STATE v. NEWLAND (2026)

Mr. Denver L. Newland (“Newland”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Callaway County, Missouri (“trial court”), convicting him of one count of first-degree property damage. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History 1

On July 30, 2023, Victim 1 ² drove to Newland's residence in her Toyota vehicle to retrieve her belongings after she and Newland ended their relationship in the days prior. Newland was behaving oddly, which made Victim 1 feel uncomfortable. Victim 1 wanted to leave, but Newland had taken her car keys so Victim 1 texted Victim 2 to pick her up from Newland's home.

Shortly thereafter, Victim 2 arrived in his Jeep. Victim 1 told Newland she was leaving, and Newland watched through a window as the victims drove away in the Jeep.

After a few minutes, Victim 1 received a call from Newland, which she did not answer. When the phone stopped ringing, Victim 1 put the phone in her lap and looked up to see her own vehicle, the Toyota, in front of her. The Toyota, which Newland was driving, stopped suddenly, causing a collision between the Jeep and the Toyota.

After the collision, Newland opened the Toyota's driver-side door, but Victim 2 attempted to avoid Newland by driving around the Toyota and driving forward on the original path of departure from Newland's home. After the victims continued driving, Newland drove the Toyota into the rear driver's side of the Jeep, which caused a flat tire and damage to the driver's side and rear of the Jeep. Victim 1 called 911 and Victim 2 parked the Jeep in a church parking lot, where law enforcement subsequently arrived.

Deputy and Sergeant were dispatched to the church. Deputy took photographs of the damage to Victim 2's Jeep. Deputy and Sergeant then drove to Newland's home, and after spotting fresh damage on the Toyota matching the victims’ description of the collision, Newland was arrested and charged with several crimes including, as relevant to this appeal, first-degree property damage.³

A jury trial was held on January 8, 2025. The State first presented testimony from Victim 1 and Victim 2.

During the State's direct examination, Victim 2 testified that his car was damaged as a result of a collision between his vehicle and the vehicle that Newland was driving (the Toyota). After the collision, Victim 2 testified that he sustained damage to the driver's side of the vehicle. The following exchange occurred:

[PROSECUTOR]: Did you talk to anybody about getting that stuff repaired?

[VICTIM 2]: I talked to a few people. At the time, I worked for a company called Creative Audio. We did a lot of audio and tow bolt work on vehicles, so we always kind of had some body shops in. I talked to a few of our customers informally about it, and they all would come out and take a look at it.

[PROSECUTOR]: And how much was it going to cost you to repair that?

[VICTIM 2]: I heard anywhere between 1,200 and about 1,600. And that was taking into consideration a tire that needed to be replaced and a taillight assembly as well as the bodywork to repair the rear quarter panel and the rear bumper, which had a dent in it as well.

Newland did not object to Victim 2's direct examination testimony. Then, the following exchange occurred between defense counsel and Victim 2 during cross-examination:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did I hear you say that the damage to your vehicle someone had told you that it was between 12 and $1,600?

[VICTIM 2]: I've heard several different—from different people. Yes, those are accurate numbers.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So these are opinions of somebody—[VICTIM 2]: Auto body professionals.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: —that told you. Okay. But they're not here today to testify, are they?

[VICTIM 2]: No.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And you don't have the expertise or wherewithal to come up with that kind of an estimate, do you?

[VICTIM 2]: I would actually argue that I could come up with a fairly—fairly reasonable guess based on my knowledge.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But all you really know is what you were told. That's all you've told us here today, correct?

[VICTIM 2]: Correct.

During redirect examination, the following exchange occurred, which prompted defense counsel's hearsay objection:

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. So the other number you gave was from informal estimates?

[VICTIM 2]: Informal. People in the trade, you know.

․

[VICTIM 2]: Like I said, I heard, you know, anywhere between 12 and like 16, 17, 1,800.

․

[VICTIM 2]: But it did not seem out of the realm of possibility for 1,200 to be a solid number knowing what I know about the cost of tires and replacing running boards and taillight assemblies.

․

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I feel like I want to lodge an objection and ask the Court to [ex]clude his testimony regarding the estimates that are clearly based on hearsay.

The trial court overruled Newland's objection.

Then, the State presented evidence from Sergeant and Deputy. When asked “how much would it cost to repair” the damage to Victim 2's vehicle, Sergeant stated: “Well into the four figures.” Newland did not object to this testimony.

The jury found Newland guilty of first-degree property damage, and he was sentenced accordingly by the trial court.

Newland timely appealed, asserting one point on appeal arguing that the trial court's erroneous admission of Victim 2's testimony on the issue of property damage was reversible error.

Standard of Review

“The circuit court ‘has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence during a criminal trial, and error occurs only when there is a clear abuse of this discretion.’ ” State v. Emery, 701 S.W.3d 585, 600 (Mo. banc 2024) (quoting State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Mo. banc 2019)). “The circuit court ‘abuses its discretion only if its decision to admit or exclude evidence is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.’ ” Id. (quoting Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 574). “On direct appeal, review is ‘for prejudice, not mere error.’ ” State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Mo. banc 2022) (quoting State v. Zink, 181 S.W.3d 66, 73 (Mo. banc 2005)). “Trial court error is not prejudicial unless there is a reasonable probability that the trial court's error affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 534 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting Zink, 181 S.W.3d at 73)).

Analysis

In his single point on appeal, Newland argues that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Newland's objection at trial and allowing Victim 2 to testify “as to what ‘people in the trade’ ” told him about the dollar estimate of the damage to his vehicle because the testimony was inadmissible hearsay.

“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted.” Wood v. State, 728 S.W.3d 416, 423 (Mo. banc 2026) (quoting State v. Taylor, 466 S.W.3d 521, 530 (Mo. banc 2015)). “Hearsay statements are inadmissible unless the statements fall under a recognized exception to the rule against hearsay.” State v. Mock, 738 S.W.3d 113, 123 (Mo. App. W.D. 2026) (quoting State v. Nytes, 711 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025)).

“In general, the admission of hearsay evidence against a defendant violates his right to confront the witnesses against him.” State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 648 (Mo. banc 1993). However, “[t]he improper admission of hearsay evidence requires reversal only if such evidence is prejudicial.” Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 535-36 (citation modified) (quoting Saint Louis Univ. v. Geary, 321 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Mo. banc 2009)).

The complaining party cannot be prejudiced by the allegedly inadmissible evidence “when the objectionable evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence that was admitted without objection and that sufficiently establishes essentially the same facts.” State v. Pulse, 725 S.W.3d 686, 695 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting State v. Wilson, 602 S.W.3d 328, 334 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)). “Cumulative evidence is additional evidence that reiterates the same point.” Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 536 (quoting Saint Louis Univ., 321 S.W.3d at 292).

Here, we need not decide whether Victim 2's testimony regarding the dollar estimate of damage to his vehicle is hearsay or not because admission of his testimony—even if inadmissible—could not result in reversible error.

Newland cannot establish reversible prejudice because the challenged testimony was cumulative to other testimony that was not objected to—both from Victim 2 and Sergeant—establishing the same facts on the relevant issue of the amount of damage to Victim 2's property necessary to sustain Newland's conviction.

Newland did not object to Victim 2's testimony on direct examination that it would cost $1,200 to $1,600 to repair the damage to his Jeep based on informal estimates he had received from customers of his who worked in the auto-body industry. Likewise, Newland did not object to Sergeant's testimony that the damage to Victim 2's Jeep would cost “well into the four figures.” Plainly, Victim 2's testimony on redirect examination was cumulative to Victim 2's direct examination testimony and Sergeant's testimony iterating the same point on the issue of damages to Victim 2's property. See State v. Sander, 682 S.W.3d 85, 96 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (“Sander cannot establish reversible error based on the store manager's testimony on redirect examination, when the store manager had offered exactly the same testimony on direct examination without objection.”).

Thus, even if Newland could establish that Victim 2's testimony during redirect examination was inadmissible hearsay, the State presented other substantial evidence (that was not challenged by Newland) at trial establishing that Newland caused over $750 in damage to Victim 2's property as was required to sustain Newland's first-degree property damage conviction. See State v. Ellis, 701 S.W.3d 647, 657-58 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (“The cumulative nature of the challenged hearsay evidence to the other substantial evidence supporting the jury verdict” precluded a finding that the defendant suffered reversible prejudice.). Because Newland cannot establish that he suffered reversible prejudice,⁴ his point on appeal fails.

Point I is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Pursuant to the directive of section 509.520.1(4) (Supp. IV 2025), we do not use the names of any victims in this opinion. All statutory references are to The Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as supplemented through July 31, 2023, unless otherwise indicated.

3.   See § 569.100.1(1) (“A person commits the offense of property damage in the first degree if such person ․ [k]nowingly damages property of another to an extent exceeding seven hundred fifty dollars[.]”).

4.   The State argues that because Newland failed to make a timely objection to Victim 2's testimony and failed to move to strike the testimony, his point on appeal is unpreserved and therefore only subject to plain error review. We need not decide that issue because our analysis would be substantially the same on plain error review. See State v. Hendricks, 720 S.W.3d 254, 263 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (“[A]n allegedly wrongful admission of hearsay testimony does not constitute plain error if such testimony is merely cumulative to other evidence properly admitted.” (quoting State v. Goodwin, 43 S.W.3d 805, 818 (Mo. banc 2001))).

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge, concur.