PETTIS COUNTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LLC LLC v. PETTIS COUNTY (2026)

Presidio Environmental Services, L.L.C. and its wholly owned subsidiary Pettis County Development Company, L.L.C. (collectively “Presidio”) own land in Pettis County on which they have been working to develop a sanitary landfill since at least 2020. Presidio claims that a solid waste management order adopted by Pettis County in February 2022 prevents Presidio from obtaining necessary governmental approvals for its planned landfill, and would unreasonably interfere with its future operation of the landfill. Presidio contends that the County's solid waste management order is unlawful; that the order cannot lawfully be applied to Presidio based on the prior nonconforming use and equitable estoppel doctrines; and that the order effects a regulatory taking of Presidio's property, for which Presidio is entitled to compensation.

The circuit court held a bench trial, following which the court declared certain provisions of Pettis County's order to be unlawful, and enjoined their enforcement. Although the circuit court's judgment did not decide Presidio's prior nonconforming use, equitable estoppel, or regulatory takings claims, the circuit court certified its judgment as final and appealable under Supreme Court Rule 74.01(b).

Both Presidio and the County appeal. We conclude that all of Presidio's claims – both decided and unresolved – constitute a single “judicial unit.” As a result, the circuit court erred by certifying a partial final judgment which resolved only some of Presidio's interrelated claims. We accordingly dismiss the parties’ appeals.

Factual Background

Beginning in 2019-2020, Presidio has sought to develop a sanitary landfill and resource recovery facility on a 628-acre parcel of property in Pettis County. The Missouri Division of Geology and Land Survey gave preliminary approval to Presidio's site on March 4, 2021. Presidio alleges that it engaged in discussions with the County in 2021, during which County officials expressed support for Presidio's plans. Presidio engaged in substantial efforts to obtain regulatory approval for its proposed landfill from the Department of Natural Resources. The circuit court found that, as of December 2024, Presidio “has spent approximately $10 million for the planning, permitting, and development” of the landfill. During 2021 and early 2022, the County Commission and Presidio negotiated over the terms of a “Host Agreement” for Presidio's facility, although no agreement was ever executed by the parties.

In response to citizen concerns, the County Commission adopted a solid waste management order on February 24, 2022. The order provides that “[t]here shall be no more than one (1) Solid Waste Management Facility operating at the same time in the County of Pettis.” The order specifies that sanitary landfills must be located at least three miles from any incorporated municipality, school, church, platted subdivision, or recreational area, and at least three-quarters of a mile from any occupied residence. The order provides that the County Commission “shall not issue any initial permit pursuant to this Ordinance before MDNR [(i.e., the Missouri Department of Natural Resources)] has issued a State permit authorizing facility operation.” The order requires County approval of the routes used to access any landfill, and requires landfill operators to maintain access roads free of litter. The order also imposes a $2,000 annual permit fee, as well as a fee of $1.50 per ton of waste disposed in the landfill. The order specifies that landfills may not be located in areas with particular geological characteristics, and prohibits the transfer of any solid waste management facility permit. The order also specifies that “[a]ny Solid Waste Management Facility in operation prior to the implementation of this Order shall be excluded in its entirety of [sic] all sections of this Order.”

Presidio contends that the provisions of the order make it impossible for Presidio to develop its contemplated landfill. In particular, Presidio alleges that the setback requirements in the order make it impossible to develop a new sanitary landfill anywhere in Pettis County. Presidio also contends that the order creates an impossible-to-meet, circular permitting process, in which Pettis County will not approve a new landfill until the Department of Natural Resources issues an operating permit, but the Department will not issue construction or operating permits without prior County approval.

This lawsuit was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Pettis County on May 19, 2022, by Mid-Missouri Waste Systems L.L.C. and Pettis County Properties Co. No. 22PT-CC00063. The original plaintiffs alleged that, like Presidio, they were seeking to develop a sanitary landfill in Pettis County, but that their efforts to do so had been stymied when the County adopted its restrictive solid waste management order in February 2022. The original plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the County's solid waste management order was unlawful; an injunction preventing the County from enforcing the order; and damages for the taking of the original plaintiffs’ property by virtue of the County's onerous regulations. The original plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims on March 18, 2025; they are not involved in this appeal.

Presidio was granted leave to intervene in the original plaintiffs’ lawsuit in November 2022, to assert claims similar to those asserted by the original plaintiffs. Because Pettis County has fewer than 75,000 inhabitants, Presidio applied for a change of venue pursuant to Rule 51.03. On December 16, 2022, the circuit court ordered a change of venue to the Circuit Court of Moniteau County.

On April 10, 2023, the circuit court's granted partial summary judgment to Presidio, declaring that the order's prohibition on transfer of solid waste management permits is unlawful because it is inconsistent with Department of Natural Resources regulations permitting the transfer of such permits.

Presidio was granted leave to file a First Amended Petition on August 26, 2024. Presidio's First Amended Petition alleges that Pettis County's solid waste management order is unlawful on multiple grounds. Presidio contends that the order is unlawful because:

• it is a zoning ordinance which the County was unauthorized to adopt without prior voter approval;

• the County has failed to satisfy the prerequisites required by State law before adopting solid waste management regulations;

• the order effectively prohibits any new landfill in Pettis County, even though operation of landfills is permitted by State law;

• the order was adopted without adequate public notice; and

• the exemption of Pettis County's sole existing landfill from the order's requirements violates equal protection, and makes the order an unconstitutional special law.

Presidio's First Amended Petition is divided into four Counts. The first Count requests a declaratory judgment that the order is unlawful. Presidio's second Count prays for an injunction preventing the County from enforcing the order.

The third Count of Presidio's First Amended Petition is titled “Inverse Condemnation by Regulatory Taking.” Count III alleges that the County's enactment of the order constitutes a taking of Presidio's property without just compensation, because adoption of the order “vastly diminished the value of [Presidio's] property in Pettis County.” In Count III, Presidio also alleges that it had engaged in substantial “work towards converting the land to a solid waste facility” prior to the County's adoption of the order, which “established a prior nonconforming use” which the order cannot prevent. Count III also alleges that Presidio has incurred substantial costs to develop a sanitary landfill “[i]n reliance on the County's lack of regulation and affirmative assurances of approval.” Presidio alleges that “the County is equitably estopped from enforcing the Order as to [Presidio] due to its prior representations that the [Presidio] Facility would be permitted.”

Finally, Count IV of Presidio's First Amended Petition alleges that the County violated the Sunshine Law by failing to adequately respond to Presidio's request for documents concerning the adoption of the solid waste management order, and the County's consideration of Presidio's planned landfill.

On June 11, 2025, the circuit court conducted a bench trial on the first two Counts of Presidio's First Amended Petition, which seek a declaratory judgment that Pettis County's solid waste management order is unlawful, and an injunction against its enforcement. The court issued its judgment on Counts I and II on October 8, 2025. The circuit court found that the order's setback requirements “make it impossible to site a landfill anywhere in Pettis County.” The court also found that the order “imposes a requirement which cannot be satisfied,” when it requires an operating permit from the Department of Natural Resources before the County will issue a permit, because “DNR will not issue its construction permit without a County permit.” Because “State law plainly permits the construction and operation of new landfills in the State of Missouri,” the circuit court found that the setback requirements, and the circular State and County permitting requirements, are invalid, “because these provisions prohibit what state law permits.” The judgment also repeated the circuit court's earlier determination that the prohibition on transfer of permits is inconsistent with State law.

Although the circuit court found that several specific provisions of the County's solid waste management order are unlawful, the court rejected Presidio's challenges to other aspects of the order. Thus, the court found that “[t]he limitation on the number of Solid Waste Management Facilities operating at the same time in Pettis County is regulatory and not prohibitory.” The court also found that the order's regulation of access routes, and the requirements to maintain the access routes litter-free, are consistent with State law. The judgment concluded that the exemption of Pettis County's one existing landfill from the requirements of the order has a rational basis, and is accordingly lawful. The circuit court also rejected Presidio's claims that the entire order is unlawful because it was adopted without adequate public notice; because it is an unauthorized zoning ordinance; or because the County failed to satisfy the preconditions required by State law before adopting solid waste management regulations.

The circuit court permanently enjoined enforcement of those provisions of the order which it found to be unlawful. (In an order entered on January 5, 2026, we stayed the circuit court's injunction pending resolution of this appeal.)

The circuit court's judgment did not resolve the claims asserted by Presidio in Counts III and IV of its First Amended Petition. Nevertheless, the court made “an express determination that Judgment should be entered on Counts I and II of the Amended Petition and that there is no just reason for delay” under Rule 74.01(b).

Both Presidio and the County have appealed the circuit court's judgment; we consolidated the parties’ appeals, and both are decided by this opinion.

Discussion

Although the judgment does not resolve all of Presidio's claims, the circuit court made an express determination under Rule 74.01(b) that an appealable final judgment should be entered.

Before addressing the merits of an appeal, this Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction. “For this Court to have jurisdiction, the judgment entered by the circuit court and appealed by the parties must have been a ‘final judgment’ as that phrase is used in section 512.020(5).” To be “final,” the judgment must either dispose of all claims (or the last claim) in a lawsuit, or be certified by the circuit court for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 74.01(b). A judgment is eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b) as a “final judgment” only if it disposes of a “judicial unit” of claims, meaning the judgment resolves “all claims by or against at least one party” or “disposes of one or more claims that are sufficiently distinct from the claims that remain pending in the circuit court.”

Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360, 365 (Mo. 2024) (citing and quoting Wilson v. City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 765, 768, 771 (Mo. 2020)).

“[T]he question of whether a judgment is eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b) is a question of law on which the circuit court has no discretion; only the question of whether an eligible judgment should be certified under Rule 74.01(b) is left to the sound exercise of the circuit court's discretion.” Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 771.

In this case, the circuit court's judgment did not result in the resolution of all of the claims in the lawsuit. Moreover, the judgment did not resolve all claims by or against any particular party: the claims which were resolved were asserted by Presidio against the County; and the claims which remain are also asserted by Presidio against the County. Therefore, the judgment is only eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b) if it “ ‘disposes of one or more claims that are sufficiently distinct from the claims that remain pending in the circuit court.’ ” Matthews, 685 S.W.3d at 365 (quoting Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 771).

“A claim is the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts.” Rhodes v. Mo. Hwys. & Transp. Comm'n, 718 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Mo. 2025) (cleaned up). “In other words, a judgment resolves a ‘distinct’ judicial unit if it resolves claims that do not arise from the same set of facts, and the same transactions and occurrences, as the counts yet to be disposed of in the circuit court.” Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 770 (cleaned up).

“[T]he ‘effect of Rule 74.01(b) is to permit severance of any unrelated substantive claim for relief of the parties and to allow appeal of a final judgment on those severed claims.’ ” First Nat'l Bank of Dieterich v. Pointe Royale Property Owners’ Ass'n, Inc., 515 S.W.3d 219, 222 (Mo. 2017) (quoting Buemi v. Kerckhoff, 359 S.W.3d 16, 21 (Mo. 2011); emphasis added by First Nat'l Bank). “It is ‘differing,’ ‘separate,’ ‘distinct’ transactions or occurrences that permit a separately appealable judgment, not differing legal theories or issues presented for recovery on the same claim.” Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC, 371 S.W.3d 798, 802 (Mo. 2012) (quoting Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. 1997)).

It may be that the Sunshine Law claim asserted by Presidio in Count IV of its First Amended Petition arises from a different “aggregate of operative facts” than its remaining claims. Rhodes, 718 S.W.3d at 422. But even if we assume for the sake of argument that Count IV constitutes a distinct “judicial unit,” the same cannot be said of the unresolved claims asserted in Count III.

In this case, the claims Presidio asserts in Counts I through III of its First Amended Petition all arise out of, and seek relief for, a single underlying set of facts: that Presidio seeks to build a landfill on property which it owns in Pettis County; and that the County's February 2022 solid waste management order allegedly prevents and unreasonably burdens Presidio's planned development. Admittedly, Presidio's various claims invoke different legal doctrines, and seek different forms of relief: Count I seeks a declaration that the order is unlawful; Count II seeks an injunction preventing the order's enforcement; the equitable estoppel and prior nonconforming use claims seeks to exempt Presidio from regulation by the order; and the inverse condemnation claim seeks damages for the order's adverse effects on Presidio's development plans. But the same basic facts underlie each claim. The fact that Presidio's various claims may seek different forms of relief does not alter the fact that they all arise out of the same underlying set of facts. See Rhodes, 718 S.W.3d at 422 (“If multiple forms of relief are sought with respect to one set of facts, it is still one claim, and an order resolving some prayers for relief and not others does not fully resolve that claim and is not a judgment.”). The First Amended Petition's incorporation of the allegations underlying Counts I and II into Count III “emphasizes th[e] point” that the claims all arise out of the same underlying facts. First Nat'l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 222.

At oral argument, counsel for Presidio informed the Court that Counts III and IV of its First Amended Petition are set for trial on October 28, 2026. Counsel advised that, during trial, Presidio would be seeking (among other things) damages for the temporary taking of its property by operation of the provisions of the order which the circuit court later found to be unlawful. With respect to this aspect of its inverse condemnation claim, counsel likened the existing judgment (which declares portions of the order to be unlawful) to a finding of liability, while the October 2026 trial will determine Presidio's damages arising from those unlawful provisions.

Counsel's description of the interrelationship of Presidio's declaratory judgment and inverse condemnation claims confirms that those claims are part of a single judicial unit. “As a general proposition, a judgment which determines that a defendant is liable for damages, but not the amount of that liability, is not final or appealable until the amount of damages is finally determined.” Jefferson City Med. Grp., P.C. v. Brummett, 665 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citations omitted). As a result, a judgment finding a party to be liable cannot be certified for immediate appeal under Rule 74.01(b) unless the full extent of the injured party's damages have been decided. Id. (despite circuit court's Rule 74.01(b) certification, dismissing appeal of judgment that found party liable for attorney's fees, but that did not determine amount of fee liability); see also Stratman v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 695 S.W.3d 96, 102 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (ruling could not be certified for immediate appeal where it “only addressed the availability of one type of damages,” but left entitlement to other categories of damages unresolved); Record v. Continental Ins. Co., 901 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995) (“The trial court resolved the issue of liability but did not resolve the issue of damages. The partial summary judgment is, therefore, not a judgment on at least one claim as required by Rule 74.01(b).” (citations omitted)); Team, Inc. v. Schlette, 814 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991).

We recognize that Presidio's claims for equitable estoppel, prior nonconforming use, and inverse condemnation may require proof of additional facts beyond the facts which support its claims in Counts I and II that the order is unlawful and should be enjoined. For example, to support the claims asserted in Count III, Presidio may be required to present evidence concerning the specific actions or statements of the County on which it claims to have relied; the costs Presidio incurred to attempt to comply with, and to challenge, the order; and the value of the landfill property before and after adoption of the order. But the fact that different legal theories, or different legal remedies, may require additional evidence does not prevent a finding that the claims arise from the same underlying facts. For example, First National Bank of Dieterich involved a declaratory judgment claim that a property owner was not liable for certain homeowner's association assessments, and a separate claim that the homeowner's association had slandered the property owner's title by filing a lien for the assessments. The Supreme Court held that the claims were part of the same “judicial unit,” even though the Court acknowledged that “these two counts seek different legal remedies and the count for slander of title may even require evidence of the Bank's damages that would not be relevant to the declaratory judgment count.” 515 S.W.3d at 223; see also Topping Ests. v. Spalitto Living Trust, 680 S.W.3d 144, 154-55 ( Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (involving similar claims; holding that “the validity of the Indentures, the direct interplay between those restrictions and the Lot, and the various methods for enforcing the Indentures are operative facts that run throughout both” the resolved and unresolved claims).

Similarly, Wilson involved a claim that certain State statutes related to vehicle parking in the City of St. Louis were unconstitutional; other claims in the lawsuit alleged that a City official had violated various statutes and ordinances while implementing the City's parking enforcement program. The circuit court entered a judgment declaring the State statutes to be unconstitutional, but did not resolve the claims concerning the City official's actions. Although the claims concerning the legality of the City official's actions would plainly require proof of additional facts beyond those relevant to the constitutional claims, the Supreme Court held that all of the claims arose from a single “judicial unit.” The Court explained:

Here, the validity of the parking statutes, the interplay between those statutes and the parking ordinances, and the various duties those statutes and ordinances impose on various city and county officials are the threads that run throughout both the claims resolved in the April 5 Order and the October 25 Injunctive Order and many (if not all) of the claims that remain pending in the circuit court. In other words, the claims resolved in the April 5 Order and the October 25 Injunctive Order are in no sense the sort of “unrelated substantive claim[s] for relief” that this Court held were eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b) in First Nat'l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 222.

Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 773 (emphasis added).

In the same way, Presidio's efforts to develop and obtain governmental approval for its planned landfill, and the effect of the County's solid waste management order on Presidio's planned land use, are “the threads that run throughout” all of Presidio's claims in Counts I through III, even if each of those claims may require evidence of certain subsidiary or ancillary facts which are not relevant to the other claims.

The claims asserted in Presidio's Counts I and II did not constitute a distinct judicial unit, and the circuit court's judgment resolving those claims was not eligible for certification as a partial final judgment under Rule 74.01(b). Because a final judgment has not been entered in this case, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review Presidio's and Pettis County's appeals.

Conclusion

The appeals are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We also dissolve the stay of the circuit court's injunction previously entered by this Court on January 5, 2026.

Alok Ahuja, Judge

All concur.