GATES v. STATE (2026)

Introduction

Christopher L. Gates (Gates) appeals the judgment denying his Rule 29.15 ¹ amended motion for post-conviction relief. Gates raises three points on appeal: (1) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move for dismissal on the grounds that Gates's right to a speedy trial was violated, (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to seek plain error review for the trial court's failure to dismiss sua sponte on the same grounds, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and request a mistrial when Gates appeared at his bench trial in an orange jumpsuit and restraints. Finding no error, we affirm the motion court's judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

Gates was arrested on June 15, 2019 and charged with murder in the first degree, armed criminal action, and resisting arrest. A series of delays caused by, inter alia, requests for continuances by the defense, joint requests from both the defense and the State, court scheduling issues, and COVID-19 resulted in Gates's trial being postponed until August 23, 2022, at which point Gates had been incarcerated for 1,166 days. Gates waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted on all counts after a bench trial. He was then sentenced to life without parole on Count I, 30 years on Count II, and 4 years on Count III, to be served consecutively. At no point did Gates assert his right to a speedy trial, nor move to dismiss the charges on that basis. Gates's convictions were upheld by this court on appeal in State v. Gates, 683 S.W.3d 726 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024).

Gates timely filed his pro se motion for postconviction relief on May 21, 2024, and appointed counsel filed an amended motion on April 17, 2025,² alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion court denied Gates's motion without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Our review of denial of a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief is limited to determining whether the motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Anderson v. State, 564 S.W.3d 592, 600 (Mo. banc 2018); Rule 29.15(k). “A judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Dorsey v. State, 448 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Mo. banc 2014) (internal quotation omitted). Claimed errors of law are reviewed de novo. Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 417 (Mo. banc 2024).

Discussion

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel and be eligible for post-conviction relief, Gates must satisfy the two-prong test laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Anderson, 564 S.W.3d at 600. Gates must prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) trial counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that reasonably competent counsel would exercise in a similar situation and (2) the movant was prejudiced by that failure.” Dorsey, 448 S.W.3d at 286-87 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Failure to satisfy either prong eliminates the need to consider the other, and the ineffective-assistance claim fails. Beck v. State, 637 S.W.3d 545, 552 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021).

To prove deficiency, Gates must “overcome the strong presumption that [trial] counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective.” Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 899 (Mo. banc 2013). Gates must show “specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance.” Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotation omitted). “No matter how ill-fated it may appear in hindsight, a reasonable choice of trial strategy cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 900.

“To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a movant must: (1) allege facts, not conclusions, that, if true, would warrant relief; (2) these facts must raise matters not refuted by the record and files in the case; and (3) the matters complained of must have resulted in prejudice to the movant.” Barnett v. State, 103 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Mo. banc 2003) (internal quotation omitted). If the record conclusively shows that movant is not entitled to relief, an evidentiary hearing is not required. Id. (citing Rule 29.15(h)).

Points One and Two: Speedy Trial

In Point One, Gates argues the motion court clearly erred by denying his Rule 29.15 motion because trial counsel failed to move for dismissal of all charges under section 545.780 ³ on the basis of his right to a speedy trial being violated. Because such motion would have been unlikely to succeed even if counsel had requested a speedy trial, because Gates has not identified a time when counsel should have made that request, and because Gates alleged no specific facts supporting a finding of prejudice, we affirm.

Analysis

“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to file a motion to dismiss for violation of the right to speedy trial, a movant must demonstrate that, had counsel filed such a motion, the trial court would have dismissed the case for failure to comply with speedy trial requirements.” Giammanco v. State, 416 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013). “[T]he speedy trial right exists primarily to protect an individual's liberty interest, to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial ․ and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” Sinks v. State, 699 S.W.3d 506, 513 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (alterations in original) (quoting State ex rel. McKee v. Riley, 240 S.W.3d 720, 728 (Mo. banc 2007)). “When assessing whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, the court must consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Id.

A. Length of Delay

The first factor, length of delay, is a threshold question: “[U]ntil there is a delay that is presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to inquire into the other factors.” Id. at 513–14 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Oliver, 655 S.W.3d 407, 416 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022)). Delay is measured from the time of defendant's arrest. Id. at 514. Missouri courts have held any delay longer than eight months presumptively prejudicial. Id. The time between Gates's arrest and trial, 1,166 days, was presumptively prejudicial, so we continue our inquiry and address the remaining factors.

B. Reasons for Delay

Deliberate attempts by the State to delay trial weigh heavily against it. Id. More neutral reasons, such as negligence or overcrowded courts, weigh against the State, but less heavily. Id. Delays attributable to Gates weigh heavily against him. Id. And delays attributable to neutral causes, including the COVID-19 pandemic and continuances requested jointly, are attributed to neither party. State v. Scherrer, 673 S.W.3d 899, 911 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).

Here, 71 days of delay are attributable to Gates alone, which weigh heavily against him. One-hundred thirty-four days are the result of joint requests. Sixty-three days are attributable to COVID-19. As to the remaining 898 days, while they would typically weigh against the State, those delays are attributable to court scheduling so they carry less weight.

C. Gates's Assertion of His Right

While there is no rigid requirement that a defendant assert the right to a speedy trial, “failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Gates concedes that he did not assert his right to a speedy trial. Though Gates argues that trial counsel's failure to assert that right is part and parcel of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Gates has also not identified when trial counsel should have made that request. The absence of such factual allegations makes it “indiscernible whether the trial court would have granted a motion to dismiss.” Sinks, 699 S.W.3d at 514. The lack of both a request for a speedy trial by trial counsel and an identification of when one should have been made weigh heavily against Gates.

D. Prejudice

“Whether delay resulted in prejudice to the defendant is the most important factor.” State v. Estes, 659 S.W.3d 655, 662 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (internal quotation omitted). The defendant has the burden of demonstrating prejudice, and prejudice must be “actual or apparent on the record, or by reasonable inference, while speculative or possible prejudice is not sufficient.” State v. Wright, 551 S.W.3d 608, 620 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). “We consider (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limitation of the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Sinks, 699 S.W.3d at 514. “The third consideration is the most serious.” Id.

Gates has made no concrete, specific allegations of prejudice; only that the “dead time” he spent in jail is prejudicial in and of itself. Gates cites to Barker for the proposition that such pretrial incarceration can be prejudicial, but Gates offers no specific example of how he was actually prejudiced other than deprivation of his freedom. Missouri courts have found that, absent specific facts, a “general claim of prejudice based upon the length of [ ] incarceration establishes only minimal prejudice.” State v. Smith, 491 S.W.3d 286, 307–08 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). Without any specific claim that Gates's detention was unusually oppressive, caused extraordinary anxiety, or—most importantly—impaired his defense, his burden has not been met.⁴ See id. at 308.

Finally, we note the motion court's finding that a motion to dismiss would likely have been overruled. That finding is entitled to special deference where, as here, “the PCR judge and the trial judge are the same.” Goodwater v. State, 560 S.W.3d 44, 55 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). Gates's insistence that the motion court clearly erred by finding that the trial court would have overruled a motion to dismiss is particularly unpersuasive.

We conclude that Gates has demonstrated neither deficiency nor prejudice. He has made no showing that a motion to dismiss had a reasonable chance of success (nor has he identified when trial counsel should have asserted the right to a speedy trial in the first place), and the decision not to file a pointless motion was reasonable. “It follows, therefore, that appellate counsel was also not ineffective for not raising this meritless claim on appeal.” Sinks, 699 S.W.3d at 515. The record clearly establishes Gates was not entitled to relief, and the motion court did not commit error denying Gates's claims without an evidentiary hearing. See Barnett, 103 S.W.3d at 769. Points One and Two are denied.

Point Three: Restraints

In Point Three, Gates argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and request a mistrial when Gates appeared at trial wearing an orange jail uniform and restraints. Because Gates has alleged no specific facts showing actual prejudice, we affirm.

Analysis

Gates argues that trial counsel should have objected and moved for a mistrial when he appeared at trial in shackles. “The use of [cuffs or other personal restraints] in courtrooms during hearings is discouraged and, absent some good reason for their use, they should not be used even though the hearing is before the court alone and not a jury.” Russell v. State, 494 S.W.2d 30, 38 (Mo. 1973). Gates's citation to Russell for this proposition is entirely reasonable. But his implication that this passage alone entitles him to prevail and supports a finding of prejudice is not only incorrect, but misleading. Russell continues:

In the instant case there is nothing to indicate that the restraints utilized caused any prejudice to movant, nor is there any indication that his questioning of witnesses and participating in the trial of the motion was inhibited by the restraints. The court holds that the use of restraints here did not cause the hearing to be fundamentally unfair.

Id. Gates has alleged no facts that distinguish this case from Russell. We defer to the motion court's finding that his alleged restraints “neither biased the court, nor interfered with [his] ability to participate in his defense.” Russell thus appears dispositive on this point.

Gates's allusions to the general prejudicial effect of being shackled before a trier of fact are equally unpersuasive. While the Supreme Court recognized in Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005), that a movant “need not demonstrate actual prejudice” where “a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury,” Gates himself concedes that proposition is specific to jury trials; thus, it has no application to Gates's bench trial. See Davidson v. State, 308 S.W.3d 311, 317 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (“[T]he prohibition on shackling during a trial is limited to restraints that are actually visible to the jury.”).

Finally, as above, “Special deference is given when the PCR judge and the trial judge are the same.” Goodwater, 560 S.W.3d at 55. The motion court's finding that Gates was not prejudiced is entitled to deference and Gates's failure to allege even a single specific contradictory fact is fatal to his argument. No evidentiary hearing was required. Point Three is denied.

Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the motion court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2022).

2.   Though filed untimely, the motion court granted Gates's motion to consider the amended motion timely filed. See Sanders v. State, 807 S.S.2d 493, 494-95 (Mo. banc 1991).

3.   All statutory references are to RSMo (2016).

4.   Gates's reference to statistical data linking pretrial detention to increased likelihood of conviction is exactly the kind of speculative, hypothetical prejudice addressed in Wright, and serves to highlight the lack of any readily discernable prejudice in this case.

Virginia W. Lay, Judge

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge, concurs. Philip M. Hess, Judge, concurs.