Juvenile Officer, Respondent, v. M.L.K., Appellant. (2026)

M.L.K., a juvenile, appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, Family Court—Juvenile Division (“juvenile court”) asserting jurisdiction over M.L.K. and providing services to him arising out of a charged status offense under section 211.031.1(2)(d).¹ We affirm.

Facts and Procedural Background 2

On April 2, 2025, sixteen-year-old M.L.K., operating a stolen Chrysler 300, led City of Independence detective, Dustin Stewart (“Detective”), on a high-speed chase. Detective first observed the Chrysler 300 make an abrupt turn without using a signal. Detective proceeded to follow the vehicle. After M.L.K. failed to stop at a stop sign, Detective initiated a traffic stop by activating his lights and siren. M.L.K. did not stop. Instead, M.L.K. fled at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. During the vehicular pursuit, M.L.K. repeatedly ignored stop lights and stop signs while proceeding through intersections. The chase ended when M.L.K. struck a curb, abandoned the vehicle, and fled on foot. Drones and a K9 unit were deployed. After 20 minutes, M.L.K. was detected hiding between two privacy fences and officers placed him in custody.

Detective's investigation confirmed that the Chrysler 300 had been reported stolen. Officers proceeded to search the vehicle. Officers recovered a Glock handgun from the space between the driver's seat and the center console. The Glock had an extended, loaded magazine, and there was a round in the chamber.

As relevant to this appeal, on April 3, 2025, the Juvenile Officer filed a “status offense” petition alleging that M.L.K. had engaged in behavior injurious to his welfare and the welfare of others pursuant to section 211.031.1(2)(d). The status offense allegations, as later amended at the evidentiary hearing were:³

The juvenile is subject to this Court's jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 211.031.1(2) RSMo., in that his behaviors are injurious to his welfare and the welfare of others. On or about April 2, 2025, the juvenile was found in possession of a Glock firearm. The juvenile was driving a stolen vehicle while in possession of the firearm. The juvenile is at risk absent the intervention of the Court.

Within days of the filing of the status offense petition by the Juvenile Officer, M.L.K.’s counsel entered his appearance on behalf of M.L.K. and was present for all adjudication and disposition phase proceedings relevant to the subject status offense.

On May 23, 2025, the juvenile court held an adjudication hearing. The juvenile court found that the evidence was sufficient to prove the status offense allegations pursuant to the clear and convincing evidentiary standard. On August 27, 2025, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing. At the disposition hearing, M.L.K. was present with counsel and counsel assisted M.L.K. in the matter. M.L.K. was granted the opportunity to address the Court but exercised his right not to speak. Pursuant to Rule 128.03,⁴ the juvenile court issued the following judgment, which stated in pertinent part:

Testimony having been heard and other evidence received by the Court and having observed the demeanor of the witnesses, evaluated credibility, and resolved any conflicts or inconsistencies in testimony and evidence, the Court rules as follows:

IT IS ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the juvenile is committed to the custody of the Director of Family Court Services, but execution of the sentence is suspended, and the juvenile is placed in the custody of juvenile's mother on probation under the supervision of the Director of Family Court Services, until further order of the Court.

M.L.K. appeals, asserting a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to the juvenile court's judgment.

Standard of Review

“Juvenile proceedings are ‘reviewed in the same manner as other court-tried cases.’ ” D.C.M. v. Pemiscot Cnty. Juv. Off., 578 S.W.3d 776, 786 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting C.G.M., II v. Juv. Officer, 258 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008)). “This Court will affirm a judgment in a juvenile proceeding unless it is not supported by evidence, is against the weight of evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law.” Id. “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight their testimony should be given is a matter to be determined at the hearing by the circuit court, which is free to believe none, part, or all of their testimony.” Id. (citation modified).

Analysis

In M.L.K.’s sole point on appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that M.L.K.’s behaviors were injurious to his welfare and to the welfare of others.

In this case, M.L.K. was charged under the juvenile code with the status offense of injurious behavior pursuant to section 211.031.1(2)(d). Missouri law treats “status” offenses and “delinquency” offenses differently, including but not limited to, differences relating to the standard of proof. Delinquency offenses require the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof, C.G.M., II, 258 S.W.3d at 882, while status offenses require the “clear and convincing” standard of proof, Juv. Officer v. B.C., 897 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995). “Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that instantly tilts the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition, so that the court is left with the abiding conviction that the evidence is true.” Dep't of Mental Health v. Rousseau, 617 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (citation modified).

Juvenile proceedings charging a juvenile with a status offense are civil proceedings. See Juv. Officer v. A.G.R., 359 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).

Section 211.031.1(2) provides for jurisdiction over those juveniles who are charged with a status, or non-criminal, offense. A status offense is a charge unique to juveniles and is an infraction that allows the juvenile court to take jurisdiction of a child (under age 17) alleged to be in need of care due to truancy, being beyond parental control, absence from home—runaway, or behavior injurious to welfare․ Status cases under section 211.031.1(2) are fundamentally different from delinquency cases under section 211.031.1(3), in which a child is alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance.

Id. at 109.⁵

There is no definition provided in Chapter 211 for “behaviors injurious to his or her welfare or the welfare of others[.]” § 211.031.1(d)(2). Indeed, Missouri courts have acknowledged “[t]he manner of such behavior is too varied to be stated exactly in the statute.” O—H— v. Murphy, 512 S.W.2d 424, 426-27 (Mo. App. 1974). Therefore, we follow the primary rule of statutory construction which is to give effect to the intent of the legislature “as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.” Karney v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. Rels., 599 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009)). “The child welfare policy of [Missouri] is what is in the best interests of the child.” § 211.011. The purpose and philosophy of the juvenile court system as expressed in section 211.011 is “to facilitate the care, protection and discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Id. “To further that purpose, the juvenile code is to be liberally construed.” A.G.R., 359 S.W.3d at 110 (citing section 211.011).

Missouri courts have found a variety of behaviors by juveniles to be “injurious.” See In re J.M.W., 676 S.W.3d 81, 85 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (noting the Juvenile Officer proved the juvenile engaged in injurious behavior by resisting arrest and punching a glass mirror while in custody); K.L.M. v. Juv. Officer, 660 S.W.3d 655, 656 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (noting the Juvenile Officer had proved the juvenile engaged in injurious behavior by using marijuana on multiple occasions, disobeying the reasonable and lawful directions of her parent or other custodian by refusing to return home, and violating conditions of probation); A.G.R., 359 S.W.3d at 110 (holding the juvenile was behaving injuriously by exposing genitals and engaging in deviate sexual intercourse); J.D.B. v. Juv. Officer, 2 S.W.3d 150, 151 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) (engaging in physical self-harm and bodily mutilation was injurious behavior as admitted by the juvenile).

In this case, the undisputed facts are that M.L.K. possessed a Glock firearm, the firearm was loaded, M.L.K. was driving a stolen vehicle, M.L.K. violated numerous traffic laws while leading Detective on a high-speed chase, and M.L.K. fled and hid from officers. This evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom are sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that M.L.K. engaged in behaviors injurious to his welfare and the welfare of others. M.L.K.’s sole point is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to The Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as supplemented through April 3, 2025, unless otherwise indicated. We have used initials to identify the juvenile to protect his identity as required by section 509.520.1(7) (Supp. IV 2025).

3.   Rule 113.02.a provides that in a juvenile matter, the petition “may be amended by leave of court at any time.” The original status offense allegations placed M.L.K. and his counsel on notice of the allegation that M.L.K. was operating a stolen vehicle while in possession of a Glock firearm. Thus, M.L.K. and his counsel were on notice of the status offense allegations that would be presented at the adjudication hearing and M.L.K.’s interests and due process rights were thus protected.

4.   All rule references are to I Missouri Court Rules – State 2025.

5.   As we discussed in Juv. Officer v. A.G.R., 359 S.W.3d 103, 109 n.5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011), there are a panoply of rights for juveniles in delinquency adjudications that are different than status offense adjudications. The flaw in M.L.K.’s arguments in this appeal is that M.L.K. is attempting to treat the current status offense adjudication as a delinquency adjudication and it simply is not. Hence, all of the delinquency adjudication precedent cited by M.L.K. in his appellate briefing is inapposite to the present status offense adjudication.

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge, concur.