Juvenile Officer, Respondent, v. C.W., Natural Father, and T.W., Natural Mother, Appellants. (2026)

T.W. (“Mother”) and C.W. (“Father”) appeal the judgment of the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Nodaway County (“juvenile court”), finding that their son J.L.W. was without proper care, custody, and support, and placing J.L.W. in the legal and physical custody of the Missouri Children's Division. Mother and Father raise two points on appeal, arguing the juvenile court's judgment was against the weight of the evidence. Prior to the submission of this case, however, the trial court released J.L.W. from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and ordered J.L.W. to be returned to the custody of Mother and Father. Because Mother and Father's claims on appeal have been rendered moot, we dismiss the appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

J.L.W. is a minor child with complex neurodevelopmental impairments.¹ J.L.W. has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”) and ADHD, and his IQ score placed him in the eighth percentile in the “borderline impaired range.” J.L.W. has a narrow range of interests and, specifically, has a persistent fascination with weapons. Additionally, J.L.W. has a history of elopement issues relating to his ASD.

Mother and Father became involved with the Juvenile Officer for the Fourth Judicial Circuit (“Juvenile Office”) in the summer of 2025.² The Juvenile Office had received multiple reports of J.L.W. leaving the home and attempting to leave school. The juvenile officer for the Fourth Judicial Circuit explained that there had also been concerns at J.LW.’s school with J.LW. drawing guns, swastikas, and vulgar language on the walls at his school. In August 2025, the Juvenile Office entered into an informal agreement with Mother and Father regarding the conditions of supervision of J.L.W. Pursuant to the agreement, Mother and Father agreed to the following:

• Juvenile will not, unless accompanied by a parent, leave his place of residence or school with[ ]out a parent or trusted supervisor with him at all times.

• Parents to ensure that [J.L.W.] will be monitored 24/7 by an appropriate caretaker.

• Parents to sign a release for consult with mental health providers ․

• Parents to ensure that [J.L.W.] has no access to weapons or modified weapons/objects perceived as weapons.

• [J.L.W.] will follow all rules at school and school sponsored activities.

• Failure to follow rules or additional information received may result in a petition being filed and your appearance before the juvenile court.

Prior to the start of the 2025/2026 school year, Mother and Father were informed that J.L.W. would not be permitted to return to his public school. Because Mother and Father worked, they arranged for J.L.W.’s sister-in-law to care for him on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays.³ The sister-in-law watched J.L.W. from mid-August until the date of the alleged incident, October 22, 2025.

On October 22, 2025, the sister-in-law, her husband, and J.L.W.’s brother were with J.L.W. in a field on the family's property, approximately one-half mile from the house. J.L.W. and his brother were at the tree line cutting trees while the sister-in-law was working in the field with her husband on a combine. J.L.W. ran from where he and his brother were by the tree line. The sister-in-law followed J.L.W. in her vehicle and asked him to get into her vehicle, but J.L.W. did not comply. J.L.W. went to a neighbor's house. The sister-in-law followed J.L.W. to the front door and attempted to secure J.L.W. J.L.W., however, ran to the back of the house and entered through an unlocked door. In the home, J.L.W. located a hunting rifle and discharged the firearm twice.

The sister-in-law's husband informed Mother that J.L.W. had eloped, and Mother reported the incident to law enforcement. The Nodaway Sherriff's Office responded to the scene and found J.L.W. back at his residence. J.L.W. told law enforcement that he entered the neighbor's home, possessed a firearm, and discharged the weapon twice. The Nodaway County Sheriff's Office took protective custody of J.L.W. at that time.

On October 23, 2025, the Nodaway County Juvenile Officer filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging that, pursuant to section 211.031.1(1)(b), J.L.W. was in need of care and treatment and was without proper care, custody, or support.⁴ Specifically, the petition alleged:

On or about October 22, 2025 the parents of the juvenile failed to provide proper care, custody, and support to the juvenile by failing to ensure proper supervision while they were away from the juvenile in that they left the juvenile in the care of a brother and his wife, knowing the juvenile is a constant danger to flee, has a fascination with guns and other weapons, and requires constant one-on-one attention. The juvenile left the caretakers’ supervision and reportedly traveled approximately one mile, entering a neighbor's home without permission. While in the neighbor's home the juvenile located a .270 high-powered rifle and discharged two rounds inside the home. On August 1, 2025, the parents agreed to an informal adjustment with the Juvenile Office which stated that the juvenile would not leave his place of residence unless accompanied by a parent or trusted adult with him at all times, and further agreed that the juvenile would be monitored at all times by an appropriate caretaker. The parent's negligence and inability or unwillingness to supervise, or have the juvenile properly supervised by a caretaker, creates a grave risk of the juvenile hurting himself or those around him.

The petition additionally alleged that on or about October 22, 2025, Father, “knowing of the juvenile's obsession with weapons and inability to make good decisions based on numerous previous encounters with school personnel, law enforcement and other agencies,” permitted J.L.W. to possess an ax along a public roadway, in violation of Mother and Father's informal agreement with the Juvenile Office to not allow J.L.W. access to “weapons or modified weapons/objects perceived as weapons ․”

The juvenile court entered an order for protective custody on October 23, 2025, and held a protective custody hearing on October 27, 2025. The juvenile court ordered that J.L.W. continue in protective custody of the Children's Division, and the Children's Division placed J.L.W. in a residential facility.

The adjudication hearing was originally set for December 15, 2025. However, on that date, the juvenile court continued the hearing due to a medical emergency with the attorney for the juvenile officer and, on its own motion, the court took up the legal and physical custody of J.L.W. The court ordered that legal and physical custody of J.L.W. be transferred to Mother and Father and further ordered that Mother and Father were to provide constant physical supervision of J.L.W. and to contact law enforcement any time J.L.W. was not in their physical presence.

On January 5, 2026, the juvenile court held the adjudication hearing. At the hearing, the juvenile court received testimony from a corporal with the Nodaway County Sherrif's Office, the renter of the residence that J.L.W. entered, the owner of the residence that J.L.W. entered, an investigative worker with the Children's Division, a juvenile officer for the Fourth Circuit Juvenile Office, the sister-in-law, J.L.W.’s treating psychologist, J.L.W.’s licensed behavior analyst, Mother, and J.L.W.’s guardian ad litem.

The juvenile court entered its order of adjudication, finding that the allegations in the petition were true and assuming jurisdiction over J.L.W. On January 27, 2026, the juvenile court entered its “Order and Judgment of Disposition Regarding Abuse/Neglect,” finding that “[r]emoval of [J.L.W.] from the family home is necessary to protect the juvenile” due to the allegations in the petition and placed J.L.W. under the care, custody, and control of the Children's Division.

On June 12, 2026, before this case was submitted (and prior to Mother and Father filing their brief with the Court), the juvenile court released J.L.W. from its jurisdiction.⁵ The juvenile court stated that J.L.W.’s placement in the residential treatment facility “was no longer appropriate,” “no other facility will accept [J.L.W.],” “[J.L.W.] does not qualify for Missouri Department of Mental Health services,” “that the parents’ home is safe, clean, and good repair,” and Mother and Father had taken steps to better secure their home. Over the objection of the juvenile officer and the guardian ad litem, the juvenile court found that the juvenile court “is no longer necessary or appropriate for the parents or [J.L.W.].” The juvenile court terminated protective custody of J.L.W., ordered the Children's Division to place J.L.W. with Mother and Father, and ordered that “[a]ny and all jurisdiction of this Court arising out of the Petition and subsequent motion to modify will terminate, effective immediately.”⁶

Mother and Father appeal the disposition judgment.

Analysis

Mother and Father bring two points on appeal, arguing the juvenile court's judgment was against the weight of the evidence.⁷ However, on June 12, 2026, after Mother and Father filed their notice of appeal and before the case was submitted by this Court, the juvenile court entered its order releasing J.L.W. from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and directing the Children's Division to place J.L.W. with Mother and Father. Thus, before we address Mother and Father's claims of error, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to decide this appeal. In Int. of J.T.S., 462 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015).

“An appellate court is not permitted to review moot claims of error.” Id. “A case is moot when the circumstances that surround it change sufficiently to cause a legal controversy to cease, and a decision by the judiciary would be insignificant in providing effective relief.” Id. “Generally speaking, there are two exceptions to the mootness doctrine.” Int. of P.D.W., 606 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). “First, when a case becomes moot after submission of the case in the appellate court and second, when the issue raised has general public interest and importance and is likely to recur but otherwise evade review.” Id.

Because the juvenile court released J.L.W. from its jurisdiction and returned J.L.W. to the physical and legal custody of Mother and Father, “[t]here remains no live controversy before this court, rendering [the] appeal moot.” In Int. of J.T.S., 462 S.W.3d at 478 (dismissing the mother's appeal from the juvenile court's disposition judgment as moot because the juvenile court had terminated its jurisdiction and returned the child to the mother's custody). Mother and Father, nevertheless, assert their claims of error—challenging the weight of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's judgment—fall within the second exception to the mootness doctrine as the issue Mother and Father raise is of general public interest and importance and is likely to recur but will otherwise evade review.⁸ We disagree.

This Court has consistently held that when an appellant's appeal from a juvenile court's disposition judgment is submitted after the juvenile court has released the child from its jurisdiction and returned the child to the custody of the appellant, claims of error relating to the evidence supporting the disposition judgment are not of general public importance. In Int. of J.T.S., 462 S.W.3d at 479 (“Mother's issues on appeal involve the sufficiency of allegations and/or evidence to support a finding of abuse and the corresponding assertion of jurisdiction over J.S. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is insufficient to establish a public interest under the second exception.”) (internal quotations omitted); Int. of P.D.W., 606 S.W.3d at 236 n.5. (finding the parents’ point on appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's disposition judgment and submitted after the juvenile court had terminated its jurisdiction, did not fall within the second exception to the mootness doctrine as their argument involved facts specific to their case); In re J.L.R., 257 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (dismissing an appeal as moot where the mother had regained custody of the child before her case was submitted by this Court because the mother's “challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence [was] insufficient to establish a public interest under the [public interest] exception.”). Thus, we find Mother and Father's challenges to the weight of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's judgment involve “facts unique to this case that are not of general public importance and are not likely to evade review in future litigation.” Int. of P.D.W., 606 S.W.3d at 236 n.5.

Mother and Father additionally claim that though they have regained custody of J.L.W., they seek reversal of the juvenile court's judgment “to be relieved from a finding of abuse and/or neglect on the central registry” pursuant to section 210.118. Specifically, Mother and Father argue that juvenile court's adjudication is “especially relevant for Appellant-Mother, who has been a teacher for twenty years.” Section 210.118 provides, in relevant part, that:

[I]n any action under chapter 210 or 211 in which the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a party is responsible for child abuse or neglect, as those terms are defined in section 210.110, the clerk shall send a certified copy of the judgment or order to the children's division and to the appropriate prosecuting attorney. Upon receipt of the order, the children's division shall list the individual as a perpetrator of child abuse or neglect in the central registry.

Mother and Father's argument that they will be subject to the registration requirements of section 210.118 does not fall within one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Int. of P.D.W., 606 S.W.3d at 236-37 (finding that the parents’ assertion that they brought their appeal not to secure custody of the child but to be relieved from the mandatory registration requirement of section 210.118 did not fall within an exception to the mootness doctrine as it “is not unique that a party may not have a right to appeal despite being subject to collateral consequences.”). Indeed, “[w]e have ․ held that a ․ moot appeal seeking only personal vindication does not fall within the public interest exception.” In Int. of J.T.S., 462 S.W.3d at 480. Thus, Mother and Father's speculative assertions about the personal effect the disposition judgment may have on Mother's employment does not render their appeal of general public interest and importance. Id. (holding that the mother's contention that the juvenile court's judgment—finding that her son should be subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction and placing her son in the custody of the Children's Division—could affect her ability to find employment, impact future custody issues, and form the basis for criminal charges were “bare, speculative assertions” that did not form the basis of an existing legal controversy.).

Finally, Mother and Father ask this Court to extend the exceptions to the mootness doctrine to the instant case, citing D.C.M. v. Pemiscot County Juvenile Office, 578 S.W.3d 776 (Mo. banc 2019). In D.C.M., the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the merits of a juvenile case after the juvenile, D.C.M., had turned 18 and been released from the custody of the division of youth services. Id. at 781. The Supreme Court found the case was not moot because though D.C.M. had been released from supervision, “his conduct would have constituted a felony had he been an adult at the time he committed the act,” and thus, if D.C.M. were “tried in the future for a criminal offense, evidence of this prior juvenile adjudication could be introduced.” Id. As a result, the Supreme Court “concluded the case was not moot because there was still a substantial element of controversy existing” and “D.C.M. should be given the opportunity to remove the discredit and stigma associated with his record of adjudication.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

We have already declined to extend D.C.M.’s expansion of the mootness doctrine in a case that is procedurally analogous to the instant case, reasoning that “the Supreme Court in D.C.M. made no signal that it intended to expand the exception beyond the opinion's very limited application to adjudications of delinquency where the juvenile had aged out of supervision.” Int. of P.D.W., 606 S.W.3d at 236 (declining to find an exception to the mootness doctrine applied under D.C.M. in an appeal from a juvenile court's disposition judgment after juvenile court had terminated its jurisdiction and returned the child to the custody of the mother and father).⁹

We find this appeal is moot, and consequently, this Court is without authority to review its merits.

Conclusion

Because the juvenile court has terminated its jurisdiction and returned J.L.W. to the custody of Mother and Father, this appeal is moot, and no exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Mother and Father's appeal is dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time the underlying action was initiated, J.L.W. was 12 years old.

2.   The Missouri Fourth Judicial Circuit serves Atchison, Gentry, Holt, Nodaway, and Worth Counties.

3.   Father would stay home with J.L.W. on Mondays and Fridays.

4.   Statutory references are to RSMo 2016 as supplemented through the date of J.L.W.’s incident.

5.   The juvenile court's order releasing J.L.W. from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and returning J.L.W. to the custody of Mother and Father is not part of the Legal File. “However, in determining mootness, the appellate court may consider facts outside the record.” Int. of P.D.W., 606 S.W.3d 232, 235 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

6.   The Juvenile Office had filed the motion to modify in response to the juvenile court's order on March 20, 2026, finding that it was “in the best interests of [J.L.W.]” that its January 2026 treatment plan be amended to return physical custody of J.L.W. to Mother and Father, effective immediately. Legal custody of J.L.W. continued with the Children's Division. On May 13, 2026, the deputy juvenile officer moved to modify the March 20, 2026, disposition, claiming that:On or about May 12, 2026, parents of the juvenile neglected to provide proper care, custody or support of the juvenile in that the juvenile absconded from his father's care and again entered the residence located at [ ] without the permission of the occupants, the same address as the previous incident which brought the juvenile into the jurisdiction of this Court, while having in his possession a machete, and later entered a shed on the property without the permission of the occupants, where he obtained an airsoft gun.The deputy juvenile officer argued that the juvenile court should order that J.L.W. again be placed in the legal and physical custody of the Children's Division. The juvenile court ordered that J.L.W. be placed in the protective custody of the Children's Division. The March 20, 2026, disposition, May 13, 2026, motion to modify, and the juvenile court's order returning J.L.W. to protective custody were not included in the legal file, which was filed on April 27, 2026. Norton v. McDonald, 590 S.W.3d 450, 452 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (“The appellate court may consider facts outside the record in determining mootness.”)

7.   Specifically, Point I argues the juvenile court's finding that Mother and Father “failed to provide proper care, custody, and support to J.W. by failing to ensure proper supervision while they were away” was against the weight of the evidence. Point II contends the juvenile court's finding that “J.W. was without proper care, custody, and support on the basis that Father allowed the juvenile to possess an ax along a public roadway without supervision” was against the weight of the evidence.

8.   The first exception does not apply because the juvenile court released J.L.W. from its jurisdiction and returned J.L.W. to Mother and Father's custody before the case was submitted by this Court.

9.   In P.D.W., the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over the child and removed the child from the parents’ custody. 606 S.W.3d at 234. The parents filed their notice of appeal on September 24, 2019. On October 30, 2019, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over the child and returned the child to the custody of the parents. Id. Because the juvenile court had closed the case and terminated its jurisdiction before the case was submitted by this Court and because the parents’ point on appeal involved facts unique to the case that were not of general public importance and not likely to evade review, this Court dismissed the appeal as moot. Id. at 236 n.5.We acknowledged the difficult situation that is presented here, explaining “[w]e are cognizant of the fact that in some cases an alleged perpetrator of child abuse or neglect may be prejudiced by the fact that they are unable to seek reversal of the judgment against them, and thereby avoid the registration requirements of section 210.118, simply because the juvenile court quickly returned custody of a child to the party and ended its jurisdiction.” Id. at 237. Nevertheless, “the Missouri legislature is well aware of how to draft into a statute the right of appeal where it may not otherwise exist and did not do so here,” nor did the Supreme Court broadly expand the exceptions to the mootness doctrine in D.C.M. Id. Rather, the Supreme Court “reiterated that there are only two narrow exceptions to the mootness doctrine and showed no intent for the broad application of D.C.M.” Id.

Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

All concur.