BALDWIN v. SPIRE MISSOURI INC (2026)

Mr. Tracy Baldwin, Assessor of Clay County, Missouri (“Assessor”), appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri (“circuit court”), which affirmed the State Tax Commission's (“Commission”) Decision and Order dated February 19, 2025, determining the true value in money (“TVM”)¹ of Spire Missouri Inc.’s (“Laclede”)² personal property located in Clay County as of January 1 for years 2014 and 2015 and the TVM of Laclede's real property in Clay County for year 2015. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History 3

Laclede is a utility company that provides natural gas services throughout Missouri by means of gas service lines, mains, and other facilities. Laclede reports the cost of its assets to the Public Service Commission (“PSC”), which impacts the rate that Laclede charges its customers for its service.

In 2013, Laclede purchased both real and personal property located in Clay County, Missouri, from Missouri Gas Electric. Between 2014 and 2015, Laclede filed its property declarations with the PSC, declaring the TVM of its personal property as $6,200,200 in 2014 and $6,400,000 in 2015, and the TVM of its real property as $38,000,000 in 2015. The Assessor rejected Laclede's property declarations and assessed the TVM of Laclede's personal property as $11,300,000 in 2014 and $11,100,000 in 2015, and the TVM of Laclede's real property as $79,200,000 in 2015.

Laclede appealed the Assessor's valuations to the Clay County Board of Equalization (“BOE”), which subsequently adopted the Assessor's valuations. Laclede then appealed the BOE's valuations to the Commission, and a hearing officer conducted a two-day hearing where both parties presented evidence regarding the TVM of the subject property.

At the hearing, Laclede called Mr. Robert Reilly as its expert witness. Mr. Reilly determined the TVM of Laclede's personal property as $7,100,000 in 2014 and $8,900,000 in 2015, and the TVM of Laclede's real property as $52,500,000 in 2015. The Assessor presented testimony from its expert witness, Ms. Mika Koyama, who determined the TVM of Laclede's personal property as $12,000,000 in 2014 and $12,000,000 in 2015, and the TVM of Laclede's 2015 real property as $73,800,000. Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued an order affirming the Assessor's valuations as adopted by the BOE.

Laclede appealed the decision of the hearing officer to the Commission, and after hearing oral argument from the parties and reviewing the record, the Commission entered its Decision and Order setting aside the hearing officer's decision, and the Commission adopted the valuations set forth by Laclede's expert, Mr. Reilly. In response, the Assessor filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the circuit court, and the circuit court affirmed the Commission's Decision and Order.

The Assessor timely appealed to this Court. We reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the Commission's assessments were unlawful and unreasonable because the Commission did not properly apply the reproduction cost approach in its valuations, and we remanded the case with specific instructions for the Commission “to calculate, in a manner consistent with this opinion, the TVM of Laclede's real and personal property in service in Clay County as of January 1, 2014[,] and January 1, 2015[,] through use of the reproduction cost approach.” Rinehart v. Laclede Gas Co., 607 S.W.3d 220, 231 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). We expressly relied on the description of the “reproduction cost approach” as discussed in Union Elec. Co. v. Estes, 534 S.W.3d 352, 367 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) and Union Elec. Co. v. Adams, 539 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).

On remand, a hearing officer issued an order to the Assessor and Laclede setting a new discovery schedule and another evidentiary hearing date. The order provided that the parties would exchange exhibits and disclose expert witnesses on or before March 1, 2022. The Assessor disclosed Ms. Lisa Hobart and Mr. John Ryan as expert witnesses he intended to call in his case-in-chief at the evidentiary hearing on remand but did not disclose the expert he presented at the first hearing—Ms. Koyama—as an expert witness.

Well after the disclosure deadline, the Assessor's counsel informed the hearing officer that the Assessor intended to call Ms. Koyama at the hearing as a “fact witness” despite his failure to disclose her as an expert witness by the deadline set forth in the scheduling order. Laclede objected to the Assessor's stated intention to call Ms. Koyama at the evidentiary hearing, and the hearing officer sustained Laclede's objection. The Assessor has not challenged the exclusion of Ms. Koyama as a witness in the proceedings below that occurred after remand from this Court.

The evidentiary hearing on remand was held on June 15-16, 2022. At the beginning of the hearing, the hearing officer took judicial notice of all the Commission's records pertaining to this case and the record on appeal for all of the prior appeals.

The Assessor presented testimony and an appraisal report from its newly hired expert, Mr. Ryan, who determined the TVM of Laclede's personal property as $24,803,525 in 2014 and $24,825,566 in 2015, and the TVM of Laclede's real property as $213,234,215 in 2015. To determine the TVM of the subject property, Mr. Ryan testified that he applied “the reproduction cost new less depreciation method,” (emphasis added),⁴ by “trend[ing] the historical cost up to the valuation dates and then consider[ing] adjustments for depreciation.”

Laclede's appraiser, Mr. Reilly, prepared two appraisals: a Summation Principle Property Appraisal and a Supplemental Analysis. As pertinent to this appeal, the Supplemental Analysis resulted in Mr. Reilly's expert opinion that the TVM of Laclede's personal property was $6,323,332 in 2014 and $6,468,289 in 2015, and the TVM of Laclede's real property was $41,536,392 in 2015. Mr. Reilly's Supplemental Analysis of the TVM of the property was based on the approved forms in the Commission's Assessor's Manual and depreciation schedule.⁵ In his Supplemental Analysis, Mr. Reilly “compared the historical cost less the [Commission's] depreciation schedule depreciation amount[.]” Mr. Reilly concluded that the use of the Commission's depreciation schedule reasonably indicated the TVM of Laclede's real and personal property for the years in dispute.

The hearing officer issued an order in favor of Laclede and adopted Mr. Reilly's valuations of the subject property as set forth in his Summation Principle Property Appraisal. Both Laclede and the Assessor appealed the hearing officer's decision to the Commission.⁶ Thereafter, the Commission issued its Decision and Order on February 19, 2025, setting aside the hearing officer's decision, and the Commission adopted the TVM values reflected in Mr. Reilly's Supplemental Analysis. The Assessor sought judicial review by the circuit court which affirmed the Commission's Decision and Order dated February 19, 2025.

The Assessor appealed, raising three points on appeal.

Standard of Review

On an appeal from a judgment of a trial court addressing the decision of an administrative agency, we review the decision of the administrative agency and not the judgment of the trial court. This court reviews the decision of the Commission and not the hearing officer. Notwithstanding, in our mandate, we reverse, affirm or otherwise act upon the judgment of the trial court. We must determine whether the Commission's findings are supported by competent and substantial evidence on the record as a whole; whether the Decision and Order is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or involves an abuse of discretion; or whether the Decision and Order is unauthorized by law. However, we review the Commission's conclusions of law and its decision de novo, and we make corrections to erroneous interpretations of the law. Whether the appropriate standard of value and approach to valuation were properly applied under the particular facts and circumstances of the case is a question of law.

Rinehart, 607 S.W.3d at 225-26 (citation modified).

Analysis

Point I

First, the Assessor argues that the Commission erred in its “application of” the reproduction cost approach on remand.

In Rinehart, we held that “[c]onsistent with Estes and Adams, ․ the Commission is obligated to use the reproduction cost approach[,]” id. at 229-30, and we remanded this case with specific instructions for “the Commission to calculate, in a manner consistent with this opinion, the TVM of Laclede's real and personal property in service in Clay County as of January 1, 2014[,] and January 1, 2015[,] through use of the reproduction cost approach.”⁷ Id. at 231 (emphasis added).

The Estes court described the reproduction cost approach as follows:

The reproduction cost approach begins with the actual or original cost of the real property and/or its improvements. In contrast, the replacement cost approach uses an estimate of the cost of constructing a building with the same utility as the building being appraised but with modern materials and according to current standards, design and layout. Simplified, reproduction cost is based on the original or historical costs of construction, while replacement cost is based on the value in today's dollars to reconstruct an improvement. Regardless [of] the cost approach utilized, it is recognized that a proper deduction must be made for depreciation.

Estes, 534 S.W.3d at 367 (emphasis added) (citation modified) (citing Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Mo. Gaming Corp., 156 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Mo. banc 2005)). To summarize, the reproduction cost approach utilizes “original, historical costs, reduced by depreciation.” Id. at 367. The Estes court determined that the Commission's form and Assessor's Manual promulgated by the Commission in 2013 requires use of the reproduction cost approach. Id. Our sister courts came to the same conclusion in Adams and Elfrink. See Adams, 539 S.W.3d at 782; Union Elec. Co. v. Elfrink, 544 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017). Thus, it is a well-settled principle of Missouri law that the reproduction cost approach is calculated by reducing historical or original costs by depreciation.

Here, in its Decision and Order dated February 19, 2025, the Commission expressly relied upon the Estes court's description of the reproduction cost approach and applied that methodology—which the Commission described in its order as “original, historical costs, reduced by depreciation,”—to reach its conclusion that the TVM of Laclede's personal property was $6,323,322 in 2014 and $6,468,289 in 2015, and the TVM of Laclede's real property $41,536,392 in 2015.

In reaching its conclusion, the Commission adopted Mr. Reilly's valuation of Laclede's property “via application of the historical cost and depreciation data as reported in the [Commission]-recommended natural gas distribution forms[,]” which appeared in Mr. Reilly's Supplemental Analysis. According to Mr. Reilly's Supplemental Analysis testimony, Mr. Reilly determined the TVM of the property by first determining the historical cost of the subject property as reported in the Laclede Gas continuing property record (“CPR”) provided to him by Laclede. Then, he applied the Commission-adopted depreciation schedule to the property by multiplying the historical cost of the property, for each respective year, by the corresponding depreciation rate as set forth in the depreciation schedule. The resulting amount, he concluded, was the historical cost less Commission-adopted depreciation methodology.

Thus, Mr. Reilly's Supplemental Analysis applied the reproduction cost approach consistent with this Court's description of that methodology as described in Estes. He began with “the original or historical costs of construction” and applied a proper deduction for depreciation. Estes, 534 S.W.3d at 367. Because the Commission properly applied the reproduction cost approach “[c]onsistent with Estes and Adams” as it was specifically instructed to do on remand, see Rinehart, 607 S.W.3d at 229-30, the Commission's decision was not unauthorized by law as argued by the Assessor.⁸

Point I is denied.

Point II

Point II argues that the Commission's Decision and Order was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because it “ignored ․ Assessor's Exhibit 1”—Ms. Koyama's appraisal report—and declined to adopt Ms. Koyama's valuations that she conducted prior to remand. Before responding to the merits of the Assessor's claim of error, Laclede argues that this Court should decline to address Point II because the Assessor failed to preserve his argument for appeal when the Assessor did not offer Ms. Koyama's report into evidence at the evidentiary hearing on remand or argue before the Commission on remand that it should adopt Ms. Koyama's valuations.

Despite arguing his point on appeal is preserved, the Assessor has failed to provide this Court with any citations in his appellant's brief to the voluminous record on appeal that support his assertion that Ms. Koyama's report was admitted into evidence at the evidentiary hearing on remand, as is required by Rule 84.04(e). See Rule 84.04(e)⁹ (“All factual assertions in the argument shall have specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits.”). Despite this, we conclude that Ms. Koyama's report was made part of the evidentiary record on remand. At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing on remand, the hearing officer took judicial notice of all of the materials in the Commission's files and the record on appeal for all of the prior appeals in this matter, which would have purportedly included Ms. Koyama's report. Thus, giving the Assessor the benefit of the doubt, we find that Ms. Koyama's report was a part of the evidentiary record on remand.

However, we decline to address the Assessor's second point on appeal because he failed to request to the Commission that it adopt Ms. Koyama's valuations on remand—an action that the Assessor now claims constitutes reversible error.

“The general rule is that a court should not set aside administrative actions unless the agency has been given a prior opportunity, on timely request by the complainant, to consider the point at issue.” Mo. Dep't of Health & Senior Servs. v. Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, 722 S.W.3d 629, 643 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Sultany Trucking, LLC v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 662 S.W.3d 775, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)).

The Assessor contends that his challenge is preserved because he raised the same argument in his post-hearing brief filed with the Commission and in his Petition for Judicial Review filed with the circuit court.¹⁰ But our review of the Assessor's post-hearing brief does not indicate that the Assessor ever requested that the Commission adopt Ms. Koyama's valuations found in “Assessor's Exhibit 1.” Instead, the Assessor's post-hearing brief specifically requests that the Commission either: (1) adopt the valuation of his new expert appraiser he hired on remand—Mr. Ryan, or alternatively, (2) “affirm the value initially set by the Assessor and affirmed by the BOE.”¹¹ The Assessor did discuss Ms. Koyama's report in his post-hearing brief: he argued that Ms. Koyama's report “support[ed] the BOE's valuation” but the Assessor only raised Ms. Koyama's report as support for his position that the BOE's original assessment should be affirmed and only to the extent necessary to prove that point.¹²

A review of the extensive record on appeal of this case demonstrates that the position the Assessor now takes on appeal—that the Commission “ignored” Ms. Koyama's report and her valuations therein—is vastly different than the position he took before the Commission itself on remand. The filings made in this case upon remand from this Court's decision in Rinehart v. Laclede Gas Co. and the transcript of the evidentiary hearing on remand suggest that the Assessor abandoned Ms. Koyama's valuations upon remand in favor of a new appraisal conducted by a newly hired expert appraiser.

After this Court issued its mandate in Rinehart, the hearing officer issued a scheduling order detailing deadlines for the parties to disclose expert witnesses, written direct testimony, and exhibits that each party intended to present at the second evidentiary hearing. Notably, the Assessor did not disclose Ms. Koyama as an expert witness he intended to call in his case-in-chief. Nor did he disclose Ms. Koyama's report as an exhibit he intended to offer at the second evidentiary hearing. Instead, the Assessor disclosed his new expert appraiser, Mr. Ryan, and the Assessor disclosed Mr. Ryan's written testimony and his appraisal report as exhibits he intended to present at the evidentiary hearing on remand.

At the hearing, the Assessor presented lengthy testimony from Mr. Ryan about his expert appraisal. Mr. Ryan testified that he determined that TVM of Laclede's personal property as $24,803.525 in 2014 and $24,825,566 in 2015, and the TVM of Laclede's real property in 2015 as $213,234,215—a valuation that was nearly 200% higher than Ms. Koyama's valuations as set forth in “Assessor's Exhibit 1.” And the Assessor elicited testimony from Mr. Ryan affirmatively showing that he “did not rely on any information from [Ms.] Koyama” in preparing his appraisal. (Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, the Commission's Decision and Order dated February 19, 2025, stated that at the evidentiary hearing on remand, the parties had submitted “updated evidence regarding valuation”—which further confirms this Court's understanding of the proceedings on remand: that the parties intended the Commission to consider new evidence presented on the issue of valuation in lieu of prior evidence on that issue presented at the first evidentiary hearing before this Court's decision in Rinehart v. Laclede Gas Co.

Thus, while Ms. Koyama's valuations were part of the evidentiary record, we refuse to address the merits of the Assessor's second point on appeal because he did not request the relief from the Commission that he now argues on appeal was error by the Commission. See Lynch v. Franklin Cnty., 604 S.W.3d 855, 869 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (“Under Missouri law, a reviewing court may refuse to consider a claim of alleged error by an administrative agency when the aggrieved party fails to raise the objection before that agency.”); Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, 722 S.W.3d at 643 (“Because the Department did not make this argument before the AHC, it is not preserved for our review, and we do not address it.”); Ocvina v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of St. Louis, 402 S.W.3d 125, 129 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (“Here, Appellants ․ had multiple opportunities to present the argument they assert on appeal, yet chose to advance an alternative theory. This Court finds Appellants failed to sufficiently raise the applicability of Sections 536.080 and 89.080 before the Board, thus waiving the issue for appellate review ․”).

Point II is denied.¹³

Point III

Point III argues that the Commission erred in adopting Mr. Reilly's Supplemental Analysis because Mr. Reilly's valuations violate Article X section 6 of the Missouri Constitution, in that it depreciates Laclede's real and personal property to “zero and negative dollars” in violation of the statutorily imposed floor of twenty percent found in section 137.122.¹⁴ We do not reach the merits of Point III because the Assessor failed to raise his constitutional argument before the Commission.

“Constitutional issues not raised at the first opportunity are deemed waived.” Tate v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 18 S.W.3d 3, 7 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000).

A party is not required to raise a challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute before an administrative agency in order to preserve that claim for appeal. See Trenton Farms RE, LLC v. Hickory Neighbors United, Inc., 603 S.W.3d 286, 291 (Mo. banc 2020) (“Since an administrative hearing commission is not empowered to determine the constitutionality of statutes, a party is not required to raise those issues at that level.” (quoting Tadrus v. Mo. Bd. of Pharm., 849 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993))).

However, “[w]hen a party is challenging the application of a statute before an administrative agency on constitutional grounds, that party must raise the constitutional issue and preserve it for appeal before the agency.” Tate, 18 S.W.3d at 7 (emphasis added); see Duncan v. Mo. Bd. for Architects, Pro. Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d 524, 531 n.3 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988) (“We note in this connection the distinction between a constitutionally infirm statute and the unconstitutional application of a statute. The logic of the rule does not apply to the latter situation where the administrative body has the authority to apply the statute in a constitutional manner.”). “The purpose of the rule is to bring to the attention of the tribunal the constitutional objection to the tribunal's proposed application of the statute and allow the tribunal to correct itself.” Tate, 18 S.W.3d at 7. “Moreover, it is imperative to an efficient and fair administration of justice that a litigant may not withhold his objections, await the outcome, and then complain that he was denied his rights if he does not approve the resulting decision.” Id. (citation modified).

Here, the Assessor's third point on appeal argues that the Commission erroneously applied section 137.122 in adopting Mr. Reilly's Supplemental Analysis because Mr. Reilly's calculation of the TVM of the subject property violates Article X section 6.1 of the Missouri Constitution because it depreciates below the statutory floor. As a result, the Assessor was required to raise this constitutional argument before the Commission in order to preserve this constitutional argument for appeal.

The Assessor states that he preserved Point III by raising the argument in his post-hearing brief and again in his Petition for Judicial Review filed with the circuit court. The Assessor directs us to a footnote in his post-hearing brief in support of his assertion. The Assessor mentions Article X section 6 of the Missouri Constitution in a single sentence of that footnote, but even then, he did not argue that Mr. Reilly's Supplemental Analysis violated the Missouri Constitution or in any way request the Commission make a finding to that effect.

While the Assessor's Petition for Judicial Review did raise the constitutional challenge he now raises in Point III, by that time, that argument was untimely. By failing to raise the same argument before the Commission, the Assessor prevented the Commission from ruling on this claim of error or correcting its purportedly erroneous application of section 137.122. Accordingly, the Assessor did not raise his constitutional challenge “at the first opportunity” and thereby waived this constitutional argument for consideration in this appeal. Id. Because the Assessor has failed to preserve his constitutional challenge, we refuse to address the merits of Point III.

Point III is denied.¹⁵

Conclusion

The judgment of the circuit court affirming the Commission's Decision and Order dated February 19, 2025, is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “True value in money is the fair market value of the property on the valuation date[ ] and is a function of its highest and best use, which is the use of the property which will produce the greatest return in the reasonably near future.” Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Mo. Gaming Corp., 156 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Mo. banc 2005) (quoting Aspenhof Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990)).

2.   Laclede Gas Company changed its name to Spire Missouri Inc. in 2016 but we refer to the respondent, Spire Missouri Inc. as “Laclede” for convenience and continuity with the prior appeal between these parties decided by this Court.

4.   In other words, Mr. Ryan's valuation model was based upon a “historical” cost that was the cost to replace the property “new” in today's dollars. This is not the reproduction cost approach model identified for the parties and the Commission by this Court in the first appeal nor the approach model identified for use in our specific remand instructions in the first appeal, Rinehart, 607 S.W.3d at 229-31.

5.   In 2013, to create more uniform and consistent assessments, the Commission promulgated a form for natural gas distribution companies to use to report their property. The form recommended using the methodology stated in section 137.122 for all natural gas distribution property. Section 137.122 sets forth a depreciation schedule to be applied by assessors to value business personal property by adopting, in part, the depreciation guidelines in IRS Publication 946, where physical depreciation is determined through the use of the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (“MACRS”) modified to include a twenty-percent floor.

6.   While Laclede agreed with the hearing officer's decision adopting Mr. Reilly's valuations, it requested the Commission modify the hearing officer's order to clarify the application of the MACRS depreciation schedule under the reproduction cost approach.

7.   “There are two types of remands: (1) a general remand, which does not provide specific direction and leaves all issues open to consideration in the new trial; and (2) a remand with directions, which requires the trial court to enter a judgment in conformity with the mandate.” State ex rel. St. Charles Cnty. v. Cunningham, 401 S.W.3d 493, 495 (Mo. banc 2013) (quoting Guidry v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010)). “Where the mandate contains express instructions that direct the trial court to take a specified action, the trial court has no authority to deviate from those instructions.” Allen v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 585 S.W.3d 289, 294 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting Edmison v. Clarke, 61 S.W.3d 302, 310 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001)).

8.   Although the Assessor frames his point on appeal as a challenge to the Commission's application of the reproduction cost approach, what he really challenges is this Court's description of the reproduction cost approach in Estes. In his appellate brief, the Assessor argues that the reasoning in Estes “overlooked a critical distinction in valuation methodology[,]” which led this Court to “inadvertently pronounce a principle of law” that “has been restated in later opinions.” The Assessor argues that Estes “overruled a long line of binding precedent” and misconstrued Missouri Supreme Court precedent because it failed to utilize “current costs” as opposed to original or historical costs in its TVM calculation.What the Assessor fails to appreciate, however, is that the same argument was raised and rejected in Estes, Adams, and Elfrink. See Union Elec. Co. v. Estes, 534 S.W.3d 352, 366-67 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017); Union Elec. Co. v. Adams, 539 S.W.3d 779, 780-82 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017); Union Elec. Co. v. Elfrink, 544 S.W.3d 246, 247-49 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017). In Estes, the county assessor's expert calculated the TVM of the property at issue by “trend[ing]” original costs “to present day[,]” and in doing so applied a valuation methodology that we characterized as “fundamentally different” from the reproduction cost approach based on original or historical costs. See Estes, 534 S.W.3d at 362-63 & 375 (“Instead of calculating ‘Market Value’ by reducing original costs by depreciation, Mr. Sansoucy calculated ‘Market Value’ by reducing ‘reproduction costs new’ by depreciation. ‘Reproduction costs new’ represented Mr. Sansoucy's calculation of the cost of Ameren's pipeline property in today's dollars, starting with Ameren's reported original costs ‘trended to present day.’ ․ Mr. Sansoucy used a fundamentally different valuation methodology than the assessors used (replacement costs new versus reproduction costs based on original costs).”). We recognized that this methodology, as described, “is essentially ‘replacement cost’ in today's dollars employing today's standards,” which is “a recognized cost approach methodology” but we rejected that approach as inconsistent with Missouri law in Estes. See id. at 375 nn.24 & 25.The Assessor asks this Court to reverse the Commission's decision because it failed to base its calculation of the TVM of Laclede's property on “current” costs as opposed to “historical” costs—a position that is fundamentally at odds with this Court's holdings in Rinehart and Estes and conflicts with the decisions of our sister courts in Adams and Elfrink. We decline to do so.

9.   All rule references are to I Missouri Court Rules – State 2025.

10.   Neither the Assessor nor Laclede made an opening statement or closing argument at the evidentiary hearing on remand. Instead, the parties both submitted post-hearing briefs where they requested specific relief from the Commission.

11.   Ms. Koyama and the Assessor (as adopted by the BOE) arrived at different conclusions as to the TVM of the subject property. Ms. Koyama assessed the TVM of Laclede's personal property as $12,000,000 in 2014 and $12,000,000 in 2015, and the TVM of Laclede's real property as $73,500,000 in 2015. The Assessor determined the TVM of Laclede's personal property as $11,300,000 in 2014 and $11,100,000 in 2015, and the TVM of Laclede's real property as $79,200,000 in 2015.

12.   It is puzzling to this Court why the Assessor would ask the Commission to affirm the BOE's initial assessment considering that this Court had already concluded that such assessment was unlawful because it “unreasonably failed to consider and properly calculate depreciation based on the vintage years of the property.” Rinehart, 607 S.W.3d at 229.

13.   Even if the Assessor's challenge was preserved, we would find no reason to believe that the Commission arbitrarily or unreasonably “ignored” Ms. Koyama's report as he now contends. The Assessor argues that the Commission erred in “ignor[ing]” Ms. Koyama's report because in order to disregard the report, the Commission was required to make a specific finding that it “lacked credibility” as is required under Missouri law. “While it is true that unimpeached or undisputed evidence cannot be disregarded unless an administrative agency makes a specific finding that such evidence is incredible or unworthy of belief ․ this rule is inapplicable here.” Lagud v. Kansas City Mo. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 272 S.W.3d 285, 292 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (emphasis added). Here, Ms. Koyama's determination of the TVM of the subject property was disputed—not only by Laclede's expert, Mr. Reilly, but also by the Assessor's new expert, Mr. Ryan. None of the expert appraisers in this case came to the same conclusion regarding the TVM of Laclede's property and that issue remained highly disputed on remand.Further, we note the lack of specific findings on Ms. Koyama's report does not indicate that the Commission “ignored” Ms. Koyama's report or otherwise acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. The record in this case and the detailed analysis in the Commission's Decision and Order dated February 19, 2025, demonstrates a careful consideration of the evidence presented by both parties on remand and said Decision and Order details the Commission's reasoning for adopting Mr. Reilly's valuation and for refusing to adopt the valuation of the expert that the Assessor designated on remand: Mr. Ryan. See Chipperfield v. Missouri Air Conservation Comm'n, 229 S.W.3d 226, 249 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007) (“Appellants have cited us to no authority, and we have found none, that requires the Commission to mention and review every individual piece of a party's evidence in its written decision. The Decision and Order clearly demonstrates that the Commission considered all of the evidence and all issues related to the evidence before it, and Appellants have not established that the Commission failed to consider any important aspect or factor before it ․”).

14.   All statutory references are to The Revised Statutes of Missouri (2000), as supplemented through January 1, 2014, unless otherwise indicated.

15.   Ex gratia, we note that there is no substantive merit to the Assessor's constitutional argument in Point III. The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on remand demonstrates that Mr. Reilly's Supplemental Analysis does not “depreciate[ ] hundreds of items of property to zero value” as the Assessor alleges. The Assessor cross-examined Mr. Reilly about this alleged discrepancy in his analysis and Mr. Reilly thoroughly explained why some of the properties appear as having a “zero value.” Mr. Reilly gave two explanations: the values represent partial retirements of certain pipelines, or in the alternative, they represent transfers between accounts when the company had erroneously recorded assets.The Assessor has failed to direct this Court to any evidence that contradicts Mr. Reilly's explanations, but even if he had, this Court would be required to defer to the Commission's determination that Mr. Reilly was a qualified and credible witness and the weight it gave to Mr. Reilly's testimony. See Ferry v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson City Pub. Sch. Dist., 641 S.W.3d 203, 206 (Mo. banc 2022) (“In reviewing an agency's findings of fact, this Court defers to the agency's credibility determinations and the weight given to conflicting evidence.”); Rinehart, 607 S.W.3d at 230-31 (“We are loathe to substitute our judgment for the expertise of the Commission in matters of property tax assessment.” (citation modified)).Furthermore, Appendix H to Mr. Reilly's report (which the Assessor wholly failed to cite or otherwise explain in his appellate briefing to this Court) detailed Mr. Reilly's application of the Commission-adopted depreciation schedule to the historical costs of Laclede's property, and it demonstrates that Mr. Reilly did not apply any less than twenty-percent depreciation to the subject property.

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge, and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge, concur.