ROBERTS v. STATE (2026)

¶1. Coley Djuan Roberts was indicted for armed robbery and capital murder in 2007. On June 2, 2008, Roberts pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to serve a term of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”).

¶2. On February 11, 2025, Roberts filed a post-conviction collateral relief (“PCR”) motion in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court, alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary, he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, and he had received an illegal sentence.¹ The circuit court dismissed Roberts's PCR motion on June 26, 2025, finding the motion was time-barred. The court additionally rejected each of Roberts's arguments. On July 30, 2025, Roberts appealed; on the same day, he was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶3. “When reviewing a lower court's decision to deny a petition for post conviction relief this Court will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.” Castillo-Valencia v. State, 396 So. 3d 1214, 1215 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999)). “When issues of law are raised, we apply a de novo review.” Id. (citing Rice v. State, 910 So. 2d 1163, 1164-65 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)).

ANALYSIS

¶4. On appeal, Roberts largely argues that there are errors associated with his guilty plea, namely that he pled guilty to the “lesser crime” of murder under the impression that his sentence would be life imprisonment with parole eligibility. He alleges that the court “alter[ed] or change[d] the plea agreement,” rendering his guilty plea involuntary. Roberts also alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea and sentencing hearing as well as an illegal sentence.

¶5. First and foremost, Roberts's PCR motion is statutorily time-barred. Roberts pled guilty in 2008 and did not file his PCR motion until 2025. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020) provides that a PCR motion “in case of a guilty plea” must be filed by a defendant “within three (3) years after entry of the judgment of conviction.” (Emphasis added). Our supreme court has enforced this law, holding that “an untimely PCR motion is barred if it is filed beyond the three-year time period unless the claim fits within one of the express statutory exceptions.” Castillo-Valencia, 396 So. 3d at 1216 (¶5) (emphasis added) (citing Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613, 615-16 (¶¶8, 12) (Miss. 2023)). Those exceptions are “an intervening decision of the Supreme Court of either the State of Mississippi or the United States which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction[,]” newly discovered evidence that was “not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial” and “would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence[,]” the existence of biological evidence that was not tested or should be “subjected to additional DNA testing,” or the contention that the petitioner's sentence “has expired or his probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)-(b).

¶6. Before the Howell decision, this Court recognized an exception to the time-bar for “errors affecting certain fundamental constitutional rights[.]” Carter v. State, 422 So. 3d 1098, 1099-1100 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Howell, 358 So. 3d at 615-16 (¶¶8, 12)). Howell, however, overruled “cases in which the Mississippi Supreme Court had held that the courts of Mississippi can apply the judicially crafted fundamental-rights exception” to the time-bar. Id.

¶7. Roberts's claims invoke that overruled “judicially crafted” exception. Concerning the voluntariness of Roberts's guilty plea, this Court has previously held “that the claim of an involuntary guilty plea is subject to the [statutory] time-bar,” Crockett v. State, 334 So. 3d 1232, 1238 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (emphasis added), even though it “involves fundamental constitutional rights[.]” Id. (citing Goul v. State, 223 So. 3d 813, 815 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017); Kirk v. State, 798 So. 2d 345, 346 (¶¶4-6) (Miss. 2000); Gaulden v. State, 240 So. 3d 503, 507 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)). An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, while also a constitutional right, “is not an exception to the statutory time-bar” either. Castillo-Valencia, 396 So. 3d at 1216 (¶5) (emphasis added) (citing Howell, 358 So. 3d at 615 (¶¶8-10)). Finally, “Howell also made clear that illegal-sentence claims are no longer excepted from the three-year statute of limitations.” Carter, 422 So. 3d at 1100 (¶5) (emphasis added) (citing Howell, 358 So. 3d at 615 (¶8)). Thus, Roberts's claims do not fall within the statutory exceptions.

CONCLUSION

¶8. Roberts pled guilty to murder in 2008 and did not file his PCR motion until approximately seventeen years later in 2025. His motion is time-barred, and his claims demonstrate no statutory exception to the time-bar. Therefore, we affirm the order dismissing the PCR motion.

¶9. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On March 31, 2025, Roberts filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting a ruling on his PCR motion. The court addressed the petition on April 4, 2025, explaining it took up motions in the order in which they were received.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, C.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.