STATE v. COOK (2026)

Jerry Cook (“Cook”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cooper County (“trial court”), following a jury trial, convicting him of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of section 577.060.¹ Cook raises one point on appeal, arguing the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Cook left the scene of the accident knowing that he had caused property damage. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background 2

The State charged Cook with committing the class A felony of assault in the first degree, the class E felony of unlawful use of a weapon, the unclassified felony of armed criminal action, the class E felony of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident, and the class B misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated. Following a jury trial, the jury found Cook not guilty of all of the charged offenses except for the offense of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident. In the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the following evidence was adduced at trial.

In the early morning hours of August 15, 2023, a man awoke to Cook knocking on his front door. When he answered the door, Cook told the man that he wanted to see his wife, who was staying at the man's house. The man told Cook to leave, but Cook refused, and the men began arguing. The argument became physical, and the men fought in the front yard until Cook left and got into his vehicle.³

Cook drove away quickly and “crashed” his car into a neighbor's (Victim) vehicle that was parked on the street. Cook continued to drive away and drove to the hospital to receive treatment for the injuries he sustained during the physical altercation with the man.

Shortly thereafter, Victim realized her vehicle had been damaged and reported the damage to law enforcement. A law enforcement officer investigated the scene of the accident. He testified that he observed “[m]oderate damage to the front left” side of Victim's vehicle and that the bumper “appeared to be partially dislodged.” The law enforcement officer noted that, based on his experience, the damage appeared to be from a collision of two motor vehicles. He explained that Victim's vehicle was legally parked, and the right side of Cook's vehicle collided with the left side of Victim's vehicle as Cook drove by. An auto body shop estimated the damage to Victim's vehicle to be $7,162.82. Photos of the damage to Victim's vehicle were admitted into evidence.

The law enforcement officer went to the hospital where Cook's vehicle was parked. There, the law enforcement officer photographed the damage to Cook's vehicle.⁴ The officer testified that the passenger side of Cook's vehicle “ha[d] scrapes and gouges on it.” He offered that the damage on the vehicle was consistent with a sideswipe vehicle collision. He further explained that the vehicle damage “appear[ed] to be fresh” as the damage to the paint on Cook's vehicle was “consistent with a very recent crash.”

At trial, defense counsel acknowledged that Cook had collided with Victim's vehicle, providing during his opening statement: “There's a lot of it that's not in dispute. For instance, we're not denying that [Cook] drove away and hit somebody's car as he was heading to the hospital.” In his closing argument, defense counsel asserted:

But [Cook] left the scene because he was being assaulted. He was bleeding. He was heading to the hospital. He was so frazzled and panicked that he hit this other car. And we're not claiming that he didn't do that or whether the damage was over a certain amount. But what was he supposed to do? He's being assaulted even while he's trying to drive away.

․

So, yeah, he hit this car. He caused this damage. But it wasn't with any kind of criminal intent. No intent whatsoever to violate this law. I'm going to ask you find him not guilty of that.

The jury found Cook guilty of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident,⁵ and the trial court sentenced him to four years in the Missouri Department of Corrections.

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

“When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this Court must determine whether sufficient evidence permits a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Tate, 708 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Mo. banc 2025). “In making that determination, great deference is given to the trier of fact, and an appellate court will not weigh the evidence anew.” Id. The Court “accepts as true all of the evidence favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary.” State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 687 (Mo. banc 2010).

Analysis

In Cook's single point on appeal, he claims the State presented insufficient evidence to support his leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident conviction. Specifically, Cook argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “had actual knowledge the collision with [Victim's] vehicle caused property damage, as is necessary to prove the requisite mental state for the offense.”

A person commits the offense of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident pursuant to section 577.060 if:

(1) Being the operator of a vehicle or a vessel involved in an accident resulting in injury or death or damage to property of another person; and

(2) Having knowledge of such accident he or she leaves the place of the injury, damage or accident without stopping and giving the following information to the other party or to a law enforcement officer, or if no law enforcement officer is in the vicinity, then to the nearest law enforcement agency:

(a) His or her name;

(b) His or her residence, including city and street number;

(c) The registration or license number for his or her vehicle or vessel; and

(d) His or her operator's license number, if any.

Here, the jury was instructed that to convict Cook of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident, it was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cook: (1) “operated a vehicle”; (2) “while doing so, [Cook] was involved in an accident that caused damage to the property of [Victim]”; (3) “[Cook] knew that such accident had occurred”; and (4) “[Cook] left the place of the accident without stopping and giving [Cook's] name, residential address, license number of [Cook's] vehicle, and operator's license number to the other party in the accident or a law enforcement officer in the vicinity or to the nearest law enforcement agency”; and (5) “that the property damage was in excess of one thousand dollars[.]”

Cook does not contest that he operated a motor vehicle, that in doing so he was involved in an accident that caused damage to Victim's car, that he left the scene of the accident, and that the property damage he caused was in excess of one thousand dollars. Rather, he solely claims that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he left the scene of the accident knowing that he had caused property damage.⁶ We disagree.

Section 577.060 requires the State to prove that “the defendant left the accident scene knowing that his culpability or accident caused either personal injury or property damage.” Schlax v. State, 419 S.W.3d 906, 909 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (emphasis added).⁷ “Knowledge” as used in section 577.060 requires actual knowledge “rather than mere constructive knowledge, or such notice as would put one on inquiry, and more than mere negligence in failing to know, or the mere presence of facts which might have induced the belief in the mind of a reasonable person.” Id. (quoting State v. Dougherty, 216 S.W.2d 467, 472 (1949)).⁸ “Actual knowledge, however, may be proved by indirect evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from circumstances surrounding the incident.” State v. Lee, 871 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994).

A review of the record reveals that the State produced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Cook knew he caused property damage to Victim's vehicle when he left the accident scene. Evidence was adduced that Cook sped off and “crashed” his vehicle into Victim's vehicle when leaving the altercation with the man and then proceeded to drive to the hospital. Indeed, defense counsel specifically acknowledged that Cook “hit” Victim's car as he was leaving and caused damage. Denzmore, 436 S.W.3d at 643 (“An admission made by an attorney in open court during trial which is against the interests of his clients is presumed to be true and courts are warranted in acting thereon.”).

Additional evidence of the nature of the collision was provided by the law enforcement officer who responded to the scene and testified that the damage to each vehicle was consistent with a sideswipe collision. The jury could have reasonably found that Cook was aware he had caused damage to Victim's vehicle based on his sideswipe collision with Victim's vehicle while he sped off from the altercation and that he did not assess the damage after he “crashed” into the vehicle. See State v. Watson, 968 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998) (noting that the defendant's “rapid departure from the scene without first determining the exact nature of the damage infer[red] he knew property damage occurred.”).

The severity of the damage to both vehicles provided further basis for the jury to conclude Cook was aware that he had caused property damage. The law enforcement officer testified that the bumper on Victim's vehicle was “partially dislodged” and the passenger side of Cook's vehicle had “scrapes and gouges on it.” The force with which Cook collided with Victim's vehicle was confirmed by the photos of each vehicle that were admitted into evidence. A photo of Cook's vehicle displayed scrapes stretching the entire length of the passenger side of the vehicle, which the law enforcement officer explained was damage consistent with a recent collision. Furthermore, evidence was introduced establishing that the value of the damage to Victim's vehicle was $7,161.82. It was certainly reasonable for the jury to find, given the severity of the damage to both Victim's and Cook's vehicles, that Cook knew he had caused damage to Victim's vehicle when he collided with it. See State v. Teter, 633 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Mo. App. W.D. 1982) (finding that evidence that the defendant's windshield was cracked, one side window was smashed, and parts of his automobile had fallen off, supported an inference that the defendant “not only knew that he had collided with some object but, at the very least, knew he had damaged property.”).

The circumstances surrounding the accident, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, supports a finding that Cook knew he damaged Victim's vehicle when he sideswiped it while departing the area. Accordingly, we find there was sufficient evidence to support Cook's conviction for the class E felony of leaving the scene of an accident. Cook's point is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as supplemented through the date of Cook's offense, unless otherwise noted.

3.   The man testified that he did not recall how the physical fight began. Both Cook and the man received medical treatment for injuries sustained in the altercation.

4.   The photos of Cook's vehicle were admitted into evidence.

5.   The jury found Cook not guilty of assault in the first degree, unlawful use of a weapon, armed criminal action, and driving while intoxicated.

6.   The State contends that Cook waived appellate review of this claim on appeal by making a judicial admission at trial that Cook “had caused property damage to Victim's vehicle.” State v. Denzmore, 436 S.W.3d 635, 643 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (“The general rule is that when a defendant makes a voluntary judicial admission of fact before the jury, it serves as a substitute for evidence and dispenses with proof of the actual fact. The admission is conclusive on him for the purpose of the case.”).During his opening statement, defense counsel conceded that Cook collided with Victim's vehicle and caused damage, stating, “we're not denying that [Cook] drove away and hit somebody's car as he was heading to the hospital.” In his closing argument, defense counsel reiterated that Cook was not disputing his involvement in the accident, stating, “he hit this car. He caused this damage. But it wasn't with any kind of criminal intent.”The State asserts that “[b]y admitting that [Cook] had caused property damage to Victim's vehicle, defense counsel indicated that [Cook] knew that such damage had occurred and thus was not contesting [Cook's] knowledge of the damage.” Although defense counsel admitted that Cook “hit” Victim's car and caused damage, defense counsel specifically asserted in closing argument that Cook did not possess the requisite criminal intent—a distinct element of the charged offense— to convict him of the offense and asked the jury to find Cook “not guilty” of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident. Nonetheless, regardless of whether defense counsel waived appellate review of this argument, we find the State presented sufficient evidence to support Cook's conviction.

7.   Shlax references a prior version of section 577.060. 419 S.W.3d at 909 (citing section 577.060, RSMo 2000). The current version of section 577.060 became effective on August 28, 2017. The pertinent elements of the offense, however, remain the same.

8.   In Dougherty, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted the predecessor statute to section 577.060. 216 S.W.2d at 472.

Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

All concur.