D.P.U., Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE (2026)

The Missouri Director of Revenue (Director) appeals the judgment of the Callaway County Circuit Court (circuit court) granting D.P.U.’s petition to expunge his criminal conviction for leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident in violation of section 577.060, RSMo 1986.¹ In one point on appeal, Director argues that the circuit court erred in granting D.P.U.’s petition for expungement in that his offense was ineligible for expungement under section 610.140.3(10) because D.P.U.’s prior offense was for a violation of state law regulating the operation of motor vehicles and he has been issued a commercial driver's license (CDL). We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1989, D.P.U. was convicted of the Class D felony of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident in violation of section 577.060, RSMo 1986. At the time of the offense and conviction, D.P.U. did not possess a CDL, nor was he required to possess a CDL.

In February 2005, D.P.U. obtained a Class A commercial driver's permit which expired later that same year. In August 2023, D.P.U was issued a Class A CDL which is not set to expire until August 2029.

In February 2025, D.P.U. petitioned the circuit court pursuant to section 610.140 to expunge his 1989 leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident conviction. Director filed a motion to dismiss the petition for expungement, arguing that D.P.U. was ineligible for expungement under section 610.140.3(10). Specifically, Director contended that D.P.U. was ineligible for expungement because he is and has been a holder of a CDL. Director's motion to dismiss was denied.

Evidence was heard on D.P.U.’s petition and the circuit court granted the request for expungement. Director appeals.

Standard of Review

When reviewing court-tried cases, we will affirm a trial court's judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Doe v. Mo. State Highway Patrol Crim. Recs. Repository, 474 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015). However, statutory construction is a question of law and, therefore, an appellate court's review is de novo, giving no deference to the circuit court's determination of law. Id.

Discussion

Director's sole point on appeal is that the circuit court erred in granting D.P.U.’s petition for expungement because his offense is ineligible for expungement under section 610.140.3(10) in that the offense was a violation of a state law regulating the operation of motor vehicles and D.P.U. has been issued a CDL.

Interpreting section 610.140.3(10) is the focus of our de novo review. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature's intent as reflected in the statute's plain language. Kehlenbrink v. Dir. of Revenue, 577 S.W.3d 798, 800 (Mo. banc 2019). “Words in a statute are not read in isolation but, rather, are read in the context of the statute to determine their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. Additionally, we presume that the legislature intended for “every word, clause, sentence, and provision of a statute [to] have effect” and meaning. Boles v. City of St. Louis, 690 S.W.3d 592, 600 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (citation omitted). We “must avoid statutory interpretations that are unjust, absurd, unreasonable, or render statutory language meaningless.” A.I.A.K. v. T.M.K., 695 S.W.3d 118, 127 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citation omitted). Statutory construction rules do not apply if a statute is unambiguous or, in other words, if its terms are “plain and clear to one of ordinary intelligence.” Kehlenbrink, 577 S.W.3d at 800 (citation omitted). We also note that remedial statutes, such as expungement statutes, should be liberally construed to promote their beneficial purpose. B.K. v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 561 S.W.3d 876, 879 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018).

The expungement of certain criminal records is governed by sections 610.130 to 610.145 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri. S.E. v. Dir. of Revenue, 737 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Mo. App. E.D. 2026). Section 610.130 provides the statutory framework for the expungement of “intoxication-related traffic offense[s].” Id. Section 610.140 allows for the expungement of other criminal records, subject to limitations. Id. Section 610.140.3 enumerates crimes that “shall not be eligible for expungement under th[e] section[,]” which includes “[a]ny violation of any state law or county or municipal ordinance regulating the operation of motor vehicles when committed by an individual who has been issued a [CDL] or is required to possess a [CDL] issued by this state or any other state[.]” § 610.140.3(10) (emphasis added).

Director argues that section 610.140.3(10) “categorically bars expungements of motor-vehicle offenses for any individual who has been issued a CDL, regardless of when the individual is issued the CDL or whether they currently possess a CDL.” Citing State v. Owen, 216 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007), Director contends that “this Court held that even if a petitioner relinquished their CDL before seeking expungement, the phrase, ‘any individual who has been issued a CDL’ meant that any individual who, at any point, held a CDL is ineligible for expungement of the specified offenses.” Director's interpretation of Owen and its application to section 610.140.3(10) is incorrect.

In Owen, this Court interpreted the statute which concerned the expungement of alcohol-related driving offenses.² The version of the statute at the time stated, in relevant part:

1. After a period of not less than ten years, an individual who has pleaded guilty or has been convicted for a first alcohol-related driving offense which is a misdemeanor or a county or city ordinance violation and which is not a conviction for driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and who since such date has not been convicted of any other alcohol-related driving offense may apply to the court in which he or she pled guilty or was sentenced for an order to expunge from all official records all recordations of his or her arrest, plea, trial or conviction. If the court determines, after hearing, that such person has not been convicted of any alcohol-related driving offense in the ten years prior to the date of the application for expungement, and has no other alcohol-related enforcement contacts as defined in section 302.525, RSMo, during that ten-year period, the court shall enter an order of expungement․

2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any individual who has been issued a [CDL] or is required to possess a [CDL] issued by this state or any other state. (Emphasis added.)

Id. at 228-29 (citing § 577.054).³

Owen pleaded guilty to driving with an excessive blood alcohol content and, thereafter, petitioned the court pursuant to section 577.054 to expunge the charge from his records. Id. at 228. Director filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Owen was ineligible for expungement because he had been issued and held a CDL until he surrendered it just before filing the petition for expungement. Id. Owen argued the language “has been issued” in the statute suggests the person is in current possession of a CDL. Id. at 229. On appeal, the focus of this Court's analysis was subsection 2 of section 577.054, which specifically stated that the “provisions of th[e] section shall not apply to any individual who has been issued a [CDL] or is required to possess a [CDL.]” Id. at 228-29. Accordingly, the only question before this Court was whether Owen was considered an individual who “has been issued” a CDL, when it was surrendered before he filed the petition for expungement. Id. at 229.

This Court found the words “has been issued” to mean that the person was issued a CDL at some point in the past and that the present possession of the CDL is irrelevant. Id. We further explained:

If the legislature had intended the phrase to apply to those currently holding [CDLs], it could have used the phrase “any individual who holds a [CDL]” or some similar phrasing. The legislature instead chose to use the phrase “any individual who has been issued a [CDL]” with no reference to whether or not that individual still possesses the license.

Id. at 230. Therefore, we held that Owen was not entitled to expungement of his alcohol-related driving offense. Id.

Here, Director argues that because sections 577.054 and 610.140 both contain the language “has been issued a [CDL],” the Owen analysis applies to D.P.U.’s case. Director, however, ignores two key distinctions between sections 577.054 and 610.140. First, and most obvious, section 577.054 only pertained to the expungement of alcohol-related driving offenses, whereas section 610.140 generally applies to “any crimes”⁴ subject to the limitations of subsection 3. By separating the procedures and limitations for expungements of intoxication-related driving offenses into section 610.130, we presume that the legislature intended for the expungement of such offenses to have a different standard than the expungement of other crimes under section 610.140. See Boles, 690 S.W.3d at 600 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (“This Court presumes the legislature intended that every word, clause, sentence, and provision of a statute have effect and [should] be given meaning.”). We recently noted that section 610.130.2 has “more stringent standards” for expungement, S.E., 737 S.W.3d at 861, which demonstrates the legislature's intent to differentiate the expungement standards for intoxication-related driving offenses from the standards for other crimes. The legislature's creation of more stringent expungement standards in section 610.130.2 is similar to its creation of a stricter blood alcohol concentration limit for CDL holders, thus, demonstrating an intent to hold individuals with CDLs to a higher standard when dealing with intoxication-related driving offenses. See § 302.700.2(18)(e) (defining “driving under the influence of alcohol” for drivers of noncommercial vehicles over twenty-one years old as a blood alcohol content of 0.08 or more versus 0.04 or more for drivers of commercial vehicles).

Second, sections 577.054 and 610.140 are distinct because the statutory language concerning the CDL-specific limitation has a key difference. In section 577.054.2, the CDL limitation states that the provisions of the section “shall not apply to any individual who has been issued a [CDL] or is required to possess a [CDL.]” Section 577.054 lacked a temporal modifier connecting the issuance of the CDL to the time the offense was committed and, in effect, it is evident that the legislature intended for anyone who has been issued a CDL—before or after the offense—to be ineligible for expungement. See Owen, 216 S.W.3d at 229.

In contrast, the CDL limitation in 610.140.3(10) makes “[a]ny violation of any state law or county or municipal ordinance regulating the operation of motor vehicles when committed by an individual who has been issued a [CDL] or is required to possess a [CDL] issued by this state or any other state” ineligible for expungement. (Emphasis added.) Section 610.140.3(10) includes the additional language “when committed by,” where “when” serves as a conjunction meaning “at or during the time that.” When, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/when (last visited Aug. 18, 2026). See Fin. Sols. & Assocs. v. Carnahan, 316 S.W.3d 518, 527-28 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“[W]hen a definition is not present in the statute, the plain and ordinary meaning is derived from the dictionary.”). The legislature's inclusion of the phrase “when committed by” must be given effect because we presume that “the legislature did not insert idle verbiage or superfluous language in a statute.” Treasurer of State v. Penney, 710 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Mo. banc 2025) (citation omitted). Therefore, under a plain and ordinary reading of section 610.140.3(10), the statute requires that the violation of state law or county or municipal ordinance regulating the operation of motor vehicles occurred at or during the time that the offender possessed a CDL. In short, the Owen analysis is inapplicable given that D.P.U.’s conviction of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident was not an intoxication-related driving offense, and, therefore, section 610.130 is not the applicable expungement statute for this case.

Director also incorrectly relies on L.F.W. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Criminal Records Repository, 585 S.W.3d 846 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019), to argue that section 610.140.3(10) applies to individuals who have ever been issued a CDL, regardless of when the license was issued or whether the individual later surrendered the license. L.F.W. was operating a commercial vehicle when the Missouri State Highway Patrol issued him three citations. 585 S.W.3d at 848. L.F.W. held a CDL on the date the citations were issued, and all three citations noted that L.F.W. had a CDL. Id. The trial court ordered L.F.W.’s criminal records in all three cases to be expunged and the State appealed, arguing L.F.W. was ineligible for expungement because he possessed, or was required to possess, a CDL when he committed the motor vehicle offenses. Id. at 848-49. On appeal, L.F.W. did not dispute that he possessed a CDL, but instead argued that there was no evidence before the trial court of his driver's license status because the State did not introduce the citations into evidence nor did they seek testimony from L.F.W. Id. at 851. There was no discussion or argument regarding the timing of the violation versus the timing of possession of the CDL. The Southern District concluded that the trial court should have dismissed the expungement petition in one of the cases, L.F.W.’s failure to register a nonresident commercial motor vehicle, because L.F.W. had been issued a CDL.⁵ Id. at 848, 852.

In footnote 9, which Director cites in support of its argument before this Court, the Southern District discussed Owen, stating that the phrase “who has been issued a [CDL] or is required to possess a [CDL]” appears in both sections 610.130 and 610.140. Id. at 850 n.9. Yet the Southern District failed to acknowledge or discuss that section 610.140 contains the additional language “when committed by.” Then, the Southern District seemingly equates L.F.W.’s case to Owen, stating “[s]imilarly, L.[F.]W.’s status of having a CDL renders his criminal records in [the first case] ineligible for expungement.” Id. Importantly, Owen, unlike L.F.W., interpreted section 577.054—now section 610.130—which is more stringent than section 610.140, as discussed supra. Thus, while it is true that both Owen's and L.F.W.’s status of having a CDL rendered them ineligible for expungement under the applicable expungement statute, L.F.W. was ineligible under section 610.140 only because he committed the offense when he possessed the CDL whereas Owen was ineligible under 577.054 because he had a CDL at one time. See id. at 852. And when comparing L.F.W. and D.P.U., who both sought expungement under section 610.140, D.P.U. acquired a CDL approximately fourteen years after he committed the relevant offense. L.F.W.’s and D.P.U.’s difference in CDL status when the offense was committed is a crucial distinction that makes Director's reliance on L.F.W. misplaced.

Last, Director argues that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act (the Act) further supports Director's interpretation of section 610.140.3(10). The purpose of the Act is to ensure federal and state governments “work in partnership to establish programs to improve motor carrier, commercial motor vehicle, and driver safety to support a safe and efficient transportation system[.]” 49 U.S.C. § 31100. Director argues that because 49 U.S.C. § 31311(a)(19) prohibits “violations to be withheld or masked in any way from the record of an individual possessing a commercial driver's license,” Director's interpretation of section 610.140.3(10) would show clear legislative intent to comply with federal law by making individuals with CDLs ineligible for expungement, regardless of when the individual is issued the CDL and when the violation occurred. We disagree.

As D.P.U. notes, section 610.140 expressly preserves access to expunged records for law enforcement and to ensure compliance with federal employment restrictions. See § 610.140.10, 610.140.13. Section 610.140.13 specifically states that nothing in the section “shall be construed to limit or impair in any way the subsequent use of any record expunged under this section of any arrests or findings of guilt by a law enforcement agency, criminal justice agency, prosecuting attorney or circuit attorney, including its use as a prior crime.” Interpreting section 610.140.3(10) to allow for the expungement of D.P.U.’s offense because it occurred before he possessed a CDL complies with federal anti-masking requirements because such records are still accessible by the relevant government agencies. See also In re J.S., 48 N.E.3d 356, 359, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (ordering Indiana circuit court to amend its order, which expunged a misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated conviction committed by a CDL holder, to allow the bureau of motor vehicles to disclose the conviction to the CDLIS as required by federal and state law).

Director's sole point on appeal is denied.

Conclusion

The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All other statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as updated, unless otherwise noted.

2.   In 2007 when Owen was decided, the relevant statute regulating the expungement of alcohol-related driving offenses was section 577.054. See State v. Owen, 216 S.W.3d 227, 228 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007). Section 577.054 has since been transferred to section 610.130. Additionally, the statute's language has been amended post-Owen, with section 610.130 more broadly including intoxication-related traffic or boating offenses.

3.   References to section 577.054 are to the RSMo Cum. Supp. (2005).

4.   Section 610.140.1(2) defines “crime” as “any offense, violation, or infraction of Missouri state, county, municipal, or administrative law[.]”

5.   In L.F.W.’s two other cases, the expungements were filed prematurely before the expiration of the three-year waiting period required by section 610.140.5(1). L.F.W. Mo. State Highway Patrol Crim. Recs. Repository, 585 S.W.3d 846, 854 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019). For those two cases, the Southern District stated that dismissal was required and it reversed the judgment expunging those offenses. Id.

Janet Sutton, Presiding Judge

Lisa White Hardwick and W. Douglas Thomson, JJ. concur.