IN RE: the Marriage of: Andrew John ROTTINGHAUS (2026)

Andrew John Rottinghaus (“Husband”) appeals from the trial court's Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage (“Judgment”) dissolving his marriage to Kelly Ann Rottinghaus (“Wife”). Husband raises two points on appeal, arguing the trial court erred in 1) dividing assets owned by a limited liability company between the spouses and 2) ordering Wife to transfer registration of an asset owned by a limited liability company to Husband. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History 1

Husband and Wife were married in September 2012. The parties separated in March 2022 and Husband filed his petition for dissolution of marriage in May 2022. Trial was held in December 2024 and the trial court subsequently entered its Judgment dissolving the marriage and dividing the parties’ property. The issues raised on appeal revolve around an aviation company known as Sky Magic, LLC (“Sky Magic”) and a 1975 Piper Seneca aircraft (“Airplane”).

Husband created Sky Magic in 2006. Wife never became a member of Sky Magic. Sky Magic purchased the Airplane in 2021. The Airplane was purchased with $72,000 from funds held in an account in Wife's name, which held the proceeds of sold marital real estate, and $8,000 on a credit card. After purchase, improvements were made to the Airplane that increased its value. All interest in Sky Magic was then sold by Husband in April 2022 to a third party (“Buyer”), in the month between the parties’ separation and Husband's filing of his petition for dissolution of marriage. The sole asset of Sky Magic at the time of sale was the Airplane. Buyer was known to Wife and a friend of Husband. Sky Magic was ostensibly sold to Buyer for $60,000, significantly less than its market value, given the Airplane had only recently been purchased for $80,000 after which improvements were made to the Airplane that increased its value. Husband testified Sky Magic was sold “on the cheap” because he was in immediate need of funds due to legal proceedings surrounding his aged father's care, though at the time of trial, the trial court found none of the purchase price had ever been paid to Husband by Buyer. Around this timeframe, unbeknownst to Husband, Wife took action with the Federal Aviation Administration to register the Airplane in her name in an effort to protect what she believed was a marital interest in it.

The trial court entered its Judgment in June 2025, issuing the following relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law:

23. [Husband] had a business known as [Sky Magic], a Missouri Limited Liability Company created on July 2, 2006. This business had one asset, [Airplane] purchased with funds paid by [Wife] in the amount $72,000; after improvements to the [A]irplane, [Wife] valued the [A]irplane at $165,000. [Wife] testified [Husband] had promised to pay her back the $72,000, but [Husband] never paid her back. [Husband] insured the [A]irplane for $120,000, and $120,000 is found to be the value of the [A]irplane. [Wife] is entitled to reimbursement from [Husband] for half the value of the [Airplane] which is $60,000.

24. On April 22, 2022, [Husband] sold [Sky Magic] to his friend for $60,000 and [Husband] has not been paid any of the sales price. The sale included the transfer of the [Airplane] to the Buyer and [Husband] testified the Buyer has possession of the [A]irplane. Based on [Husband's] relationship with the Buyer and upon testimony of [Wife], the Court has good reason to believe that after this dissolution is final [Sky Magic] may be transferred back to [Husband].

71. The credible evidence indicates that the value of the [Airplane] is $120,000, which is the value [Husband] placed on the [A]irplane for insurance purposes; this value shall be included in the division of assets.

The trial court's corresponding Judgment ordered Husband to reimburse Wife $60,000, which it described as half the value of the Airplane. The Judgment further ordered Wife to “take all action necessary to transfer registration of the [Airplane] to [Husband] within thirty (30) days of entry of the Judgment[.]”

Husband appeals. On appeal, Husband specifically states he does not challenge any of the trial court's factual findings.

Standard of Review

“We will affirm the trial court's judgment in a court-tried dissolution proceeding ‘unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.’ ” Kaderly v. Kaderly, 656 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting Reichard v. Reichard, 637 S.W.3d 559, 569 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021)). “In considering whether the trial court erroneously declared or misapplied the law, we defer to the trial court's factual determinations but otherwise review the trial court's legal conclusions and application of the law to the facts de novo.” Gilbert v. Chrismer-Still, 697 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (quoting McLeod v. McLeod, 681 S.W.3d 215, 228-29 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). “We do not retry the case, rather we accept as true the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and disregard contradictory evidence.” Janet v. Janet, 638 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting McCallum v. McCallum, 128 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003)). “This Court does not review credibility determinations or resolutions of conflicting evidence.” Lollar v. Lollar, 609 S.W.3d 41, 46 (Mo. banc 2020) (citing In re Marriage of Patroske, 888 S.W.2d 374, 383 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994)).

Analysis

Husband raises two points on appeal, both arguing the trial court misapplied the law in its disposition of Sky Magic and its Airplane.

Point I

In Point I, Husband argues the trial court misapplied the law in ruling the Airplane owned by Sky Magic was “value that had to be divided among other marital assets.” Husband reasons that because the trial court identified the Airplane as the property of Sky Magic, it was erroneous to order him “to ‘reimburse’ [Wife] for half the value of [Airplane] as part of the ‘division of assets.’ ” Wife counters that the trial court did not err in ruling the Airplane's value was an asset to be divided because marital funds were used to purchase the Airplane and thus increased the value of Sky Magic, which gave Wife a marital interest in Sky Magic.

Before addressing the crux of Husband's point, we first note that Husband liquidated Sky Magic before trial and, at the time of trial, the trial court found Husband had not received any of the sale proceeds. Thus, neither Sky Magic, the Airplane, nor the proceeds from their sale were available for division at the time of trial. “[A]s a general rule, the appropriate date for valuing marital property in a dissolution proceeding is the date of trial.” Schubert v. Schubert, 366 S.W.3d 55, 72 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 108 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003)). “[I]f a marital asset does not exist at the time of trial, the court cannot value and include it in the division of marital property.” Reichard v. Reichard, 637 S.W.3d 559, 577 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting Martin v. Martin, 504 S.W.3d 130, 135-36 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016)). “One exception to this rule occurs when ‘a party has intentionally secreted or squandered a marital asset in anticipation of the marriage being dissolved.’ ” Gilbert, 697 S.W.3d at 560 (quoting Reichard, 637 S.W.3d at 578). “Further, where a party has intentionally secreted or squandered an asset in anticipation of divorce, the trial court may hold that party liable for the value of the asset by awarding it to the party.” McGowan v. McGowan, 43 S.W.3d 857, 866 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001) (citing S.L.J. v. R.J., 778 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. App. E.D.1989)). “A trial court does not have to specifically find that it believes monies have been secreted or squandered in anticipation of divorce, because its actions can imply such a conclusion where sufficient evidence exists to support the conclusion.” Schubert, 366 S.W.3d at 72 (citing McGowan, 43 S.W.3d at 866). “Once it [has] been established that Husband squandered assets, the trial court [has] substantial discretion in determining the precise amount of squandered assets attributable to Husband.” Pickering v. Pickering, 314 S.W.3d 822, 832 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (citing Farnsworth, 108 S.W.3d at 841-42).

Here, though the trial court did not specifically identify the marital interest in Sky Magic as secreted or squandered in anticipation of divorce, its actions imply such a conclusion and sufficient evidence exists to support the conclusion such that the trial court could hold Husband liable for its value. The trial court found Husband sold Sky Magic to a “friend.” The trial court heard testimony that Husband sold Sky Magic to Buyer in April 2022—one month after his separation from Wife and the month prior to filing his dissolution petition. Husband testified Sky Magic was sold because he needed the funds. Yet, the trial court found at the time of trial Husband had received no payment from Buyer; this, more than two and a half years after the purported sale. Wife testified she knew Buyer and was aware that when Buyer and his wife separated, assets were moved to an airport to be hidden from Buyer's wife. In fact, the trial court found that, “Based on [Husband's] relationship with the Buyer and upon testimony of [Wife], the Court has good reason to believe that after this dissolution is final [Sky Magic] may be transferred back to [Husband].” Further, Husband testified he has a rental agreement with Buyer to use the Airplane. Moreover, Husband admitted he sold Sky Magic “on the cheap,” for $60,000, ostensibly due to the immediacy of his financial need, even though he testified at trial that he believed the Airplane to be worth $80,000.

It is evident the trial court possessed sufficient evidence to find that Husband was attempting to secrete or conceal assets in anticipation of divorce. The trial court therefore could have considered any marital interest in Sky Magic notwithstanding the sale of Sky Magic prior to the date of trial. “If a party secretes property in anticipation of a divorce, the court may order reimbursement.” Schubert, 366 S.W.3d at 72 (citing Calia v. Calia, 624 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Mo. App. W.D. 1981)).

Here, the trial court properly awarded Wife funds representing the value of her marital interest in Sky Magic. In distributing marital property, Section 452.330.1 ² instructs the trial court to first “set apart to each spouse such spouse's nonmarital property.” Kaderly, 656 S.W.3d at 340 (quoting § 452.330.1). Second, the trial court must “divide the marital property and marital debts in such proportions as the court deems just.” Id. (quoting § 452.330.1). “Any increase in the value of [nonmarital] property is marital property if marital assets or marital labor contributed to acquiring that increase.” Fox v. Fox, 552 S.W.3d 777, 788 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (quoting Selby v. Selby, 149 S.W.3d 472, 484 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004)); see also § 452.330.2(5). Thus, “non-marital property may be characterized as marital property if evidence is presented that under the source-of-funds rule, a party is entitled to a portion of the non-marital property.” Torres v. Torres, 606 S.W.3d 168, 175 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (cleaned up); see also Beckham v. Beckham, 41 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (discussing the “source[-]of[-]funds” doctrine).

In Torres, our Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the value of the husband's interest in an LLC plumbing business, which was ongoing at the time he married his wife, had increased during the marriage as a result of marital efforts and funds. 606 S.W.3d at 175-77. As a result, the trial court properly classified that portion of the LLC's increase in value attributable to these marital contributions as marital property. Id. at 177. This conclusion was in part because the parties had purchased a building during the marriage using marital assets, which the husband's LLC then utilized as a warehouse and office. Id. at 172, 177.

Similarly, here, although the trial court did not articulate why it awarded Wife half the value of the Airplane, it could have easily made the legal conclusion that the value of Sky Magic increased during the marriage and that said increase was marital property. Husband formed Sky Magic in 2006, prior to the parties’ 2012 marriage, and Wife never acquired a formal membership interest in the LLC. Thus, the entity Sky Magic itself began as Husband's nonmarital property. See id. at 175 (citing § 452.330.2). However, the parties agree, and the trial court found, that Sky Magic purchased the Airplane for $80,000 during the marriage using $72,000 from Wife's account, which held funds from the sale of marital real estate, and $8,000 from a credit card. And, improvements were made to the Airplane that increased its value. Further, the trial court found the Airplane was the sole asset of Sky Magic, a finding which Husband does not challenge on appeal. Thus, the equity in Husband's non-marital entity could have been deemed marital property due to the use of marital funds and efforts for the acquisition and later improvement of Sky Magic's sole asset, the Airplane. See id. at 177; Rhodus v. McKinley, 16 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (affirming that husband created a “marital interest in his [farming] business to the extent that he used marital funds to increase the value of his separate property”). In short, the trial court could have awarded Wife an interest in Sky Magic had Husband not transferred Sky Magic prior to trial. It follows then, that Wife would have been entitled to a just share of the proceeds from its sale. See Kaderly, 656 S.W.3d at 342 n.6 (“Wife's interest in the corporation itself was liquidated upon the sale of its assets ․ and therefore subject to division if classified as marital property.”); Rhodus, 16 S.W.3d. at 618-19 (holding the trial court did not err in including the increase in husband's business’ value in his share of marital property and ordering him to execute a promissory note to wife for her share of the increase).

The trial court determined the value of the Airplane to be $120,000 because Husband insured the Airplane for that amount. This value was within the range of values estimated by the parties, with Husband estimating it was worth the purchase price of $80,000, and Wife estimating its value at $165,000. The entirety of this value may be classified as marital property because, as discussed, the Airplane—Sky Magic's sole asset—was acquired using marital funds and efforts. The trial court then made a just division of such value in its award to Wife of $60,000. This amount is representative of Wife's share of the marital interest in Sky Magic's increase in value. In sum, the trial court made sufficient findings to have found the value of Husband's interest in Sky Magic had increased during the marriage as the direct and sole result of marital funds and efforts and thus could have classified the entirety of such increase as marital property. See Torres, 606 S.W.3d at 175-77. Point I is denied.

Point II

In Point II, Husband argues the trial court misapplied the law by instructing Wife to transfer registration of the Airplane to Husband because the ruling granted relief “that no party requested over an asset that neither party controls.” He explains that he does not want to be associated with the Airplane because Wife may face liability for preventing Buyer from utilizing the Airplane, as it is not registered in Buyer's name, but Wife's. Husband asserts he may face liability from Buyer if the Airplane is transferred by the trial court to him, though he does not explain how.

First, Husband's Point states the trial court granted relief “no party requested.” Husband doubles down on this point in his appellate brief and argues his “requests for relief did not ask the trial court to compel [Wife] to transfer the [Airplane's] registration to any party.” These assertions are simply not supported by the record. At trial Husband agreed he was “asking the Court for an order that [Wife] immediately sign that [Airplane] over to [Buyer]” because Buyer was the rightful owner. Further, in Husband's proposed judgment he requested a ruling that “[Wife] shall be solely responsible for taking every action necessary, including executing all documents required to return title of said [Airplane] to its rightful owner, [Buyer] or [Sky Magic] within ten (10) days from the date of entry of the Judgment[.]” Thus, it is clear Husband contemplated the trial court's authority to transfer the Airplane's registration to someone, just not him. “[A] party cannot lead a trial court into error and then employ the error as a source of complaint on appeal.” In re Marriage of Cunningham, 571 S.W.3d 688, 695 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019) (quoting Sutton v. McCollum, 421 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013)); see also Torrey v. Torrey, 333 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (“That [h]usband may now have second thoughts or misgivings about what he specifically asked the court to do in his proposed judgment does not entitle him to a ‘do-over.’ ” (citation omitted)). “Thus, any error was invited and not subject to review on appeal.” Tycon Co. v. Tyson, 726 S.W.3d 707, 715 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

Further, Husband's Point states the trial court exercised control “over an asset that neither party controls.” In his briefing, Husband asserts the trial court lacked the authority to take any action regarding the Airplane because it was owned by Sky Magic. But again, Husband did not have this concern at trial as he requested the trial court to order Wife to transfer the Airplane to Buyer or Sky Magic. Yet, neither Buyer nor Sky Magic was a party to the dissolution proceeding. Husband did not join either of them as a party nor did either intervene. “Husband cannot raise the rights of third persons that are not parties to this proceeding.” Binkley v. Binkley, 725 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987); see also In re Marriage of Julian, 868 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994) (“Husband is precluded from raising the rights of third persons who are not parties to this proceeding.” (citation omitted)). Such third persons are still free to pursue any claims they have against Husband and Wife. Binkley, 725 S.W.2d at 912; Julian, 868 S.W.2d at 187. Point II is denied.

Conclusion

The Judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   All statutory references are to RSMo (2016), as supplemented through the date of the Judgment, unless otherwise indicated.

W. Douglas Thomson, Judge

All concur.