IN RE: the Marriage of: John B. CADWALADER (2026)

Melissa Cadwalader (“Wife”) appeals the trial court's judgment dissolving her marriage with John Cadwalader (“Husband”). Wife argues that a provision in the judgment ordering Husband to designate her as the surviving beneficiary of his military retirement benefits was indefinite and therefore unenforceable. Wife further contends that the trial court erred in finding that Husband satisfied his obligations under a pendente lite order and that he was thereby not in contempt. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background 1

Husband and Wife married in July 2003 and separated in March 2022. Shortly after the separation, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Wife filed an answer and counterpetition for dissolution of marriage. The trial court entered a temporary order to limit spending to necessities during the pendency of the case to prevent the depletion of marital assets. Husband and Wife had three children during the marriage. However, at the time of their dissolution filings, only one was an unemancipated minor child (“Child”).

Wife filed an application for pendente lite orders regarding child support, maintenance, attorneys’ fees, and court costs in January 2023. Husband opposed the application for pendente lite orders. The trial court appointed a special master to consider the application for pendente lite orders. In April 2023, the special master issued a report finding that Wife should receive $1,423 in temporary child support, $10,626 per month in temporary maintenance, and $35,000 in interim attorney fees.

Husband filed objections to the special master's report, asserting that the special master overstated Husband's monthly income, understated Wife's income, and required Husband to pay more than he was able. The trial court held a hearing on the objections. The trial court then entered a pendente lite order in August 2023, which adopted most of the special master's findings. The pendente lite order directed Husband to pay Wife $1,423 per month in retroactive temporary child support from April through August 2023, $1,330 per month in temporary child support from September 2023 until further order of the trial court, $8,546 per month in temporary maintenance from April 2023 until further order of the trial court, and $35,000 in interim attorneys’ fees.²

In November 2023, Wife filed an application for contempt citation against Husband. Although Husband had paid temporary child support and temporary maintenance as ordered for September and October 2023, and had paid Wife's attorney's fees as ordered, Husband had not paid the retroactively ordered child support and maintenance for April through August 2023. The trial court issued a show cause order that contemplated a hearing in December 2023. However, the application for contempt citation was not determined at that time.

Instead, in May and July 2024, the trial court held a four-day trial on the competing petitions for dissolution of marriage and also heard evidence related to Wife's application for contempt citation. With respect to the application for contempt citation, Husband admitted that he had not directly paid the retroactive child support and maintenance payments required by the pendente lite order. He asserted that he had been unable to comply with these obligations because his resources had been depleted by direct payments to Wife to cover Wife and Child's expenses, and that Wife had misrepresented her available income. Husband presented evidence showing that: he paid $58,796.10 for Wife's and Child's living expenses from April to August 2023; Wife received $22,912.41 in cash payments through Husband's military education benefits from April 2022 to March 2024, but failed to disclose this income to the special master or the trial court; Husband had to pay Wife $29,600.50 as an advance for her portion of the parties’ anticipated 2021 joint federal and state tax refunds before she would agree to sign the returns; Wife then kept the entire federal tax refund of $46,075, despite having already received her portion of the refund from Husband's advance; and Wife depleted all of this cash on primarily nonessential expenses despite the temporary order limiting spending to necessities during the pendency of the case. Husband asked the trial court to consider all of this evidence to support affording him a credit against his arrearages for retroactive child support and maintenance from April through August 2023.

Wife agreed that Husband had directly paid for expenses for her and Child from April through August 2023; that she had received direct cash payments by virtue of Husband's military education benefits but had not reflected that income in her Income and Expense Statement; and that she kept both the advance paid by Husband for her portion of the 2021 state and federal tax refund and the entire federal tax refund. Wife testified to spending the cash received from these sources on elective cosmetic and medical procedures, a life coach program, a healing coach program, food delivery, dining out, a dog waste pickup service, airline and concert tickets, and gifts for herself.

With respect to the division of assets, Husband testified that although he was not yet retired from the military, he would be entitled upon retirement to military retirement benefits based on his service in the United States Marine Corps on active duty, and then the Marine Corps Reserves. Husband asked the trial court to equally divide the marital portion of his military retirement benefits. Both parties recognized, however, that unlike traditional retirement accounts, military retirement benefits do not have a current cash value that can be calculated, and instead are calculated at retirement based on base pay rates and creditable service points, and other variables. Though Husband did not oppose dividing the marital portion of his military retirement benefit, he did not want to designate Wife as a beneficiary of the Survivor Benefits Program (“SBP”), which would ensure continued payments should Husband predecease Wife, because Husband wanted to preserve that right for a potential future spouse.

Wife testified that she wanted Husband to elect her as the SBP beneficiary so she would continue to receive her share of the marital portion of military retirement benefits if Husband were to predecease her. Wife expressed concern about Husband's serious health problems. She explained that the Department of Veterans Affairs already considered Husband to be 100 percent disabled. Wife testified that due to his disabilities, Husband would be eligible to receive Veteran's disability benefits upon retirement, which offset military retirement benefits to avoid double payment. However, disability payments are not divisible. Wife thus asked the trial court to require Husband to indemnify her for any reduction in the marital portion of military retirement benefits due to Husband's later receipt of Veteran's disability payments.

On September 6, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and determining Wife's application for contempt citation (“Judgment”). The trial court found that based on the evidence, Husband was not in contempt for nonpayment of retroactive child support and maintenance obligations described in the pendente lite order, and instead had satisfied those requirements and was current on all financial obligations to Wife.

The Judgment denied Wife spousal maintenance and ordered Husband to pay Wife child support in the amount of $1,437 per month. With respect to Husband's military retirement benefits, the trial court directed that the portion of the military retirement benefits acquired by Husband during the marriage were to be equally divided between Husband and Wife, with the parties directed to retain and equally pay a named attorney to “prepare the necessary documents for the division of the marital portion of [Husband's] military retirement benefits.” The Judgment went on to state that “[i]n the event it is possible for [Wife] to be the surviving spouse of the marital portion of the military retirement benefits (but not the non-marital portion) then a surviving spouse election shall be made so long as [Wife] bears any cost for the surviving spouse election from her portion of the military retirement benefits.”

Wife filed a motion to amend the Judgment. Wife argued that the trial court's directive to divide the marital portion of Husband's military retirement could not be achieved without stating the formula for doing so. Wife also argued that the Judgment did not specifically order Husband to make the SBP election in Wife's favor, and instead said that the election should be made “[i]n the event it is possible.” Finally, Wife challenged the Judgment's failure to award Wife a cash equivalent for her half of the marital portion of Husband's military retirement benefits if for any reason Wife is ultimately not entitled to those benefits. Husband opposed Wife's motion and noted that Wife did not at any time during trial argue that the Judgment needed to include a formula for calculating the marital portion of Husband's military retirement, and that the trial court had contemplated the need for that calculation to be made by directing the parties to “retain and equally pay” a named attorney well-known to the trial court to prepare the necessary documents for the division of the marital portion of Husband's military retirement benefits. Husband also argued that Wife's request for a cash award would violate the law because, should Husband be entitled to Veteran's disability benefits upon retirement, those benefits could only be received if a commensurate amount of military retirement benefits are waived, and such disability benefits are not, as a matter of law, considered “disposable retired pay” that can be divided as marital property. The trial court denied Wife's motion.

Wife timely appealed.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a court-tried case, we will affirm the trial court's judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). The party challenging the judgment bears the burden of proving it erroneous. Charles v. Oak Park Neighborhood Ass'n, 685 S.W.3d 519, 527 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023).

We will find that a “trial court's judgment is not supported by substantial evidence when ‘there is no evidence in the record tending to prove a fact that is necessary to sustain the [trial] court's judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Sanders v. City of Columbia, 602 S.W.3d 288, 302 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Laut v. City of Arnold, 491 S.W.3d 191, 197 (Mo. banc 2016)). In reviewing whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment and defer to the trial court's credibility determinations. Id. “Because, ‘[w]hen faced with a no substantial evidence challenge, no contrary evidence is to be considered[,] ․ our review is limited to determining whether any evidence in the record supports the trial court's finding[s].’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Wyrick v. Henry, 592 S.W.3d 47, 59 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019)).

When assessing whether the trial court erroneously declared or misapplied the law, “we defer to the trial court's factual determinations but otherwise review the trial court's legal conclusions and application of law to the facts de novo.” McLeod v. McLeod, 681 S.W.3d 215, 228-29 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citing Singleton v. Singleton, 659 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Mo. banc 2023)). “An alleged misapplication of the law will only constitute reversible error if the misapplication of law ‘materially affects the merits of the action [so that we have] a firm belief that the ․ judgment is wrong.’ ” Id. at 229 (quoting Odermann v. Mancuso, 670 S.W.3d 461, 471 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)).

Analysis

Wife raises three points on appeal. In her first point, Wife argues that the portion of the Judgment requiring that a surviving spouse election be made in her favor for the marital portion of Husband's military retirement benefits “[i]n the event that is possible” was indefinite and unenforceable. The second point asserts that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding that Husband satisfied the retroactive temporary child support and maintenance payments under the pendente lite order. The third point contends that the trial court misapplied the law in finding that Husband satisfied his obligations to Wife under the pendente lite order.

Point One: The Judgment's provision requiring a surviving spouse election to be made for the marital but not the non-marital portion of Husband's SBP program in the event it was possible was not indefinite and unenforceable

In her first point on appeal, Wife asserts that the provision of the Judgment directing Wife to be named as the beneficiary of the marital, but not the non-marital, portion of Husband's SBP program “[i]n the event it is possible” was indefinite and unenforceable. Wife argues that this indefinite provision does not render the Judgment not final, but does require a remand to specifically order Husband to elect Wife as the SBP beneficiary.

“An essential requirement of a judgment is that it be sufficiently certain in its terms to be susceptible of enforcement in the manner provided by law.” Lacher v. Lacher, 785 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Mo. banc 1990) (quoting Ravenscroft v. Ravenscroft, 585 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979) (overruled on other grounds)). “To comply with this requirement, the judgment must adjudicate the controversy to a conclusion which permits issuance and processing of an execution without external proof or another hearing.” Id. (quoting Ravenscroft, 585 S.W.2d at 273).

Here, the Judgment provided that “[i]n the event it is possible for [Wife] to be the surviving spouse of the marital portion of the military retirement benefits (but not the non-marital portion) then a surviving spouse election shall be made so long as [Wife] bears any cost for the surviving spouse election from her portion of the military retirement benefits.” The Judgment did not direct whether Wife or Husband should take the steps to determine if an election of SBP benefits limited to the marital portion of Husband's military retirement benefits was possible, but for reasons we will explain, it did not need to. Regardless, the plain import of the Judgment was that if it was not possible to elect Wife as the SBP program beneficiary only as to the marital, and not the non-marital, portion of Husband's military retirement benefits, then no election would be required.

The federal government provides retirement pay to service members who retire from the Armed Forces after serving at least 20 years. See 10 U.S.C. section 7311 et seq. (Army retirement benefits); section 8327 et seq. (Navy and Marine Corps retirement benefits); section 9311 et seq. (Air Force retirement benefits). Generally, military retirement payments cease upon the death of a service member. Kuba v. Kuba, 400 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013); see 10 U.S.C. section 1408(d)(4). “The Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP), established by 10 U.S.C. [sections] 1447-1455, is an annuity plan under which a surviving spouse or other designated beneficiary can continue to receive a monthly benefit following the death of a service member.” Kuba, 400 S.W.3d at 876 (citation omitted); see 10 U.S.C. section 1450(a). “With respect to a spouse or former spouse, the annuity payments generally cease upon the death of the spouse or former spouse, or their remarriage before reaching age 55.” Kuba, 400 S.W.3d at 876 (citing 10 U.S.C. section 1450(b)).

A service member entitled to retirement pay is automatically enrolled in SBP, unless he affirmatively opts out. Id.; see 10 U.S.C. section 1448(a)(1)(A), (2)(A). However, “SBP coverage for a former spouse is not automatic, ․ but must be affirmatively elected.” Kuba, 400 S.W.3d at 877 (emphasis in original). “An eligible participant may voluntarily elect to name a former spouse as the SBP beneficiary.” Id. (citation omitted); see 10 U.S.C. section 1448(b)(2), (b)(3)). “A member also may be required by court order to provide an SBP annuity to a former spouse as part of a dissolution judgment.” Kuba, 400 S.W.3d at 877 (citation omitted); see 10 U.S.C. section 1450(f)(4). Such a court-ordered election must be written, signed by the service member, and received by “the Secretary concerned ³ within one year after the date of the decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment.” 10 U.S.C. section 1448(b)(3)(A)(iii). “If a service member is required by court order to provide an SBP annuity to a former spouse and he fails or refuses to make such an election, the member shall be ‘deemed’ to have made such an election if the Secretary receives a written request from the former spouse and a copy of the court order within one year of the date of such court order.” Kuba, 400 S.W.3d at 877 (citation omitted); see 10 U.S.C. section 1450(f)(3)(A), (C) (former spouse's ability to self-elect as SBP beneficiary).

Wife argues that it was “indefinite” to require her to be named the beneficiary of only the marital portion of the SBP program if possible, and that a remand to modify the Judgment to specifically require Husband to make this election is required. We disagree. The Judgment did not need to specify that Husband would make the SBP election, as either spouse was permitted by federal law to do so, within one year of the Judgment. And though the Judgment made clear that all that was being awarded Wife was a right to an SBP election for the marital portion of SBP benefits, if that was possible, that does not render the Judgment indefinite. Wife does not contend that the phrase “[i]n the event it is possible” impacted either Husband's or Wife's ability to follow the steps outlined in 10 U.S.C. sections 1448(b)(3)(A)(iii) or 1450(f)(3)(A) to attempt to make an SBP election limited to the marital portion of Husband's military retirement benefits within the year following the entry of Judgment.

The record does not disclose whether either party has tried to make the SBP election contemplated by the Judgment. Though Wife summarily contends in the argument portion of her Brief that Husband has refused to elect her as the SBP beneficiary, nothing prevented Wife from making this election herself. In fact, because it is “all too common” in divorce cases for the military member to fail to elect his former spouse as the SBP beneficiary, the SBP statute was specifically amended to empower the former spouse to initiate her election as the SBP beneficiary without the concurrence or cooperation of the military member. Holt v. U.S., 64 Fed.Cl. 215, 216 (2005).

If neither party took steps within one year of the Judgment to determine whether Wife could be named the beneficiary to only the marital portion of Husband's military retirement benefits under the SBP program, then under federal law, the time to do so has expired. We are not persuaded by Wife's argument that the Judgment is indefinite and must be modified to specifically require Husband to make the SBP election when she was equally empowered to do so.

Point One is denied.

Points Two and Three: The trial court did not err in finding Husband was not in contempt and had instead satisfied his obligation to pay retroactive temporary maintenance and child support pursuant to the pendente lite order

Wife's second and third points on appeal assert that the trial court erred in finding that Husband had satisfied his obligations to pay the retroactive payments required in the pendente lite order. Her second point contends that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's determination because no evidence established that Husband paid Wife the required retroactive payments. Her third point argues that the trial court misapplied the law in finding that Husband satisfied the retroactive payments because Husband admitted to failing to comply with the temporary order. We disagree with both contentions because they improperly characterize the trial court's findings as an unauthorized modification of the pendente lite order.

Pendente lite orders for child support, maintenance, and attorney's fees are authorized by statute. Section 452.315. Pendente lite awards for child support and maintenance are to be determined by using the same statutory standards that are applicable to such awards in a final judgment of dissolution. Section 452.315.5 (referencing section 452.335 on maintenance and section 452.340 on child support). Pendente lite awards are considered independent actions, and are thus appealable. As such, the “[f]ailure to appeal from pendente lite orders confers finality upon them.” State ex rel. Carlson v. Aubuchon, 669 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984) (citations omitted); Noll v. Noll, 286 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Mo. App. 1956) (observing that if no appeal is taken from support authorized by a pendente lite order, it becomes final and can be executed upon). It follows that the support provisions in a final pendente lite order, as with similar provisions in a final dissolution decree, may be modified only upon a showing of changed conditions. Carlson, 669 S.W.2d at 296 (citing section 452.370).

Here, the pendente lite order required Husband to pay retroactive temporary child support and temporary maintenance ⁴ for April through August 2023. Husband did not appeal the pendente lite order, and it thus became final. Wife contended that Husband did not pay the retroactive temporary child support and maintenance required by the pendente lite order. However, Wife did not seek to execute upon the pendente lite order, and instead filed an application for civil contempt wherein she claimed that Husband was in contempt for failing to make the required retroactive payments, totaling $51,225.

“Civil contempt is intended to benefit a party for whom an order, judgment, or decree was entered. Its purpose is to coerce compliance with the relief granted.” Whitton v. Whitton, 707 S.W.3d 42, 50-51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 682 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024)). “A party alleging contempt establishes a prima facie case for civil contempt when the party proves: (1) the contemnor's obligation to perform an action as required by the decree; and (2) the contemnor's failure to meet the obligation.” Id. at 51 (quoting Woolery v. Woolery, 679 S.W.3d 17, 29 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). When a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the contemnor to prove “that person's failure to act was not due to his own intentional and contumacious conduct.” Id. (quoting Woolery, 679 S.W.3d at 29).

Here, Husband disputed that Wife made a prima facie case of contempt, as he disputed that he had failed to meet the retroactive payment obligations required in the pendente lite order. Husband contended that he was entitled to credits against the retroactive payment obligations for: (1) direct payments for Wife's and Child's monthly expenses from April through August 2023, totaling $58,796.10; (2) cash payments of the advance of half the anticipated 2021 state and federal tax refund and Wife's retention of the entire federal tax refund, totaling $75,675.50; and (3) cash payments Wife received from Husband's military education benefits, totaling $22,912.41 that were not disclosed to the special master or the trial court. Husband also offered evidence that Wife spent nearly all the cash received from him, from the tax refunds, and from the military education benefits on discretionary expenses in contravention of the trial court's temporary order limiting spending to necessities during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings.

A trial court possesses the equitable power to credit a spouse for overdue court-ordered payments if the circumstances so require. See Wakili v. Wakili, 918 S.W.2d 332, 344-45 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) (a trial court can credit a spouse for nonconforming payments against retroactive payments required under a temporary order and retroactively decrease a spouse's obligations under a temporary order based on the circumstances of the case); McCully v. McCully, 550 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Mo. App. 1977) (A “trial court is clothed with broad equitable powers. The adjustment of financial equities as between the parties was and is an inherent power of the trial court”). Here, the Judgment acknowledged the evidence supporting Husband's requests for credits, as well as the evidence of Wife's depletion of Husband's financial resources, and concluded that Husband was not in violation of the pendente lite order and was instead current on his obligations to Wife.

The trial court's exercise of its equitable powers in this regard was supported by substantial evidence. We need only address the funds directly paid to and withheld by Wife from the 2021 tax refund, and the undisclosed funds Wife received from Husband's military education benefits to reach this conclusion. The evidence established that Husband paid Wife $29,600.50 as an advance of the parties’ anticipated 2021 tax refunds before she would agree to sign the returns. The evidence established that despite having received this advance, Wife retained the entirety of the federal tax refund in the sum of $46,075—all of which should have gone to Husband. Husband offered bank statements to prove Wife's retention of the refund, and Wife's credit card statements to show that Wife spent these funds during the pendency of the case on discretionary expenditures. Wife admitted to keeping both Husband's advance and the full amount of the federal tax refund, and admitted to spending these funds on discretionary expenses.

Additionally, the evidence established that Wife received $22,912.41 in direct cash payments from using Husband's military education benefits during the pendency of the case and that Wife had not disclosed these funds on the Income and Expense Statement that she submitted to the trial court. Husband presented evidence that Wife received monthly payments ranging from $83.33 to $1,488 per month from April 2022 to March 2024. Wife admitted to receiving these funds as a stipend for housing and books while she was in school. She further admitted to failing to disclose this income to the special master or the trial court during the pendente lite order proceedings.

The trial court properly considered this evidence to find that Husband's financial obligations to Wife under the pendente lite order were satisfied. See Webb v. Webb, 475 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Mo. App. 1971) (“Missouri law would allow a credit under proper and equitable circumstances”) (citation omitted). This conclusion is further bolstered by substantial evidence which supported Husband's claim that he also directly paid for Wife's and Child's expenses during the period from April through August 2023 in the amount of $58,796.10. Wife argues these payments cannot be relied on to credit Husband's obligation under the pendente lite order unless she expressly consented to accept them for that purpose. We disagree. Though it is generally true that no credit is allowed for support other than as is ordered by a dissolution decree (including a pendente lite order), this general rule is intended to respect the payee spouse's privilege to determine how monies awarded for support are to be spent. Anderson v. Anderson, 684 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985). This general rule is thus subject to equitable exceptions where direct support is provided with the express or implied support of the payee spouse. Id. Here, Husband offered uncontested and specific evidence of direct support he provided for Wife and Child's benefit in the amount of $58,796.10. Wife did not challenge that she accepted this monetary support from Husband. Substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Husband was entitled to a credit for this direct monetary support against the retroactive maintenance and child support obligations set forth in the pendente lite order.

The trial court did not commit error, therefore, when it concluded that Husband was not in contempt and instead had satisfied his obligations under the pendente lite order. The trial court's finding was supported by substantial evidence, and was consistent with the trial court's legal authority to exercise its equitable powers to treat nonconforming payments as a credit against retroactive payment obligations described in a pendente lite order. See Wakili, 918 S.W.2d at 344-45; McCully, 550 S.W.2d at 914.

During oral argument, Wife conceded that she is not challenging the trial court's conclusion that Husband was not in contempt. Instead, she complains that because the trial court deemed the pendente lite order “satisfied,” she can no longer execute upon the order, despite its finality. This argument depends for its success on Wife's suggestion that the trial court's findings improperly modified the pendente lite order. They did not. The trial court's conclusion that Husband was not in contempt because, in the exercise of equity, Husband should be deemed to have performed his obligations under the pendente lite order is the antithesis of a finding that the pendente lite order should be modified. It follows that because payments required by the pendente lite order were found by the trial court to have been paid by appropriately applied credits, those payment obligations have been satisfied and cannot be executed upon.

The trial court did not misapply the law in exercising its equitable power to credit Husband's retroactive maintenance and child support obligations described in the pendente lite order and, therefore, in finding Husband was not in contempt and had instead satisfied his obligations under the pendente lite order.

Points Two and Three are denied.

Conclusion

The Judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Shortly thereafter, the parties submitted an amended Form 14 because the Form 14 calculated by the trial court included a mathematical error. Though an amended pendente lite order was never issued, the parties and the trial court appeared to agree that Husband's temporary child support obligation would be $1,699 per month.

3.   Husband served in the United States Marine Corps and was a reservist at the time of dissolution. Thus, the written request to elect Wife as SBP beneficiary would have needed to be sent to the Secretary of the Navy. See Holmes v. U.S., 98 Fed.Cl. 767, 769, 782 (2011) (surviving former spouse of Navy veteran had to notify the Secretary of the Navy of her SBP election); 10 U.S.C. section 8043(d) (the Commandant of the Marine Corps performs his duties under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy).

4.   Section 452.335 addresses the award of maintenance and, unlike section 452.340 addressing the award of child support, makes no provision for an award of retroactive maintenance. Thus, retroactive maintenance awards are universally prohibited in a final decree of dissolution. See Archdekin v. Archdekin, 562 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Mo. banc 2018). However, maintenance awarded for a period preceding the entry of a final decree of dissolution is permitted when a party has moved for temporary maintenance under section 452.315. Id. Thus, maintenance awarded retroactive to the date of filing of a pendente lite motion is generally viewed as authorized by section 452.315, even though retroactive maintenance is not contemplated by section 452.335. See id. (citing Wendel v. Wendel, 72 S.W.3d 626, 631 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002)).

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur