SANCHEZ v. SANCHEZ (2026)

¶1. After almost thirteen years of marriage, Stacy Sanchez sought a divorce in the Lamar County Chancery Court from her husband Patrick Sanchez. At trial, the parties agreed to a fault-based divorce. The parties requested that the chancellor equitably distribute their marital property, determine the amount of child support and expenses, and determine the type and amount of any alimony award.

¶2. After equitably dividing the marital estate, the chancellor ordered Patrick to pay child support. The chancellor also awarded Stacy periodic alimony. Because Patrick was entirely responsible for the mortgage payments on the parties’ marital home, the chancellor set Patrick's initial monthly alimony payments at $1,000. When the parties later sold the marital home and Patrick's obligation to cover the mortgage payments ended, the chancellor ordered that Patrick's periodic alimony payments increase to $3,000 a month.

¶3. In his sole issue on appeal, Patrick challenges the type of alimony that the chancellor awarded. Specifically, Patrick argues that the chancellor abused his discretion by awarding periodic alimony because rehabilitative alimony would have been more appropriate. Upon review, we find no error in the chancellor's award of periodic alimony. We therefore affirm the chancellor's final judgment.

FACTS

¶4. Patrick and Stacy married in June 2010. During their almost thirteen years of marriage, the couple had five children. Stacy filed a complaint for divorce in March 2023, and Patrick subsequently filed his answer and counter-complaint for divorce. At trial, the parties consented to a fault-based divorce and requested that the chancellor determine equitable distribution of the marital property, child support and expenses, and the type and amount of alimony.

¶5. At the time of trial, both parties were thirty-seven years old. Patrick worked full-time as a physician. Although Stacy initially worked full-time while Patrick completed medical school, the parties agreed that she would no longer work outside the home when she became pregnant. At the time of the parties’ divorce, Stacy worked part-time as a preschool teacher. The parties agreed that Stacy would not resume full-time employment until after their youngest child began school. The parties also agreed that their children would attend and graduate from a local private school. Moreover, Patrick agreed to assume sole financial responsibility for most of the children's expenses, including the expenses related to the children's education, insurance, and general activities.

¶6. The chancellor found that Stacy's adjusted gross monthly income was $500, while her monthly expenses totaled about $7,700. The chancellor further found that none of Stacy's monthly expenses were extravagant or unreasonable. By contrast, Patrick's adjusted gross monthly income amounted to $13,458.84, and his monthly expenses totaled about the same as Stacy's expenses.

¶7. The monthly mortgage payment on the parties’ marital home amounted to $3,800. Considering each party's monthly income and expenses, the chancellor concluded that they could no longer afford the marital home. As a result, the chancellor ordered that the marital home should be sold and that Patrick should continue to pay the mortgage and utilities until the sale was completed. Because Patrick had agreed to “absorb the brunt of [Stacy's] expenses and the children's expenses for some time[,]” the chancellor found that the sale of the marital home would help “increase Patrick's ability to meet these financial obligations.”

¶8. In equitably distributing the couple's “non-retirement[-]account liquid assets,” the chancellor ultimately awarded Stacy sixty percent of the assets and awarded Patrick forty percent. This distribution amounted to $282,557.44 for Stacy and $188,371.62 for Patrick. The chancellor explained that he divided the “non-retirement[-]account liquid assets” this way “[i]n an effort to provide Stacy with a down payment on a new mortgage and to lessen Patrick's future financial obligations to her ․” With regard to the parties’ retirement accounts, the chancellor awarded Stacy half of Patrick's two accounts and allowed Stacy to retain the entirety of her account. Although noting that “[t]his award slightly skews in Stacy's favor[,]” the chancellor reasoned that the “retirement accounts provide future financial security, and Patrick has much greater means to strengthen his future financial security than Stacy currently has.” In all, the chancellor found that the total assets awarded to Stacy amounted to $588,994.67 and that the total assets awarded to Patrick amounted to $456,155.88.

¶9. In discussing the parties’ marital debts, the chancellor determined that Patrick would retain his ownership interest in a local medical partnership entity. Although Patrick would be solely responsible for the debt associated with the ownership interest, the chancellor stated that Patrick would also “solely retain[ ] the income-producing benefit of the interest.” Despite having a current negative value on paper, the chancellor found that Patrick's ownership interest in the partnership entity provided Patrick with “a substantial income ․, which should increase tremendously once the debt is satisfied.”

¶10. After distributing the marital estate, the chancellor assessed the following factors to determine whether to award Stacy alimony:

1. The income and expenses of the parties;

2. The health and earning capacities of the parties;

3. The needs of each party;

4. The obligations and assets of each party;

5. The length of the marriage;

6. The presence or absence of minor children in the home, which may require that one or both of the parties either pay, or personally provide, child care;

7. The age of the parties;

8. The standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at the time of the support determination;

9. The tax consequences of the spousal support order;

10. Fault or misconduct;

11. Wasteful dissipation of assets by either party; or

12. Any other factor deemed by the court to be “just and equitable” in connection with the setting of spousal support.

Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993).

¶11. The chancellor found that both parties were thirty-seven years old, in good health, and had their maximum wage-earning years still ahead of them. Patrick's monthly income far surpassed Stacy's monthly income, and both parties had monthly expenses totaling just over $7,000. On top of Patrick's routine monthly expenses, he had agreed to pay a majority of the children's expenses and now would be required to pay child support as well. Patrick possessed a much greater earning capacity as a physician than Stacy did as an educator, but the chancellor recognized that Stacy currently worked only part-time. As a result, Stacy earned only a fraction of her potential full earning capacity. Even as Stacy transitioned to full-time employment, however, the chancellor acknowledged that Patrick's earning capacity would continue to eclipse her earning capacity and that a significant discrepancy would likely continue between the parties’ incomes.

¶12. The chancellor characterized the parties’ nearly thirteen-year marriage as lengthy and acknowledged that the parties had agreed to joint legal and physical custody of their children. Each party would therefore have the children for significant periods of time every month. Patrick, though, had agreed to assume sole responsibility for the children's private-school tuition and a majority of their other expenses. In addition, Patrick would be responsible for funding two households as Stacy continued to work part-time and then eventually would transition to full-time employment after the youngest child started school. The chancellor found that each party's primary needs would focus on providing housing and transportation for the children. In light of Stacy's more limited income, the chancellor concluded that these needs were greater for her than for Patrick. The chancellor recognized, though, that both parties would be responsible for the mortgage payment on a new home and that Patrick would continue to pay his partnership debt after the divorce.

¶13. Although Patrick stipulated to a fault-based divorce, the chancellor noted that Patrick had maintained his role as the primary income provider throughout the parties’ marriage. The chancellor found that the parties had enjoyed an above-average standard of living during marriage and that there was no evidence of unnecessary spending or dissipation of assets by either party since their separation. Given the parties’ various obligations after the divorce, however, the chancellor concluded that there was no way for them to maintain or replicate their prior standard of living as they moved forward.

¶14. After taking into consideration each relevant factor, the chancellor found that an award of periodic rather than lump-sum alimony would be appropriate. The chancellor ordered Patrick to pay Stacy $1,000 a month in alimony while Patrick also paid the monthly mortgage on the marital home. Once the parties sold the marital home and Patrick no longer had to pay the monthly mortgage, the chancellor ordered Patrick's alimony payment to increase to $3,000 a month.

¶15. The chancellor next considered the issue of child support. The chancellor discussed the statutory guidelines for child support, the parties’ agreed-upon custody schedule, and Patrick's willingness to assume sole responsibility for a large portion of the children's routine expenses. Taking these facts into consideration, the chancellor ordered Patrick to pay $3,425 in monthly child support, which included the cost of the children's private-school tuition.

¶16. In total, the chancellor ordered Patrick to pay Stacy $6,425 a month in child support and alimony. The chancellor found that after these payments, Stacy would have a monthly income of $6,925, and Patrick would have a monthly income of $7,034. Of utmost importance, the chancellor found that the amounts awarded to Stacy would help to ensure that the parties' “children will be properly provided for moving forward.”

¶17. Both parties filed post-trial motions. After a hearing on the parties’ arguments, the chancellor ordered Patrick to pay the guardian ad litem's fees. In his bench ruling, the chancellor noted that Stacy's income remained the same as it had at the time of trial and that she now would bear the additional responsibility of paying for a new house. Based on the parties’ relative financial positions, particularly Stacy's limited income and ongoing expenses, as well as the fault-based ground underpinning the divorce, the chancellor found that no other relief would be granted. The chancellor therefore denied the parties’ other requests for relief, including Patrick's attempt to change Stacy's alimony award. Aggrieved by the chancellor's judgment, Patrick appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶18. In his sole issue on appeal, Patrick challenges the award of periodic alimony to Stacy. Patrick contends that given the chancellor's own findings under Armstrong, an award of rehabilitative alimony would have been more appropriate and “far better suited to the facts” of the case.¹ Patrick argues that the chancellor incorrectly applied his findings under the Armstrong factors, which resulted in an inequitable award of periodic rather than rehabilitative alimony. As a result, Patrick asks this Court to reverse the chancellor's award of alimony to Stacy and to remand the matter for further proceedings.

¶19. In reviewing the chancellor's decision, “[w]e will not ‘disturb his opinion when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous[,] or an erroneous legal standard was applied.’ ” Anderson v. Grabmiller, 394 So. 3d 493, 510 (¶73) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Rankin v. Rankin, 323 So. 3d 1073, 1077 (¶8) (Miss. 2021)). We review de novo any questions of law. Id. at 500 (¶29). Questions regarding “whether to award alimony and the amount to be awarded are largely within the discretion of the chancellor.” Id. at 502 (¶36) (quoting Gussio v. Gussio, 371 So. 3d 734, 749 (¶39) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)). “When reviewing decisions on alimony, we do not apply or reweigh the Armstrong factors de novo but instead recognize that alimony awards are within the discretion of the chancellor, and [those determinations] will not be reversed on appeal unless the chancellor abused his discretion.” Id. at 500-01 (¶29) (quoting Layton v. Layton, 181 So. 3d 275, 279-80 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)).

¶20. An award of alimony is appropriately considered if “the property division results in a ‘deficit’ to one spouse.” Id. at 501 (¶31) (quoting Layton, 181 So. 3d at 282 (¶17)). The “deficit” to which we refer “does not mean that ‘one spouse has received assets with a lesser net value than those allocated to the other spouse.’ ” Id. Instead, the relevant “question is whether the spouse seeking alimony is left with a deficit with respect to having sufficient resources and assets to meet his or her needs and living expenses.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).

¶21. Mississippi courts award periodic alimony “on the basis of need, generally in monthly installments.” Id. at (¶33) (quoting Gussio, 371 So. 3d at 748 (¶35)). Periodic alimony “has no fixed termination date, but it automatically terminates upon the remarriage of the recipient or death of the payor.” Id. In addition, periodic alimony “can be modified or terminated in the event of a material change of circumstances for either party.” Id.

¶22. Although “similar to periodic alimony, [rehabilitative alimony] includes a time limitation so that it is payable only for a fixed period.” Id. at (¶34) (internal quotation marks omitted). Like periodic alimony, rehabilitative alimony can be modified. Id. But “[t]he purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to ‘allow the [recipient] to get back into the working world ․ to become self-sufficient.’ ” Id. (quoting Gussio, 371 So. 3d at 749 (¶37)).

¶23. Here, the record supports the chancellor's determination that even after equitably dividing the marital property, Stacy was left with insufficient resources and assets to cover her needs and living expenses. In addition, the record demonstrates that in awarding Stacy monthly periodic alimony, the chancellor sought to balance the competing interests of adequately providing for Stacy while also reducing Patrick's burden as much as possible in light of Patrick's other financial obligations. Based on the parties’ own testimony and evidence, the chancellor concluded that Stacy's monthly income amounted to only $500, while her reasonable monthly expenses totaled about $7,700.

¶24. Although Stacy's portion of the marital estate would assist her after the divorce, the chancellor found that alimony would still be necessary to help her purchase a new home and cover other future expenses for herself and the children. After conducting his analysis of the Armstrong factors, including Stacy's income relative to her needs and living expenses, the chancellor concluded that “[a] fixed, reliable stream of monthly income” was needed rather than any type of lump-sum payment. As a result, the chancellor found that an award of periodic alimony was most appropriate. Even after considering Patrick's post-trial arguments in favor of rehabilitative alimony, the chancellor determined at the end of the hearing that periodic alimony remained the most appropriate type of alimony.

¶25. In affirming the chancellor's award of periodic alimony to Stacy, we find our prior decision in Anderson to be instructive. In that case, Sarah Anderson and Josh Grabmiller agreed to an irreconcilable-differences divorce but asked the chancellor to determine several issues, including “[t]he amount, duration, and form of alimony, if any, to be paid by one party to the other.” Anderson, 394 So. 3d at 496 (¶1). In his final judgment, the chancellor granted Sarah physical custody of the couple's children, granted Josh visitation, and granted both parties legal custody. Id. at 500 (¶25). The chancellor ordered Josh to pay Sarah $600 in monthly child support. Id. After equitably distributing the marital estate, the chancellor considered the Armstrong factors and whether to award alimony. Id. at (¶¶26-27). The chancellor ultimately ordered Sarah to pay Josh $1,000 in monthly periodic alimony. Id. at (¶27). In appealing from the chancellor's decision, Sarah argued that the chancellor erred by failing to (1) “analyze or consider rehabilitative alimony as an alternative to periodic alimony;” and (2) “apply the Armstrong factors to decide the proper type of alimony (rehabilitative or periodic) and ․ consider whether any of the factors supported rehabilitative alimony.” Id. at 496 (¶2) (footnote omitted).

¶26. Much like Patrick and Stacy, the parties in Anderson were married for approximately fourteen years, although they were separated for the final two years of their marriage. Id. at 505 (¶47). The chancellor described the parties’ marriage as “a relatively long” one, but he later acknowledged that others might consider the marriage to “be in the middle ground somewhere ․” Id. at 503-05 (¶¶43, 51). Similarly to Patrick and Stacy (who were both thirty-seven years old at the time of their divorce), Josh was forty-one years old, and Sarah was thirty-nine years old at the time of their divorce. Id. at 503 (¶43).

¶27. Sarah worked as a physician while Josh stayed home with the couple's children and remodeled the marital home. Id. at 497-98 (¶¶10-13). Following the couple's separation, Josh obtained employment. Id. at 499 (¶22). The chancellor found that Josh had a monthly disposable income of $2,995 and that Sarah had a monthly disposable income of $12,969. Id. at (¶¶22-23). After factoring in each party's reasonable monthly expenses, “the chancellor determined that Josh was [still] left with a monthly deficit of $1,004, while Sarah was left with a monthly surplus of $2,050.” Id. at 503 (¶41). As a result, much like the chancellor's findings here with regard to Stacy's income and expenses, the chancellor in Anderson concluded that “a financial disparity” remained regarding Josh's ability to meet his reasonable needs and living expenses. Id.

¶28. In her unsuccessful post-trial motion, Sarah asked the chancellor to alter or amend the alimony award to Josh and to consider awarding rehabilitative rather than periodic alimony. Id. at 500 (¶28). Similarly to Patrick's arguments now before us, Sarah contended on appeal that the chancellor erred by limiting the alimony inquiry to a consideration of periodic alimony only. Id. at 504 (¶46). Also like Patrick, Sarah took issue with the chancellor's classification of the parties’ fourteen-year marriage as “relatively long[.]” Id. at 505 (¶48). Moreover, Sarah noted that Josh was forty-one years old, and “[s]he asserted that ‘Mississippi case law shows patterns of denying permanent alimony to parties who are young and able to still work.’ ” Id. at (¶49).

¶29. Despite Sarah's assertions on appeal, this Court remained unpersuaded. Id. at 506 (¶55). We pointed out that “[t]he chancellor did consider rehabilitative alimony when Sarah raised the issue in her motion to alter or amend the judgment.” Id. at 504 (¶46). The record clearly reflected that the chancellor not only heard but also considered the parties’ arguments regarding alimony. Id. at 505 (¶51). But as the chancellor explained, even upon reconsideration, he still found the disparity in the parties’ incomes to be an important factor that warranted the award of periodic rather than rehabilitative alimony. Id.

¶30. This Court also rejected Sarah's arguments that the chancellor failed to properly apply the Armstrong factors and consider if any factors supported an award of rehabilitative alimony. Id. at 506-07 (¶56). Although “the chancellor did not reiterate a complete on-the-record consideration of the Armstrong factors in the rehabilitative alimony context when he issued his bench ruling or order denying Sarah's motion[,]” this Court ultimately found that such “a second on-the-record review” was unnecessary. Id. at 507-09 (¶¶59, 67). We noted that “the chancellor made detailed findings of fact on each of the Armstrong factors in his memorandum opinion that was entered several weeks after the conclusion of the three-day trial.” Id. at 507 (¶57). Following the hearing on the parties’ post-trial motions, the chancellor did readdress at least some of the Armstrong factors. Id. at 507-08 (¶¶61-63).

¶31. For instance, the chancellor once again “emphasized the financial/earning capacity between the parties in denying Sarah's motion to reform the alimony award ․” Id. at 508 (¶63). And as we noted in affirming the chancellor's decision, such “a significant disparity in earning capacity is a major factor in the determination of a periodic alimony award.” Id. at (¶64) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 832 So. 2d 492, 499 (¶23) (Miss. 2002)). In addition, the chancellor amended his initial characterization of the parties’ fourteen-year marriage as “relatively long” and acknowledged that perhaps the marriage “may be in the middle ground somewhere.” Id. at 507-08 (¶61). Other than recognizing that the chancellor's statement demonstrated his reconsideration of the Armstrong factors in light of Sarah's post-trial arguments, we declined to comment on his classification of the parties’ marriage as either “relatively long” or, later, as “in the middle ground.” Id. at (¶¶61-62). Moreover, we held that even with the chancellor's “reclassification” of the length of the parties’ marriage, there was “no error in the chancellor declining to grant Sarah's motion to reform the alimony awarded from periodic to rehabilitative alimony.” Id. at 508 (¶65). Instead, we specifically pointed out prior cases where we had “affirmed awards of periodic alimony where the marriages were of comparable lengths.” Id.

¶32. Although the chancellor in Anderson did not explicitly readdress his findings on the remaining Armstrong factors, we observed that we need not remand the case “so long as all facts are available to us so as to allow an equitable determination to be made.” Id. at 509 (¶66) (quoting Lewis v. Lewis, 360 So. 3d 298, 304 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)). Based on our own review of the record and the findings the chancellor set forth in his earlier memorandum opinion, we concluded that we indeed had all the facts necessary to allow us to find no manifest error or abuse of discretion in the chancellor's decision to deny Sarah's requested change to the type of alimony awarded. Id. at 510 (¶71). As a result, we affirmed the chancellor's determination. Id. at (¶74).

¶33. Just as in Anderson, we find the record here reflects that the chancellor heard and considered Patrick's arguments in favor of rehabilitative alimony. Although the chancellor acknowledged that Patrick raised “legitimate arguments” during the post-trial hearing, the chancellor ultimately concluded that none of these arguments compelled him to alter Stacy's alimony award. Much like the chancellor in Anderson, the chancellor here did not perform a second in-depth analysis of each Armstrong factor before denying Patrick's request to award rehabilitative alimony. Rather, the chancellor only briefly referenced the parties’ financial situations, including Stacy's unchanged limited monthly income and new home-ownership responsibility, as well as Patrick's conduct contributing to the divorce, before denying almost all of the parties’ requested relief.

¶34. Between our own review of the record and the factual findings contained in the chancellor's final judgment, we find there is sufficient evidence “available to us so as to allow an equitable determination to be made.” Anderson, 394 So. 3d at 509 (¶66) (emphasis omitted). Thus, as in Anderson, we conclude “after considering the chancellor's bench ruling and order and the supporting facts in the record ․ that the chancellor did assess the Armstrong factors in the rehabilitative alimony context ․” Id. at 510 (¶71). And upon review of the chancellor's determination, we find that he “was neither manifestly wrong nor did he abuse his discretion when he denied [Patrick's] motion to reform the alimony award from periodic to rehabilitative alimony.” Id. at 510 (¶71).

CONCLUSION

¶35. Because we find that substantial record evidence supports the chancellor's award of periodic alimony to Stacy and that the alimony award resulted in neither manifest error nor an abuse of discretion, we affirm the chancellor's judgment.

¶36. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his appellate brief, Patrick alleges that an award of lump-sum alimony also would have been more appropriate than periodic alimony. In his post-trial motion, however, Patrick only asked the chancellor to reconsider the award of periodic alimony in favor of an award of rehabilitative alimony, and he did not assert as error the chancellor's failure to award lump-sum alimony. We therefore decline to address for the first time on appeal Patrick's contention that the chancellor erred by failing to award lump-sum alimony; instead, we consider only his argument that the chancellor erred by failing to award rehabilitative alimony. See In re Est. of Dorris, 428 So. 3d 441, 451 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2026).

WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.