TERRINA BOATNER v. TINA HICKERSON (2026)

Introduction

This appeal stems from an action to quiet title brought by Appellant Terrina Boatner (“Boatner”) against Respondent Tina Hickerson (“Hickerson”). The trial court initially entered a default judgment in favor of Boatner, but later granted Hickerson's motion to set aside the default judgment. Boatner, acting pro se, attempts to appeal from the trial court's judgment setting aside the default judgment, pursuant to Rule 74.06.¹ Boatner's amended brief raises four points on appeal. Boatner's appeal violates several Missouri Supreme Court Rules, including the briefing requirements of Rule 84.04, and her amended brief includes fictitious cases generated by artificial intelligence (“A.I”), which prevent this Court from engaging in meaningful review. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Additionally, given the frivolousness of the appeal, this Court awards $10,000 in damages to Hickerson, pursuant to Rule 84.19.

Factual and Procedural Background

On March 10, 2025, Boatner, acting pro se, filed a “Petition to Quiet Title” against Hickerson. Therein, Boatner sought to quiet title for a property on Capitol Drive in St. Louis County (“Property”). Because personal service of process was not successful on Hickerson, Boatner filed an application for service by publication. The trial court entered an order for service by publication. Then, on July 14, 2025, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of Boatner.² In its judgment, the trial court declared the 2012 purported transfer of the Property invalid and set it aside, ordered Hickerson's name be removed from the title of the Property, and declared Boatner the rightful owner of the Property. On July 24, 2025, the trial court entered a writ of possession for the eviction of Hickerson from the Property.

Upon learning of the judgment entered against her, Hickerson hired counsel, who moved to stay the writ of execution for possession of the Property and to set aside the default judgment. The trial court granted Hickerson's motion to stay. Boatner moved to vacate the stay of execution and reinstate the writ of possession as well as enforce the default judgment. Subsequently, Hickerson filed an amended motion to set aside the default judgment, pursuant to Rule 74.05, and a motion for relief from the judgment, pursuant to Rule 74.06(b). The motion included Hickerson's sworn affidavit and certified and/or sealed copies of deeds from the Office of Recorder of Deeds for St. Louis County, as well as documents from the St. Louis County Assessor's Office.

On October 7, 2025, a hearing was held on the pending motions. Following the hearing, the trial court denied Boatner's motions and granted Hickerson's motion to set aside the July 14, 2025 judgment. The “Order and Judgment,” dated October 7, 2025, provides:

Cause called upon [Hickerson's] Amended Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Under Rule 74.05 and Motion for Relief From Judgment Pursuant to Rule 74.06(b). [Boatner] appears pro se. Defendant Hickerson appears by counsel. Argument heard and evidence presented. The Court, considering the record, the arguments, [Hickerson's] exhibits and all other matters presented, hereby GRANTS [Hickerson's] motion. The Judgment of July 14, 2025 in favor of [Boatner] is void and hereby VACATED and held for naught.

Further, this Court finds that Terrina Boatner has no standing and therefore it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that [Boatner's] case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Boatner timely appealed and filed her appellate brief on December 3, 2025. This Court entered an order on December 8, 2025, finding Boatner's brief violated Rules 84.04 and 84.06, and directing Boatner to “The ABC's of Appellate Practice” published on this Court's website. This Court granted Boatner until January 7, 2026, to file an amended brief that substantially complied with Rule 84.

On December 22, 2025, Boatner filed her amended brief. Hickerson subsequently filed a motion under Rule 81.15, arguing, in pertinent part, she had identified numerous documents that were filed with the trial court but were omitted from the legal file. The motion also informed this Court there was a transcript of the hearing on October 7, 2025, which Boatner had failed to order. Boatner filed a motion to strike Hickerson's motion.

On January 9, 2026, this Court entered an order granting Hickerson's motion in part and denying it in part, and denying Boatner's motion to strike. This Court found Hickerson's concerns valid and explained the record needed to be corrected in order for this Court to have a complete and accurate record for appellate review. This Court expressly ordered Boatner “to file a supplemental legal file containing the omitted documents specifically identified by [Hickerson] on or before January 28, 2026.” This Court reminded Boatner she bore “the burden of filing a complete record on appeal, and thus, the decision of whether to order the transcript rest[ed] with her.” This Court noted that failure to file a complete record on appeal may be grounds for dismissal. Last, this Court concluded the issues raised in Hickerson's motion did not require remand pursuant to Rule 81.15 as there were no allegations that the records of the trial court were incorrect. Boatner filed a supplemental legal file on January 20, 2026.

On January 30, 2026, Hickerson filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending Boatner's amended brief violates Rule 84.04 in several respects and the supplemental legal file did not comply with this Court's January 9th order. The motion was taken with the case. Hickerson timely filed a response brief addressing Boatner's points on appeal. In her response, Hickerson also provided additional reasons as to why Boatner's appeal should be dismissed, including Boatner's failure to order and file the transcript of the hearing on October 7, 2025, as required by Rule 81.12(c), and invoke this Court's jurisdiction by specifying the judgment she is appealing from in the notice of appeal, as required by Rule 81.04(a).

Discussion

This Court must first address Hickerson's motion to dismiss this appeal, which was taken with the case. This Court finds Boatner's appeal fails to comply with Rules 81.04(a) (notice of appeal requirements), 81.12 (record on appeal), and 84.04 (appellate briefing requirements). First, the notice of appeal fails to specify the judgment Boatner is appealing from as required by Rule 81.04(a). Second, the record on appeal violates Rule 81.12 because it is incomplete. Lastly, Boatner's amended brief fails to comply with the mandatory appellate briefing rules set forth in Rule 84.04. As discussed in detail below, this Court is unable to engage in meaningful appellate review due to Boatner's violation of the aforementioned rules. Thus, Hickerson's motion to dismiss is granted.

Rule 81.04: Notice of Appeal

Rule 81.04(a) states a notice of appeal must specify “the judgment, decree, or order appealed from[.]” See Rule 81.04(a). “An appellate court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a judgment unless the appellant files an effective notice of appeal related to that judgment.” State v. Williamson, 729 S.W.3d 762, 772 (Mo. App. W.D. 2026) (emphasis omitted).

Boatner's notice of appeal fails to specify the final judgment she is appealing from, as required by Rule 81.04(a). This Court notes Boatner attached the trial court's order denying Boatner's “Motion for Sanctions” and “Motion to Enforce Default Judgment and Writ of Possession Despite Late Entry of Counsel and Absence of Supersedeas Bond.” This, however, is not the final judgment the trial court entered in the underlying case. Generally, an appellate court “only has jurisdiction over final judgments disposing of all issues and parties, which leave nothing for future determination.” Beckmann v. Wilson, 725 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting MJDZ, L.L.C. v. De La Cruz, 553 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018)). Here, there is no dispute the final judgment in the matter is the trial court's judgment entered on October 7, 2025. Because the notice of appeal did not specify Boatner was appealing from the October 7th judgment, Boatner's notice of appeal did not invoke appellate jurisdiction over the final judgment. See Williamson, 729 S.W.3d at 772. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review any claims of error related to the trial court's judgment granting Hickerson's motion to set aside the judgment entered on July 14, 2025, and finding Boatner lacked standing.

Rule 81.12: Record on Appeal

Rule 81.12(a) clearly specifies the record on appeal, consisting of the legal file and transcript, “shall contain all of the record, proceedings and evidence necessary to the determination of all questions to be presented, by either appellant or respondent, to the appellate court for decision.” “The appellant alone has the duty to furnish a sufficient record on appeal[.]” Wheeles v. Wheeles, 577 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). When an appellant fails to furnish a sufficient record on appeal for this Court to determine all of the questions presented by her appeal, dismissal is required. Id.

Here, Boatner's legal file fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 81.12(a). In its January 9th order, this Court explained to Boatner what she needed to do to furnish a complete and accurate record on appeal. Yet, her supplemental legal file failed to include all of the omitted pages. As a result, the legal file remains incomplete. Additionally, the order noted Boatner had not ordered the transcript of the October 7th hearing and warned her that this alone could lead to dismissal. Despite this Court's warning, Boatner failed to order a transcript of the October 7, 2025 hearing and file it with this Court.

As such, Boatner failed to satisfy her obligation of filing a transcript and furnishing a complete legal file for this Court to determine the questions presented by her appeal.

Rule 84.04: Briefing Requirements

Rule 84.04 plainly sets forth the mandatory appellate briefing requirements. Lexow v. Boeing Co., 643 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. banc 2022). Pro se litigants, such as Boatner, are “subject to the same procedural rules as parties represented by counsel, including the rules specifying the required contents of appellate briefs.” Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 47 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (quoting Hutcheson v. Dep't Soc. Servs., Fam. Support Div., 656 S.W.3d 37, 40 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022)).

This Court recognizes the problems faced by pro se litigants, but they are not entitled to exceptions they would not otherwise receive if represented by counsel. Id. This Court cannot relax its standards for non-lawyers. Id. The “application of the rules stems not from a lack of sympathy, but instead from a necessity for judicial impartiality, judicial economy, and fairness to all parties.” Id. (quoting Barbero v. Wilhoit Props., Inc., 637 S.W.3d 590, 595 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). But most importantly, “[c]ompliance with Rule 84.04 is essential to ensure that this Court retains its role as a neutral arbiter and avoids becoming an advocate for any party.” Renegar v. Borman, 712 S.W.3d 33, 37 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting Jones v. Impact Agape Ministries, 693 S.W.3d 122, 126 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023)). “Deficient briefing runs the risk of forcing this Court to assume the role of advocate by requiring us to sift through the legal record, reconstruct the statement of facts, and craft a legal argument on the appellant's behalf.” Murphree v. Lakeshore Estates, LLC, 636 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). “Failure to substantially comply with Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for our review and is grounds for dismissal.” Mecey v. Harps Food Stores, 721 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

After finding Boatner's initial brief included numerous Rule 84.04 violations, this Court gave Boatner the opportunity to file an amended appellate brief. Yet, Boatner's amended brief still fails to sufficiently comply with Rule 84.04's requirements. The numerous briefing deficiencies and the submission of fictitious cases generated by A.I. prevent this Court from engaging in any meaningful review. Dismissal is particularly appropriate where, as here, Boatner failed to correct the deficiencies in her brief after being put on notice her brief was inadequate. See Brown v. Brown, 645 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). This Court discusses each Rule 84.04 violation in turn.

Appendix

Rule 84.04(h) requires a party's appellate brief be accompanied, in pertinent part, by a separate appendix containing the judgment, order, or decision in question and the complete text of all controlling statutes, ordinances, or rules. Rule 84.04(h)(1)–(2). Boatner filed three separate appendices. None of the appendices include the final judgment in question or the controlling authorities Boatner relies on to support her points on appeal. Therefore, Boatner fails to comply with Rule 84.04(h).

Table of Contents

Rule 84.04(a)(1) requires an appellant's brief contain a detailed table of contents and a table of cases, statutes, and other authorities cited, with reference to the pages of the brief in which they are cited. Boatner's table of contents and table of authorities contain inaccurate page references. In particular, many of the authorities appear on different pages. Thus, Boatner's table of contents violates Rule 84.04(a)(1).

Statement of Facts

Rule 84.04(c) requires the statement of facts include “a fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for determination without argument.” “The primary purpose of the statement of facts is to set forth an immediate, accurate, complete and unbiased understanding of the facts of the case.” Clark v. Aranda, 730 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting Pearson v. Keystone Temp. Assign. Group, Inc., 588 S.W.3d 546, 550 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). “Failure to include, in the statement of facts, the facts upon which an appellant's claim of error is based fails to preserve the contention for appellate review.” Id. (quoting Pearson, 588 S.W.3d at 550).

Boatner's statement of facts is a single page long and consists of an abbreviated procedural history. “A statement of facts that consists of nothing more than an abbreviated procedural history fails to provide an understanding of the case and is deficient.” Id. (quoting Yarnall ex rel. Yarnall v. Choudhury, 23 S.W.3d 920, 921 (Mo. App. S.D. 2000)). Thus, Boatner has failed to provide this Court with an immediate, accurate, and complete understanding of the facts of the case and violates Rule 84.04(c).

Points Relied On

“Points Relied On define the scope of appellate review” and serve “to give notice to the opposing party of the precise matters which must be contended with and to inform the court of the issues before it.” Kruse, 692 S.W.3d at 48 (quoting Hutcheson, 656 S.W.3d at 41). Rule 84.04(d) requires each point relied on: “(A) [i]dentify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges; (B) [s]tate concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and (C) [e]xplain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.” To ensure compliance, this subsection provides a simple template: “The trial court erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal reasons for the claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible error].” Id.

Here, Boatner's points relied on read as follows:

[Point One:] The trial court erred in setting aside the July 14, 2025 default judgment under Rule 74.05(d) because [Hickerson] failed to establish either good cause or a meritorious defense, in that [Hickerson] did not file a responsive pleading, did not appear, and presented no sworn facts or competent evidence explaining the failure to respond or demonstrating a legally sufficient defense.

[Point Two:] The trial court erred in treating [Hickerson's] claim of lack of service as credible and setting aside the default judgment under Rule 74.05(d) because [Hickerson] failed to present competent evidence of good cause or a meritorious defense, in that the record reflects multiple documented service attempts and demonstrates that [Hickerson] had actual notice of the proceedings.

[Point Three:] The trial court erred in treating [Hickerson's] affidavit and attached exhibits as a legally sufficient meritorious defense under Rule 74.05(d) because [Hickerson] failed to rebut [Boatner's] evidence of false consideration, lack of delivery, lack of acceptance, medical incapacity of the grantor, or an irregular chain of title.

[Point Four:] The trial court erred in treating the January 5, 2012 warranty deed as valid under Missouri law because the deed is void for lack of delivery, lack of acceptance, lack of valid consideration, and failure to comply with statutory requirements governing conveyances, in that the undisputed record fails to establish any valid transfer of title.

While Boatner uses the key words set forth in the template–“the trial court erred,” “because,” and “in that,”–all four of Boatner's points relied on fail to substantially comply with the format provided in Rule 84.04(d)(1). Specifically, Points Two, Three, and Four fail to specify the precise ruling or action Boatner is challenging on appeal. Asserting generally that the trial court erred does not sufficiently inform this Court of the specific trial court ruling or action an appellant is challenging. See Malin v. Cole Cnty. Prosecuting Att'y, 631 S.W.3d 638, 644 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (“[Appellant]’s second point fails to identify a specific action of the trial court that he is challenging, as required by Rule 84.04(d)(1)(A); and instead asserts, generically, that the trial court erred in entering judgment.”). But most importantly, none of Boatner's points relied on challenge the trial court's grounds for setting aside the default judgment or finding that Boatner had no standing to bring the underlying action. Failure to challenge the articulated grounds for the trial court's ruling is fatal to the success of an appeal. See Geiler v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 621 S.W.3d 536, 546–47 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021); see also Tolu v. Reid, 639 S.W.3d 504, 534 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021).

All of Boatner's points also fail to satisfy the “because” requirement, which puts this “Court on notice of the legal reason the appellant asserts support reversal of the trial court's judgment.” Brown, 645 S.W.3d at 82. This Court notes what follows the word “because” are not legal reasons; they are general references to principles or rules of law. Abstract statements of law, standing alone, do not comply with the requirements of Rule 84.04(d). Clark, 730 S.W.3d at 229.

Additionally, the “in that” requirement is “dedicated to explaining why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible error.” Brown, 645 S.W.3d at 82. Boatner completely fails to include the “in that” requirement in Point Three; Points One and Two simply attribute error to Hickerson, not the Court; and Point Four gives only a vague statement concluding the record does not support the trial court's findings. In short, none of the points comply with the “in that” requirement as they do not explain how the facts of the case before this Court, when combined with a viable or sound legal theory, support reversal. Without such a link, this Court is left guessing at the nature of Boatner's argument. See id.

This Court will not speculate about the claims Boatner attempts to raise and the legal justifications averred. See Kruse, 692 S.W.3d at 48. Such speculation would place this Court in the role of an advocate for Boatner by attempting to discern, refine, and supplement and/or completely rewrite her points. This we cannot do. Renegar, 712 S.W.3d at 40 (stating this Court lacks authority to assume the role of an advocate for any party on appeal).

Last, Rule 84.04(d) requires each point relied on be immediately followed by “a list of cases, not to exceed four, and the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions or other authority upon which that party principally relies.” Rule 84.04(d)(5). Some of the cases cited in support of Boatner's points relied do not appear in her argument, and the majority of the cases listed are fictitious, which will be discussed in more detail below. Thus, Boatner's points relied on fail to comply with Rule 84.04(d).

Argument

Rule 84.04(e) requires that, for each claim of error, the argument “include a concise statement describing whether the error was preserved for appellate review; if so, how it was preserved; and the applicable standard of review.” “To properly brief the alleged error, an appellant must explain why, in the context of the case, the law supports the claim of reversible error by showing how principles of law and the facts of the case interact.” Burgan v. Newman, 618 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Also, “[a]ll factual assertions in the argument shall have specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits.” Rule 84.04(e). Boatner fails to comply with Rule 84.04(e) in multiple respects.

All of Boatner's points on appeal fail to include both a preservation statement and the applicable standard of review for any of the alleged errors. “An appellant's failure to include the applicable standard of review or demonstrate preservation of the alleged errors as required by Rule 84.04(e) is grounds for dismissal.” Hutcheson, 656 S.W.3d at 43.

Further, many of Boatner's statements fail to include specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal. This requirement is “mandatory and essential for the effective functioning of appellate courts because courts cannot spend time searching the record to determine if factual assertions in the brief are supported by the record.” Carmen v. Olsen, 611 S.W.3d 368, 372 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (quoting P & J Ventures, LLC v. Yi Yu Zheng, 479 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016)).

As to Boatner's arguments, they are short, consisting of fact statements and conclusory assertions, and devoid of any meaningful legal analysis or supporting rationale. Importantly, Boatner fails to “satisfy the fundamental requirement of an appellate argument, which is to demonstrate the erroneousness of the basis upon which the lower court issued an adverse ruling.” Hicks v. Northland-Smithville, 655 S.W.3d 641, 649 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A mere recitation of facts does not provide a legal reason upon which this Court can find reversible error.” Mecey, 721 S.W.3d at 202. Of equal significance, “[m]ere conclusions and the failure to develop an argument with support from legal authority preserve nothing for review.” Id. (quoting Frazier v. City of Kansas, 467 S.W.3d 327, 346 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)).

More egregious is Boatner's failure to cite any relevant and existing caselaw to support any of her conclusions. To prevail on appeal, an appellant is obligated to cite relevant and available authority, and, if there is no authority available, the appellant should explain the reason for the absence of citations. Kinman v. Donahoo, 719 S.W.3d 94, 97 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). “Where relevant authority is neither cited nor is there any explanation as to why authority is not available, the appellate court may be justified in considering the points abandoned and dismiss[ing] the appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Boatner's entire brief reference the following six cases:

Brungard v. Risky's Inc., 240 S.W.3d 685 (Mo. banc 2007);

City of Greenwood v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 606 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009);

Davis v. Bess, 655 S.W.3d 29 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022);

Jones v. Jones, 764 S. W.2d 307 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989);

Kelley v. Kelley, 290 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1956); and

Stein v. Steeplechase Condominiums, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 233 (Mo. App. E.D. 1983).

Boatner conceded at oral argument she used A.I. to draft parts of her brief. In reviewing her brief and cited cases, this Court found Brungard and City of Greenwood are both real cases, but they are never cited in Boatner's arguments; they are only cited under her points relied on.

The remaining cases are fictitious. Boatner's citations present a much more serious and fundamental issue than poor briefing; citing nonexistent caselaw constitutes making a false statement to this Court. See Kruse, 692 S.W.3d at 52. There is no excuse for citing to fictitious caselaw generated by A.I. in an appellate brief. This Court notes “[p]ro se appellants have successfully argued and won appeals in this Court using freely accessible caselaw.” Id. This case, however, is much different. Boatner's submission of fictitious cases constitutes an abuse of the judicial system and represents a flagrant violation of the duties of candor owed to this Court by parties, including pro se litigants. Id.

This Court's first case addressing a party submitting an appellate brief with citations to fictitious cases was Kruse, 692 S.W.3d at 50–54. There, this Court urged “all parties practicing before this Court, barred and self-represented alike, to be cognizant that we are aware of the issue and will not permit fraud on this Court in violation of our rules.” Id. at 52 (emphasis added). Kruse served as warning to parties that it is impermissible to file an appellate brief containing fictitious citations and there will be consequences for such actions. This case is no exception, and this Court must not only dismiss the matter but also impose sanctions. See infra, Sanctions.

Summary of Rule 84.04 Violations

Rule 84.04 does not require perfection, but an appellant must substantially comply with the mandatory briefing rules. Clark, 730 S.W.3d at 227. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, this Court recognizes the challenges faced by pro se litigants, however, this appeal does not involve minor or technical briefing deficiencies. Taken together, the violations are numerous and significant and so deficient they preclude appellate review.

Sanctions

Pursuant to Rule 84.19, this Court has discretion to award monetary damages to the respondent if this Court determines an appeal is frivolous. Kruse, 692 S.W.3d at 53. In determining whether a case is frivolous, this Court considers: “whether the appeal presents any justiciable question and whether it is so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little prospect of success.” Montanari v. McKay-Montanari, 699 S.W.3d 567, 574 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting Biersmith v. Curry Ass'n Mgmt., Inc., 359 S.W.3d 84, 89–90 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011)). The purpose of Rule 84.19 is two-fold: “(1) to prevent congestion of the appellate court dockets with meritless cases which, by their presence, contribute to delaying resolution of meritorious cases and (2) to compensate respondents for the expenses they incur in the course of defending these meritless appeals.” Kruse, 692 S.W.3d at 53 (quoting Estate of Downs v. Bugg, 242 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007)).

Boatner's appeal substantially fails to comply with the Missouri Supreme Court Rules, even after this Court granted her leave to file an amended brief. Boatner's numerous and significant violations favor a finding that her appeal is frivolous and warrant the imposition of sanctions under Rule 84.19. The most troubling aspect of Boatner's appeal is that it involves fraud on the Court. “[J]udicial impartiality and fairness mandate that we hold pro se appellants to the same standards as parties represented by lawyers.” Puetz v. Rice, 675 S.W.3d 652, 656 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). This Court cannot make an exception for Boatner. The utilization of A.I. does not excuse a party's responsibility of confirming the existence of the cases cited in support of his or her arguments. Boatner, just like any party before this Court, has an ethical duty to demonstrate candor. “Citing nonexistent case law or misrepresenting the holdings of a case is making a false statement to a court[;] [i]t does not matter if [generative A.I.] told you so.” Kruse, 692 S.W.3d at 52 (quoting Maura R. Grossman, Paul W. Grimm, & Daniel G. Brown, Is Disclosure and Certification of the Use of Generative AI Really Necessary? 107 JUDICATURE 68, 75 (2023)).

Moreover, even if Boatner had appealed from the final judgment with a brief that was compliant with Rule 84.04, her claims wholly lacked merit. Specifically, Boatner's appeal lacks any basis for asserting error on the part of the trial court in setting aside the default judgment entered on July 14, 2025, and finding she lacked standing to bring the underlying action. Notably, not once do her argument sections mention the relevant standard of review or applicable rules for this court to address any of the trial court's findings.

Boatner's actions in pursuing this appeal required Hickerson to expend more resources than necessary. In filing this appeal with all of the aforementioned deficiencies and the use of fictitious cases, Hickerson was compelled to file a response and a motion to dismiss. In order to file a response brief, Hickerson was required to decipher the issues raised on appeal; provide this Court with a complete and accurate record on appeal, including the transcript of the October 7th hearing and a supplemental legal file; cross-reference the accuracy of Boatner's filings; present arguments to all of Boatner's points on appeal which wholly lacked merit; and attend oral argument. In summary, Boatner's appeal is “so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little prospect of success.” Montanari, 699 S.W.3d at 574 (quoting Biersmith, 359 S.W.3d at 90). “The imposition of damages serves to promote the integrity of the judicial process.” Kruse, 692 S.W.3d at 54. For these reasons, an award to Hickerson for appellate attorney's fees is warranted. Thus, Boatner is hereby ordered to pay an award of $10,000 to Hickerson for attorneys’ fees.³

Conclusion

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. Pursuant to Rule 84.19, damages are assessed against Boatner in the amount of $10,000 for filing a frivolous appeal. The damages shall be a judgment against Boatner in favor of Hickerson for which execution may issue.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All references are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2026).

2.   Rule 54.20(e) sets forth the requirements for proving service by publication, stating:Service by publication shall be proved by an affidavit showing the dates upon which and the newspaper in which the notice was published. A copy of the notice shall be attached to the affidavit which shall be filed. The clerk's certificate that a copy of the notice upon order for service by publication and a copy of the petition were mailed to defendant at the address stated in the plaintiff's petition or in the affidavit for order of publication and the date of the mailing shall likewise be filed.This Court notes the trial court's default judgment provides that service was completed by publication in accordance with its order. However, there is no evidence in the record on appeal to support Boatner complied with the requirements of Rule 54.20(e) and that proper service by publication was actually made. In the absence of proof of service mandated by Rule 54.20, a trial court does not have jurisdiction over the defendant, unless he or she has consented to such jurisdiction or has waived the objection to personal jurisdiction. Russ v. Russ, 39 S.W.3d 895, 897 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001).

3.   This Court notes that “Eastern District Local Rule 400 requiring a specific request for attorneys’ fees prior to the submission of the cause does not apply to awarding damages under Rule 84.19.” Kruse, 692 S.W.3d at 54. Here, Hickerson sought “all such other and further relief [a]s deemed just and proper” in her motion to dismiss the appeal. This Court finds damages under Rule 84.19 to be necessary and appropriate in this case.

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge

Philip M. Hess, Judge and Virginia W. Lay, Judge concur.