SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. HILL (2026)

Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”) appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court of Randolph County that found that a minor child (“Child”) was not a resident of the household of her natural father (“Father”) and his wife (“Stepmother”) for purposes of an insurance policy exclusion that barred coverage for bodily injury to “relatives residing in” their “household.” On appeal, Shelter argues that the trial court misapplied the law in finding that Child was not a resident of the household of her Father and Stepmother. The judgment is affirmed.

Background 1

In July of 2018, Child sustained serious injuries in an accident involving an all-terrain vehicle. The accident occurred in Randolph County at the home of Father and Stepmother. Child's mother (“Mother”), on Child's behalf, sued Father and Stepmother for damages resulting from the accident.

Shelter filed a petition for declaratory judgment – the petition underlying this appeal – seeking a determination that the personal liability provisions of the Farmowners Policy issued to Father and Stepmother provided no coverage for the claims asserted by Mother on Child's behalf.² Shelter relied on a provision in the policy that would exclude personal liability coverage for bodily injury to: “Your relatives residing in your household[.]” The policy did not define the terms “reside,” “residing,” or “household.” Shelter asserted that Child was a resident of the household of her Father and Stepmother for purposes of coverage, such that the exclusion was applicable.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which were submitted with stipulated facts, including the custody provisions of the decree in the divorce proceedings of Father and Mother and the subsequent modification proceedings, as well as facts pertaining to Child's activities, whereabouts, and living arrangement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the declaratory judgment Defendants, concluding that Child was a resident of Mother's household and was not a resident of Father's household.

Shelter appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. This Court reversed, recognizing that Missouri courts had held that the question of whether a child of divorced parents resided in the household of one or both parents presented a question of fact. See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 688 S.W.3d 638, 649-51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024); see also Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoffman ex rel. Schmutzler, 46 S.W.3d 631, 634 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (“The question of whether a person is a resident of a particular household is one of fact.”); Countryside Cas. Co. v. McCormick, 722 S.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Mo. App. S.D. 1987) (holding that trial court's factual finding that child of divorce was a resident of both parents’ households was not against the weight of the evidence). Thus, although the parties had stipulated to a large number of relevant facts in the summary judgment proceedings, the parties had not stipulated regarding the question of fact of whether Child resided in Father's household. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 688 S.W.3d at 649-51. As there remained a genuine dispute as to this material fact, such that the case was not susceptible to resolution as a matter of law, this Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded to permit the trial court to determine the fact issue of whether Child resided in Father's household. Id. at 651.

Following remand, a bench trial was held. Prior to the introduction of evidence, Shelter requested that the trial court issue findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 73.01(c). More specifically, Shelter requested “findings of all controverted material facts bearing on [Child]’s residence at the time of the accident ․ including the ultimate issue of [Child]’s residence on the date of the accident” and “conclusions of law applying [Shelter]’s insurance policy based on the evidence presented at trial.”

In its opening statement, Shelter argued that, following the prior appeal, the only remaining issue before the court was the resolution of the “factual issue” regarding Child's residence at the time of her injury. Shelter argued that the trial court was not required to decide Child's primary residence, but could also find that Child resided with both parents.

Shelter presented a number of exhibits including a divorce decree and joint parenting plan from 2007, documents related to a modification of the decree in 2015, a joint stipulation of facts from the summary judgment record, deposition designations from Mother, Father, and Child, the Farmowners Policy, and a 2018 calendar.

The Defendants (in the declaratory judgment action) presented a separation agreement and property settlement from 2007, as well as testimony from Mother and Father.

Mother testified that she and Father were divorced in 2007; that both have since remarried; that Mother lives in Linn County with her husband, a child of their marriage, and Child. Mother testified that Child has resided with her since her birth; that Child lived with her in Linn County; that Father resided over an hour away in Randolph County; that Child has not ever lived with her father in Randolph County; that Child went to school in Linn County; that Child received mail at her Linn County residence; that she did not receive mail in Randolph County; that the mail Child received in Linn County included medical bills, banking statements, school letters, report cards, invitations, and mail from her relatives on her father's side. Mother testified that Child was involved in numerous activities in Linn County, including sports, church, and 4-H club; that her involvement in 4-H club included showing livestock; and that Child had daily responsibilities with regard to taking care of livestock. Mother testified that Child did not have keys to Father's house in Randolph County. Mother testified that, at the time of the incident, Father did not provide substantial support for Child; did not pay additional monthly expenses for Child; and did not regularly pay monthly child support for Child. Mother testified that Child had a bedroom at her Mother's house; that “everything Child owned” was kept at her Mother's house; and that Child reported being treated as a stepchild at Father's house.

Father testified that he lived in Randolph County with Stepmother, his son, and a step-son; that Child did not live with him in 2018; that Child lived with Mother in Linn County; that Child did not receive mail at his house; and that Father's family sent mail to Child at her Linn County address. Father testified that Child visited his house “[p]robably once a month”; that Child did not have a dedicated bedroom in his house; that Child stayed in a “[s]pare bedroom/office” when she visited; that Child brought her clothes with her in a bag when she visited; that Child did not keep belongings at his house; that Child would frequently not visit his house as specified in the parenting plan; and that Child resided with her Mother in Linn County.

The trial court issued a judgment, in which the trial court found that Child did not reside in the household of Father and Stepmother on the date of the incident. The judgment indicated that this finding was based on a number of additional findings drawn from the evidence at trial, which the trial court found largely in accordance with the testimony received, which the trial court expressly found to be credible. The trial court noted that the 2007 dissolution judgment granted joint physical and legal custody to Mother and Father, but also included findings that Child was residing in the actual custody of Mother. The trial court recognized that the 2007 dissolution judgment was modified in 2015 in a manner that eliminated Father's weekday parenting time. The modification judgment, which continued joint legal and physical custody, also indicated that Child's residence “shall continue to be that of” Mother, and ordered that Child “shall reside with [her Mother].” The trial court found that Father did not follow the schedule in the joint parenting plan after the divorce; that Child spent substantially less time with Father than ordered; that Child lived with her Mother where she had her own bedroom and kept all her belongings; that, when at her Father's house, Child stayed in a room that served as both an office and a spare bedroom; that this room was Father's best effort to accommodate Child but that it “wasn't really” her room; and that nothing that Child owned was kept at her Father's house. Consistent with the testimony received, the trial court recognized all of Child's activities that occurred in Linn County. The trial court found that Father did not substantially support Child, that Child felt like a stepchild when visiting Father; that Child lived with her mother approximately 80% of the time and visited her father approximately 20% of the time; and that there was never any intention between Father and Mother for Child to reside at Father's house, but that both always intended for Child to return to Mother's house where she resided.

Shelter now appeals to this Court.

Standard of Review

“The standard of review in declaratory judgment cases is the same as in any other court-tried case.” Kerperien v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 100 S.W.3d 778, 780 (Mo. banc 2003). The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed “unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law.” Id. (quoting Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)). “All evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the circuit court's judgment.” Singleton v. Singleton, 659 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Mo. banc 2023). Claims that the circuit court erroneously declared or applied the law are reviewed de novo. Id. (citation omitted). Although we review de novo the trial court's application of law to the facts, we do defer to the trial court's factual determinations. See id. (quoting Sun Aviation, Inc. v. L-3 Communications Avionics Sys., Inc., 533 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Mo. banc 2017)).

Analysis

In its sole point on appeal, Shelter argues that the trial court misapplied the law in concluding that the household exclusion in the Farmowners Policy did not apply. Shelter argues that a child of divorce may be a dual resident of both parents’ households, and argues that the trial court misapplied the law in finding that Child was not a resident of her Father's household.

In Shelter's prior appeal, this Court found that the case was not susceptible to resolution as a matter of law in the summary judgment proceedings despite an extensive record of stipulated facts, because there remained between the parties a genuine dispute of material fact, namely, a dispute regarding the “ultimate factual determination” regarding whether Child was a resident of Father's household. Shelter Mut. Ins., 688 S.W.3d at 649-50; see also Hoffman, 46 S.W.3d at 634 (“The question of whether a person is a resident of a particular household is one of fact.”); Countryside, 722 S.W.2d at 658 (holding that trial court's factual finding that child of divorce was a resident of both parents’ households was not against the weight of the evidence). Thus, the case was remanded for the trial court to hear and weigh evidence regarding the material fact issue of whether Child resided in Father's household. Shelter Mut. Ins., 688 S.W.3d at 649-51.

Following remand, the trial court, as trier of fact, heard and weighed evidence and found that Child did not reside in Father's household, such that the policy exclusion did not apply to bar coverage.

On appeal, Shelter makes no attempt to challenge the trial court's factual determination that Child did not reside in Father's household. Shelter also fails to provide an indication that the trial court was under a misunderstanding of law regarding whether a child of divorce could be a resident of more than household. Instead, Shelter attempts to argue that the trial court misapplied the law in making the factual determination of whether Child resided in Father's household. However, simply framing an argument as an error of law does not entitle a party on appeal to de novo review of a factual issue as a means to avoid our deferential standard of review on factual issues. Although we review the circuit court's application of law to the facts de novo, we still do defer to the trial court's factual determinations. Singleton, 659 S.W.3d at 341. In this case, this standard of review involves deference to the trial court's factual determination that Child did not reside in Father's household, which is precisely the determination that Shelter seeks to challenge as an issue of law.

We defer to the trial court's factual determination that Child did not reside in Father's household.

Point denied.

Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Shelter's petition also presented other issues that were previously resolved in summary judgment proceedings.

Thomas N. Chapman, Presiding Judge

All concur.