CITY OF NATCHEZ v. BANKS (2026)

¶1. The Natchez Planning Commission (NPC) revoked a previously approved special exception for Rickey O. Banks and David Haywood (collectively “owners”) to operate their bar/nightclub, Truth Lounge LLC, at 7191/212 Franklin Street in Natchez, Mississippi. The owners appealed to the Board of Aldermen for the City of Natchez (City), which affirmed the NPC's decision. Banks and Haywood appealed that decision to the Circuit Court of Adams County. The circuit court found that the NPC acted outside its apparent authority by revoking the special exception. The court reversed and rendered the decision of the NPC, ruling that the revocation was void and had no legal effect. The City appealed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On February 15, 2023, the owners applied for a special exception under Natchez Development Code ¹ sections 7.3.4 and 7.3.5 to operate Truth Lounge. Because Truth Lounge was meant to be a bar/lounge, a special exception was required for it to operate at 7191/212 Franklin Street in Natchez. Their application was placed on the agenda for a regular meeting of the NPC on March 16, 2023. After its consideration of the factors set out in section 7.3.2 of the Natchez Development Code (the Code), the NPC granted the special exception.²

¶3. On October 19, 2023, at another regularly scheduled meeting of the NPC, some concerns were raised regarding incidents that had occurred at or near Truth Lounge.³ The Commissioner voicing the concerns cited the criteria to be considered to maintain the special exception and made a motion for a special public hearing to review Truth Lounge's special exception. The motion was seconded and approved by a unanimous vote. After providing notice on February 12, 2024, of its review and reconsideration of the special exception, the NPC held a public hearing on the Truth Lounge's special exception on February 15, 2024, “to determine if the development has revised, enlarged, or modified the terms and conditions of the approved Special Exception for a Bar/Nightclub” pursuant to sections 7.3.4 and 7.3.5. The NPC weighed the seven factors listed in section 7.3.2, heard arguments both for and against the continued operation of the nightclub, and voted to allow its continued operation.

¶4. On March 31, 2024, an off-site shooting occurred that allegedly was the result of an altercation that began at Truth Lounge. Then, on April 10, 2024, the NPC noticed another public hearing for April 25, 2024, to review Truth Lounge's special exception. The owners appeared at the hearing and testified that the incidents were not happening inside the nightclub. Six letters in favor of the revocation of the special exception were read, six public comments from members of the community who attended the hearing were heard, and then several commissioners made comments. A commissioner moved to approve the continued operation of Truth Lounge, and the motion was seconded. The motion failed by a 3-4 vote, with three in favor and four against. After that vote, a commissioner moved to revoke the special exception and cited the criteria from section 7.3.2, which he argued were not being met at that time. The NPC voted 4-3 to revoke the special exception.

¶5. The owners appealed the NPC's decision to the Natchez Board of Aldermen, and the Board affirmed the NPC's decision. They then appealed that decision to the Adams County Circuit Court.⁴ After reviewing the parties’ briefs, pleadings, relevant law, and oral arguments, the circuit court reversed and rendered the Board of Aldermen's decision to ratify the NPC's revocation of Truth Lounge's special exception, finding:

In the absence of any statute, ordinance, or provision that expressly grants NPC the authority to revoke a special exception once granted, the Court finds that NPC acted beyond its legal authority. Consequently, the Board of Aldermen's decision to ratify the revocation was both unauthorized and arbitrary.

․

Further, the decision of the Planning Commission to revoke [Banks and Haywood's] special exception was issued without legal authority and is therefore void and has no legal effect.

Aggrieved, the City appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. In a case where this court reversed and rendered the grant of a special exception, Keenum v. City of Moss Point, 368 So. 3d 817, 819 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), we stated:

The interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a question of law, and we are to apply a de novo standard of review. Wheelan v. City of Gautier, 332 So. 3d 851, 856-59 (¶¶16-19) (Miss. 2022). We must not adopt an interpretation of an ordinance that renders other parts of the same ordinance meaningless. Id. at 859 (¶20).

ANALYSIS

 Does the Natchez Planning Commission have the authority to conduct a sua sponte review and revoke a special exception use?

¶7. Section 7.3.1 of the Natchez Development Code provides:

The classification of “special exception” is established to provide for the location of those uses which are generally compatible with the other land uses permitted in a zoning district, but which, because of their unique characteristics or potential impacts on the surrounding neighborhood and the City of Natchez as a whole, require individual consideration of their location, design, configuration, and/or operation at the particular location proposed. Such individual consideration may also call for the imposition of individualized conditions in order to ensure that the use is appropriate at a particular location.

¶8. In supporting its decision, the City relies on sections 7.3.4, 7.3.5, and 7.1.1(b) of the Natchez Development Code. The City argues that “[t]hese sections expressly authorize NPC to make any changes to the special exception use, which would include revocation of the approved use.” However, the City's brief on appeal also states:

The trial court was correct in its statement that the applicable Developmental Code, in Natchez, does not contain the term “revocation” of special exception approval. However, the trial court failed to acknowledge that the same Development Code does not expressly prohibit the NPC from revoking special exception approval.

(Emphasis in original).

¶9. In any event, section 7.3.4. headed, “Changes to Terms and Conditions of Approval,” provides:

Any changes to the terms or conditions of approval of the special exception use shall require separate review and approval by the Planning Commission. Any application for approval of such a change shall be filed, processed, reviewed, and approved or denied in the manner set forth in the Part for an original application for special exception use approval. This section shall not apply, however, to modifications to the approved site plan for the special exception use.

(Emphasis added). In the present case, there is no record evidence of the filing of an application to change the terms and conditions of the prior approval of the special exception use granted by the NPC or an application to revoke the special exception previously granted. Therefore, even if this section could be said to support the revocation of the special exception, there was no application to initiate the process.⁵

¶10. In Carroll v. City of Canton, 296 So. 3d 751, 758-59 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020), we explained:

A board's decision regarding a special-use exception is an adjudicative rather than a legislative act. Como Steak House Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Panola Cty., 200 So. 3d 417, 421 (¶11) (Miss. 2016). “We will not disturb the City's decision concerning a special exception application unless we find that the decision was 1) unsupported by substantial evidence, 2) arbitrary or capricious, 3) beyond the Board's scope or powers, or 4) in violation of a party's constitutional or statutory rights.” [Carroll, 296 So. 3d at 759 (¶12)]. A governing board's decision concerning a zoning or special-use exception is presumptively valid and the burden of proof is on the one claiming it to be invalid. [Id. (citing Foster v. City of Pass Christian, 117 So. 3d 658, 659 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013))].

(Emphasis added). Further, in Wheelan, 332 So. 3d at 859 (¶18), our supreme court stated:

Our cases make it clear that “[t]he ultimate authority and responsibility to interpret the law, including statutes, rests with this Court.” Queen City Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Miss. State Dep't of Health, 80 So. 3d 73, 84 (¶28) (Miss. 2011); see also Miss. State & Sch. Emps.’ Life & Health Plan v. KCC, Inc., 108 So. 3d 932, 939 (¶20) (Miss. 2013). Courts have the duty to determine what statutes provide. Lawson v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 75 So. 3d 1024, 1027 (¶7) (Miss. 2011). Mississippi's Constitution requires a “strict separation of powers.” Gunn v. Hughes, 210 So. 3d 969, 972 (¶13) (Miss. 2017) (citing Tuck v. Blackmon, 798 So. 2d 402, 410 (Miss. 2001), overruled by Gunn, 210 So. 3d 969). If, as we held in cases such as Gunn, Hooker, and Hunt v. Wright, 70 Miss. 298, 11 So. 608 (1892), we must wholly refrain from exercising powers granted only to another branch of government, then surely we must embrace the inverse proposition and wholly exercise those powers and responsibilities conferred upon the courts. We cannot do so while we also defer to the interpretation of statutes—or ordinances—to other branches of government. Less than one year after our decision in Hatfield v. Board of Supervisors of Madison County, 235 So. 3d 18 (Miss. 2017), the Court, in a unanimous opinion, ended the practice of giving deference to executive-branch interpretations of statutes, largely due to the truth of the proposition set forth above, i.e., that the courts have the duty to interpret the law. King v. Miss. Mil. Dep't, 245 So. 3d 404, 407-08 (¶¶10-11) (Miss. 2018). As the King Court pointed out, article 1, section 2, of our state's Constitution starkly forbids the sharing of power between different branches of government. Id.

Today, we overrule Hatfield and our other cases that established a standard of review deferential to local agencies on the pure questions of law presented in the interpretation of zoning ordinances. Such pure questions of law are to be reviewed de novo. To do otherwise would contradict our unanimous decision in King and perpetuate the continued concession to other branches of government the duty to interpret the law the Mississippi Constitution vests in the courts.

(Emphasis added).

¶11. The City bases its argument upon its interpretation of the sections of the Natchez Development Code cited above. In their reply brief, the City admits that the “zoning scheme in Natchez” is “silent on a specific ‘revocation’ process.”⁶ We find nothing in the City of Natchez Development Code, the City of Natchez Code of Ordinances, or any other authority cited by the City that grants the NPC the authority to sua sponte revoke a special exception once it has been granted.

CONCLUSION

¶12. We find that under the facts of this case, the NPC's revocation of the special exception was outside the scope of its powers under the Code. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's decision to reverse and render the Board of Aldermen's ratification of the NPC's revocation of the special exception.⁷ Because we find that the NPC lacked authority to revoke the special exception, the other issues raised by the City are moot. While the public may have legitimate safety concerns surrounding the operation of Truth Lounge, those concerns must be dealt with according to law.

¶13. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Natchez Development Code is part of the Code of Ordinances for the City of Natchez.

2.   Unlike many municipalities that require a planning commission to submit a recommendation concerning an application for a special exception to the city board for final action, the Natchez Development Code grants the NPC the authority to make a final decision, subject to the right to appeal any such decision to the City, under Part 3-Special Exception Uses.

3.   According to the City of Natchez's brief and the minutes from the October 19 meeting, those incidents included “fights, disorderly conduct and gunshots fired” between August 6, 2023, and October 22, 2023.

4.   Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2019) provides that “[a]ny person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the board of supervisors of a county, or the governing authority of a municipality, may appeal the judgment or decision to the circuit court of the county in which the board of supervisors is the governing body or in which the municipality is located.”

5.   To interpret that provision to allow the NPC to revoke the special exception, sua sponte, without an application being filed would render meaningless the requirement that an application be filed.

6.   The City's argument that it would have no recourse to close the business if it becomes a danger to the community is flawed. There are other avenues to achieve that purpose, i.e., petition the chancery court to abate a nuisance.

7.   Since the NPC lacked authority to revoke the special exception in this case, the City was without authority to ratify such action. See Paine v. Matthews, 213 Miss. 506, 511-12, 57 So. 2d 148, 151 (1952).

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.