MCNOWELLY v. SODECIA AUTOMOTIVE KANSAS CITY LLC (2026)

Lorrie McNowelly, Individually and as a Representative of the Estate of Lee McNowelly (“McNowelly”), appeals the trial court judgment granting Sodecia Automotive Kansas City, LLC's (“Sodecia”) motion to set aside the previously entered default judgment. We reverse and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

Sometime before December 16, 2018, Sodecia retained a third-party security company ¹ to monitor and patrol its manufacturing facility in Kansas City, Missouri. Lee McNowelly (“Decedent”) was employed by the security company and tasked with patrolling Sodecia's premises. On the night of December 16, 2018, allegedly while working as a security guard at Sodecia's facility, Decedent was shot and killed.

On October 23, 2019, McNowelly filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against Sodecia in Jackson County Circuit Court (“trial court”). The Petition directed service to Sodecia's named registered agent at 8701 Elmwood Avenue, Suite 300, Kansas City, Missouri 64132. On March 16, 2020, the summons was served by a Deputy Sheriff for the Department of Civil Process (“Sheriff”) to Sodecia's business office, 8701 Elmwood Avenue, Suite 300, Kansas City, Missouri.

The Sheriff's return of service, filed March 18, 2020, was pre-titled “Corporation – Person In Charge.” The Sheriff completed the form by writing in the name of the “defendant corporation” as “Sodecia Automotive Kansas City, LLC.” The Sheriff certified that he served Sodecia “by leaving a copy of the summons and a copy of the petition at the business office of said defendant corporation with _, who said he/she was the person in charge thereof.” In the blank line the Sheriff wrote in the name of the person served as “Steve Kunde HR Mgr” and then also inserted, in the appropriate lines, the place of service, date of service, and time of service.

On December 18, 2020, after finding Sodecia failed to file an answer to McNowelly's petition, the trial court entered default judgment in favor of McNowelly and awarded $968,339 in damages.

Three and a half years later, on May 23, 2024, Sodecia filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. Pursuant to Rule 74.06(b)(4)² , Sodecia argued that the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction because McNowelly failed to properly serve Sodecia with the summons and petition. In support of its argument, Sodecia provided the affidavit of the Sodecio Plant Manager (“Plant Manager”), who had been authorized to testify on Sodecio's behalf. The Plant Manager's affidavit attached exhibits for Sodecia's Certificate of Organization, its Articles of Organization, and its Original Operating Agreement. The Plant Manager averred in his affidavit that the HR Manager “was formerly employed as an HR Manager at Sodecia,” but the HR Manager was not “the registered agent or an authorized agent, designated as a manager in the Operating Agreement, or designated by a vote to manage the LLC.” The affidavit went on to state that the HR Manager was not “the person in charge” of the facility on March 16, 2020.

The trial court initially scheduled Sodecia's motion for hearing on August 29, 2024. On August 30, 2024, by agreement of the parties, the trial court reset the case for an evidentiary hearing on December 13, 2024. The record contains no transcript of the August 29, 2024 hearing, although the trial transcript does suggest that at least one reason for the postponement was because Sodecia wished to take the deposition of the HR Manager who was served with the petition. That deposition never took place, and the HR Manager did not testify at the hearing.³

Ultimately, hearings were held on Sodecia's motion on December 13, 2024, and January 23, 2025.⁴ Sodecia submitted the affidavit of its Plant Manager, who also testified at the second hearing. The Plant Manager testified that he was hired by Sodecia in October 2019, and that on March 16, 2020, he was employed as the Sodecia Plant Manager, although he was not present at the facility that day. He also testified that he knew the HR Manager and that, in March of 2020, the HR Manager was working for Sodecia as both HR Manager and Safety Manager. The Plant Manager testified that the HR Manager was “not in charge of the business” and not “the one responsible” to accept legal papers. He denied that the HR Manager gave him any documents on March 16, 2020, related to a lawsuit against the company. The Plant Manager did not know whether the Sodecia General Manager was present at the facility that day. Sodecia offered no other evidence.⁵

On May 21, 2025, the trial court granted Sodecia's Rule 74.06(b)(4) motion to set aside the default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. In recording its order and judgment, the trial court stated that it had “taken into consideration ․ the briefing, testimony, and all other materials submitted by the parties” and relied on T Westfall Plaza WCR MO, LLC v. SJB Rest. Grp., LLC, 689 S.W.3d 216 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) in granting the motion to set aside the default judgment.

This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

Normally, a trial court's ruling on a Rule 74.06(b) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Bate v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 464 S.W.3d 515, 517 (Mo. banc 2015). When the ruling involves a determination of personal jurisdiction, however, the judgment is reviewed de novo. Id. Generally, even where our review of a circuit court's ultimate legal conclusion is de novo, we nevertheless defer to the findings of fact that provide a basis to determine the legal question. See, e.g., Mo. State Conf. of NAACP v. State, 730 S.W.3d 550, 560 (Mo. banc 2026) (although stating broadly that “this court reviews issues of standing de novo,” clarifying that “this Court reviews de novo the circuit court's application of the law with respect to standing but defers to the circuit court's factual findings and credibility determinations”). “A judgment entered against a person over whom personal jurisdiction is lacking is void.” Nguyen v. Wang, 182 S.W.3d 688, 690 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006).

Analysis

Preliminarily, we respond to Sodecia's claim in its brief that McNowelly's point relied on is multifarious and thus fails to comply with Rule 84.04(d)(1). The purpose of points relied on is to provide “notice to the opposing party of the precise matters which must be contended with and to inform the court of the issues presented for review.” Lexow v. Boeing Co., 643 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. banc 2022). A point relied on is multifarious when it contains multiple, independent claims. Macke v. Patton, 591 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Mo. banc 2019). We agree with McNowelly that their point relied on contains one interdependent point of error and thus complies with the requisites of Rule 84.04(d).⁶ We proceed to the merits.

To properly trigger a court's personal jurisdiction, “service of process must conform to the manner established by law.” Bate, 464 S.W.3d at 517. In Missouri, service of process on a foreign limited liability company may be made “by delivering a copy of the summons and petition to an officer, partner, or managing or general agent, or by leaving the copies at any business office of the defendant with the person having charge thereof.” Rule 54.13 (b)(3) (emphasis added).

When service is made by a sheriff, the return of service is “considered prima facie evidence” of proper service upon a party. T Westfall Plaza, 689 S.W.3d at 220 (applying Rule 54.22(a)). Sodecia argues that the Sheriff's return of service was “deficient on its face.” The Sheriff's return of service “must show on its face that every requisite of the statute has been complied with.” Marti v. Concrete Coring Co. of N. Am., 630 S.W.3d 920, 922 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (internal quotation omitted) (holding that the return of service was deficient on its face under Rule 54.13(b)(3) because the Sheriff selected the line stating he served the summons and petition “by delivering a copy ․ to the Defendant/Respondent” when the documents were actually served on one of defendant's employees and not the named defendant (citation modified)). Specifically, in Marti, the return was deficient on its face because the section identifying the person who accepted service did not include the individual's position at the company. Id. at 923 n. 4 (noting that the relevant section was “left blank” on the return of service).

Conversely, a return of service cannot be found to be deficient on its face when the requisite statements of time, place, and manner of service are completed. Xtra Lease, LLC v. Pigeon Freight Servs., Inc., 662 S.W.3d 309, 315 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). In Xtra Lease, the Eastern District of this Court specifically held that the special process server's affidavit was complete because, in contrast to the section that was “left blank” in Marti, the affidavit in Xtra Lease did state the time, place, and manner of service. Id.

Here, similar to the return of service in Xtra Lease, the Sheriff's return of service was completed with the time, place, and manner of service, including naming Sodecia as the entity receiving service, and stating the name of the HR Manager along with his position at the company. We do not believe the return was deficient on its face, nor does the trial court's order reflect this as the basis for its judgment.

The question thus becomes whether Sodecia provided the trial court with clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that it was properly served. Because the Sheriff's return created a presumption of proper service under Rule 54.13(b)(3), Sodecia bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the service was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. See T Westfall Plaza, 689 S.W.3d at 220; see also Ground Freight Expeditors, LLC v. Binder, 407 S.W.3d 138, 141 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013).

Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that “instantly tilt[s] the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition, [such that] the fact finder's mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.” Grant v. Sears, 379 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). The “heavy burden” of clear and convincing evidence “follows from the well-settled presumption that an official duty, like service of process, has been regularly performed” when completed by a sheriff and from the legislature's intent that a sheriff's “return of service shall be considered prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein.” Hoffman v. Quality Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc., 706 S.W.2d 576, 580-81 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, because a movant may file a Rule 74.06(b)(4) motion contending that a judgment is void at any time, and because courts favor finality of judgments, “the concept of a void judgment is narrowly restricted.” Ground Freight, 407 S.W.3d at 141 (internal quotation omitted). “Placing the burden on the moving party is particularly warranted” in the context of a motion to set aside a default judgment as void that is filed “years after the judgment's entry, and when the evidence concerning the existence of personal jurisdiction may be largely, if not exclusively, in the defendant's possession.” Id. at 143.

The Hoffman court noted that the trial court in that case had granted a motion to set aside a default judgment based solely on the party's testimony that he had not received service. 706 S.W.2d at 581. After reviewing cases from multiple other jurisdictions, Hoffman concluded that “clear and convincing evidence corroborating the denial of the party alleged to have been served is necessary to impeach the verity of the return.” Id. at 580. In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Eastern District of this court particularly noted that there was “[n]o corroborating evidence and circumstances” to the party's denial of receiving service. Id. at 581.

Likewise, in T Westfall Plaza—the case cited here by the trial court in its order and judgment setting aside the default judgment—the Eastern District of this Court again reversed the trial court's decision to set aside default judgment after finding the moving party failed to satisfy the clear and convincing standard when it presented only its denial that it had received service. 689 S.W.3d at 222. The T Westfall Plaza Court emphasized that neither the motion to set aside the default judgment nor the movant's testimony articulated facts to meet the clear and convincing burden to impeach a presumptively valid sheriff's return. Id.; see also M.F.S.D.-C.S.E. v. J.M., 651 S.W.3d 834, 837 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (“To challenge the accuracy of the return of service, a party must do more than simply deny service; rather, the party must present clear and convincing evidence that he or she was not served.”).

Sodecia, through its Plant Manager, testified that the HR Manager was not the person “in charge” of the business office. To support the Plant Manager's testimony, the Plant Manager attached documentation to his affidavit reflecting Sodecia's ownership and business structure. In doing so, Sodecia attempted to bootstrap its business organization documents onto its Plant Manager's testimony to buttress its position that the HR Manager was not the person in charge of the business office. But the issue here is not whether the HR Manager was designated by by Sodecia as an officer, managing agent or member, or other similar title. Instead, the relevant question is whether the HR Manager was “in charge of the office at the time of service.” See Kitchens v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 737 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Mo. App. W.D. 1987) (emphasis added). Sodecia's corporate documents have limited relevance to this question.

The Plant Manager's affidavit and testimony do not supply clear and convincing evidence that the HR Manager was not the person “in charge” of the business office on March 16, 2020. Although the Plant Manager's affidavit made the conclusory statement that the HR Manager “was not the person in charge of the Sodecia Kansas City facility on March 16, 2020,” the Plant Manager's affidavit offered no facts or circumstances to support the bare denial that HR Manager was in charge of the office. The only facts referenced in the affidavit to support this conclusion are the statements that the HR Manager was not designated as Sodecia's registered agent, authorized agent, or manager in its Operating Agreement, and was not authorized to accept service of process on Sodecia's behalf. Under Rule 54.13(b)(3), however, whether HR Manager was “the person having charge” of Sodecia's business office, at the time of service, is separate from whether he was Sodecia's registered, authorized, or managing agent.

In his testimony, Plant Manager once again denied that the HR Manager was in charge of Sodecia's business office; as in his affidavit, Plant Manager once again failed to testify to any facts or circumstances which would support Sodecia's contention that HR Manager was not in charge of the office at the time of service. Thus, beyond its bare denial of the HR Manager's authority, Plant Manager's testimony failed to establish who was in charge of Sodecia's business office. When asked if the HR Manager was in charge of the office, Plant Manager testified that “he was not the Business Manager.” But Plant Manager did not identify Sodecia's “Business Manager,” or testify whether that Business Manager was present at Sodecia's office on March 16, 2020. Plant Manager also acknowledged that neither he, nor the “General Manager,” were present at the facility on March 16, 2020. Even Sodecia appears to be confused about who was in charge of the facility on March 16, 2020—while Sodecia, in its brief to this Court, argues that its Plant Manager was the “person in charge” of the business that day, in contrast, at the December 13, 2024 hearing, Sodecia argued to the trial court that the Plant Manager was “certainly not” in charge.

Conversely, there is no dispute that the HR Manager was Sodecia's employee on March 16, 2020, and there is no dispute that the HR Manager (also serving as Safety Manager) was at the Sodecia facility on March 16, 2020. Further, there is no dispute that the location where service was made was in fact a proper business office for service under the Rule, and that the HR Manager was served with the summons and petition by the Sheriff on that day. Finally, there is no dispute that the HR Manager told the Sheriff that he was the person in charge of the business office on that day. “Any employee, even a clerical employee, can receive service of process on behalf of an employer if, in fact, the employee was in charge of the office at the time of service.” Kitchens, 737 S.W.2d at 222. As the court noted in Xtra Lease, the rule does not require the person in charge of the office even to be an employee. 662 S.W.3d at 316. Sodecia failed to depose or call the HR Manager to testify at the hearing as to the events of that day, in spite of requesting a continuance of an earlier hearing on its motion for the purpose of deposing the HR Manager. Sodecia did not argue that the HR Manager was unavailable to testify or even that he was equally available to all parties. It failed even to provide an affidavit from the HR Manager as to what occurred on that day.

“[A]s the plain language of Rule 54.22(b) suggests, [a] movant cannot meet the heavy ‘clear and convincing’ burden to impeach a presumptively valid sheriff's return solely by testifying that they were not served, without introducing supporting facts to contradict the facts reported by the return.” T Westfall, 689 S.W.3d at 220 (citing Hoffman, 706 S.W.2d at 580). Sodecia's bare denial that HR Manager was in charge of its business office on March 16, 2020, without evidence of any relevant facts or circumstances supporting the claim, was insufficient to “instantly tilt[ ] the scales ․ when weighed against the evidence in opposition” – namely, the presumptively valid sheriff's return. Grant v. Sears, 379 S.W.3d at 915. On the limited facts provided in the record, including the lack of any evidence as to who was in charge (other than “the pandemic”) of the facility where service was made on the day of service, or who, other than the HR Manager, was even physically present at the facility on the day of service, we do not find that Sodecia carried its heavy burden to overcome the presumption of valid service by clear and convincing evidence.⁷

Conclusion

We reverse the judgment of the trial court setting aside the default judgment and remand for reinstatement of the default judgment awarding McNowelly damages against Sodecia.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The security company is not a party to this lawsuit.

2.   Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024), the version applicable to the trial court's hearing, unless otherwise noted.

3.   See infra n. 7.

4.   A second hearing was held after the trial court learned that Sodecia planned to call the Plant Manager to testify, and the Plant Manager was not a native English speaker. The court determined that an interpreter was needed.

5.   At the December 13, 2024 hearing, Sodecia's counsel reminded the trial court of what was happening in world events in the days leading up to the March 16, 2020 service of process. In Sodecia's counsel's words, “[i]n March and in February and in April, Sodecia's H.R. Director was dealing with furloughs and sending people home. The [Covid 19] pandemic was in charge of [Sodecia's business] facility, certainly not H.R. or the Plant Manager. The General Manager [was] dealing with a pandemic.” (emphasis added).

6.   Even if McNowelly's point relied on is construed as multifarious, we can clearly ascertain the alleged claim of error and we would exercise our discretion to review the point and “resolve the issues on the merits.” Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262, 268 n. 8 (Mo. banc 2016).

7.   In their brief to this Court, McNowelly reports that the HR Manager was produced by Sodecia as a management employee in an unrelated case pending in the United States District Court For The Western District Of Missouri. McNowelly argues that this Court can “take judicial notice of our own records and may take judicial notice of the records of other cases when justice so requires.” Muhammad v. State, 579 S.W.3d 291, 293 n. 4 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (citation modified). Muhammad involved taking judicial notice of other related cases in Missouri state courts. McNowelly urges this Court to take judicial notice of a case pending in the Federal District Court. Those proceedings would not appear on the State of Missouri Case.net service. To be clear, our analysis here is based exclusively on those facts in the record in the present case.

Gary D. Witt, Judge

All concur