LAURIE STAUS v. FEDERAL PROTECTION INC (2026)

Federal Protection, Inc. (“Appellant”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Pettis County (“trial court”) overruling its motion to set aside a default judgment in favor of Laurie Staus (“Respondent”). Appellant raises five points on appeal, arguing the trial court misapplied the law and abused its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion. Because Appellant did not seek to set aside the default judgment within the one-year time limit provided by Rule 74.05(d)¹ , the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's motion. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 28, 2024, Respondent filed a petition for damages against Appellant, alleging Appellant's negligent acts caused personal injuries to Respondent. Appellant was served on March 7, 2024, and the return of service was filed with the trial court on March 15, 2024. Appellant failed to file an answer within 30 days after the service of the summons and petition pursuant to Rule 55.25, and Respondent moved for entry of a default judgment in favor of Respondent and against Appellant.²

Following a hearing, the trial court entered a default judgment against Appellant on May 15, 2024, awarding Respondent $5,250,000.00 in compensatory damages. On June 5, 2024, Respondent moved to amend the return of service for a second time ³ pursuant to Rule 54.22.⁴ Appellant asserted it was seeking the amendment “[t]o address any deficiency in the prior returns and to state facts showing that [the individual who received service] was a qualified person to receive service on behalf of [Appellant] under Missouri law ․ ”⁵ Appellant stated the motion was “merely meant to correct the return (memorialization) of service” and that “[t]here was never a defect in service on [Appellant], but, at most, a defect in the original return of service.”⁶ The trial court sustained Respondent's motion to amend the return of service, and the second amended return of service was filed on June 11, 2024, identifying the individual who received service on Appellant's behalf as the “person in charge of business office.”

On May 30, 2025, more than one year after the entry of the default judgment, Appellant moved to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 74.05(d) and Rule 74.06(b).⁷ Appellant argued, inter alia, that its motion was timely as the May 15, 2024, default judgment was “Not a Final Judgment for the purposes of Rule 74, or, at a minimum” did not become final until June 11, 2024. Appellant claimed that the trial court was without proper proof of service of process on Appellant until June 11, 2024, and thus, “at the earliest, the Court did not render a final judgment that disposed of all issues in the case until June 11, 2024,” making Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment timely. Appellant further asserted that, even if it had moved to set aside the default judgment outside the time-constraints of Rule 74.05(d) and Rule 74.06(c), the one-year limitation periods provided for by Rule 74.05(d) and Rule 74.06(c) violated Appellant's due process rights as applied in the instant case because Respondent “never notified [Appellant] of its motion for a default judgment or the hearing on that motion,” depriving Appellant of a “meaningful opportunity to file a motion to set aside the default judgment.” Alternatively, Appellant claimed the one-year limitation period should be equitably tolled because Respondent's “strategic delay in notifying [Appellant] of the default judgment amounts to a manipulation of Missouri's Rules of Civil Procedure” and constituted an “extraordinary circumstance” that “absent the application of equitable tolling, would prevent [Appellant] from asserting its rights to seek to have the default judgment set aside.”

The trial court held a hearing on Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment on June 10, 2025. Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment overruling Appellant's motion. The trial court rejected Appellant's contention that its May 15, 2024, default judgment was not the operative judgment, reasoning that the judgment “was a writing, signed by the court, denominated ‘judgment’ and filed on May 15, 2024.” The court noted that “[n]o amended judgment was entered following the filing of the amended return or the second amended return,” Appellant had “concede[d] that it was in fact served with a copy of the summons and petition on March 7, 2024,” and Appellant had not challenged the court's order granting Respondent's June 2024 motion to amend the return of service nor asserted that the second amended return of service was deficient in any way. Furthermore, the trial court explained that the “record reveals that there was never a defect in service, but, at most, a defect in the original and amended returns of service.” However, “[n]either the original nor the amended returns of service [were] facially defective, but instead merely failed to accurately reflect the manner in which service was properly made.”

Additionally, the trial court rejected Appellant's claim that the time-constraints of Rules 74.05(d) and 74.06(c) violated its due process rights. The trial court reasoned that because Appellant, by its own admission, had received proper service of process, “[Appellant's] receipt of a copy of the summons and petition sufficiently afforded it due process.” Finally, the trial court found equitable tolling was not warranted under the circumstances “because the fault for missing the deadlines imposed by Rules 74.05(d) and 74.06(c) are more directly attributable to [Appellant], who failed to timely plead or otherwise defend, which resulted in entry of the default judgment.”

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Appellant moved to set aside the default judgment pursuant to both Rule 74.05(d) and Rule 74.06(b).⁸ “Appellate courts review the judgment overruling the motion to set aside default judgment, not the default judgment itself.” Steele v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 688 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Mo. banc 2024). “A judgment overruling a Rule 74.05(d) motion to set aside a default judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 196-97. Likewise, “[w]e generally review a trial court's ruling on a Rule 74.06(b) motion for abuse of discretion.” Chick v. Moving Proz, LLC., 699 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024). “A [trial] court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration.” 4021 Iowa, LLC v. K&A Delmar Prop., LLC, 681 S.W.3d 309, 315 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, “while disposition on the merits is favored, this general policy must be carefully applied to the facts of each case in the interest of justice; for, the law defends with equal vigor the integrity of the legal process and procedural rules and, thus, does not sanction the disregard thereof.” Steele, 688 S.W.3d at 197 (internal quotations omitted).

Analysis

Appellant raises five points on appeal, arguing the trial court misapplied the law and abused its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment. Specifically, in Point I, Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding its May 30, 2025, motion to set aside the default judgment was not timely filed within one year of the default judgment. In Point II, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 74.05(d) because Appellant proved it had good cause for not filing a responsive pleading and had a meritorious defense to the claims raised. In Point III and Point IV, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment because Appellant was entitled to relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 74.06(b). In Point V, Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in overruling its motion to set aside the default judgment because the default judgment was entered in a manner inconsistent with due process.

Because our resolution of Point I and Point V—regarding the timeliness of Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment—guides our analysis of Point II, Point III, and Point IV, we address Point I and Point V first.

Point I

In Point I, Appellant claims the trial court misapplied the law in finding Appellant's May 30, 2025, motion to set aside the default judgment was not timely filed within one year of the entry of the default judgment. We disagree.

Rule 74.05(d) provides that a default judgment may be set aside “[u]pon motion stating facts constituting a meritorious defense and for good cause shown ․ ” Rule 74.05(d), however, provides a time limit for which such a motion may be filed, stating, “[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the entry of the default judgment.” (Emphasis added). Appellant moved to set aside the default judgment on May 30, 2025, more than one year after the entry of the default judgment on May 15, 2024. Nonetheless, Appellant claims the trial court did not have evidence of proper service of process on Appellant until the court granted Respondent's motion to amend the return of service on June 11, 2024, and thus, June 11, 2024, “became the date upon which the default became a ‘judgment’ triggering the one-year time limit for purposes of [Appellant's] Rule 74.05(d) and Rule 74.06(b) motion to set aside the default judgment.”

Rule 54.22(a) provides the trial court may, in its discretion, “allow any process, return or proof of service thereof to be filed or amended at any time unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued. The return of service shall be considered prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein.” In accordance with Rule 54.22(a), Respondent moved to amend the return of service on June 5, 2024, “[t]o address any deficiency in the prior returns and to state facts showing that [the individual who received service on Appellant's behalf] was a qualified person to receive service on behalf of [Appellant] under Missouri law.” Eagle Star Grp., Inc. v. Marcus, 334 S.W.3d 548, 555 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (“[A] return may be amended to conform to the facts.”). The trial court sustained Respondent's motion to amend the return, which it was authorized to do pursuant to Rule 54.22(a). See id. at 554-55 (explaining that the return of service could be amended to reflect the undisputed fact that service was made on a corporate officer as there was no defect in the service but rather the return of service “did not reflect proper service upon a corporation ․”).

It is immaterial that the trial court sustained the motion to amend the return after the date on which it entered the default judgment as “[t]he time when a return can be amended is not limited to before the judgment is entered; rather, it may be amended after judgment.” Christianson v. Goucher, 414 S.W.3d 584, 589 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013); Rule 54.22(a) (“The court may in its discretion allow any process, return or proof of service thereof to be filed or amended at any time unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued.”) (emphasis added). Furthermore, “[w]hen a return of service is amended, it relates back to the date of the return and is binding in its amended form.” Id. Indeed, it is the “service of process, not the return, [that] gives the trial court jurisdiction.” Id.⁹ ; see Kahn v. Mercantile Town Mut. Ins. Co., 128 S.W. 995, 997 (Mo. 1910) (“It was the service of the writ and petition upon the defendant, and not the return, that gave the trial court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The return was merely the evidence by which the court was informed that the defendant had been served.”).¹⁰

Appellant does not dispute that a copy of the summons and petition were left with an individual qualified to receive service on behalf of Appellant nor disputes that service of process was properly made. Moreover, Appellant does not argue the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the amendment of the return or that the amendment materially prejudiced Appellant. The second amended return “in no way changed actual service had upon [Appellant] but only correctly informed the trial court that [Appellant] was in fact properly served.” Id. at 590. Accordingly, the second amended return related back to the date of the original return and was “binding in its amended form.” Id.

The trial court entered the default judgment against Appellant on May 15, 2024. “Rule 74.05(d) specifies that the one-year limitation runs from the ‘entry of the default judgment,’ ” and we “must apply the plain language of a Rule as written, in the same manner courts evaluate statutes.” Gamez v. EasyEx MO Ofallon, LLC, 728 S.W.3d 907, 910 (Mo. App. E.D. 2026). No other judgment was entered nor was the judgment amended, and the subsequent amendment of the return of service to conform to the facts of the actual service had did not in any way alter the effect of the May 15, 2024, judgment. See Hagan v. Buchanan, 215 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (“We therefore hold that when a motion to set aside a default judgment is made more than one year after the default judgment was filed, denominated ‘judgment,’ and signed by the judge, the motion is untimely even if the judgment is not yet ‘final’ for all other purposes.”).

As such, Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment was due within one year of May 15, 2024, and the trial court did not err in finding Appellant's May 30, 2025, motion to set aside the default judgment was not timely filed.

Point I is denied.

Point V

In Point V, Appellant argues that even if its motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 74.06(b) was untimely, “the manner in which the default judgment was entered was in a manner inconsistent with due process and equitable tolling should apply to permit [Appellant] to seek relief from the default judgment.”¹¹

Due Process

Appellant claims the “manner in which the default judgment was entered was in a manner inconsistent with due process․” Specifically, Appellant contends “[fi]nding the one-year time-limit began to run on May 15, 2024, at a time before the trial court had evidence of proper service on [Appellant] would violate [Appellant's] due process rights and be inconsistent with the purpose[ ] of the one-year limit.” Appellant additionally alleges Respondent intentionally waited until May 21, 2025, to notify Appellant of the default judgment to prevent Appellant from seeking timely relief from the judgment.

We find Appellant was sufficiently afforded due process. We reiterate that Appellant does not challenge that it received proper service of process. In fact, in support of its motion to set aside the default judgment, Appellant attached an affidavit from the individual who received service on Appellant's behalf acknowledging that “[o]n March 7, 2024, [Appellant] was served with a copy of the summons and Petition.” “[P]roper service of process on a duly authorized agent of a named defendant is reasonably calculated to notify the defendant of the lawsuit, and is sufficient to afford due process.” Chick, 699 S.W.3d at 458; see also Christianson, 414 S.W.3d at 589 (“[S]ervice, not the return, establishes jurisdiction.”).

It is inconsequential that Respondent and the trial court failed to notify Appellant of the entry of the default judgment. Appellant does not contest that it failed to timely file a responsive pleading to Respondent's petition. Breckenridge Material Co. v. Enloe, 194 S.W.3d 915, 921 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006) (“It is the failure to file a responsive pleading that causes a party to be in default ․ ”). “When a party is served properly and fails to appear, as is undisputed here, the party faces the consequences of that failure.” Gamez, 728 S.W.3d at 910. “One such consequence is that the party is charged with notice of all future proceedings, including any judgment entered.” Id. As such, Appellant was not entitled to notice of the proceedings following its default, and the entry of the default judgment did not violate Appellant's right to due process.

Equitable Tolling

Appellant additionally asserts that equitable tolling should be applied to toll the deadline for filing a motion to set aside the default judgment under these circumstances. “The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a plaintiff to toll a statute of limitations where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the cause of action, or where the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or has raised the precise statutory claim in issue but has mistakenly done so in the wrong forum.” Adams v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 353 S.W.3d 668, 673 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). “Though it is traditionally a method for extending statutes of limitations, courts have also used equitable tolling to extend other statutory and administrative deadlines.”¹² Id. A party seeking equitable tolling carries the burden of establishing: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” Id.

Appellant fails to demonstrate that it had been pursuing its rights diligently and that “extraordinary circumstances” stood in its way. Appellant, by its own admission, received the summons and petition on March 7, 2024. Appellant asserts that after it was served, it “immediately forwarded the summons and petition to its liability insurer,” and, between March 8, 2024, and May 20, 2025, “was never provided notice by [Respondent] o[r] by the trial court of any proceeding that occurred thereafter.” Appellant, however, does not identify any action it took to pursue its rights diligently after forwarding the summons and petition to its insurer on March 7, 2024, until Respondent sought to collect on the default judgment 14 months after Appellant was properly served. Rather, Appellant argues it “assumed its [insurer] would timely and properly protect [Appellant's interests] in the [ ] action,” and claims it “immediately took action” by filing its motion to set aside the default judgment on May 30, 2025—more than one year after the entry of the default judgment. As Appellant had been properly served and failed to timely respond, it bears the consequences for its inaction.

Consequently, Appellant is not entitled to have the deadline for moving to set aside the default judgment equitably tolled. See Ross v. Union Pac. R. Co., 906 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Mo. banc 1995) (“Courts do not forgive late filings, however, where the fault for missing the statutory deadline is more directly attributable to the plaintiff.”).

Point V is denied.

Point II

In Point II, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Appellant's Rule 74.05(d) motion to set aside the default judgment because Appellant “proved it had good cause for not filing a responsive pleading ․ and it had a meritorious defense to the claims asserted by [Respondent] ․”

As explained above, Rule 74.05(d) permits the trial court to set aside the entry of a default judgment “[u]pon motion stating facts constituting a meritorious defense and for good cause shown” if such motion is “made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the entry of the default judgment.” (Emphasis added).¹³ Because we hold the trial court did not err in finding that Appellant failed to timely move to set aside the default judgment, we need not address whether Appellant “proved it had good cause for not filing a responsive pleading” and whether Appellant “had a meritorious defense” to the claims asserted by Respondent. See 4021 Iowa, LLC, 681 S.W.3d at 319 (explaining that because the court found the defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment was not made within a reasonable time—one of the three Rule 74.05(d) requirements—it need “not reach the other two prongs—good cause and a meritorious defense ․”).

Point II is denied.

Point III and Point IV

Similarly, in Point III and Point IV respectively, Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 74.06(b) because the trial court's judgment was irregular under Rule 74.06(b)(3) in that “no evidence of proper service was before the trial court until June 11, 2024,” and under Rule 74.06(b)(1), Appellant “proved the failure to timely respond to the summons was because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect ․”  ¹⁴

Rule 74.06(c), like Rule 74.05(d), required a motion alleging these grounds for relief from the judgment be brought “not more than one year after the judgment or order was entered.” As such, Appellant's motion was untimely under Rule 74.06(c), and we need not reach the merits of Appellant's arguments brought pursuant to Rule 74.06(b).

Point III and Point IV are denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All Rule references are to the Missouri Court Rules (2025). All statutory references are to RSMo 2016.

2.   Rule 74.05(a) provides, “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules, upon proof of damages or entitlement to other relief, a judgment may be entered against the defaulting party.”

3.   The return of service mistakenly indicated that the deputy left a copy of the summons and petition at “the dwelling house or usual place of abode” of Appellant—as would be done to obtain service on an individual, section 506.150.1(1)—rather than indicating that service was had on a corporation. Service on a corporation can be obtained “by delivering a copy of the summons and of the petition to an officer, partner, a managing or general agent, or by leaving the copies at any business office of the defendant with the person having charge thereof, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or required by law to receive service of process ․ ” § 506.150.1(3).On May 14, 2024, an amended return of service was filed to accurately reflect that the summons and petition were served on a corporation. The amended return included the same address that was on the original return—Appellant's principal place of business—and included the same name of the individual who was served on Appellant's behalf.

4.   Rule 54.22 permits a trial court to, in its discretion, “allow any process, return or proof of service thereof to be filed or amended at any time unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued.”

5.   The first amended return of service, filed May 14, 2024, failed to identify the position of the individual who received service on behalf of Appellant.

6.   Respondent's motion reiterated that “[t]he second amended return in no way changes actual service had upon [Appellant] but only correctly informs the court that [Appellant] was in fact properly served.”

7.   Rule 74.05(d) provides that a motion to set aside a default judgment “shall be made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the entry of the default judgment.”

8.   Appellant's memorandum in support of its motion to set aside the default judgment alleged, in pertinent part, that Appellant was entitled to relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 74.06(b)(1) based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” and Rule 74.06(b)(3) because the judgment was “irregular.” The Missouri Supreme Court, however, has instructed that Rule 74.06(b)(1) is not a proper avenue to seek relief from a default judgment. Steele v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 688 S.W.3d 192, 199 n.12 (Mo. banc 2024). Steele clarified that “Rule 75.01 [providing that a trial court may vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its judgment within 30-days of entry of the judgment for good cause] does not provide an end-run around express provisions of Rule 74.05(d) governing independent actions to set aside default judgments and requiring the defaulting party to show good cause and a meritorious defense,” and for the same reasons, a party cannot seek to set aside a default judgment pursuant to Rule 74.06(b)(1). Id. at 199, 199 n.12. The Missouri Supreme Court noted, however “[t]his does not mean a defaulting party cannot move to set aside a default judgment pursuant to other provisions of Rule 74.06 that do not involve the defaulting party's conduct in failing to answer or otherwise defend,” including a motion pursuant to Rule 74.06(b)(3). Id. at 199 n.12.Accordingly, our review of Appellant's arguments brought pursuant to Rule 74.06(b) are limited to those seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 74.06(b)(3), which also carries a one-year limitation during which a motion for relief from the judgment must be brought. Rule 74.06(c).

9.   In Christianson, the appellant/defendant argued the trial court erred in permitting the respondent/plaintiff to correct deficiencies in the process server's original return and then denying the appellant/defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment. 414 S.W.3d at 588. The appellant/defendant asserted that respondent/plaintiff's failure to comply with the return of service requirements deprived the court of jurisdiction to issue any rulings in the case. Id. This Court rejected the appellant/defendant's arguments, explaining that a defect in the original return of service did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction and a return of service may be amended before or after the entry of the default judgment to conform to the facts. Id. at 589-90.Appellant asserts Christianson is inapplicable to the instant case as Appellant “did not argue the trial court never had personal jurisdiction” and instead argued “the one-year time-limit to file a Rule 74.05(d) or 74.06(b) motion is triggered when the last issue raised by plaintiff is decided presenting the court with evidence of proper service ․” We find Christianson’s reasoning instructive. Because the return of service may be amended after the date of the judgment to conform to the facts of the actual service had—proper service that established the trial court's jurisdiction over the party—the amendment of the return to conform to those facts, consequently, does not affect the finality of the judgment.

10.   In Christianson, we rejected a defendant's claim that “the defective original return [of service] in th[at] case deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction,” in reliance on “Missouri Supreme Court cases that hold that service, not the return, establishes jurisdiction.” 414 S.W.3d at 589. Nonetheless, we are aware that certain cases have suggested that “[i]f the sheriff's return ‘is deficient on its face, the court acquires no jurisdiction over the party allegedly served.’ ” Marti v. Concrete Coring Co. of N. Am., 630 S.W.3d 920, 922 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (citation omitted). However, notwithstanding any such statements in decisions of this Court, we are required by Article V, section 2 of the Missouri Constitution to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court, and we do so here.

11.   Respondent asserts Point V is impermissibly multifarious in violation of Rule 84.04(d). In Point V, Appellant raises two distinct claims of error: (1) that the default judgment should be set aside because it was entered in a manner inconsistent with due process; and (2) that equitable tolling should apply to extend the statutory deadline. Kirk v. State, 520 S.W.3d 443, 450 n.3 (Mo. banc 2017) (“A point relied on violates Rule 84.04(d) when it groups together multiple, independent claims rather than a single claim of error ․”). “Multifarious points relied on are noncompliant with Rule 84.04(d) and preserve nothing for review.” Id. Although we are not obligated to address a multifarious point, we prefer to resolve cases on their merits and may do so when “we can readily discern and separate the independent claims of error asserted in the point.” Crisp v. Mo. Sch. for Deaf, Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 681 S.W.3d 650, 659 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). We find that Appellant's point provides this Court and Respondent adequate notice of the issues raised. Thus, we exercise our discretion to address the merits of Appellant's point relied on.

12.   Appellant does not provide precedent demonstrating that equitable tolling has been applied to toll the deadline for setting aside a default judgment. We need not determine whether equitable tolling is an appropriate remedy to extend the deadline for filing a motion to set aside a default judgment as we find Appellant was afforded sufficient notice in this case and, nonetheless, failed to timely respond. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to its requested relief.

13.   Here, the trial court did not determine whether Appellant's motion stated facts showing good cause and meritorious defense as it found Appellant's motion was untimely.

14.   In Point IV, Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment because Appellant “proved the failure to timely respond to the summons was because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” pursuant to Rule 74.06(b)(1). As explained above, even if Appellant had timely filed its motion to set aside the default judgment, this argument would fail as Rule 74.06(b)(1) is not a proper avenue to seek relief from the entry of a default judgment involving “the defaulting party's conduct in failing to answer or otherwise defend.” Steele, 688 S.W.3d at 199 n.12.

Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

All concur.