SHADARA McGILBERRY APPELLANT v. SVP SEWING BRANDS LLC APPELLEE (2026)

¶1. Shadara McGilberry filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Mississippi, seeking damages for injuries she suffered while operating an allegedly defective sewing machine she had recently purchased. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. McGilberry appeals the order granting summary judgment and dismissing her complaint. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. McGilberry purchased a Singer sewing machine from Walmart in Flowood, Mississippi. Seven days later, while she was using the sewing machine for the first time, the needle broke, and part of the broken needle struck McGilberry in her left eye. McGilberry filed her original complaint against SVP Worldwide d/b/a SVP-Stringer Holdings Inc., John/Jane Does 1-5, and ABC Corporations. In this complaint, McGilberry alleged negligence, strict liability, deceptive marketing, and breach of warranty. McGilberry filed an amended complaint in which she replaced the defendant SVP Worldwide d/b/a SVP-Stringer Holdings Inc. with SVP Sewing Brands LLC (SVP).

¶3. The Madison County Circuit Court entered a scheduling order that required, among other deadlines, expert witnesses for McGilberry to be designated by October 21, 2024. The order required SVP to designate its expert witnesses by November 19, 2024. While McGilberry failed to designate an expert witness by the deadline, SVP timely designated Keil Zheng as its expert witness.

¶4. This designation, which was filed of record, shows that Zheng had been the Senior Director of Research & Development and Product Engineering for five years prior to this action. Through his education and experience, Zheng had specialized knowledge of industrial management within the sewing machine manufacturing industry, with a focus on the analysis of design specifications and the manufacturing processes used to implement those designs. In his report, Mr. Zheng found: (1) the design of the Singer Heavy 4423 model comports with all applicable safety regulations and does not create unreasonably hazardous conditions for the end-user, (2) the processes used to assemble the Singer Heavy Duty 4423 model comport with what is required by the Design Specifications, and (3) all Singer Heavy Duty 4423 models, including the subject machine, undergo extensive inspection and testing. The subject machine passed this inspection and did not exhibit any signs of any manufacturing defects posing a risk to consumer safety, including, but not limited to, the type of defect that might result in the “ejection” of a needle from the machine during its operation.

¶5. On April 18, 2025, the defense filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that McGilberry

cannot prove, and has failed to offer any credible evidence that the Singer sewing machine at issue was unreasonably dangerous or defective in its design or manufacturing such that SVP should be liable to the Plaintiff. As such, the Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proof, and consequently, her claims against SVP should be dismissed with prejudice.

In its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, SVP attached a copy of the first amended complaint, McGilberry's responses to interrogatories and request for production of documents, SVP's responses to McGilberry's interrogatories and request for production of documents, Zheng's expert report, and McGilberry's deposition.

¶6. In McGilberry's response to the motion for summary judgment, filed on April 28, 2025, she argued:

While SVP argues the Plaintiff cannot prove the Singer sewing machine was unreasonably dangerous or defective, the Plaintiff contends that the sudden and unexpected ejection of the sewing machine needle constitutes prima facie evidence of a manufacturing defect and/or faulty design.

In her response, McGilberry also argued that “her extensive experience with sewing machines qualifies her to offer expert testimony regarding the machine's malfunction.” While in this response McGilberry referred to her “proffered expert testimony,” there were no documents, affidavits, or any other summary judgment proof attached to her response. In a rebuttal to McGilberry's response, filed on May 5, 2025, SVP argued that she was not qualified to be an expert witness and was not timely designated as an expert witness.

¶7. The circuit court heard arguments of counsel in support of and in opposition to SVP's motion for summary judgment on June 25, 2025. SVP first pointed out that its expert had provided a report establishing that the machine, which was purchased by McGilberry, had passed all inspections and that it was free of defects when it left the manufacturer. SVP argued that an expert was required to support McGilberry's contention that the machine had a manufacturing defect or design flaw. SVP argued that McGilberry had produced no proof to create a question of fact as to whether the machine had any such defect.

¶8. McGilberry argued that she was qualified to testify as an expert based upon her experience with sewing machines. The circuit judge asked McGilberry's counsel whether she had been designated as an expert and whether she had provided a report. Her attorney told the court that McGilberry had been designated as an expert and had given a report in her testimony.¹ The judge questioned whether McGilberry could be an expert witness to a manufacturing defect or design flaw. Her counsel responded by arguing that McGilberry had made the machine available to SVP's expert, but Zheng never inspected the machine. McGilberry's attorney argued that a person would not expect a needle in a sewing machine to pop out. He argued that was enough to submit the case to a jury. McGilberry's counsel admitted that other than McGilberry, they had no expert testimony that the machine in question was defective. In response, SVP argued that during her deposition, McGilberry acknowledged that she had never repaired a sewing machine, that she had never reviewed blueprints or plans for any sewing machine, that she had never visited a Singer sewing machine factory, and that she had no training as an engineer. SVP maintained that McGilberry was not qualified to offer an expert opinion.

¶9. The circuit judge ruled from the bench that SVP's motion for summary judgment would be granted and stated: “The Court finds that [McGilberry] has failed to provide sufficient evidence, including expert testimony, to support the prima facie claim for negligence, strict liability, deceptive marketing and breach of warranty.” A written order was entered on July 14, 2025, specifically finding that “Plaintiff cannot prove and will not be able to offer any credible evidence that the Singer sewing machine at issue was unreasonably dangerous or defective in its design or manufacturing.” The circuit court granted summary judgment and dismissed McGilberry's complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. In Heiser v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 429 So. 3d 1240, 1246 (¶¶23-24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2026), this Court explained:

“This Court employs a de novo standard of review of a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment.” United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Moffatt, 334 So. 3d 165, 168 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022). Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered ․ if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories[,] and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” M.R.C.P. 56(c). “In this regard, we ‘must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and the moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ ” Moffatt, 334 So. 3d at 169 (¶15) (quoting Pollan v. Wartak, 240 So. 3d 1185, 1190 (¶12) (Miss. 2017)).

However, “[i]f the party opposing the motion is to avoid entry of an adverse judgment, he or she must bring forth evidence which is legally sufficient to make apparent the existence of triable fact issues.” Alexander v. Metro. Y.M.C.A., 411 So. 3d 177, 184 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Travis v. Stewart, 680 So. 2d 214, 218 (Miss. 1996)). “[U]pon our de novo review, we ‘must ․ determine whether a party has carried its summary-judgment burden based upon the evidence presented to the court,’ which must be ‘competent evidence under the requirements of Rule 56.’ ” Back Bay Lawnscapes LLC v. Graham, 420 So. 3d 949, 958 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Karpinsky v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 109 So. 3d 84, 91 (¶20) (Miss. 2013)).

ANALYSIS

¶11. The Mississippi Products Liability Act (MPLA) applies broadly to “any action for damages caused by a product, including, but not limited to, any action based on a theory of strict liability in tort, negligence, or breach of implied warranty, except for commercial damage to the product itself.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (Rev. 2019). McGilberry's complaint asserts various claims sounding in products liability against SVP arising from an alleged defect in a sewing machine. All products liability claims in this State are governed by the MPLA. See Williams v. Bennett, 921 So. 2d 1269, 1273 (¶13) (Miss. 2006); see also Elliott v. El Paso Corp., 181 So. 3d 263, 268 (¶14) (Miss. 2015) (stating that “the Mississippi Products Liability Act ․ applies ‘in any action for damages caused by a product’ ” (quoting § 11-1-63)).

¶12. In Logan v. Ford Motor Co., 293 So. 3d 840, 844-45 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), this Court stated:

And to survive summary judgment in a products-liability claim, the nonmovant needs to show that the product was:

(1) designed in a defective manner; (2) which rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff; (3) that the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition proximately caused the plaintiff's damages; (4) that the damages were not caused by an inherent characteristic of the product which cannot be eliminated without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability and which an ordinary person would recognize; (5) that the defendant knew or should have known of the danger that caused the damage; and (6) that there existed a feasible design alternative that would have, to a reasonable probability, prevented the harm without also impairing the product's utility, usefulness, practicality or desirability.

Thompson v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 89 So. 3d 696, 700 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[t]he plaintiffs bear the burden of proof on the issue of causation and must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not, that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough.” Rowan [v. Kia Motors Am. Inc.], 16 So. 3d [62,] 66 (¶12) [(Miss. Ct. App. 2009)] (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶13. On appeal, McGilberry raises three issues that she maintains require reversal of the grant of summary judgment and asks that the case be remanded to circuit court for a trial on the merits. However, in the one-page Appellant's brief, counsel fails to make any meaningful argument in support of these claims. In fact, Appellant's counsel cites two purported cases for the proposition that “hands on experience can provide sufficient foundation for expert testimony”: Huff v. State, 926 So. 2d 797 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), and Moore v. State, 187 So. 3d 1178 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). This Court cannot find either case using the citations provided by McGilberry's counsel, nor could this Court identify any other Huff or Moore opinion supporting McGilberry's argument. The reporter at 926 So. 2d 797 lands in the middle of State v. Wynne, 926 So. 2d 789 (La. Ct. App. 2006), and the reporter at 187 So. 3d 1178 lands in the middle of Tennant v. Chase Home Finance LLC, 187 So. 3d 1172 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). Because McGilberry's brief totally fails to meet the requirements of Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 in form ² and substance, McGilberry's limited arguments are barred from appellate review. The procedural bar notwithstanding, we briefly address the merits of the appeal.

¶14. McGilberry first argues that the circuit court erred by not allowing her to testify as an expert witness, but we find no order of record where such a ruling was made by the circuit court. Rather, the court found that McGilberry had failed to submit summary judgment proof that the machine was unreasonably dangerous, or that McGilberry's injury was caused by a manufacturing defect or a design defect. The only evidence McGilberry used in an effort to prevent summary judgment was her deposition testimony (which was actually submitted by SVP, not McGilberry) that the needle broke and hit her eye the first time she used the machine. It is clear that, both at trial and on appeal, McGilberry is relying upon res ipsa loquitur to support her claim for damages, although she never uses that term. This appears true because she never once testified or speculated as to what caused the needle to break. Whether an expert or not, we find this testimony is insufficient to prevent summary judgment.

¶15. In Hammond v. Coleman Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 533 (S.D. Miss. 1999), the plaintiff's products liability claim was dismissed because the plaintiff's expert failed to offer any opinion on the cause of the injury. In ruling in favor of the defendant, the court stated:

This Court cannot conclude from the deposition testimony of Rosenhan that he has stated any opinion that in fact the Coleman lantern was defectively designed or manufactured defectively. His testimony appears to present nothing to the trier of fact other than the possibility that the lantern malfunctioned. Whether or not this was an inherent defect, a design defect, a manufacturing defect, or caused by some other reason is not adequately explained, or indeed is not explained at all, by Rosenhan. Res ipsa loquitur is not an appropriate doctrine in regard to a strict liability claim. See generally, Cather v. Catheter Technology Corp., 753 F. Supp. 634, 638-39 (S.D. Miss. 1991); and Powe v. Wagner Electric Sales Corp., 589 F. Supp. 657, 661 (S.D. Miss. 1984). Simply offering proof that damage occurred after the use of a product is not sufficient to establish liability. Cather, 753 F. Supp. at 639; citing, William Cooper & Nephews, Inc. v. Pevey, 317 So. 2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1975).

Id. at 538-39 (emphasis added). Our review of McGilberry's testimony reveals that the same is true in the present case. McGilberry offered nothing more than that the needle broke while she was using the sewing machine and hit her in the eye. Therefore, she contends, there must have been a defect in the machine, but she does not point to a defect in the machine. We find that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate under the facts of this case.

¶16. McGilberry briefly complains that SVP's expert never inspected the machine after the accident; however, as noted above, McGilberry had the burden of proof as to causation. She also contends that the circuit court weighed conflicting evidence that should have been presented to the jury to resolve. Our review of the record, however, shows that McGilberry presented no evidence as to causation. These arguments are also without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶17. Based upon the analysis above, we affirm the circuit court's order granting SVP's motion for summary judgment.

¶18. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We assume counsel was referring to McGilberry's deposition, which was attached to SVP's memorandum in support of summary judgment.

2.   The brief had no table of contents, no table of authorities, and no statement of assignment, see M.R.A.P. 28(a), and was not double spaced, see M.R.A.P. 32.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.