OLSON v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE (2026)

Jonathan Olson (“Olson”) appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court of Platte County that affirmed the decision by the Director of Revenue (the “Director”) to revoke Olson's driving privileges. In his sole point on appeal, he argues that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that there were reasonable grounds to believe that he was driving a motor vehicle in an intoxicated or drugged condition. The judgment is affirmed.

Background 1

On October 31, 2024, Olson was arrested at his residence for the offense of driving while intoxicated. He refused to take a breath test leading to the revocation of his driving privileges.

In the light most favorable to the judgment, Deputy DeClue of the Platte County Sheriff's Office responded to a report by Olson's wife that Olson was intoxicated and had arrived home on a golf cart with the couple's two young daughters on it.

Deputy DeClue arrived at the residence at approximately 10:40 P.M. Olson's wife let Deputy DeClue into the residence and informed Deputy DeClue that she had told Olson on several occasions not to drink and drive the golf cart with the children. Olson's wife indicated that Olson had at least two beers at their residence before traveling to a friend's house and continuing to drink. She indicated that, in response to a text questioning where the couple's daughters were, Olson had told her that the daughters were home when they were not home. Olson's wife indicated that Olson then arrived home on a golf cart, intoxicated, a few minutes later, at approximately 9:45 P.M. Olson's wife reported that Olson went straight to bed upon arriving home. Olson's wife showed Deputy DeClue to Olson's bedroom, where Deputy DeClue woke a sleeping Olson.

In interacting with Olson, Deputy DeClue observed that Olson's eyes were glassy and bloodshot, that his breath carried a strong odor of alcohol, that his speech was slurred, and that Olson stumbled when walking. When asked if he had had anything to drink that night, Olson indicated that he had “a couple of drinks” earlier in the night. When asked how much earlier, Olson stated, “Way earlier.” Deputy DeClue inferred from this information that Olson had not consumed any alcohol upon arriving home. Later in the interaction, Olson indicated that he had not had any drinks. Olson refused to perform field sobriety tests. He was placed in handcuffs. Olson was informed of implied consent and that the consequence of refusing to take a breath test would be the loss of his driving privileges. Olson refused to take the test. Following his refusal, Olson volunteered that he had a few beers after he arrived home.

Due to his refusal to take a chemical test, Olson was issued a notice of revocation of his driving privilege. Olson timely filed for circuit court review of the revocation pursuant to section 302.574.4.²

On June 13, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Olson's review petition. At the beginning of the hearing, the Director offered into evidence Exhibit A, which included, inter alia, Olson's Missouri Driver Record, the notice of revocation of Olson's driving privileges for refusal to submit to a chemical test, a copy of the Alcohol Influence Report completed by Deputy DeClue in conjunction with Olson's arrest, a narrative report written by Deputy DeClue, and a written statement provided by Olson's wife on the night of Olson's arrest. Olson objected on the ground that there were “certain hearsay statements from a third-party inside the packet.” The Director argued that the packet was self-authenticating and admissible with the trial court having the ability to take the information in the packet under consideration when assessing the weight to be attributed to the evidence. The trial court admitted Exhibit A. The Director then indicated that the Director had no further evidence.

Olson testified in his defense. He indicated that he had gone to pick up his daughters from their friend's house in a golf cart and that he had a few drinks after he arrived home, which included a couple of “tall” beers and some whiskey. He testified that he had only consumed alcohol after arriving home for the night. He testified that he and his wife were going through a divorce and that his wife had made other allegations about him earlier in the day on October 31, 2024, which were investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. Olson argued that his wife had shown a pattern of making false allegations about him and that her statements to law enforcement lacked credibility.

The trial court entered judgment on June 27, 2025, finding that the Director had met the burden of each element necessary to sustain the revocation of Olson's driving privileges.

Olson now appeals to this Court.

Standard of Review

On appeal from a court-tried civil case, the judgment of the trial court will be sustained “unless there is not substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law.” Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); Wilmoth v. Dir. of Revenue, 669 S.W.3d 102, 108 (Mo. banc 2023) (citing Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32).

Analysis

Under Missouri's implied consent law, persons operating vehicles on the public highways of the state are deemed to have consented to testing for the purpose of determining the alcohol or drug content of the person's blood under certain circumstances. § 577.020.1. These circumstances include the following: “If the person is arrested for any offense arising out of acts which the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe were committed while the person was operating a vehicle or a vessel while in an intoxicated condition[.]” § 577.020.1(1). Following a refusal under such circumstances, the person's driving privileges are revoked by the Director. See § 302.574.1-3. The person may petition for review of the revocation in the circuit court of the county in which the arrest occurred. § 302.574.4.

Section 302.574.4 provides that, at the review hearing, the court shall determine only:

(1) Whether the person was arrested or stopped;

(2) Whether the officer had:

(a) Reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition; ․ [and]

(3) Whether the person refused to submit to the test.

§ 302.574.4.³ If the circuit court finds one of these elements lacking, the circuit court must order the reinstatement of the person's driving privileges. § 302.574.5.

In his sole point on appeal, Olson argues that there was no substantial evidence to support a determination that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that he was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition because the only evidence to support the determination came from hearsay statements of his wife.

Missouri courts have recognized that “reasonable grounds” in a refusal case “is virtually synonymous with probable cause.” Stanton v. Dir. of Revenue, 616 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (quoting Ayler v. Dir. of Revenue, 439 S.W.3d 250, 254 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014)). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer's knowledge of the particular facts and circumstances is sufficient to warrant a prudent person's belief that a suspect has committed an offense.” Id. (quoting Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 621 (Mo. banc 2002)). Whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving a motor vehicle in an intoxicated condition is evaluated at the time of the arrest. Id. (quoting Boggs v. Dir. of Revenue, 564 S.W.3d 693, 698 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018)). “The arresting officer does not need to observe the person actually driving or to know of the person's condition at the time of driving to establish probable cause, and may rely on circumstantial evidence to logically infer that a person was driving while intoxicated.” Id. (citing Gallagher v. Dir. of Revenue, 604 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020)). “An officer may also rely on information provided by witnesses to establish probable cause to believe a person was driving in an intoxicated condition.” Id. “[I]t is well established that statements relayed to the arresting officer by eyewitnesses, law enforcement officers, and radio dispatch, which would be considered hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted, are admissible to establish a basis for a belief that reasonable grounds to arrest for driving while intoxicated existed ․” Tarwater v. Dir. of Revenue, 637 S.W.3d 383, 393 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting Auck v. Dir. of Revenue, 483 S.W.3d 440, 444 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016)).

In this matter, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that Deputy DeClue had reasonable grounds at the time of the arrest to believe that Olson was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.⁴

In the light most favorable to the judgment, the Director presented evidence that, prior to the arrest, Deputy DeClue received information that Olson had been driving home in a golf cart while intoxicated with the couple's young daughters in the vehicle. The evidence indicated that Deputy DeClue arrived at the residence a little less than an hour after Olson had been reported to arrive home; that Olson's wife indicated that Olson had driven a golf cart home from a friend's house in an intoxicated condition; that Deputy DeClue personally observed Olson as stumbling, with slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol on his breath; that Olson indicated that he had had a couple of drinks but that he did so “way earlier,” allowing Deputy DeClue to reasonably infer that Olson had not consumed alcohol since arriving home; and that Olson gave conflicting answers regarding whether he had consumed any alcohol. Based on this evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, Deputy DeClue had reasonable grounds to believe that Olson was driving the golf cart in an intoxicated condition when he arrived home.

Olson's briefing fails to identify the evidence in the record favorable to the trial court's determination, fails to address the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, and fails to direct his arguments to the evidence of what Deputy DeClue could reasonably believe at the time of the arrest. Olson appears to argue that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds that he was driving a motor vehicle ⁵ in an intoxicated condition because the officer relied on his wife's statements, which he asserts were hearsay and lacked credibility. However, Olson does not argue that the trial court erred in admitting evidence. He also does not make an argument regarding why an officer cannot consider statements of third parties in assessing whether there are reasonable grounds to believe a person was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. Further, his arguments regarding his wife's credibility are not predicated on information that would have been available to Deputy DeClue at the time of the arrest so as to be indicative of what Deputy DeClue could reasonably believe at the time of arrest.

The General Assembly has elected in review proceedings to make the circuit court's inquiry very limited. See § 302.574.4 (limiting the issues that the circuit court may review). Indeed, aside from whether an arrest or refusal occurred, the circuit court is only allowed to determine whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. See § 302.574.4(1)-(3). In doing so, the Missouri legislature has chosen to limit the ability of a person to defend themselves from revocation based on what actually occurred rather than what the arresting officer had reasonable grounds for believing occurred. § 302.574.4(2).⁶

The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that Deputy DeClue had reasonable grounds to believe that Olson was driving a motor vehicle in an intoxicated condition.

Point denied.⁷

Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as updated.

3.   Cases involving persons under twenty-one years of age may present additional issues. See § 302.574.4(2)(b)-(c).

4.   Olson frames his challenge as a challenge to a factual finding of the trial court. However, because probable cause determinations under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are reviewed de novo, see White v Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 310 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing and quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-699 (1996)), and because the reasonable grounds determination in a refusal case has long been recognized to be “virtually synonymous” with a probable cause determination, Ayler v. Dir. of Rev., 439 S.W.3d 250, 254 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (quoting Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Mo. banc 2002)), Missouri courts have indicated that the question of whether an arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person was driving a motor vehicle in an intoxicated condition – like the question of whether probable cause existed for an arrest – presents what is essentially a mixed question of law and fact. Stanton, 616 S.W.3d at 407 (citations omitted). Thus, appellate courts defer to the trial court's role as trier of fact in resolving factual issues regarding the circumstances that led to the arrest; however, the ultimate question of whether an arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving a motor vehicle in an intoxicated condition based on a particular set of facts (as found by the trial court) presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id.; Harlan v. Dir. of Revenue, 334 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (citing White, 321 S.W.3d at 308, 310).

5.   Olson does not argue that the golf cart was not a “motor vehicle.” See Covert v. Fisher, 151 S.W.3d 70, 76-77 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (holding that use of golf cart on street used for public travel rendered golf cart a “motor vehicle”).

6.   Thus, as the statutory language has been interpreted by Missouri courts, persons cannot even defend themselves in a revocation review hearing under section 302.574.4(2) with proof that they were not, in fact, driving, but only on whether there were reasonable grounds for the arresting officer to believe that they were driving. See Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 621-22 (Mo. banc 2002) (“Absurd or not, that is what the statute says.”). “Evidence that the licensee was not driving may be relevant to show the unreasonableness of the officer's belief that the licensee was driving while intoxicated.” Hinnah, 77 S.W.3d at 622. In this case, Olson admitted at the hearing that he had picked up his daughters from a friend's house on a golf cart, but denied having done so in an intoxicated condition. However, as indicated, the relevant question at such review hearings is what the arresting officer had reasonable grounds for believing at the time of the arrest. See § 302.574.4(2).

7.   Olson makes further arguments in his brief asserting that the trial court's finding was against the weight of the evidence. However, Olson failed to raise such an argument in a point relied on. Rule 84.04(e) provides that the argument following a point relied on “shall be limited to those errors included in the ‘Points Relied On.’ ” “Claims of error raised in the argument portion of a brief that are not raised in a point relied on are not preserved for [appellate] review.” Hale v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 638 S.W.3d 49, 61 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021) (quoting Davis v. Wieland, 557 S.W.3d 340, 352 n.10 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018)).

Thomas N. Chapman, Presiding Judge

All concur.