GEANTT v. STATE (2026)

¶1. Justin Alexzander Geantt appeals from the order of the DeSoto County Circuit Court dismissing his third motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR) pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11 (Rev. 2020) of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA). Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court's order.

FACTS

¶2. A DeSoto County grand jury indicted Geantt for five drug offenses. Count 4 of the indictment charged Geantt with trafficking fentanyl, i.e., possession with intent to sell 40 or more dosage units of a Schedule I or II controlled substance (trafficking-of-fentanyl count), in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139(f) (Rev. 2020).

¶3. Represented by counsel, Geantt pleaded guilty in the DeSoto County Circuit Court to the trafficking-of-fentanyl count in exchange for the State remanding the remaining four counts. The trial court sentenced Geantt to serve twelve years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, followed by seven years of post-release supervision.

¶4. Geantt later filed two PCR motions; both were denied. The circuit court references Geantt's first PCR motion in its order dismissing Geantt's current (third) PCR motion. Geantt's first PCR motion was filed on July 17, 2024, in DeSoto County Circuit Court Cause No. 17CI1:24-cv-00282-CW, which the circuit court denied on August 1, 2024. In his current PCR motion, Geantt identified “[o]ne previous post conviction relief that was denied and procedurally barred.” Additionally, the docket in Geantt's underlying criminal case is contained in the record and reflects that Geantt filed a second PCR motion on September 17, 2024, which was denied on September 19, 2024.

¶5. In Geantt's third PCR motion, he asserted that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing him to plead guilty to the trafficking charge and that his trafficking conviction and sentence were illegal because, according to Geantt, he was only indicted for “possession with intent to sell fentanyl”—not trafficking. The circuit judge dismissed Geantt's PCR motion as without merit and an impermissible successive PCR motion.¹

¶6. Geantt appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. “We review a circuit court's dismissal or denial of a PCR motion for abuse of discretion and decline to reverse unless the circuit court's decision is clearly erroneous.” Badger v. State, 369 So. 3d 90, 93 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). “Questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Id.

DISCUSSION

¶8. On appeal, Geantt asserts that his “sentence under trafficking is an illegal sentence [because he] ․ was arrested and indicted for the lesser charge, possession of controlled substance (intent).” Geantt further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer “put[ ] a charge on my sentencing order [(trafficking)] I was never aware of”; “[failed to] present[ ] the mitigating factors of my drug use history to show the drugs were for personal use”; and “allowed me to plea[d] guilty to an invalid indictment.”

¶9. Geantt's third PCR motion is barred as successive. Under the UPCCRA, any order dismissing or denying a PCR motion “shall be a bar to a second or successive [PCR] motion.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6); see Varnado v. State, 429 So. 3d 1237, 1239 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2026) (recognizing that “any order denying or dismissing a PCR motion is a bar to a second or successive PCR motion”). Essentially, [a movant] “is granted one bite at the apple when requesting post-conviction relief.” Dobbs v. State, 18 So. 3d 295, 298 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). Because Geantt's current PCR motion constitutes his “[third] bite at the apple,” Geantt's PCR motion is barred as successive unless he can prove his claims fall within a statutory exception to this bar. Badger, 369 So. 3d at 93 (¶12) (The PCR movant “bears the burden of proving his claims are not barred because of a statutory exception.”).

¶10. Section 99-39-23(6) of the UPCCRA sets forth certain statutory exceptions to the successive-motions bar,² but Geantt has raised no statutory exception to overcome this bar. Accordingly, the circuit court was correct in dismissing Geantt's third PCR motion as successive. See, e.g., Cardwell v. State, 426 So. 3d 349, 352 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025); Hyland v. State, 401 So. 3d 1056, 1059 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), cert. denied, 401 So. 3d 1029 (Miss. 2025).

¶11. In any event, Geantt's claims, which center around his mistaken belief that his “indictment was invalid” and his trafficking conviction and sentence are “illegal” because he was “arrested and indicted for [a] lesser charge,” are without merit.

¶12. First, a review of the applicable statute shows that Geantt's indictment properly charged him with trafficking. Count 4 of Geantt's indictment alleged that he “possess[ed] with intent to sell, barter, transfer, distribute or dispense ․ forty (40) dosage units or more [of fentanyl] in direct violation of [s]ection 41-29-139(f).” Section 41-29-139(f) delineates the penalties for “trafficking in controlled substances” and defines that phrase to include “[a] violation of subsection (a) of this section involving ․ forty (40) or more dosage units of a Schedule I or II controlled substance[,]” which includes fentanyl. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(f)(2)(A) (Rev. 2020). Subsection (a) of 41-29-139, as specifically incorporated by reference in subsection (f), makes it unlawful at the time “for any person knowingly or intentionally” to “possess with intent ․ to transfer ․ a controlled substance.”

¶13. Thus, we find that by the plain terms of section 41-29-139(f), Geantt's indictment—which expressly cites section 41-29-139(f), identifies the controlled substance (fentanyl), and identifies the dosage units of that controlled substance (forty (40) or more dosage units)—correctly sets forth the trafficking charge.

¶14. Second, although Geantt relies on the capias that states “possession with intent to sell fentanyl” to assert that he was not charged with trafficking, his reliance is misguided. The controlling document is the indictment, as clearly indicated in the documents Geantt signed in connection with his guilty plea to “trafficking,” and as reflected in the March 1, 2023 transcript of Geantt's guilty-plea and sentencing hearing. Upon our review of this information, we find that Geantt was plainly on notice that he was charged with trafficking and knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to that charge.

¶15. In particular, Geantt's “Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty,” which he initialed on each page and signed under oath, specifically provides: “I plead guilty to the charge(s) of Trafficing [sic] Fentanyl 40 du or more in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(f), as set forth in count 4 of the indictment in this cause number.” Geantt further acknowledged in the petition that his lawyer “advised [him] of the nature of the charge” and “the elements of the charge,” and he agreed “that all the elements are proven by the true facts.” Geantt further declared, “I offer my plea of ‘guilty’ freely and voluntarily and of my own accord and with full understanding of all matters set forth in the indictment herein and in this Petition, and this plea is with the advice and consent of my lawyer.”

¶16. At his guilty-plea and sentencing hearing, Geantt told the circuit court judge that he was entering a plea of guilty to “Trafficking ․ fentanyl,” he assured the circuit judge that he understood the information set forth in his petition, and he further assured the judge that his guilty plea was “freely, voluntarily, and willingly given.” The circuit judge also confirmed that Geantt had reviewed his sentencing order with his lawyer and understood everything in it, as indicated by his signature on that order.

¶17. Accordingly, because Geantt's PCR motion was successive, Geantt failed to demonstrate that a statutory exception applies, and, in any event, Geantt's claims are without merit, we affirm the circuit court's order dismissing his PCR motion.

¶18. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The circuit judge dismissed Geantt's PCR motion pursuant to section 99-39-11 of the UPCCRA, attaching to her order the documents from Geantt's criminal case that she relied upon in doing so. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (providing that “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief, the judge may make an order for its dismissal and cause the petitioner to be notified”).

2.   These statutory exceptions include (1) “a motion filed under Section 99-19-57(2), raising the issue of the convict's supervening mental illness before the execution of a sentence of death,” where such motion has not been previously denied or dismissed, (2) “an intervening decision ․ which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence,” (3) “[conclusive] evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial ․ [that] would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence,” (4) a claim that the convict's “sentence has expired or his probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked,” and (5) “new or different grounds for relief related to DNA testing not previously presented or the availability of more advanced DNA technology.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6).

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.