STEPHANIE FORD APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE (2026)

¶1. A jury convicted Stephanie Ford of shooting into an occupied dwelling in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-29 (Rev. 2020). The circuit court sentenced Ford to serve ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Ford now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in admitting video surveillance evidence that was not properly authenticated. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2. On May 8, 2023, police responded to a report of a shooting at a quadruplex on Skyview Drive in Jackson. Resident Rasheka Harris reported that a woman she recognized (but knew only by her nickname “Black”) came to Harris’ door and beat on it with a hammer before retrieving a gun from her car and firing shots at Harris’ apartment. Based on the subsequent investigation, Ford was identified as the suspect and arrested. Harris identified Ford in a lineup. Ford was charged with shooting into an occupied dwelling.

¶3. At trial, Harris testified that she knew Ford because Ford used to date Harris’ uncle. On the day of the shooting, Harris was sitting on the stairs outside her second-story apartment door having a phone conversation when she saw Ford climbing up the stairs toward her. Ford was wielding a hammer, yelling Harris’ name and profanity. Harris rushed inside and closed her door. Harris testified that Ford then “started hitting on the door with the hammer, saying, ‘Open up the door. Open up the door’ ․ and was kicking on it and pulling on the doorknob.” Harris said that the hammer looked like a “f[l]atheaded hammer; not like a nailing hammer.” Harris was worried that Ford would break in and start hitting her with the hammer, so Harris went to the kitchen window to show Ford that she was calling the police.

¶4. However, Ford had gone back downstairs. Harris opened the door and observed Ford retrieving a gun from a gray Honda. Ford fired shots up at the apartment as Harris ran back inside, taking shelter in the back of the apartment. After Ford left, Harris observed bullet hole damage to the outside walls of the building, her kitchen window, and the door of her apartment. The door was also damaged with hammer marks. She testified that the dents in the door were not there before the incident. Harris later heard that Ford had taken issue with a Facebook post by Harris that Ford had taken to be directed at her. Harris testified that she does not own a gun and did not have a gun in the apartment. Body-camera footage and photographs were introduced showing the damage to the door and holes in the kitchen window.

¶5. No other witnesses testified to directly seeing the incident. The manager of the apartment complex sent the police a disc of the video surveillance capturing the parking lot during the relevant time span of the incident. The video shows a woman retrieve a gun from a gray Honda and then shoot repeatedly up at Harris’ apartment from ground level before getting in the car and driving off quickly.¹ At trial, the State introduced the video surveillance through the investigating officer, who testified that he received it from the apartment complex and that the video shown at trial was the same video he received. The video is slightly blurry, and the investigator acknowledged that he could only describe the woman as a dark-skinned female with long hair, and he could not tell her identity from the video alone. The video was admitted over Ford's undue prejudice objection.

¶6. Chrishawna Paige was the only witness for the defense. She testified that Ford is like a sister to her and that she calls her “sister.” Paige further testified that she was visiting a friend at the apartments, and that while she was at her car to retrieve some items, she heard gunfire. She claimed that when she looked up, she saw Harris shooting a gun from her balcony. Paige did not see who she was shooting toward. She testified that she did not observe Ford to be present.

¶7. After the close of testimony, during the jury instruction conference, the trial court refused the defense's proposed Jury Instructions D-3 and D-4. D-3 stated:

The phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” means that you must have a strong and abiding conviction that the State has shown the guilty [sic] of Stephanie Ford. You must be persuaded as you would want to be persuaded about the most important concerns of your lives. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be proof of such a convincing character that you would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important concerns of your own personal affairs. If your view of the evidence, or lack of evidence, makes you doubt Stephanie Ford is guilty because you have not been persuaded that the State has shown the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to acquit [Stephanie Ford].

D-4 stated:

The Court instructs the Jury that Stephanie Ford is entitled to a verdict of all 12 jurors, of whom on the whole of the evidence, and after free consultation with their fellow jurors, must be free from any reasonable doubt in their minds. Each juror should be allowed to have their own conception of what a reasonable doubt is to them. Each member of the jury is under no legal compulsion to give or to be able to formulate and state the reason which may raise a reasonable doubt in their mind and conscience. It any one of you, in fact, have a reasonable doubt, then Stephanie Ford is entitled to your individual vote of “Not Guilty” on the verdict.

The State objected to the proposed instructions as an attempt to define reasonable doubt. The record reflects the following exchange:

COURT: There have been some very recent Supreme Court opinions that discourage attempts to define reasonable doubt. This looks like an instruction that has been approved in the past. I'm going to pass[ ].

ATTORNEY: You're going to what?

COURT: Pass on it until I see all the instructions.

¶8. The State proposed Jury Instruction S-2, which stated:

The Court instructs the jury that you are bound, in deliberating upon this case, to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt that arises out of the evidence or want of evidence in this case. There is always reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilty [sic] when the evidence simply makes it probable that the defendant is guilty. Mere probability of guilt will never warrant you to convict the defendant. It is only when, after examining the evidence on the whole, you are able to say on your oaths, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty, that the law will permit you to find her guilty; and yet, if you are not able to say on your oaths, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she is guilty, it is your sworn duty to find the defendant “Not Guilty.”

The following exchange occurred:

DEFENSE: I object to S-2.

STATE: S-2 is what – the problem that I had with D-4. It basically says what D-4 says but in the proper way.

DEFENSE: It says there's always reasonable doubt to a defendant's guilt.

COURT: S-2 will be granted. That brings me back to D-4, which is duplicitous and refused for that reason. I don't want too many instructions.

Two other given instructions referenced reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed that the State “must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty” and that the “presumption of innocence attends the Defendant throughout the trial and prevails at the trial's close unless overcome by evidence which satisfies the Jury of their guilty [sic] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Additionally, the elements instruction stated that the jury must find each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶9. The jury found Ford guilty, and she now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. “Jury instructions are generally within the discretion of the trial court, and the settled standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Butler v. State, 424 So. 3d 429, 433 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Johnson v. State, 252 So. 3d 597, 599 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). “When reviewing a trial court's admission of evidence, this Court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” Crutcher v. State, 68 So. 3d 724, 733 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction that attempted to define “reasonable doubt.”

¶11. On appeal, Ford argues that the trial court erred in giving Jury Instruction S-2 because the instruction was an attempt to define reasonable doubt. Our supreme court has “consistently asserted that ‘[r]easonable doubt defines itself.’ ” Lett v. State, 902 So. 2d 630, 638 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Martin v. State, 854 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (¶12) (Miss. 2003)). Such an instruction is improper because it “in effect tells jurors that they should be able to state a reason why they have a doubt. Such an instruction is erroneous because, in our jurisprudence, jurors are never required to articulate any explanation of their decision.” Id. at (¶28) (quoting Isaacks v. State, 337 So. 2d 928, 930 (Miss. 1976)); see also Boutwell v. State, 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479 (1932).

¶12. Consistent with this long line of precedent, this Court has affirmed the refusal of instructions similar to the instruction given in this case. In Williams v. State, 94 So. 3d 324, 332-33 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), we affirmed the denial of a request for a defense instruction that stated:

The Court instructs the Jury that that [sic] you are bound, in deliberating upon this case, to give ․ Williams, [sic] the benefit of any reasonable doubt that arises out of the evidence or lack of evidence in this case. There is always reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt when the evidence simply makes it probable that ․ Williams is guilty. Mere probability of guilt will never call for you to convict ․ Williams. It is only when, after examining the evidence on the whole, you are able to say on your oaths, beyond a reasonable doubt, that ․ Williams is guilty that the law will permit you to find him guilty. You might be able to say that you believe beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty, and yet, if you are not able to say on your oaths, beyond a reasonable doubt, that ․ Williams is guilty, it is your sworn duty to find ․ Williams, “Not Guilty.”

In affirming the denial, we noted the “long-standing rule that defining ‘reasonable doubt’ for the jury is improper.” Id. (quoting Colburn v. State, 990 So. 2d 206, 217 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). We further reiterated that “jurors are never required to articulate any explanation of their decision.” Id. (quoting Lett, 902 So. 2d at 638 (¶28)).

¶13. While such an instruction is improper, here we must determine whether giving it constituted an abuse of discretion warranting reversal of the conviction. On the particular circumstances of this case, we find that it does not. When the jury instructions “taken as a whole fairly—although not perfectly—announce the applicable primary rules of law[,] no reversible error will be found.” Moody v. State, 202 So. 3d 1235, 1237 (¶7) (Miss. 2016) (quoting Boyd v. State, 47 So. 3d 121, 124 (¶11) (Miss. 2010)). Our Supreme Court has previously found that the giving of an instruction defining reasonable doubt, while improper, was not prejudicial when looking to the other instructions and the facts of the particular case. Johnson v. City of Crystal Springs, 218 Miss. 453, 67 So. 2d 465, 466 (1953). In Johnson, the Court stated that “we again withhold our approval of this particular instruction” yet found no reversible error where the defendant was granted multiple instructions that “adequately set forth the extent to which the jurors must be convinced of guilt before finding a verdict of guilty.” Id. Similarly, in Sykes v. City of Crystal Springs, 216 Miss. 18, 61 So. 2d 387, 389 (1952), “other instructions granted appellant as well as the state, when taken together, cure[d] any possibly misleading aspect of this instruction.”

¶14. Here, Ford has not demonstrated how giving the instruction, while erroneous, constitutes an error requiring reversal of her conviction. Under the circumstances of this particular case, the error was harmless. See Johnson, 67 So. 2d at 466. Significantly, additional proper instructions were given on reasonable doubt that “adequately set forth the extent to which the jurors must be convinced of guilt before finding a verdict of guilty.” Id.

II. Whether the trial court erred in admitting video surveillance that was not properly authenticated.

¶15. Ford argues that the trial court erred in admitting the apartment complex video surveillance as evidence because the video was not properly authenticated. Because Ford did not object at trial to the admission of the video on the ground that it had not been properly authenticated, on appeal she asks us to review the issue for plain error. To determine “if plain error has occurred, [this Court] must determine if the trial court has deviated from a legal rule, whether that error is plain, clear[,] or obvious, and whether the error has prejudiced the outcome of the trial.” Neal v. State, 15 So. 3d 388, 403 (¶32) (Miss. 2009) (quoting McGee v. State, 953 So. 2d 211, 215 (¶8) (Miss. 2007)).

¶16. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 901(a) provides:

To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.

Rule 901(b)(1) further provides that evidence that satisfies the requirement includes “[t]estimony that an item is what it is claimed to be.” MRE 901(b)(1). “A party need only make a prima facie showing of authenticity, not a full argument on admissibility.” Wilson v. State, 267 So. 3d 264, 270 (¶24) (Miss. 2019). “Once a prima facie case is made, the evidence goes to the jury and it is the jury who will ultimately determine the authenticity of the evidence, not the court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶17. “The same standards used in determining admissibility of photographs are applicable to videotapes.” Conway v. State, 915 So. 2d 521, 526 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). “When a videotape is admitted into evidence through a witness, it must be authenticated by someone who can testify that the events on the tape accurately depict the transaction as it occurred on the day in question.” Id. at (¶19) (citing Seals v. State, 869 So. 2d 429, 433 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)). In McCammon, for example, this Court found that video recordings of the defendant's police interviews were properly authenticated when one of the officers present for the interviews testified at trial how the recordings were made by being burned to discs and that they were “fair and accurate recordings of the interviews.” McCammon v. State, 299 So. 3d 873, 891 (¶66) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). Similarly, in Bunch v. State, 123 So. 3d 484, 490-94 (¶¶13-14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), this Court found that surveillance videos from a hospital parking lot and a Walmart were properly authenticated when the employees who acted as custodians of the surveillance-video equipment (an IT director and assistant manager, respectively) provided the original videos to law enforcement and testified at trial that the videos submitted into evidence accurately depicted the original footage.

¶18. Ford points to contrasting cases in which videos were found to not be properly authenticated. In Conway, a violent altercation resulting in a shooting death occurred at a carwash business. Conway, 915 So. 2d at 524 (¶9). The business provided the responding officer unedited surveillance footage from 24 hours before the incident, which was admitted through the officer's testimony at trial without objection from the defense. Id. at 525 (¶16). The original video was “unviewable” and “unclear,” so a detective took the original tape from the evidence room and transported it to a technician who copied and enhanced the relevant portions of the video to make it more viewable and to slow it down. Id. at (¶17). Over the defense's objection, the State admitted the edited video through the testimony of the detective. Id. at 526 (¶17). On appeal, the defense argued that the second video should not have been admitted because the detective “was not the person who actually made or produced the second tape.” Id. This Court agreed, noting that the detective “was not at the accident scene and never indicated that he watched the first video tape. In addition, he was not the technician who made the edited tape.” Id. at (¶19). Therefore, the “State failed to prove that [the detective] had sufficient knowledge of the crime scene to be able to testify that the edited videotape accurately depicted the events on the day in question.” Id.

¶19. In Terry, the State introduced video surveillance from a Kroger parking lot showing an altercation unfold between five adults during a child custody exchange. Terry v. State, 386 So. 3d 744, 749 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). Following the altercation the individuals left the premises in two cars. Several blocks away, one car chased the other, and the defendant shot and killed a person in the other car. Id. at 747 (¶5). Both a passenger and a bystander testified at trial to witnessing the shooting. Id. at 747-48 (¶6). The surveillance footage was introduced at trial through a detective who had obtained it from Kroger and watched it prior to trial. Id. at 748 (¶10). However, the detective “did not testify that the video was an accurate representation of the Kroger parking lot, that the video accurately depicted the meeting itself, or that the video offered at trial was an exact, unedited copy of the original video on Kroger's surveillance system.” Id.

¶20. This Court determined that the video was not properly authenticated. Id. at 750 (¶16). The detective could not testify that she watched the original recording prior to receiving a copy from Kroger, whether the surveillance system was functioning properly at the time, or whether the video accurately depicted the location or events depicted in the video. Id. Further, the State did not try to authenticate the events in the video through the testimony of the witness who was present at the altercation. Id.

¶21. Here, we agree with Ford's argument that the video surveillance footage was not properly authenticated. Similar to Conway and Terry, “the sponsoring witness lacked sufficient personal knowledge to authenticate the surveillance video.” Terry, 386 So. 3d at 750 (¶16). The video was admitted through a police officer who was not at the scene and did not view the original video. He was not able to testify that it was an exact copy of the original video or that the video accurately depicted the location or events that happened.

¶22. Because the video surveillance was not properly authenticated, we find that it was error for the trial court to admit it. However, we do not find that the error warrants reversal of Ford's conviction. “No trial is free of error; however, to require reversal the error must be of such magnitude as to leave no doubt that the appellant was unduly prejudiced.” Conway, 915 So. 2d at 526 (¶20) (quoting Busick v. St. John, 856 So. 2d 304, 308 (¶9) (Miss. 2003)). “When the weight of the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming, such error is harmless.” Id. In both Conway and Terry, this Court affirmed the convictions despite the admission of improperly authenticated surveillance videos. In Conway, multiple eyewitnesses testified that they saw the shooting in the business parking lot, and the defendant argued self-defense. Id. at 524 (¶¶9-10). In Terry, eyewitnesses to the shooting that occurred at a second location testified to the surveillance video in question. Terry, 386 So. 3d at 750 (¶18).

¶23. Similarly here, the State's case against Ford relied primarily on eyewitness testimony. The victim, Harris, testified that Ford beat on her door with a hammer, retrieved a gun, and shot at her apartment. The State did not rely on the blurry video to establish Ford's identity. The jury further saw and heard evidence of the damage done to Harris’ door and the outside of the apartment walls. On plain error review, Ford has not demonstrated that the admission of the improperly authenticated video resulted in prejudice warranting reversal of her conviction.

CONCLUSION

¶24. Giving Jury Instruction S-2 did not constitute reversible error. While the trial court erred in admitting video surveillance that was not properly authenticated, this error did not result in prejudice to Ford warranting reversal of the conviction. We therefore affirm Ford's conviction and sentence for shooting into an occupied dwelling.

¶25. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Another person, who is not visible in the video, was driving the car.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., AND EMFINGER, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.