DEMARCO LADRELLE MARQUIZ WOODARD DEMARCO WOODARD DEMARCO WOODARD APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE (2026)

¶1. Demarco L. Woodard was arrested for multiple crimes on July 15, 2020, including possession of a firearm as a felon. He was indicted for that charge on May 12, 2021. On December 15, 2022, Woodard pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon and was sentenced to ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with six years suspended and four years to serve, followed by five years of post-release supervision. Woodard's sentencing order stated the following:

It is the order of the court that you shall comply with the following conditions. Failure to abide by any one of these conditions is sufficient to revoke the probationary portion of this order. Probation is a privilege. It is not a right. It may be revoked for the slightest violation of this order. The conditions are as follows: (a) The Defendant shall hereafter commit no offense against the laws of this State or of any other State or the United States of America․

Woodard signed the document in acknowledgment.

¶2. While still in MDOC custody, Woodard was indicted on January 12, 2023, for one count of touching a child for lustful purposes and three counts of sexual battery. The indictment alleged those crimes had occurred “between the dates of September 22, 2018 through September 21, 2019,” and “between the dates of June 1, 2021 through July 26, 2021[.]” The record on appeal does not explain what caused the delay in prosecution.

¶3. Regarding the firearm conviction, Woodard filed his first motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court on November 2, 2023.¹ Woodard alleged that he “had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights,” that “his confession was not voluntary[,]” that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction[,]” “that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest[,]” and “that he received ineffective assistance of counsel ․ and counsel's performance was deficient.” He also alleged that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. On March 6, 2024, the circuit judge entered an order addressing Woodard's claims and denying his PCR motion. Woodard did not appeal.

¶4. On June 7, 2024, Woodard was released from MDOC custody for his felon-in-possession conviction and began the post-release supervision (PRS) portion of his sentence. However, Woodard was detained soon after in relation to the 2023 indictment for one count of lustful touching and three counts of sexual battery. To be clear, these charges were completely unrelated to the felon-in-possession conviction for which he was placed on PRS.

¶5. On January 28, 2025, Woodard filed a second PCR motion in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. He alleged that he had been released from MDOC's physical custody and on PRS on June 7, 2024, and was subsequently detained for additional crimes. Woodard's PCR motion alleged that his PRS for the felon-in-possession conviction had not been revoked, so he had been unlawfully detained. In addition, he asserted again that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel and was denied a speedy trial, and he raised various arguments associated with search warrants. Woodard attached a civil rights complaint to his PCR motion as well, arguing that his “pending charges [we]re being used as a weapon for prosecutorial discretion misconduct to stay [him] and hold him in abeyance without due process of law[.]” Woodard indicated that he was not in the custody of MDOC at the time of filing his PCR motion.

¶6. On May 8, 2025, the circuit judge entered an order dismissing Woodard's PCR motion as moot because the motion had been filed after Woodard was released from prison due to the expiration of his sentence. The judge also found the PCR motion was barred as successive. Woodard appealed on May 22, 2025.²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. This Court will review a “circuit court's dismissal or denial of a PCR motion for abuse of discretion and [will] decline to reverse unless the circuit court's decision is clearly erroneous.” Hamilton v. State, 367 So. 3d 1039, 1041 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Taylor v. State, 348 So. 3d 1017, 1019 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)). “We review questions of law de novo.” Id.

ANALYSIS

¶8. Woodard argues on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the court clerk did not mail the “proceedings” related to his first PCR motion to him, causing a “procedural default” for his chance to appeal, and that misconduct occurred in the form of a conspiracy between the prosecutor's and public defender's offices to withhold “discovery favorable to his defense.” However, this Court has established that “a defendant who fails to raise an issue in his motion for post-conviction relief before the trial court may not raise that issue for the first time on appeal.” Arnold v. State, 312 So. 3d 748, 751 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Fluker v. State, 17 So. 3d 181, 183 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). These arguments presented by Woodard are not those contained in his second PCR motion before the circuit court. Therefore, Woodard is procedurally barred from raising those claims.

¶9. As for the circuit court's denial of Woodard's PCR motion, the judgment stated that Woodard's motion was moot because he was no longer in custody for the felon-in-possession conviction and that, even so, the motion was successive. The State concedes in its brief that Woodard's case is not moot because “postconviction relief is available to any person sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi[.]” Howell v. State, 283 So. 3d 1100, 1104 (¶16) (Miss. 2019) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1) (Rev. 2015)). We agree and continue to address the successive bar.³

¶10. “Mississippi statutory law grants each movant one bite at the apple when requesting post-conviction relief.” Lambert v. State, 329 So. 3d 1225, 1228 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Hayes v. State, 282 So. 3d 1185, 1187 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)). Indeed, “[u]nder Mississippi's Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), any order denying or dismissing a PCR motion is a bar to a second or successive PCR motion.” Bradley v. State, 395 So. 3d 1015, 1019 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Evans v. State, 115 So. 3d 879, 880 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)); see Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23 (Rev. 2020) (“[A]ny order dismissing the petitioner's motion or otherwise denying relief under this article is a final judgment and shall be conclusive until reversed. It shall be a bar to a second or successive motion under this article.”). The bar for successive motions has three statutory exceptions: “[(1)] when an intervening appellate decision would have adversely affected the outcome of a defendant's conviction or sentence; [(2)] when there is evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of the trial that would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence; or [(3)] when probation, parole, or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked or the sentence expired.” Bradley, 395 So. 3d at 1019 (¶12) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6)).

¶11. Woodard's first PCR motion was filed on November 2, 2023, denied on March 6, 2024, and was never appealed. His second PCR motion was filed on January 28, 2025. Woodard's second motion did not show that a recent appellate decision would have changed his conviction or sentence. Woodard's second motion did not show there was new evidence that would have affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence. And Woodard's second motion did not show that his PRS had been “unlawfully revoked.”⁴ Therefore, the issues raised in Woodard's second PCR motion are not only procedurally barred for failing to raise the arguments in the circuit court; his motion is also statutorily barred as a successive motion under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-23 and, thus, prohibited.

CONCLUSION

¶12. This Court finds Woodard's arguments in his PCR motion procedurally barred and his PCR motion successive. Therefore, this Court affirms the circuit court's decision to deny post-conviction relief.

¶13. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record before this Court only contains documents associated with Woodard's second PCR motion. However, we are permitted to take judicial notice of Woodard's first PCR motion and the accompanying order denying it. See Morris v. State, 432 So. 3d 390, 398 (¶8) & n.5 (Miss. Ct. App. 2026) (taking judicial notice of a petition filed on the Mississippi Electronic Courts (MEC) system because the petition “is readily available on MEC and cannot reasonably be disputed”) (citing Jackson v. State, 394 So. 3d 420, 432 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024)).

2.   On July 22, 2025, the circuit court clerk for Lauderdale County filed a motion with this Court requesting an extension of time to prepare the record on appeal. On July 31, 2025, this Court granted the motion.

3.   “It is well-settled law that on appeal this Court may affirm a circuit court's ruling for different reasons than those offered by the circuit court.” Dunaway v. State, 111 So. 3d 117, 119 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Campbell v. State, 75 So. 3d 1160, 1162 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)). We are therefore permitted to affirm the denial of Woodard's PCR motion as successive.

4.   Woodard claims that he was illegally detained during his PRS period. That is not the case. Woodard was detained for an indictment for touching a child for lustful purposes and three counts of sexual battery. He was convicted of two counts of sexual battery and sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment for one and to serve a consecutive term of thirty years in MDOC custody for the other. He was sentenced to serve a consecutive term of fifteen years in MDOC custody for the conviction of lustful touching. Woodard appealed those convictions, and his appeal is currently pending before our state supreme court. See Woodard v. State, 2026-TS-00228-SCT.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.