GRAY v. STATE (2026)

¶1. This is an appeal from the dismissal of Maurice Gray's fourth petition for post-conviction relief following his 1999 convictions for murder and aggravated assault. The trial court dismissed Gray's current petition on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction due to Gray's failure to obtain the Mississippi Supreme Court's permission to proceed in the trial court pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-7 (Rev. 2020). Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In 1999, a jury convicted Gray of murder and aggravated assault in the shooting death of Ladell Lay. Gray v. State, 846 So. 2d 260, 261 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). One month prior to the shooting, Gray had been arrested for drug possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 262 (¶4). Gray made threats to harm those he believed had “snitched on him,” including threats against Lay. Id. Gray approached a vehicle occupied by Lay and Alonzo Cooper. Id. at 261 (¶2). Following a brief argument, he shot Lay in the head, killing him, and shot Cooper in the buttocks as he ran away. Id. Gray was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and to serve twenty years for the aggravated assault. Id. at (¶1). This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Id.

¶3. In 2004, Gray applied for and received permission from the Mississippi Supreme Court to proceed in the trial court with a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Gray v. State, 13 So. 3d 307, 308 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). Gray had argued that his counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial, failed to seek a plea deal, and failed to advance an adequate trial strategy. Id. at 309 (¶5). Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court denied his petition, and this Court unanimously affirmed the denial on appeal. Id. at 308 (¶1).

¶4. In 2011, Gray applied again to the Mississippi Supreme Court for permission to proceed in the trial court. The Court found the application to be barred as successive, warning that future frivolous filings may subject Gray to sanctions. Order, No. 2011-M-01225 (Miss. Oct. 19, 2011). In 2017, Gray filed a third petition in the trial court, styled a “Petition for Conditional Release.” Gray v. State, 283 So. 3d 211, 212 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). Gray, who was eighteen at the time of the crime, cited Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-5-139(1)(a) (Rev. 2015), which provides that inmates who have served at least fifteen years of their sentence and who are sixty-five years or older can petition for conditional release. Id. The court construed the petition as one for post-conviction relief and found that in addition to Gray's not meeting the statutory age requirement, he had not identified a relevant exception to the bar on successive petitions. Id. at (¶5). On appeal, this Court found that while the trial court did have jurisdiction over Gray's challenge to the constitutionality of section 47-5-139(1)’s age requirement, the trial court did not have authority to grant the conditional release Gray requested in light of his failure to obtain permission from the Mississippi Supreme Court to proceed in the trial court pursuant to section 99-39-7.¹ The constitutionality of section 47-5-139(1) had been previously recognized in Peterson v. State, 119 So. 3d 1068, 1070 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). This Court unanimously affirmed the trial court's denial of relief. Id. at 214 (¶11).

¶5. In 2025, Gray filed his fourth and current petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court, styled as a “Motion for Resentencing Under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21(2)(d) and the Equal Protection Clause.” He moved the court to “reconsider and modify his life sentence” because the “current sentencing framework arbitrarily distinguishes between a 17-year-old and an 18-year old.” He argued that an eighteen-year-old is not neurologically mature enough to be held accountable to the same standards as older adults, and should be eligible for individual consideration the same as juvenile offenders under the sentencing statute, Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-21 (Supp. 2024). The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. We review questions of law, including jurisdiction, de novo. See Reynolds v. State, 292 So. 3d 620, 622 (¶¶2, 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).

DISCUSSION

¶7. On appeal, Gray argues that the statute which authorizes resentencing hearings for juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree or capital murder prior to July 1, 2024, should also apply to a “similarly situated eighteen-year-old.” The State argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Gray's petition under the provisions of the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, which provided that “the motion under this article shall be filed as an original civil action in the trial court, except in cases in which the petitioner's conviction and sentence have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi and there affirmed or the appeal dismissed.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2020).² Further:

Where the conviction and sentence have been affirmed on appeal or the appeal has been dismissed, the motion under this article shall not be filed in the trial court until the motion shall have first been presented to a quorum of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Mississippi[.]

Id. This procedure is jurisdictional, not advisory. Chandler v. State, 190 So. 3d 509, 511 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016); see also Dunaway v. State, 111 So. 3d 117, 118 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). “Unless leave is granted, the circuit court is without jurisdiction and must dismiss the PCR motion.” Dunaway, 111 So. 3d at 118 (¶7); see also Nicolaou v. State, 410 So. 3d 489, 492 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025).

¶8. Here, Gray did not obtain leave from the Mississippi Supreme Court to proceed in the trial court. The trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his petition for resentencing. Regardless, we note that our courts have long recognized the legitimate constitutional boundary of classifying an eighteen-year-old as an adult for the purpose of sentencing and those under eighteen as juveniles. See Washington v. State, 422 So. 3d 37, 43 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025); Skinner v. State, 354 So. 3d 327, 342 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022).³ Gray's contention in this regard is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶9. The trial court correctly dismissed Gray's petition for lack of jurisdiction under section 99-39-7. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶10. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court construed Gray's filing as a challenge to his parole-eligibility status, noting that “a PCR motion provides a proper avenue for challenging a determination of Parole eligibility.” Gray, 283 So. 3d at 213 (¶8); see also Keys v. State, 67 So. 3d 758, 759-60 (¶¶6-9) (Miss. 2011).

2.   This statute was amended, effective July 1, 2026, 2026 Miss. Laws ch. 370, § 1 (H.B. 748), to add two other circumstances requiring a petitioner to request permission from the Supreme Court before seeking post-conviction relief in the trial court.

3.   See also Ward v. State, 914 So. 2d 332 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698 (Miss. 2013); Johnson v. State, 433 So. 3d 738 (Miss. Ct. App. 2026); Mason v. State, 235 So. 3d 129, 133 (¶¶12-13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.