DORRELL v. LANGNER (2026)

Corbin Langner appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Missouri (“motion court”), denying her motion to set aside the interlocutory order of default entered against her. On appeal, Langner claims that the motion court: (1) abused its discretion in overruling her motion to file her answer out of time because Langner established that her failure to timely file her answer was due to excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 44.01(b), and a proposed answer was submitted before the interlocutory order of default was entered; (2) abused its discretion in overruling her motion to file her answer out of time because the decision prejudiced her defense; and (3) abused its discretion in overruling Langner's action to set aside the interlocutory order of default on the basis that her actions were “reckless and without regard for the rules of [the motion] Court”, because Langner sufficiently established good cause for her failure to file a timely answer and she alleged a meritorious defense to the underlying action. We reverse the judgment of the motion court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

Dorrell and Langner were the parents of a young daughter (“Daughter”) who is tragically deceased. Dorrell and Langner were never married but Dorrell's paternity was established in a prior proceeding and they shared joint custody of Daughter. Dorrell brought a wrongful death action against Langner, alleging that she negligently caused or directly contributed to cause the death of Daughter. Langner was served with the summons, the petition, and discovery including requests for admissions on March 11, 2025. Langner, who was also facing felony criminal charges arising from the death of Daughter, showed the materials, “a stack of papers and a CD,” to her public defender, who told her that he could not represent her in this civil matter. After leaving her public defender's office, Langner spoke to several attorneys but was unable to retain anyone to represent her in the civil case. The summons notified Langner that she was required “to appear before this court and to file your pleading to the petition, a copy of which is attached, and to serve a copy of your pleading upon the attorney for plaintiff/petitioner at the above address all within 30 days after receiving this summons, exclusive of the day of service.”

Having been unsuccessful finding an attorney, Langner attempted to respond pro se. Although she received physical copies of both the petition and the requests for admissions, the CD she received only contained the requests for admissions. Langner used her phone to email her responses to the requests for admissions to Dorrell's counsel on April 11, 2025. Because the petition contained allegations, and the requests for admissions consisted of a series of questions, Langner believed she was complying with the orders on the summons by answering the questions on the requests for admissions. She sent her response to Dorrell's counsel “since it was ․ counsel who served me.” Langner affirmed that her “mistake was based on [her] lack of understanding of the law, and not any desire to delay the Court process.”

Dorrell filed a motion for interlocutory order of default on April 15, 2025, and noticed the motion for a hearing on May 12, 2025. Langner was not provided notice of the motion for default or of the hearing, but she learned about it from her bond supervisor. Langner was eventually able to retain counsel on May 7, 2025, and on that day her counsel filed with the court a motion for leave to file her answer out of time and a proposed answer; this was filed prior to the scheduled default hearing.

At the default hearing, on May 12, 2025, the motion court overruled Langner's motion for leave to file her answer out of time and entered an interlocutory order of default. Langner filed a motion to set aside the interlocutory order of default, which, pursuant to Rule 74.05(d), is an independent action and not a post-trial motion; a hearing on the action to set aside the interlocutory order of default was held on June 9, 2025. The motion court only allowed fifteen minutes for argument on the motion, so Langner entered her testimony via several affidavits.¹

On June 26, 2025, the motion court issued an order and judgment overruling Langner's motion to set aside the interlocutory order of default, finding that Langner's “actions were not merely negligent, but were rather reckless as is clear based upon the filings, exhibits, and statements.”² This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

“Appellate courts review the judgment overruling the motion to set aside default judgment [or interlocutory order of default], not the default judgment itself.” Steele v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 688 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Mo. banc 2024). See also Kansas City Live v. Bukovac, 494 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (noting that, “[p]ursuant to Rule 74.05(d), a motion to set aside a default judgment is an ‘independent action’ and, as such, a judgment granting or denying such a motion is a final judgment eligible for immediate appellate review.”). “A judgment overruling a Rule 74.05(d) motion to set aside a default judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 196-97. “The discretion of a trial court to deny a motion to set aside a default judgment is subject to closer scrutiny on appeal than is the discretion of a trial court to grant a motion to set aside.” Boatmen's First Nat. Bank, Raytown Banking Ctr. v. Krider, 844 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); see also Vogel v. Schoenberg, 620 S.W.3d 106, 111 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (“[W]e are more likely to reverse a judgment denying a motion to set aside a default judgment than one granting relief.”). “Therefore, an appellate court is much more likely to interfere with a trial court's decision when the motion to set aside the judgment has been denied.” Boatmen's, 844 S.W.2d at 12. This standard of review balances the generalization that the law favors disposition on the merits against the integrity of the legal process and procedural rules. Id.; Hazelcrest I & II Condominium Assoc. v. 7520 Hazel Crest LLC, 719 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). “If there is a reasonable doubt as to whether conduct was intentionally designed or irresponsibly calculated to impede the work of the courts, it should be resolved in favor of good faith.” Saturn of Tiffany Springs v. McDaris, 331 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).

Analysis

Langner's third point on appeal is dispositive.³ In Point III she argues that the motion court abused its discretion in overruling her motion to set aside the interlocutory order of default because she established good cause in failing to file a timely answer to Dorrell's petition. We agree.

Formerly, a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside an interlocutory order of default was not appealable. Joy v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988). Joy was interpreting a prior version of Rule 74.05 and should no longer be followed. Rule 74.05(d) was amended, effective January 1, 2007, to provide that “an interlocutory order of default or a default judgment may be set aside” upon motion showing a meritorious defense and good cause and to provide that any such motion is to be treated as an independent action. (Emphasis added). Thus, so long as the denial of a motion to set aside an interlocutory order of default is denominated a judgment, it is subject to the right of appeal available to a final judgment, as all issues as to all parties in the independent action will have been resolved. See Parker v. American Pub. Co., 314 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (dismissing appeal of denial of a motion to set aside interlocutory order of default based on fact that court's ruling not denominated as a “judgment” or “decree”); Roberts v. Reserve at Heritage, LLC, 681 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). See also City of Osage Beach v. Duenke Real Est. Holdings, LLC, --- S.W.3d ––––, 2026 WL 481454 (No. SD 39033, Feb. 20, 2026) (Reviewing the ruling on the motion to set aside a default that was ruled as a judgment even though the underlying action remained pending). It was thus superfluous for the trial court to conclude in its order and judgment denying Langler's motion to set aside the interlocutory order of default that an interlocutory appeal would be permitted pursuant to Rule 74.01(b).

To warrant a circuit court setting aside an interlocutory order of default, the litigant must show both good cause in failing to timely file an answer and that they have a meritorious defense to the underlying action. Hazelcrest, 719 S.W.3d at 854. “A motion to set aside a default judgment does not prove itself and must be supported by affidavits or sworn testimony.” Steele, 688 S.W.3d at 197 (internal quotation omitted). “Good cause includes a mistake or conduct that is not intentionally or recklessly designed to impede the judicial process.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “Reckless conduct involves a conscious choice of [a] course of action when the actor knew or reasonably should have known of a serious danger.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Unlike the conscious disregard of a serious danger characterizing recklessness, negligent conduct resulting from inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness or failure to take precautions may constitute good cause for a default.” Id. at 197-98 (internal quotation omitted).

In this case, the motion court reached the legal conclusion that Langner's “actions were not merely negligent, but were rather reckless as is clear based upon the filings, exhibits, and statements.” Thus the motion court did not deny Langner's motion to set aside based on any determination that Langner's affidavits and other evidence were not credible; instead, the court found that Langner's affidavits and other supporting documents established Langner's recklessness. Our review of the evidence on which the motion court relied does not support the court's finding of recklessness. Langner did not ignore the summons and pleadings with which she was served. She took them to her public defender, who advised her that his office could not represent her in the civil case. Then she spoke with several attorneys, but she could not find one she could retain. Nevertheless, she still attempted to respond pro se to the pleadings with which she was served. While Dorrell maintains, and the judgment states, Langner's “need to file an Answer within 30 days․ is plainly stated on the summons she acknowledges receiving,” the summons does not expressly direct Langner to file an “answer”. Rather, it states that she is required “to file your pleading to the petition, a copy of which is attached, and to serve a copy of your pleading upon the attorney for plaintiff/petitioner at the above address all within 30 days after receiving this summons, exclusive of the day of service.”

In addition, although Langner was served with both the petition and the requests for admissions, the CD she received contained only the requests for admissions, and only the requests for admissions contained questions for her to answer; the petition listed allegations, to which Langner indicated she did not know how to respond. Langner's affidavit stated that she “thought [she] was only required to answer the items that were questions.” She also believed that her response needed only to be sent to Dorrell's counsel “since it was [his] counsel that served me.” Pro se parties are held to the same standards as attorneys, and must comply with Supreme Court Rules. Landwehr v. Hager, 612 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). However, Dorrell acknowledges in his brief that the requests for admissions were filed prematurely and that Rule 59.01(c)(2)(B) provides that requests for admission can only be served, without leave of court, on a defendant “upon the expiration of 30 days after the first event of the defendant either entering an appearance or being served with process[.]” The requests for admissions were therefore void and a nullity. Lane House Const., Inc. v. Ogrowsky, 427 S.W.3d 882 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). The premature filing of the requests for admissions in this case contributed to Langner's misconception as to what she was required to respond, which supports her argument for good cause.

Langner affirmed that her “mistake was not done intentionally or recklessly to hinder or delay the Court process, but through [her] lack of knowledge regarding the law, and [her] lack of funds, at that time, to hire a private attorney to represent” her. As soon as she was able to secure counsel, and before the hearing on Dorrell's motion for a default judgment, she submitted a proposed answer and moved for leave from the trial court to file such answer out of time. “Prompt action by a movant assists in establishing the defendant's good faith required under Rule 74.05(d).” Capital One Bank (USA) NA Successor in Interest to, Capital One Bank v. Largent, 314 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). We conclude that the evidence on which the circuit court relied does not support its conclusion that Langner's failure to file a timely answer was reckless; that evidence, instead, at best establishes negligence.

Moreover, Langner notified the court of her alleged meritorious defense in her affidavits. She affirmed that she was given a “booklet” from Children's Mercy Hospital regarding proper treatment of Daughter's medical condition, that she went over the booklet with hospital staff, that they answered her questions, and that she took the steps outlined in the booklet to manage Daughter's condition “at any particular time, based on a Green Zone, Yellow Zone, and Red Zone system.” Langner listed the medications recommended for the various “Zones” and stated that she “utilized this system, as best I could, each day [Daughter] was with me” including the timeframe of June 10, through June 16, 2023 (the day of Daughter's death). Langner testified that because of the air quality, she kept “all of [her] children indoors, as much as possible, during that time” even though there was a new neighborhood park that the children were eager to use. (LF 32). Finally, Langner affirmed that on the morning of June 16, 2023, she “did what [she] thought was the quickest way to get [Daughter] the help she needed.” Although a jury might find Langner responsible for Daughter's death, the facts she set forth in her affidavit are sufficient to allege a meritorious defense to Dorrell's petition for purposes of this motion.

Because Langner sufficiently established good cause for her failure to answer and a meritorious defense to the allegations against her, the motion court abused its discretion in overruling her action to set aside the interlocutory order of default.

Conclusion

For all of the above-stated reasons, we reverse the judgment of the motion court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Langner's counsel also indicated he preferred not to have her testify under oath because her criminal case which arose from the same operative facts and allegations was still pending.

2.   Neither this judgment nor the interlocutory order of default assessed damages; however, as we explain, supra, a motion to set aside an interlocutory order of default is an independent action pursuant to Rule 74.05(d), and if the motion is denied, it is thus subject to the right of appeal as a final judgment, so long as the trial court's ruling on the motion is denominated a “judgment.”

3.   Langner's first point on appeal was that the motion court abused its discretion in overruling her motion to file her answer out of time because Langner established that her failure to file her answer out of time was due to excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 44.01(b), and a proposed answer was submitted before the interlocutory order of default was entered. Her second point on appeal is that the motion court abused its discretion in overruling her motion to file an answer out of time because the ruling prejudiced her defense. A motion to set aside a default judgment or an interlocutory order of default pursuant to Rule 74.05(d) is an independent action. Therefore, it is unclear that an appellant can challenge a court action, other than the ruling on the motion to set aside the default, made in the underlying case as part of an appeal of the denial of the motion to set aside the interlocutory order of default. The cases cited by the parties all review the denial of the motion to set aside the default judgment and not any part of the underlying default order or judgment itself. In any event, demonstrating the excusable neglect needed for the court to allow the filing of a pleading out of time “is a higher burden than proving an action was not recklessly designed to impede the judicial process as required to show good cause” to set aside a default judgment. Holmes v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 617 S.W.3d 853, 860 (Mo. banc 2021) (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, litigants would understandably appeal the issue of good cause to set aside the default rather than whether the court erred in finding that they had not shown excusable neglect in failing to timely file the answer.

Gary D. Witt, Judge

All concur