Together that is sufficient.

¶7. Espy continued:

Final issue of concern. [T]he statute says [the candidate must] declare party, if any ․ Now, standing here, I assume that Mrs. Pearson would qualify as a Republican candidate ․ I do not believe it is enough to disqualify someone for running for office. Based on the research I've done and talking to two qualified lawyers—Mr. Howard Brown, chairman of the Madison County Democratic Party ․ I also spoke with Flatgard [attorney for the Commission] ․ so [I've] talked to counsel for and against this. I believe that the benefit of the doubt for any incompleteness that remains should be resolved in the favor of the voters of district three on election day. I believe Mrs. Pearson has met all of the ․ standards necessary by the statute ․ to qualify her for this position and that is my recommendation.

¶8. The Board then voted three-to-one to approve “the Candidate Petition for Election Commissioner for District 3 in Madison County filed by Joanne Pearson and acknowledge documentation in support of this position presented by Board Attorney.”¹ On February 29, 2024, Brown, along with four other aggrieved citizens, appealed the Board's decision to the Madison County Circuit Court. Brown contended that Pearson's petition was invalid for incompleteness and that no legal basis existed for the Board to resolve the party affiliation of a candidate for election commissioner.

¶9. On March 4, 2024, Pearson addressed the Board at a regularly scheduled meeting, relating, inter alia, that “I am Joanne Pearson. I live [in] Ridgeland, and I am a Republican candidate for the Madison County Election Commissioner for District Three.”

¶10. On May 31, 2024, Flatgard entered an appearance as counsel for the Board in the matter. In response, Brown moved to disqualify Flatgard under Rule 1.7 of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. Brown contended that Flatgard could not reasonably be perceived as objectively representing the interests of both the Board and the election commission in the matter. Brown further contended that “there is no indication in the minutes of the Board that it ever authorized lawyer Flatgard to enter an appearance in this case.” In the alternative, Brown argued that Flatgard should be enjoined “from providing any advice to the election commission or having any involvement with the election commission concerning or addressing how ․ Pearson's name may appear on the November 5, 2024[,] ballot ․” (Emphasis added.)

¶11. On July 10, 2024, the circuit court denied Brown's motion to disqualify Flatgard or for injunctive relief in the alternative. On September 11, 2024, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Board, finding that

The record shows that on February 20, 2024, at a regularly scheduled board Meeting, the Madison County Board of Supervisors reviewed the timely filed petition of Joanne Pearson to be placed on the ballot for the office of election commissioner in district three in Madison County, Mississippi. The Board also reviewed the attached county registrar's certification of the petition signatures. The Board determined that the petition was sufficient and had met the statutory requirements for the position.

․

The record further shows that on March 4, 2024, at a regularly scheduled Madison County board meeting, Pearson spoke to the board and declared that she was “a Republican candidate for the Madison County election commissioner for District 3.”

․

The Court has reviewed the filings in the matter and finds the decision of the Board should be affirmed as it was supported by substantial evidence to be compliant with Mississippi Code section 23-15-213. The decision was not arbitrary or capricious, was within the Board's discretionary power, and was not in violation of Appellant's constitutional or statutory rights.

¶12. Brown appealed both orders. Brown raises two issues: (1) whether the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously when it voted to approve Pearson's candidacy, and (2) whether the circuit court erred by denying Brown's motion to disqualify Flatgard as counsel for the Board. Finding no error, we affirm.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously by approving Pearson's candidacy pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-15-213 (Supp. 2024) when her candidate petition failed to include the date of election and when her qualifying statement of intent failed to declare her party affiliation.

¶13. The standard of review in candidate qualification challenges is de novo as to questions of law. Young v. Stevens, 968 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Miss. 2007) (citing Ladner v. Necaise, 771 So. 2d 353, 355 (Miss. 2000)). Moreover, the Court reviews matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Chandler v. McKee, 202 So. 3d 1269, 1271 (Miss. 2016) (citing Wallace v. Town of Raleigh, 815 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Miss. 2002)).

¶14. Prospective candidates for the office of election commissioner can only qualify under Mississippi Code Section 23-15-213. McIntosh v. Sanders, 831 So. 2d 1111, 1114 (Miss. 2002). When a candidate attempts to qualify to run for election commissioner, the county's board of supervisors assumes the role of the election commission over the candidate qualification process. Id. at 1114 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-213 (Rev. 2001)).² Accordingly, “the county board of supervisors has the duty to determine whose name is entitled to appear on a county general election ballot as a candidate for election commissioner.” McIntosh, 831 So. 2d at 1114 (citing § 23-15-213).

¶15. In today's case, therefore, “the board of supervisors acted as election commissioners, not as the board of supervisors.” Id. at 1115. The Court has found that

the [Election] Commission is a quasi judicial administrative agent of the State, and as such, has authority to determine whether or not a person is qualified as a candidate for public office, and such duty is not a ministerial act but is a determination and finding of fact by an administrative agency.

Powe v. Forrest Cnty. Election Comm'n, 249 Miss. 757, 163 So. 2d 656, 659 (1964).

¶16. As such, the Board's decision to approve Pearson's candidacy will be disturbed “only if the decision (1) was beyond its scope or power; (2) violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party; (3) was not supported by substantial evidence; or (4) was arbitrary or capricious.” McAdams v. Perkins, 204 So. 3d 1257, 1261 (Miss. 2016) (citing Baymeadows, LLC v. City of Ridgeland, 131 So. 3d 1156, 1169 (Miss. 2014)); see also UCRCCC 5.03. “An act is arbitrary when it is not done according to reason or judgment, but depending on the will alone.” Burks v. Amite Cnty. Sch. Dist., 708 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (Miss. 1998) (citing McGowan v. Miss. State Oil & Gas Bd., 604 So. 2d 312, 322 (Miss. 1992)). Capricious is defined “as any act done without reason, in a whimsical manner, implying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard for the surrounding facts and settled controlling principles.” Id. (citing McGowan, 604 So. 2d at 322).

¶17. Mississippi Code Section 23-15-213 reads, in relevant part, that

(3) Candidates for county election commissioner shall qualify by filing with the clerk of the board of supervisors of their respective counties a petition personally signed by not less than fifty (50) qualified electors of the supervisor's district in which they reside, requesting that they be a candidate, by 5:00 p.m. not later than February 1 of the year in which the election occurs and unless the petition is filed within the required time, their names shall not be placed upon the ballot. All candidates shall declare in writing their party affiliation, if any, to the board of supervisors, and such party affiliation shall be shown on the official ballot.

(4) The petition shall have attached thereto a certificate of the county registrar showing the number of qualified electors on each petition, which shall be furnished by the registrar on request. The board shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, and if the petition contains the required number of signatures and is filed within the time required, the president of the board shall verify that the candidate is a resident of the supervisor's district in which he or she seeks election and that the candidate is otherwise qualified as provided by law, and shall certify that the candidate is qualified to the chair or secretary of the county election commission and the names of the candidates shall be placed upon the ballot for the ensuing election.

Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-213(3)-(4) (Supp. 2024) (emphasis added).

¶18. In the case sub judice, Brown contended that because Pearson's candidate petition failed to included the date of the election on the pages signed by electors, the electors were misled as to what they had signed. In support, Brown contended that “[p]rimary elections were held ․ on ․ March 12, 2024[;] [i]t is possible or even likely that some of the petitioners thought that Pearson would be on the March 12 ballot.” And “based on her qualifying papers,” according to Brown, “[s]ome of the petitioners may have thought that the candidate intended to run non-partisan and signed on that basis.”

¶19. In City of Clinton v. Smith, a concerned citizen presented to the mayor and board of aldermen a petition calling for a referendum on the sale of beer and to set an election on the matter. City of Clinton v. Smith, 493 So. 2d 331, 332 (Miss 1986). Exceptors to the referendum contended that several signatures were on pages of the petition without any indiction on its face that the signers were endorsing a referendum on the sale of beer in the city. Id. at 334. The Court found that

It is appropriate that our law provide reasonable safeguards upon the petitioning process to the end that no one will be misled and that the intent of the petitioning parties will be clear. Where, as here, there are six pages containing the signatures of registered voters with no language appearing thereon other than signatures, addresses and date of signing, we may be comfortable upon neither point: That the signatories were not misled nor that their intent was clearly manifested.

․

․ [W]e hold that each signature of a registered voter, before that signature may be validated and counted toward the number of signatures required by statute, must appear upon a page which contains language expressing in an intelligible manner the desire of the signing party that a particular referendum election be called, that is, language sufficient that one reading it before signing would not likely be misled as to the effect and import of his or her signature.

Id. at 341 (emphasis added).

¶20. The Court has held in similar circumstances that “[i]t is well established that minor irregularities and defects in a petition will not invalidate an election.” Stennis v. Bd. of Supervisors of Clay Cnty., 232 Miss. 212, 98 So. 2d 636, 641 (1957) (citing 29 C.J.S. Elections § 69). The Court concluded that “[i]t is sufficient if the petition express in an intelligible manner the desire of the petitioners that a local option election be held.” Id. (citing 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 77). Moreover, the Court found that “petitions for an election are adequate if they substantially comply with the requirements of the statute and are reasonably sufficient to authorize the board of supervisors to take jurisdiction of the matter and make the order for election.” Id. at 642 (emphasis added).

¶21. Additionally, the Court has found that “[w]e have on many occasions held that technical irregularities will not vitiate an election where there is no evidence of fraud or intentional wrong.” Wilbourn v. Hobson, 608 So. 2d 1187, 1192 (Miss. 1992) (citing Rizzo v. Bizzell, 530 So. 2d 121, 126-27 (Miss. 1988)). This is because “[i]f the integrity of a ballot is unquestioned, there is no good reason to disenfranchise a voter for some technical aberration beyond his control.” Id. at 1193.

¶22. Moreover, the Board's attorney based his recommendation to approve Pearson's candidacy on three attorney general opinions. Miss. Att'y Gen. Op., No. 2012-00355, 2012 WL 3535932, Martin, at *1 (July 13, 2012)³ ; Miss. Att'y Gen. Op., No. 2012-00442, 2012 WL 6065230, Clark, at *1-2 (Sept. 21, 2012)⁴ ; Miss. Att'y Gen. Op., No. 2016-00371, 2016 WL 4965394, White, at *1-2 (Aug. 26, 2016)⁵ . The Court has found that “Attorney General opinions are not binding, but they certainly are useful in offering guidance to the Court.” Jones Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Miss. Dep't of Revenue, 111 So. 3d 588, 602 (Miss. 2013) (citing Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dale, 914 So. 2d 698, 703 (Miss. 2005)); see also Smith v. Webster, 233 So. 3d 242, 248 (Miss. 2017) (“Attorney-general opinions are not binding on this Court but may be considered.” (citing McAdams, 204 So. 3d at 1262)).

¶23. These attorney general opinions, which were presented to and acknowledged by the Board, are in harmony with the decisions of this Court. It is uncontested that Pearson's submitted candidate petition did not include the date of the general election. The plain language of Mississippi Code Section 23-15-213, however, does not require a prospective candidate to include the date of the election in their petition for it to be sufficient to qualify for placement upon the ballot. Based on this Court's decisions in Stennis and City of Clinton, the dispositive question is whether Pearson's failure to include the date of the election on each page of her candidate petition misled the fifty-five qualified electors as to what they had signed. See Stennis, 98 So. 2d at 642; City of Clinton, 493 So. 2d at 341.

¶24. In today's case, the record reveals that each and every page of Pearson's candidate petition contained her name, the office that she sought, the county of which she would appear upon the ballot, and the appropriate district number, District Three, which properly corresponded to the supervisor's district in which she resided. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we find that Pearson's candidate petition was not misleading by its terms and that the signers’ intent to endorse Pearson's placement upon the ballot was clear.

¶25. Moreover, the last sentence of Section 23-15-213(3) reads, “[a]ll candidates shall declare in writing their party affiliation, if any, to the board of supervisors, and such party affiliation shall be shown on the official ballot.” § 23-15-213(3). Section 23-15-213(3) contains a mandatory requirement that a candidate declare their party affiliation in writing to the Board, as denoted by the word “shall.” It is a core principle of statutory construction that “shall” signifies a mandatory requirement while “may” is discretionary. Wallace v. State, 360 So. 3d 231, 237 (Miss. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Khurana v. Miss. Dep't of Revenue, 85 So. 3d 851, 854 (Miss. 2012)). Although Pearson declared to the Board on March 4, 2024, that she was a “Republican candidate” for election commissioner, she did not declare her party affiliation in writing to the Board. Her party affiliation, however, did appear on the official ballot of the November 5, 2024, general election.⁶

¶26. While Section 23-15-213(3) contains the mandatory requirement for Pearson to declare her party affiliation in writing, Brown's challenge regarding Pearson's party affiliation does not contest her qualifications as a candidate pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-15-963(2). Under that statute, only “the qualifications” of candidates for county election commissioner can be contested. See Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-963(2) (Rev. 2018). Section 23-15-213(3) unambiguously sets forth that a candidate for election commissioner “shall qualify” by (1) filing with the clerk of the Board, (2) a petition personally signed by fifty qualified electors, (3) of the supervisor's district in which they reside, and (4) that petition must be filed prior to 5:00 p.m. on the first of February of the election year. § 23-15-213(3); see supra ¶ 17.

¶27. Brown's challenge to Pearson's failure to properly declare her party affiliation does not contest whether Pearson's name was entitled to appear on the ballot but rather how her name would appear on the ballot. See supra ¶ 10. Section 23-15-213 represents the exclusive procedure for qualifying as a candidate for county election commissioner. See McIntosh, 831 So. 2d at 1114. Under the plain language of that statute, candidates for a county's election commission do not run in primary elections. For most offices, primary elections are held by a county's party executive committee to determine which candidate will stand for the general election under the banner of a particular political party pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-15-299 (Supp. 2024). Because county election commissioners do not run in primary elections, prospective candidates for that office must declare their party affiliation to the Board to ensure that the general election ballots properly reflect the candidate's desired party affiliation. See § 23-15-213(3).

¶28. The consequence of Pearson's failure to abide by this mandatory provision was that the Board would have been justified in denying Pearson the ability to have her desired party affiliation reflected on the general election ballot. The Board in today's case, however, determined that it was sufficiently satisfied with Pearson's oral declaration at its March 4, 2024, board meeting to allow Pearson to appear as a Republican candidate on the general election ballot. We find that this determination neither touched on Pearson's qualifications to run as a candidate for county election commissioner under Section 23-15-213 nor was it grounds to disqualify her candidacy under Section 23-15-963(2).

¶29. In today's case, Pearson's application satisfied each and every requirement to qualify as a candidate for county election commissioner under Section 23-13-213(3)-(4). See supra ¶ 17. Evidence was presented of Pearson's “Certification of Candidate Petition Signatures County Registrar,” revealing that the county's registrar, Wray, certified that the fifty-five signatures of qualified electors included on Pearson's candidate petition were valid. That certification, along with Pearson's qualifying statement of intent and candidate petition, was filed with the clerk of the Board, Lott, prior to the February 1 filing deadline.

¶30. The Board then found that Pearson's petition contained the required number of signatures after hearing the arguments and recommendations of Young, the challenger, and Espy, attorney for the Board. Each page of Pearson's candidate petition contained the office she sought, the county where she was running, her name, and the specific district number for the office sought. Pearson's qualifying statement of intent, moreover, revealed that she met “all constitutional, statutory and other legal requirements to hold said office.” Her qualifying statement of intent additionally revealed that she was a resident of Ridgeland, i.e., District Three—the district for which she sought election.

¶31. Accordingly, the Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by finding that Pearson's application was sufficient to approve her candidacy for county election commissioner under Section 23-15-213.

II. Whether the circuit court manifestly erred by its decision to deny Brown's motion to disqualify Attorney Flatgard.

¶32. This Court has applied a manifest error standard of review of trial court decisions regarding a motion to disqualify an attorney. Colson v. Johnson, 764 So. 2d 438, 439 (Miss. 2000) (citing Quick Change Oil & Lubrication Co. v. Cnty. Line Place, Inc., 571 So. 2d 968, 970 (Miss. 1990)); see also Williams v. Bell, 793 So. 2d 609, 611 (Miss. 2001). Accordingly, the circuit court's decision to deny Brown's motion to disqualify Flatgard will not be disturbed “unless it ‘is a result of prejudice, bias, or fraud, or is manifestly against the weight of credible evidence.’ ” Glenn v. Powell, 149 So. 3d 480, 483 (Miss. 2014) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Boyd v. Tishomingo Cnty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 912 So. 2d 124, 128-29 (Miss. 2005)).

¶33. Rule 1.7 of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct reads:

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes:

(1) the representation will not be adversely affected; and

(2) the client has given knowing and informed consent after consultation. The consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the representation and the advantages and risks involved.

Miss. R. Pro. Conduct 1.7(b).

¶34. “Conflict of interest occurs when a person charged with looking after the interest of A and B is faced with an option whereby if he makes one choice it will of necessity hurt A and help B, and if he makes the other choice he will of necessity help A and hurt B.” Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 268 (Miss. 1988) (citing Pearl River Valley Water Supply v. Hinds Cnty., 445 So. 2d 1330, 1356 n.25 (Miss. 1984)).

¶35. Mississippi Code Section 19-3-47(1)(b) provides that “[t]he board of supervisors shall have the power ․ to employ counsel in all civil cases in which the county is interested ․” Miss. Code Ann. § 19-3-47(1)(b) (Rev. 2024). Moreover, Mississippi Code Section 23-15-219(1) provides that “the board of election commissioners is hereby authorized ․ to employ and set or determine the duties of ․ legal counsel ․ However, before employing such persons ․ the election commissioners must first have the approval of the board of supervisors of the county.” Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-219(1) (Rev. 2018).

¶36. Brown contends that “lawyer Spencer [sic] Flatgard cannot reasonably be perceived to be able to represent the Board of Supervisors in this case and then to objectively represent the election commission on whether or how to address the candidate's party affiliation.”

¶37. In this specific matter, the interests of the election commission and the Board are not adverse because they are the same entity. In qualifying as a candidate under Section 23-15-213, “[t]he board of supervisors takes on the role of the board of election commissioners when the election commissioners themselves run for election.” McIntosh, 831 So. 2d at 1114 (citing § 23-15-213). As such, “the county board of supervisors has the duty to determine whose name is entitled to appear on a county general election ballot as a candidate for election commissioner.” Id. at 1115 (citing § 23-15-213). Despite Brown's contention, the election commission possessed no authority under Section 23-15-213 to determine “whether or how to address the candidate's party affiliation.” Pursuant to that statute, once the Board found that Pearson's application was sufficient for her to qualify as a candidate, the election commission's sole duty was to ensure that the printed ballots reflected the Board's decision.

¶38. Brown further contends that “upon information and belief, there is no indication in the minutes of the Board that it ever authorized lawyer Flatgard to enter an appearance in this case” and that “[i]f that is in fact the case, arguably Flatgard has entered an appearance in this case without proper authorization.” Brown did not present any evidence to support this contention.

¶39. The Board contended that it approved Flatgard's representation of the county for election matters. In support, the Board presented a letter dated October 12, 2022, from Flatgard, an attorney employed by Watkins & Eager, to the election commission, which read that

I have enjoyed representing the Madison County Election Commission since 2004 and each of you as Election Commissioners. I also have enjoyed working with the Board of Supervisors, County employees and Mike Espy who all make my job much easier. I am grateful for the opportunity to continue serving the County as your counsel pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 23-15-219(1).

The Board also presented the minutes from its meeting held on November 7, 2022, revealing that it had approved the election commission's “Agreement with Watkins & Eager for Continuing Counsel Representation.”

¶40. The Board further contended that under Section 23-15-219(1), a lawyer for the election commission must be hired with the approval of both the election commission and the Board, contemplating that counsel for the election commission must be approved by and represent both entities within one county government. According to the Board, “Mr. Flatgard has, in fact, followed the statute and been employed by both entities for Madison County in this matter as reflected by the approval of his engagement letter and several legal invoices approved by both entities and reflected in their respective minutes.”

¶41. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court's decision to deny Brown's motion to disqualify Flatgard, therefore, was not the result of prejudice, bias, or fraud or manifestly against the weight of credible evidence.

CONCLUSION

¶42. Finding no error, we affirm the decisions of the Board and circuit court.

¶43. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Along with Section 23-15-213, Espy discussed three Mississippi attorney general opinions that the Board acknowledged in making its determination. See infra ¶ 22.

2.   Generally, when a candidate seeks to qualify to run for office,[t]he appropriate election commission shall determine whether each candidate is a qualified elector of the state, state district, county or county district they seek to serve, and whether each candidate meets all other qualifications to hold the office he or she is seeking or presents absolute proof that he or she will, subject to no contingencies, meet all qualifications on or before the date of the general or special election at which he or she could be elected to office.Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-359(9)(a) (Supp. 2024).

3.   In Martin, the question presented read: “[i]f the Board is required to vote on the sufficiency of the petitions, may the Board consider a ‘substantial compliance’ as opposed to a ‘strict compliance’ of the requirements of Miss Code Ann. Section 23-15-213[?]” Martin, 2012 WL 3535932, at *1. The attorney general answered that “[w]hile the Board may consider whether there has been substantial compliance with certain provisions of the qualifying procedure set forth in Section 23-15-213, the deadline for filing the required petition ․ requires strict compliance.” Id. (emphasis added).

4.   In Clark, the attorney general identified that the Court has found that “mere technical irregularities will not vitiate the validity of an election where there is no evidence of fraud or intentional wrongdoing.” Clark, 2012 WL 6065230, at *2 (citing Wilbourn, 608 So. 2d at 1192; Campbell v. Whittington, 733 So. 2d 820, 826 (Miss. 1999)). The Attorney General “further recognized that the commission should give the candidate the ‘benefit of the doubt’ since the ultimate decision of who holds the office will be made by the voters.” Id. (citing Miss. Att'y Gen. Op., 1986 WL 82029, Reece, at *1 (Sept. 19, 1986)).

5.   In White, the question to the attorney general was whether the board of supervisors could find a petition valid when the petition stated the incorrect district of the prospective candidate for county election commissioner. White, 2016 WL 4965394, at *1. The attorney general opined thatIn MS AG Op., Sorrel (March 23, 2009), again citing City of Clinton v. Smith, we advised the City of Southaven that if a signature page of a candidate petition lacks either the candidate's name or the ward number of a candidate for alderman, then the signatures on that page may not be counted. However, Southaven has aldermen elected by ward as well as an at-large alderman; therefore, voters could be mistaken as to which office the candidate sought election, since he would have been qualified to run in only one ward alderman office, the ward in which he resided for electoral purposes.Since there is no at-large county election commission office, voters signing the candidate petition are “not likely to be misled” if the district number on the petition is incorrect, as evidenced by the fact the requisite number of signatures on the petition are by qualified electors of the district in which the candidate resides. Therefore, the board of supervisors, exercising its authority to determine the sufficiency of the petition may find that the petition is valid, subject to judicial review.Id. at *2 (emphasis added).

6.   See SAMPLE Official Election Ballot State of Mississippi Madison County Federal General Election Tuesday, November 5, 2024, https://madison-co.com/sites/default/files/sample_ballot_7.pdf (last visited June 13, 2025).

RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., MAXWELL, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN AND BRANNING, JJ., CONCUR.