RAYMOND WYNN DECEASED JEAN WYNN v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY MISSOURI FIRE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYER AND MISSOURI DIVISION OF WORKERS COMPENSATION AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LINE OF DUTY COMPENSATION FUND (2026)

Jean Wynn (“Wynn”) appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (“Commission”) denying compensation from the Line of Duty Compensation Fund (“LDC Fund”) following the death of her husband, Raymond Wynn (“Captain Wynn”).¹ The Commission determined Wynn's Line of Duty Compensation Claim (“LDC Claim”) was not timely filed and therefore denied the claim. Wynn raises one point on appeal, arguing that the Commission erred as a matter of law in declining to apply the law of the case doctrine as to determinations made in Wynn's worker's compensation claim (“WC Claim”) to her LDC Claim. Because these two claims are separate matters presenting different legal issues, the law of the case doctrine is not implicated and thus we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History 2

Captain Wynn served as a firefighter for the City of Kansas City, Missouri for approximately 31 years, retiring as a captain. Due to his exposure to multiple workplace carcinogens, he developed squamous cell lung cancer in 2018. Captain Wynn passed away as a result of metastatic carcinoma on March 27, 2021.

Wynn subsequently filed her LDC Claim on June 1, 2023. The LDC Fund provides a cash benefit to certain public safety officers, including firefighters, who are killed in the line of duty. Section 287.243 ³ ; Est. of Newman v. City of Leadwood, 611 S.W.3d 529, 531 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). The Division of Workers’ Compensation (“Division”) issued an administrative determination denying Wynn's LDC Claim on June 5, 2024. The Division found the LDC Claim did not comply with section 287.243.3(1) as it was not filed within one year from the date of Captain Wynn's death. Wynn appealed, requesting an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ affirmed the denial of compensation because the LDC Claim was not timely filed. Wynn subsequently appealed to the Commission. On August 22, 2025, the Commission affirmed the decision of the ALJ and awarded Wynn no compensation. The Commission did not make any additional findings.

Prior to filing the LDC Claim, in a wholly separate and unrelated claim, Wynn filed the WC Claim for compensation based on her husband's death by occupational disease. An ALJ with the Division found that Captain Wynn's employment was the prevailing factor in causing a compensable occupational disease and resulting death which arose in and out of his employment as a firefighter. On May 2, 2023, the ALJ issued an award of workers’ compensation benefits, finding Wynn was entitled to compensation under section 287.240 (“WC Award”).

It was after receiving this WC Award, and more than two years after Captain Wynn's death, that Wynn initially filed her LDC claim. Her LDC claim having now been denied by the Commission, she appeals.

Standard of Review

Our review of the Commission's decision is governed by section 287.495.1 which provides in pertinent part:

The court, on appeal, shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other:

(1) That the [C]ommission acted without or in excess of its powers;

(2) That the award was procured by fraud;

(3) That the facts found by the [C]ommission do not support the award;

(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.

See Est. of Newman, 611 S.W.3d at 533. “We review the findings and award of the Commission rather than the ALJ, to the extent that [the Commission's ruling] departs from the ALJ's ruling.” Collins v. Century Ready Mix, Inc., 678 S.W.3d 178, 186 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Ritchie v. Silgan Containers Mfg. Corp., 625 S.W.3d 787, 793 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021)). “We review the ALJ's findings and conclusions to the extent that the Commission affirms and adopts the ALJ's findings and conclusions.” Id. (quoting Ritchie, 625 S.W.3d at 793). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Cosby v. Treasurer of State of Mo., 579 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Mo. banc 2019) (citing Mantia v. Mo. Dep't of Transp., 529 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Mo. banc 2017)).

Analysis

In her sole point on appeal, Wynn argues the Commission erred as a matter of law under subsection one of 287.495.1 by failing to apply the law of the case doctrine to her LDC Claim. Specifically, Wynn argues the LDC Claim is a successive adjudication presenting the same facts and issues as those previously decided in her WC Award. She asserts the WC Award issued findings of fact and conclusions of law which were dispositive of the issues before the Commission in the LDC Claim, thus the Commission is bound by its findings in the WC Award. The end result of her argument appears to be that the time limit in which to file an LDC claim is somehow tolled until the WC claim is resolved. On the other hand, Respondent argues that the law of the case doctrine is not implicated here because the doctrine only applies to subsequent proceedings in the same case, and Wynn's WC Claim and LDC Claim are two entirely separate matters. We agree with Respondent.

“The doctrine of the law of the case provides that a previous holding in a case constitutes the law of the case and precludes relitigation of the issue on remand and subsequent appeal.” Nance v. Maxon Elec., Inc., 425 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (quoting Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 410 S.W.3d 623, 632 (Mo. banc 2013)). The doctrine “governs successive appeals involving the same issues and facts. Under the doctrine, the appellate decision becomes the law of the case in subsequent proceedings in the same cause.” Brown v. Kirkham, 23 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (quoting McClelland v. Ozenberger, 841 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992)); see also Cornerstone Mortg., Inc. v. Ponzar, 619 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (“This doctrine applies only to subsequent proceedings within the same case.”). “Generally, the decision of a court is the law of the case for all points presented and decided, as well as for matters that arose prior to the first adjudication and might have been raised but were not.” Walton v. City of Berkeley, 223 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Mo. banc 2007) (citations omitted).

It is evident here that a WC claim and an LDC claim do not represent “subsequent proceedings in the same cause” or “successive appeals.” Brown, 23 S.W.3d at 883. Both claims are unique creatures of statute. The LDC Fund provides compensation “in addition to, and not exclusive of” any other compensation to which a claimant is entitled. Section 287.243.6. An LDC claim evidences the legislature's intent to create a claim for public safety officers killed in the line of duty which is separate and distinct from a WC claim. These two claims each contain an independent set of statutory directives detailing who is entitled to compensation and under what circumstances. Correspondingly, both necessitate their own unique legal analysis. LDC claims and WC claims are also subject to different statutes of limitations, further evidencing their separate nature. Contrast section 287.243.3(1) (creating a one-year statute of limitations in which to file an LDC claim), with section 287.430 (creating a statute of limitations ranging from one to three years for WC claims, depending on the circumstances). The law of the case doctrine thus does not apply because Wynn's LDC Claim is an entirely separate matter from her WC Claim. Moreover, the Commission in this case never reached the merits of Wynn's LDC Claim because it found the claim was not timely filed after Captain Wynn's death. See section 287.243.3. The WC Award did not decide the issues relevant to Wynn's LDC Claim, specifically it says nothing about whether the LDC Claim was timely filed. The law of the case doctrine is simply not implicated here.

Finally, the argument section of Wynn's brief also argues that the Commission's denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious because it departed from past administrative decisions without providing a rational basis for doing so. Wynn explains that the Division has previously granted LDC claims and awarded benefits to the families of firefighters even though their claims were not filed within one year of the firefighters’ death. Wynn acknowledges that administrative decisions have no stare decisis effect, yet argues that the Commission must provide an adequate explanation for its change in position.

Wynn's contentions lack a basis in Missouri law. “An administrative agency is not bound by stare decisis, nor are agency decisions binding precedent on the Missouri courts.” McKnight Place Extended Care, L.L.C. v. Mo. Health Facilities Rev. Comm., 142 S.W.3d 228, 235 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (citing State ex rel. AG Processing, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 120 S.W.3d 732, 736 (Mo. banc 2003)). “The mere fact that an administrative agency departs from a policy expressed in prior cases which it has decided is no ground alone for a reviewing court to reverse the decision.” Id. (citing Columbia v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 605 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Mo. App. W.D. 1980)). “Courts are not concerned with alleged inconsistency between current and prior decisions of an administrative agency so long as the action taken is not otherwise arbitrary or unreasonable.” In re Application of Laclede Gas Co. to Change its Infrastructure Sys. Replacement Surcharge v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 593 S.W.3d 582, 598 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (citation omitted).

Wynn's argument is underdeveloped in this regard. Her only assertion is that the Division has consistently permitted untimely LDC claims, providing a level of predictability to claimants. She maintains that the Division should not be permitted to depart from this practice without articulating a sufficient reason for doing so. Thus, Wynn solely takes issue with the Division's allegedly inconsistent decisions and does not argue that the Commission's order itself is arbitrary or unreasonable. This is not a sufficient basis for reversal. See McKnight Place Extended Care, L.L.C., 142 S.W.3d at 235 (citing Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 605 S.W.2d at 195). Indeed, Wynn fails to explain how the Commission misapplied section 287.243.3's mandate that an LDC claim must be filed “not later than one year from the date of death[.]” Rather, she simply states the Division has previously accepted untimely claims. And, she directs us to no authority which supports her underlying claim that somehow untimely claims are permitted despite the clear legislative statement of section 287.243.3. While her brief contains a few conclusory statements in this regard, such assertions are not sufficient to bring before this Court the issue of whether the Commission's order was arbitrary and capricious based on its application of the one-year time limit. “When a party fails to support a contention with argument beyond conclusions, we consider the point abandoned.” St. Louis Cnty. v. Shanklin, 616 S.W.3d 423, 428 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we decline to speculate on the legal reasoning behind her contention that the Commission erred in denying her claim based on timeliness.⁴ See State v. Hendricks, 944 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. banc 1997) (“It is not within this Court's province ․ to speculate about, then decide, arguments that are not asserted or that are merely asserted but not developed.” (citing Leahy v. Leahy, 858 S.W.2d 221, 227-28 (Mo. banc 1993) (further citation omitted)).

Wynn's point on appeal relating to the law of the case doctrine is denied as her WC Claim is wholly separate and distinct from her LDC Claim such that the law of the case doctrine is not implicated. To the extent Wynn raises additional, undeveloped arguments, we decline review.⁵

Conclusion

The Commission's denial of benefits is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The arguments raised herein are substantially similar to those presented in Wynn's companion case, Williams v. City of Kan. City Mo. Fire Dep't, No. WD88291, slip op. (Mo. App. W.D. May 26, 2026), handed down this same day. Wynn and Williams presented analogous facts, identical points on appeal, and nearly identical briefing. Accordingly, our opinion in Williams is substantially similar to our opinion here.

3.   All statutory references are to RSMo. (2016) as supplemented through March 27, 2021, the date of Captain Wynn's death, unless otherwise indicated. See Est. of Newman v. City of Leadwood, 611 S.W.3d 529, 532-534 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (holding that substantive changes to the Line of Duty Compensation Act (“LDC Act”) could not apply retroactively after the public safety officer's death).

4.   Ex gratia, we note that the LDC Act plainly and unambiguously requires a claim for compensation to be filed within one year from the date of death of a firefighter. Section 287.243.3(1). It provides, “[a] claim for compensation under this section shall be filed by survivors of the deceased with the [Division] not later than one year from the date of death[.]” Id. The statute continues, “[i]f a claim is made within one year of the date of death ․ compensation shall be paid[.]” Id. Finally, it provides, “no compensation is payable under this section unless a claim is filed within the time specified under this section[.]” Section 287.243.5. Here, the legislature's directive is clear. Had the legislature wanted to incorporate some sort of tolling provision to delay the running of the statute of limitations, it would have done so. See Roland v. St. Louis City Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 590 S.W.3d 315, 323 (Mo. banc 2019) (“Had the legislature wanted a governmental body to be entitled to an award of costs in other circumstances, it would have said so.”). We note that section 287.430 does include a tolling provision for WC claims, while such a provision is noticeably absent from LDC claims under section 287.243. See Austin, 604 S.W.3d at 671 (discussing the tolling provisions found in section 287.430).

5.   Wynn's reply brief raises the additional argument, for the first time, that the Director's actions must be judged under objective standards of equitable estoppel. “[A] reply brief is to be used only to reply to arguments raised by respondents, not to raise new arguments on appeal.” Kohn v. Mo. Dep't of Revenue, 565 S.W.3d 716, 719 n.4 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “[W]e do not review an assignment of error made for the first time in the reply brief.” Id. (alteration in original). This is in part because Respondent had no opportunity to address the argument. Priorities USA v. State, 591 S.W.3d 448, 456 n.12 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting Berry v. State, 908 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Mo. banc 1995)).

W. Douglas Thomson, Judge

All concur.