PRIVATE PARTY IMPOUND LLC v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY (2026)

Private Party Impound, LLC (“Towing Company”) appeals the trial court's judgment denying its second amended petition that sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The second amended petition alleged that the City of Kansas City, Missouri (“City”) and Jackson County, Missouri (“County”) had enacted ordinances regarding towing procedures that did not conform to various state statutes related to towing, were preempted by those statutes, and deprived the Towing Company of substantive and procedural due process. On appeal, the Towing Company argues that the trial court erred in finding that the ordinances enacted by the City did not conflict with and were not preempted by the state towing statutes because those statutes provide that only owners or lienholders have the right to redeem a towed vehicle while the ordinances allow others to redeem a towed vehicle. The Towing Company further asserts that the trial court erred in finding that there was no justiciable controversy warranting pre-enforcement review of the ordinances enacted by the City. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Towing Company is a business that engages in nonconsensual towing at the request of private property owners. On October 13, 2025, the Towing Company filed a second amended petition against the City and the County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The second amended petition alleged that in May 2025, City Ordinance No. 250367 (“First City Ordinance”) and County Ordinance No. 5978 (“County Ordinance”) were enacted to address procedural requirements for the nonconsensual towing of motor vehicles. It further alleged that City Ordinance No. 250709 (“Second City Ordinance”), another ordinance concerning nonconsensual towing, was enacted in September 2025. It claimed that in the same month, a consumer information sheet called “Owners’ Bill of Rights for Towed Vehicles” (“Bill of Rights”) was also issued. The Towing Company alleged that the First City Ordinance, the County Ordinance, the Second City Ordinance, (collectively, “Ordinances”), and the Bill of Rights did not conform to the state statutes that provide the procedural requirements for nonconsensual towing, that they were preempted by those statutes, and that they were unenforceable pursuant to section 71.010, which requires municipal ordinances to conform with state statutes related to the same subject.¹ The Towing Company also asserted that the First City Ordinance and the County Ordinance violated the due process rights of the Towing Company and similarly situated tow operators by subjecting them to deprivation of their licenses to tow. The Towing Company asked the trial court to find the Ordinances and the Bill of Rights to be unenforceable, and to enjoin the City and the County from enforcing them.

On October 15, 2025, the County filed a motion to dismiss the second amended petition, or in the alternative for summary judgment. It argued that the Towing Company had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the County Ordinance did not take effect until January 1, 2026, and was therefore not yet enforceable such that there was no justiciable controversy.

On October 23, 2025, the City also filed a motion to dismiss the second amended petition. The City asserted that the Towing Company had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the First City Ordinance and the Second City Ordinance (collectively, “City Ordinances”) did not conflict with and were not preempted by the state statutes relating to towing. It also contended that the Bill of Rights could not serve as a basis for conflict preemption since it did not have the effect of law. The City further argued that the Towing Company failed to present a justiciable controversy justifying a declaratory judgment regarding the due process claim, as the Towing Company lacked standing and its claim was not ripe.²

Though the motions were still pending, the trial court held a bench trial on November 18, 2025. At the beginning of trial, the court gave the parties an opportunity to present argument related to the motions and then proceeded to the presentation of evidence. The Towing Company attempted to introduce uncertified copies of the Ordinances. The City and the County objected to the admission of the uncertified copies because section 490.240 requires municipal ordinances to be certified to be admitted into evidence. The Towing Company responded that the pleadings had conceded that the Ordinances were admitted. The City responded that it had not admitted the content of the City Ordinances since it had not filed a responsive pleading. The County asserted that it had not admitted the content of the County Ordinance because the County Ordinance cited in the second amended petition was never enacted. The trial court sustained the objections.

The Towing Company then attempted to admit the City Ordinances by laying a foundation through the testimony of a witness who was familiar with them. The City objected to the Towing Company's attempts to admit the City Ordinances in this manner, asserting that section 490.240 still applied and required the copies of the City Ordinances to be certified to be admissible. The trial court sustained the objections.

The trial court took the matter under advisement at the close of trial. On December 23, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment that denied the second amended petition (“Judgment”). The Judgment included detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court made factual findings that the Towing Company did not submit the City Ordinances into evidence; that it did not present evidence of the alleged conflicts between the state towing statutes and the City Ordinances; that it did not offer evidence that its license or the licenses of its operators were at risk of being revoked; and that it did not submit any evidence challenging the County Ordinance. The trial court reached legal conclusions that the City Ordinances did not conflict with and were not preempted by the state towing statutes, and that the Bill of Rights could not serve as the basis for conflict preemption since it did not have the full effect of law. The trial court further concluded that there was no justiciable controversy as to the Towing Company's claim that the City Ordinances deprived the Towing Company and similarly situated tow operators of due process since the Towing Company offered no evidence to establish that it had standing through a legally protectable interest or that its claim was ripe for pre-enforcement review.

The Towing Company timely appealed the Judgment in favor of the City. The Towing Company did not appeal the Judgment in favor of the County.

Standard of Review

“When reviewing a declaratory judgment, an appellate court's standard of review is the same as in any other court-tried case.” Guyer v. City of Kirkwood, 38 S.W.3d 412, 413 (Mo. banc 2001) (citing McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. banc 1996)). We will affirm the judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). We apply de novo review to questions of law. Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. banc 2012). Whether a justiciable controversy exists is a question of law which we accordingly review de novo. Keys v. City of St. Louis, 735 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Mo. App. E.D. 2026).

Analysis

The Towing Company raises two points on appeal. In the first point, it asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the City Ordinances did not conflict with and were not preempted by the state towing statutes because those statutes provide that the only persons who can redeem a towed vehicle are the vehicle's owners or lienholders while the City Ordinances allow other persons to redeem a towed vehicle. The second point contends that the trial court committed error when it found that there was no justiciable controversy warranting pre-enforcement review because the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the City Ordinances were being enforced.

Point One: The Towing Company did not admit the City Ordinances into evidence, foreclosing appellate review of its claim that the City Ordinances are in conflict with or preempted by the state towing statutes

In its first point on appeal, the Towing Company contends that the trial court committed error by finding that the City Ordinances ³ did not conflict with and were not preempted by the state towing statutes because those statutes provide that only the owner or lienholder can redeem a towed vehicle while the City Ordinances allow others to redeem a towed vehicle. We cannot address the merits of this contention because the Towing Company failed to admit the City Ordinances into evidence at trial.

The Towing Company was required to demonstrate the content of the City Ordinances in order to establish that it was entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief because “[t]he contents of a municipal ordinance must be proven like every other fact.” Stanton v. City of Skidmore, 620 S.W.3d 245, 254 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting City of Kan. City v. Cosic, 540 S.W.3d 461, 463 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018)) (citation omitted). “[U]nlike state statutes, ‘[c]ourts may not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances; instead such ordinances must be admitted in evidence or stipulated by the parties.’ ” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Fair Emp. Pracs. Div. of Council on Hum. Rels. of City of St. Louis, 574 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Mo. banc 1978)) (citations omitted). Section 490.240 provides that any printed copy of a municipal ordinance must be certified to be admissible:

Printed copies of the ordinances ․ of any city or incorporated town in this state, purporting to be published by authority of such city or incorporated town, and manuscript or printed copies of such ordinances ․, certified under the hand of the officer having the same in lawful custody, with the seal of such city or town annexed, shall be received as evidence in all courts and places in this state, without further proof ․

The trial court properly sustained the City's objections to admitting the City Ordinances into evidence because the Towing Company failed to provide certified copies of the City Ordinances pursuant to section 490.240, and the City never admitted or stipulated to the City Ordinances’ content. The Towing Company has not challenged this evidentiary ruling on appeal. Given that the City Ordinances were not in evidence at trial, they are not in our record to review on appeal. To determine whether the City Ordinances impermissibly conflicted with or were preempted by the state towing statutes, we would need to be able to review the content of the City Ordinances. As we are unable to do so, Point One is denied.

Point Two: The trial court did not err in finding that there was no justiciable controversy with respect to the Towing Company's due process claim because the claim was not ripe for pre-enforcement review

The second point on appeal asserts that the trial court erred in finding that there was no justiciable controversy warranting pre-enforcement review of the City Ordinances because the evidence demonstrated that the City Ordinances were being enforced.⁴ We disagree.

As discussed in Point One, the City Ordinances were not in evidence at trial and are not a part of our record. To the extent our review of the Towing Company's due process claim requires specific reference to the content of the City Ordinances, that review is prohibited, requiring us to deny the Towing Company's second point on appeal. See, e.g., Keys, 735 S.W.3d at 616-17 (court evaluated the content of the challenged law in relation to the party's claim in order to assess ripeness); State Conf. of Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. State, 563 S.W.3d 138, 148 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (same). Even if the Towing Company's due process claim were susceptible to meaningful review on appeal without specific reference to the content of the City Ordinances, we would not find that the trial court committed error when it concluded that there was no justiciable controversy warranting pre-enforcement review of the City Ordinances.

A trial court must have a justiciable controversy before it to grant a declaratory judgment. Mo. All. for Retired Ams. v. Dep't of Lab. & Indus. Rels., 277 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Mo. banc 2009). “In the context of a declaratory judgment action, a justiciable controversy exists where: (1) the plaintiff has a legally protectable interest at stake; (2) a substantial controversy exists between parties with genuinely adverse interests; and (3) that controversy is ripe for judicial determination.” Keys, 735 S.W.3d at 614 (citing Mercy Hosps. E. Cmtys. v. Mo. Health Facilities Rev. Comm., 362 S.W.3d 415, 417 (Mo. banc 2012)). “The first two elements jointly comprise the concept of standing, while the latter describe[s] ripeness.” Id. (citing Schweich v. Nixon, 408 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Mo. banc 2013)). Both standing and ripeness are necessary to establish a justiciable controversy. Id.

Here, the trial court found that there was no justiciable controversy regarding the Towing Company's claim that the City Ordinances violated its due process rights because the Towing Company offered no evidence to establish that it has a legally protectable interest at stake (standing) or that its pre-enforcement challenge of the City Ordinances is ripe for review. Because ripeness is dispositive in this case, we confine our review of the trial court's justiciability determination solely to that issue.

“Ripeness is a ‘tool’ of the court, which is used to determine whether a controversy is ‘ripe’ or ready for judicial review, or whether by conducting the review, we would simply be rendering an advisory opinion on some future set of circumstances, which we are not permitted to do.” Keys, 735 S.W.3d at 614 (quoting Reeves v. Kander, 462 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)). “A ripe controversy exists if the parties’ dispute is developed sufficiently to allow the court to make an accurate determination of the facts, to resolve a conflict that is presently existing, and to grant specific relief of a conclusive character.” Id. at 614-15 (quoting Mo. Health Care Ass'n v. Att'y Gen. of the State of Mo., 953 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Mo. banc 1997)). “Ripeness does not exist when the question rests solely on a probability that an event will occur.” Id. at 615 (quoting S.C. v. Juv. Officer, 474 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Mo. banc 2015)).

When the challenge involves the constitutional validity of a city ordinance, a ripe controversy exists when the city attempts to enforce the ordinance. Id. The Towing Company asserts in the argument portion of its brief that it presented evidence that the City was enforcing the City Ordinances through the testimony of Jay Bloodworth (“Bloodworth”), the managing member of the Towing Company. But in so claiming, the Towing Company failed to include “specific page references to the relevant portion of” Bloodworth's testimony. Rule 84.04(e) (“All factual assertions in the argument shall have specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits.”). Based on our independent review of Bloodworth's testimony, we have determined that none of his testimony establishes that the City was enforcing or threatening to enforce the City Ordinances against the Towing Company. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the Towing Company did not present any evidence to establish that its due process rights were presently affected or at risk of being affected by the City's enforcement of the City Ordinances. Ripeness cannot exist upon “a probability that an event will occur.” Keys, 735 S.W.3d at 615 (quoting S.C., 474 S.W.3d at 163).

We recognize that under limited circumstances, “[a] ripe controversy may exist before [a] [challenged] law is enforced.” Keys, 735 S.W.3d at 615 (listing cases that were ripe for review before enforcement). The Towing Company contends that Bloodworth's testimony indicated, at the very least, that the Towing Company was complying with the City Ordinances because it was concerned about enforcement and that this evidence supported pre-enforcement review of the City Ordinances. We disagree.

“In the context of a pre-enforcement challenge, a dispute is ripe ‘when: (1) “the facts necessary to adjudicate the underlying claims [are] fully developed” and (2) the law at issue affects the plaintiff “in a manner that [gives] rise to an immediate, concrete dispute.” ’ ” Iseman v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 660 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting Alpert v. State, 543 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Mo. banc 2018)). Neither condition was established here.

First, the “factual development” condition is met where “no future factual developments or events will affect the analysis.” Id. For example, in Missouri Health Care Association, the appellate court determined that the constitutional claim was ripe for pre-enforcement review “[b]ecause the resolution of the constitutional issue depend[ed] entirely on facts that occurred before [the challenged law] was passed[,]” as the claim related to the procedure used to pass the challenged law such that “the facts necessary to adjudicate the underlying claim [we]re fully developed” and “[t]he accuracy of judicial fact-finding w[ould] not be aided by a delay.” 953 S.W.2d at 621. Likewise, in Iseman, the constitutional claim related to whether the offense to which the challenger had already pleaded guilty would permit enforcement of a contested statutory amendment. 660 S.W.3d at 690. Because resolution of that question concerned only historical facts without the need for future factual development, the facts necessary to adjudicate the constitutional claim were fully developed. Id.

Here, the Towing Company does not challenge the procedure used to enact the City Ordinances as in Missouri Health Care Association. And the Towing Company does not rely on “historical facts” as in Iseman to advance its due process challenge. In fact, the trial court found that the Towing Company offered no evidence of “historical fact” that would entitle the City to seek immediate enforcement of the City Ordinances based on those historical facts. The Towing Company has not challenged this conclusion. Instead, it is plain from the record that the Towing Company's due process claim depends entirely on future factual development. See Turner v. Mo. Dep't of Conservation, 349 S.W.3d 434, 446 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (claim was not ripe because challenger raised only hypothetical situations that might occur).

Second, the “immediate, concrete dispute” condition is generally met where the contested law places the challenger in a present dilemma that can be resolved through a specific, conclusive decree. Mo. Health Care Ass'n, 953 S.W.2d at 622. As an example, the challenge presented in Missouri Health Care Association was held to be an immediate, concrete dispute because the contested statutory amendment affected the ways in which the challenger conducted its business. Id. at 621. Similarly in Alpert, the Missouri Supreme Court determined that the challenger raised an immediate, concrete dispute because the contested statutory amendment resulted in the revocation of the challenger's license to deal firearms. 543 S.W.3d at 593.

The Towing Company cannot establish that the City Ordinances yielded an “immediate, concrete dispute.” Because the City Ordinances were never admitted into evidence at trial, and are not a part of our record, it is impossible to determine whether the way the Towing Company claims it is now conducting its business is required by the City Ordinances. Given that the City Ordinances were not in evidence, the Towing Company did not prove that the City Ordinances “somehow interrupted or prevented” the Towing Company from engaging in “a particular course of conduct” that it had been able to engage in prior to the enactment of the City Ordinances. Turner, 349 S.W.3d at 446; see Alpert, 543 S.W.3d at 593 (“Courts have held the interruption or prevention of previous lawful conduct supports adjudicating pre-enforcement challenges on the merits.”).

The trial court's conclusion that the Towing Company's due process claim did not present a justiciable controversy because the challenge was not ripe for pre-enforcement review is not legally erroneous.

Point Two is denied.

Conclusion

The Judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 as supplemented to May 1, 2025, when the First City Ordinance was enacted, unless otherwise indicated.

2.   The City's motion to dismiss made this argument as to both City Ordinances even though the Second City Ordinance was not identified as the subject of the Towing Company's due process deprivation claim in its second amended petition.

3.   The Towing Company did not appeal the Judgment in favor of the County and does not refer to the County Ordinance in its first point relied on. Yet the Towing Company mentions the County Ordinance in developing its argument. For obvious reasons, the Towing Company is bound by the preclusive effects of the Judgment in favor of the County. The Towing Company's stray reference to the County in the argument portion of its brief is disregarded.

4.   As noted in footnote 2, supra, though the second amended petition did not reference the Second City Ordinance in the Towing Company's asserted due process claim, the City's motion to dismiss treated the claim as covering both City Ordinances. The Judgment did as well.

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur.