THORNBURY v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2026)

Samuel Thornbury appeals the judgment of the Cole County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for declaratory judgment. Thornbury presents four points on appeal. He claims that he is entitled to credit for time spent in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The judgment is affirmed.

Facts

In July 2024, Thornbury filed a petition with the Cole County Circuit Court. He sought a declaration of the correct calculation of his jail time credit. Thornbury contended that he was entitled to receive jail time credit as a matter of law. Thornbury's petition alleged the following:

June 2016: Thornbury was alleged to have brandished a gun as he robbed someone of their vehicle in Cass County, Missouri. That same day, he was alleged to have wrecked the stolen vehicle in Christian County, Missouri. Thornbury was detained in the Christian County Jail and charged in Christian County with receiving stolen property, unlawful possession of a firearm, and various other misdemeanors.

September 2016: Thornbury was charged in federal court with possession of a firearm. This indictment pertained to the firearm recovered from Thornbury in Christian County in June 2016.

October 2016: A federal arrest warrant was returned in relation to the federal indictment. Thornbury remained in the Christian County Jail pursuant to a United States Marshal's Service hold after the issuance of the federal indictment and arrest warrant. After the federal indictment was issued, Christian County dismissed the charges against Thornbury for the June 2016 offense.

June 2017: Thornbury was charged with first degree robbery and armed criminal action in Cass County for the June 2016 offense.

August 2017: Thornbury appeared for his federal sentencing. In the sentencing memorandum, the federal government sought a four point sentencing enhancement using the facts surrounding the June 2016 Cass County vehicle theft. With that enhancement, Thornbury's sentencing guidelines range was 77 to 96 months. Thornbury was sentenced to serve 84 months in the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

September 2017: Thornbury was transferred from the Christian County Jail to United States Penitentiary, McCreary to serve his federal sentence.

April 2018: Thornbury was delivered to Cass County to answer for the robbery and armed criminal action offenses.

December 2019: Thornbury was sentenced in Cass County to 10 years’ imprisonment for robbery and three years’ imprisonment for armed criminal action. He was returned to United States Penitentiary, McCreary to finish the remainder of his federal sentence.

August 2022: Thornbury's federal sentence expired. He was delivered to the Missouri Department of Corrections at that time for execution of his Cass County sentences.

The Missouri Department of Corrections determined that Thornbury's sentence commenced in December 2019 when his Cass County sentence was imposed. Thornbury was given credit for all time in prison, jail, or custody which accrued after December 2019.

In his petition for declaratory judgment, Thornbury argued he was entitled to 123 days, 417 days, 846 days, or 1,263 days jail time credit. Thornbury argued that the 123 days he spent in the Christian County Jail, from his June 2016 arrest through the October 2016 execution of the federal warrant, were for offenses that involved the vehicle he stole in June 2016 in Cass County and were, therefore, related to his Cass County offenses.

He argued that the firearm used to commit the Cass County robbery was the same firearm that formed the basis of his federal indictment. Thornbury claimed the 417 days he spent in the Christian County Jail, from his June 2016 arrest through his August 2017 federal sentencing, were for offenses that involved the firearm he used in the Cass County offenses and were, therefore, related to his Cass County offenses.

Thornbury stated the federal prosecutor used the Cass County robbery allegations to seek an enhancement to his federal sentence. Thornbury claimed the 846 days he spent in custody, from his August 2017 federal sentencing through his December 2019 Cass County sentencing, were directly related to his Cass County offenses. Finally, Thornbury argued the 1,263 days he spent in custody, from his June 2016 arrest through his December 2019 Cass County sentencing, were related to his Cass County offenses.

In August 2024, the Missouri Department of Corrections filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted. It argued that the Cass County prosecution of Thornbury did not begin until the June 2017 arrest warrant was issued. Thus, the time Thornbury spent in custody from his June 2016 arrest in Christian County through the June 2017 Cass County arrest warrant was not related to the Cass County offenses. It claimed that Thornbury's petition stated he was in pretrial detention for his federal court charge from June 2017 through August 2017. The Missouri Department of Corrections also argued that time Thornbury spent in custody between his August 2017 federal court sentencing and December 2019 Cass County sentencing was time Thornbury served his federal sentence and cannot also be credited toward the Cass County sentence.

In November 2024, Thornbury filed his response in opposition to the Missouri Department of Corrections’ motion to dismiss. He argued that his time in custody was “related” to his Cass County offense and, thus, he was entitled to credit. In December 2024, the court entered judgment finding that Thornbury was not entitled to credit and granting the Missouri Department of Corrections’ motion to dismiss Thornbury's petition.

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews a circuit court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.” Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360, 365 (Mo. banc 2024). “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted is solely a test of the adequacy of the petition.” Id. at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). “When considering whether a petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court must accept all properly pleaded facts as true, giving the pleadings their broadest intendment, and construe all allegations favorably to the pleader.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The Court does not weigh the factual allegations to determine whether they are credible or persuasive.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Instead, this Court reviews the petition to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Missouri is a fact-pleading state.” Id. “The facts that must be pleaded are the ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts.” Id. “Ultimate facts are those the jury must find to return a verdict for the plaintiff.” Id.

“In deciding whether to dismiss a petition for declaratory judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the trial court is not to address the merits of the claim.” Mosby v. Precythe, 570 S.W.3d 635, 637 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). In its judgment, the lower court determined the merits of Thornbury's allegations. In so doing, the trial court implicitly acknowledged that he had stated a claim for declaratory relief. Id. Based on the judgment, the lower court essentially entered judgment on the pleadings rather than finding that Thornbury failed to state a claim for relief. “In the interest of judicial economy, we will consider whether the trial court reached the proper legal conclusion and could properly have entered such a judgment.” Id.

Analysis

Thornbury presents four points on appeal. Point I pertains to the 1,263 days jail credit he claims from his June 2016 arrest through the December 2019 Cass County Sentencing. Point II pertains to the 123 days jail credit Thornbury claims from his June 2016 arrest through the October 2016 execution of his federal arrest warrant. Point III pertains to the 417 days jail credit he claims from his June 2016 arrest through the August 2017 federal sentencing. In Point IV, Thornbury claims the lower court applied the wrong standard, did not accept Thornbury's pleaded facts as true, and improperly weighted and drew factual conclusions.

“[C]riminal statutes must be construed strictly against the [s]tate and liberally in favor of the defendant.” Mudloff v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 53 S.W.3d 145, 147 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When construing a statute, courts are to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used and give effect to that intent, if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 147-48 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 558.031, RSMo 2016,¹ states in relevant part:

1. A sentence of imprisonment shall commence when a person convicted of a crime in this state is received into the custody of the department of corrections or other place of confinement where the offender is sentenced. Such person shall receive credit toward the service of a sentence of imprisonment for all time in prison, jail or custody after the offense occurred and before the commencement of the sentence, when the time in custody was related to that offense, except:

(1) Such credit shall only be applied once when sentences are consecutive;

(2) Such credit shall only be applied if the person convicted was in custody in the state of Missouri, unless such custody was compelled exclusively by the state of Missouri's action; ․

“The purpose of section 558.031 undoubtedly is to eliminate the disparity of treatment between indigent defendants, who typically are in custody prior to sentencing, and non-indigents who typically are free on bond prior to sentencing.” Mudloff, 53 S.W.3d at 148 (internal quotation marks omitted). “This version of [t]he statute plainly allows such a credit for time spent in custody after the offense occurred and before the commencement of the sentence, when the time in custody was related to that offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

Thornbury's petition alleged that his time in custody was related to his Cass County offenses. Thornbury stated his Christian County offenses and federal offense involved the same vehicle and firearm as the Cass County offenses. Because of the shared facts, Thornbury stated in his petition that the time he spent in custody for the Christian County and federal offenses was related to his Cass County offenses.

“Time in custody is not ‘related to’ an offense if the prisoner would have been in custody regardless of the offense.” Farish v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 416 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Mo. banc 2013); see also Pettis v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 275 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (“Time in custody is generally ‘related to’ a sentence, and thus eligible for credit within the subsection, if the inmate could have been free from custody absent the charge.”); Belton v. Moore, 112 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (“Mr. Belton's second offense does not relate to his first offense in a similar manner. ․ [H]e would have been in custody serving the sentence on his first offense regardless of his arrest on the second one.”); Mudloff, 53 S.W.3d at 148 (holding time in custody serving sentence for prior Illinois conviction not “related to” time in custody awaiting trial for subsequent Missouri offense because “he was serving the sentence for his Illinois conviction and was not eligible for bail because of that conviction”).

In Priester v. Dept. Of Corrections, 119 S.W.3d 140, 140 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003), the defendant was on probation. A probation violation warrant was issued for defendant on the grounds that the defendant was accused of committing a murder and that the defendant possessed a gun. Id. The violation for possessing a gun was based on statements by the murder victim's children and the defendant's daughter. Id. The defendant's probation was revoked because he possessed a weapon. Id. at 141. The defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and armed criminal action. Id. The defendant sought jail credit, arguing that his probation revocation was “related to” his conviction for murder and armed criminal action. Id.

This court found that the probation revocation was not related to the murder and armed criminal action conviction. Id. at 142. “That authorities learned of his possessing a weapon while investigating the murder makes no difference.” Id. “Section 558.031.1 requires only that custody be related to the offense on which credit is sought.” Id. (emphasis in original). “ ‘It is not the relationship of the specific facts underlying two convictions ․ that is determinative of jail-time credit for purposes of section 558.031. Under section 558.031, it is to ‘the time in custody’ that the second conviction must be related.’ ” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Nixon v. Kelly, 58 S.W.3d 513, 518–19 (Mo. banc 2001)). Had the defendant “not been arrested, tried, and convicted of murder and armed criminal action, he would have been in custody because of the probation violation for possessing a weapon.” Priester, 119 S.W.3d at 142.

In Elliott v. Norman, 464 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015), the defendant “committed the Missouri offenses of first-degree assault, attempted first-degree robbery, and two counts of armed criminal action in St. Louis County (‘Missouri charges’).” Because the defendant “was in possession of a firearm, and was already a felon, he also committed the federal offense of felon in possession of a firearm (‘Federal charge’).” Id. This court reiterated that “[i]t is not the relationship of the specific facts underlying two convictions ․ that is determinative of jail-time credit for purposes of section 558.031.” Id. at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under section 558.031, it is to ‘the time in custody’ that the second conviction must be related.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even though the Missouri charges and the Federal charge arose from the same conduct, this court found that the defendant “is not entitled to jail-time credit for the time period he spent in Missouri jails following receipt of, and while serving, his federal sentence because that time was not related to his Missouri charges as a matter of law.” Id. at 235-36.

Thornbury's petition stated he was arrested and held in the Christian County jail for crimes allegedly committed in Christian County starting in June 2016. He was held in the Christian County jail on a United States Marshal's Service hold after the issuance of the September 2016 federal indictment. Thornbury was sentenced in the federal case in August 2017. He was transferred to a federal penitentiary in Kentucky in September 2017.

Thornbury's petition did not allege that he would have been out of custody if the Cass County case never existed. His petition stated that he was held in the Christian County jail for charges brought in Christian County for crimes allegedly committed in Christian County and for a federal charge that was for a crime distinct from any crimes allegedly committed in Cass County. Thornbury's custody in the Christian County jail was not related under § 558.031 to the offense he committed in Cass County. Contrast Goings v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 6 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. banc 1999) (defendant awarded jail-time credit on a stealing sentence for time spent serving an earlier sentence when the stealing offense was the reason his parole was revoked on the earlier sentence).

Thornbury's petition also stated that “in a sentencing memorandum filed by the government, the federal prosecutor sought a four point sentencing enhancement using the facts of the offenses surrounding the Cass County robbery of the stolen vehicle.” His petition stated that, “[m]inus the four point sentencing enhancement, however, Mr. Thornbury's sentencing guideline range would have been _.” He did not fill in the blank in his petition. He stated that “[t]he Cass County robbery was an offense underlying the enhancement to the calculation of Mr. Thornbury's federal sentence.” His petition stated that “[a] portion of the time Mr. Thornbury spent in federal custody after his federal sentencing was therefore directly ‘related’ to his Cass County offenses.”

Thornbury was sentenced in the federal case in August 2017. His petition stated that from September 2017 through April 2018, and from December 2019 through August 2022, Thornbury was in custody in Kentucky. Thornbury's petition alleged that some portion of his federal sentence was served while he was in custody in Missouri. This includes the month before he was initially transferred to Kentucky and the period he was brought back to Cass County (April 2018 through December 2019) to address the Cass County charges. Thornbury was sentenced in the Cass County case in December 2019. He remained in federal custody through August 2022. According to his petition, Thornbury was given credit on the Cass County sentence for the time he spent in federal custody from December 2019 through August 2022.

Section 558.031.1(2) states that “credit shall only be applied if the person convicted was in custody in the state of Missouri, unless such custody was compelled exclusively by the state of Missouri's action.” “[T]he plain meaning of the words in the final clause of subdivision (2) contemplates time in custody outside the state of Missouri unilaterally caused by the action of the state of Missouri.” Farish, 416 S.W.3d at 797. Thus, time in custody outside of the state of Missouri is not eligible for credit unless the out-of-state custody was compelled exclusively and unilaterally by the action of the state of Missouri.

“The [F]ederal Sentencing Guidelines became law in 1987.” U.S. v. Lucas, 101 F.4th 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2024). “One of the most important features of the original Guidelines was that sentencing within the Guidelines range was mandatory.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Sentencing law underwent a sea change with United States v. Booker, which rendered the Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory.” Id. (citing 543 U.S. 220, 264, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”)). The sentencing guidelines are advisory. Id. at 1662. The sentencing court applies a preponderance of the evidence standard when determining whether to apply a sentencing enhancement. Id.; see also State v. Fodrini, 570 S.W.3d 170, 176 n.7 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (“We note that different burdens of proof are required to support a sentence enhancement and a conviction. To support a federal sentence enhancement, the government is only held to a preponderance of the evidence standard, ․ whereas, the State has the burden of proving a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt․”).

Thornbury's petition stated that his federal sentence was enhanced based on the facts surrounding the vehicle theft in Cass County. It did not allege that his federal sentence was enhanced because of the State of Missouri's criminal charges against Thornbury in Cass County. As discussed, supra, the federal court learning of the facts underlying the Cass County offense is not dispositive. The federal court evaluated those facts using a preponderance of the evidence standard before Thornbury was ever brought to trial in the Cass County case.

In his first point on appeal, Thornbury argues that his petition stated a cause of action that he was entitled to 1,263 days jail credit from his June 2016 arrest through the December 2019 Cass County Sentencing. As discussed above, that argument is without merit and is denied. Thornbury's second and third point on appeal pertain to smaller time frames within the larger time frame of Point I. They are denied for the same reasons Point I is denied.

In his fourth point on appeal, Thornbury claims the lower court applied the wrong standard, did not accept Thornbury's pleaded facts as true, and improperly weighted and drew factual conclusions. Our analysis of Thornbury's petition has been de novo and has applied the correct standard. Thornbury was not entitled to relief based on the factual allegations in the petition. The fourth point is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “The relevant statute to consider is the one that was in effect at the time of [the defendant's] offenses, rather than his sentencing, unless the statute provides otherwise.” Vickers v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 706 S.W.3d 297, 302 n.8 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (citing State ex rel. Nixon v. Kelly, 58 S.W.3d 513, 518 (Mo. banc 2001) (refusing to apply a revised version of § 558.031, where the amendment occurred between the defendant's offenses and his sentencing for those offenses)). While § 558.031 has been amended multiple times throughout the years, the same version was in effect from 1995 through December 31, 2016. Thornbury's offenses occurred in June 2016; that is the applicable version of § 558.031.

Anthony Rex Gabbert, Chief Judge

All concur.