STATE v. BAKER (2026)

Mr. Christopher Baker (“Baker”) appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Henry County, Missouri (“trial court”), convicting him of one count of resisting arrest. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

The State charged Baker with two class E felonies (enhanced to the penalty range for class D felonies due to his status as a prior and persistent offender) of driving while revoked or suspended (“DWR”). As part of a plea agreement reached before trial, Baker agreed that he would plead guilty to the two class E felonies of DWR and the State's recommendation to the court that he receive enhanced sentences within the felony sentencing range of class D felonies on each count (up to seven years imprisonment), and specifically, he agreed to the State's recommendation of five-year sentences on each count to run consecutively; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss four other felony charges pending against him: first-degree harassment, a class E felony; stealing a motor vehicle, a class D felony; an additional count of DWR, a class E felony; and resisting arrest, a class E felony.

At the plea hearing, Baker stated that he understood he was charged with two counts of felony DWR and that he understood the enhanced range of punishment as up to seven years’ imprisonment for both offenses due to his status as a prior and persistent offender. The plea court accepted the factual basis for both of the guilty pleas and the State's recommended sentences, and the trial court sentenced Baker to five years of imprisonment on each count of DWR to be served consecutively, consistent with the plea agreement terms between Baker and the State.

Shortly thereafter, Baker filed a motion for post-conviction relief (“PCR motion”) arguing that the State had failed to “prove” sufficient prior offenses at Baker's plea hearing to justify enhancing Baker's DWR offenses. Baker requested that the motion court vacate and set aside his felony sentences for both DWR convictions and remand for sentencing as class A misdemeanors.

In response to Baker's PCR motion seeking to vacate and set aside his sentences,¹ the State refiled the four felony charges it had previously agreed to dismiss.

Shortly before trial began on the resisting arrest charge, Baker filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement. Baker argued that he was entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement—and consequently, dismissal of the resisting arrest charge—because he had fully performed under the terms of the agreement by “pleading guilty” to the two DWR counts in his prior criminal case. The State argued that Baker had materially breached the plea agreement by collaterally attacking the felony prison sentences on the DWR charges that he had agreed to. The trial court agreed with the State and denied Baker's motion to enforce the plea agreement, and the resisting arrest case proceeded to a jury trial.

The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that in April 2022, three felony warrants were issued for Baker's arrest for felony first-degree harassment, felony DWR, and felony stealing a motor vehicle. Sergeant and Deputy were patrolling in separate vehicles when Sergeant saw Baker (whom he knew) near his home. Knowing that Baker had active warrants for his arrest, Sergeant and Deputy parked and approached Baker's home on foot.

When they arrived, Deputy saw Baker peeking around the corner of one of the outbuildings on the property. Deputy shouted Baker's name and Baker fled into the field behind the outbuildings. Sergeant, who was a K9 officer, shouted, “Chris, stop! I'm gonna release the dog!” but Baker continued running. The officers ran after Baker. Eventually, Baker ducked behind bushes, trying to hide. Sergeant found Baker, ordered him to the ground, and handcuffed him. After the officers arrested Baker, he made several comments that demonstrated that he knew that the officers intended to arrest him for outstanding warrants when they arrived at his home. The officers’ body cameras recorded footage of the entire incident and the comments Baker made to the officers.

The jury found Baker guilty of resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced Baker to three years’ imprisonment with credit for time served.

Baker timely appealed from the resisting arrest conviction.

Arguments on Appeal

On appeal, Baker argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to enforce the plea agreement, and he also raises a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge.

Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a trial court's judgment denying a motion to enforce a plea agreement for an abuse of discretion and will reverse only if the decision was clearly erroneous. See State v. Banks, 259 S.W.3d 49, 50 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances before the court at the time and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks one's sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration.” Beverly v. Hudak, 545 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). “The judgment is clearly erroneous when, upon review of the complete record, there is a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Cornelius v. State, 653 S.W.3d 655, 662 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022) (citation modified) (quoting Hefley v. State, 626 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Mo. banc 2021)).

B. Analysis

“A plea agreement is a contract.” Branson v. Shewmaker, 710 S.W.3d 531, 534 n.4 (Mo. banc 2025) (citing Cornelius, 653 S.W.3d at 663; Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009)). “If plea bargaining is to fulfill its intended purpose, it must be conducted fairly on both sides and the results must not disappoint the reasonable expectations of either.” Id. (quoting Schellert v. State, 569 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Mo. banc 1978)); see State v. Wright, 120 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003); Brown v. Gammon, 947 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). Because a plea agreement is a contract, contract principles apply. See Cornelius, 653 S.W.3d at 663-64.

“[A] material breach in a contract may excuse the other parties’ performance.” Campbell v. Shaw, 947 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). “When a party has materially and substantially breached its own obligations under the plea agreement, this discharges the opposing party from its obligations.” People v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 825, 829 (Colo. 2000). A material breach is one that “relates to a vital provision of the agreement, i.e. one that goes to the very substance or root of the agreement[,]” Patel v. Pate, 128 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004), and one that “defeats a benefit for the non-breaching party.” State v. Deilke, 274 Wis.2d 595, 682 N.W.2d 945, 951 (2004). “If the plea agreement is breached, the parties are returned to their pre-bargain status.” Wilhite v. State, 339 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).

Here, Baker and the State agreed that Baker would plead guilty to two class E felonies of DWR and be sentenced as a prior and persistent felony offender to a recommended sentence of five years on each count to be served consecutively; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss four other felony charges then pending against Baker. “[T]here is no dispute that both parties relinquished rights and received benefits” by entering into the plea agreement. See Deilke, 682 N.W.2d at 952.

Baker gave up his constitutional rights to a trial by judge or jury, to confront witnesses, and to remain silent. In return, Baker “significantly reduced his sentencing exposure.” See Branson, 710 S.W.3d at 534 n.4. Baker was convicted of only two felony charges, and his plea eliminated the risk of going to trial on four other felony charges.

The State gave up the right to prosecute other viable felony charges against Baker and was bound to recommend less-than-maximum sentencing penalties for the offenses Baker agreed to plead to. However, the State also received benefits in return. The State vindicated its interest in law enforcement by securing two consecutive five-year sentences as punishment for Baker's numerous violations of the law and did not have to prepare for or prosecute six separate criminal trials. See id.

Baker argues that he is entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement because he “performed the core act contemplated by the plea agreement—he pleaded guilty.” The State argues that Baker is not entitled to specific performance because he breached the terms of the plea agreement when he successfully collaterally attacked the felony sentences attached to the offenses he agreed to plead guilty to.

In interpreting a plea agreement, we must “ascertain the intent of the parties by looking at the words of the contract and giving those words their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.” Cornelius, 653 S.W.3d at 663 (quoting Ethridge v. TierOne Bank, 226 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Mo. banc 2007)).

When the plea agreement was entered into, Baker had six charges then pending against him—four of which he has never challenged as correctly being charged as felonies. The plain and clear intent of the plea agreement was that Baker was going to plead guilty and serve sentence-enhanced “felony” time in prison, not six months in the county jail for a misdemeanor offense. In return, Baker was going to receive a dismissal of four (felony charges) of the six pending criminal charges.

Courts across the country have found that sentencing enhancement is a material term to a plea agreement and that full performance under the terms of a plea agreement is necessary to be entitled to specific performance of that plea agreement. See State v. Szpyrka, 223 Ariz. 390, 224 P.3d 206, 209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that sentencing enhancement was an integral part of the plea agreement where the agreement “required that Szpyrka be sentenced to a term within the enhanced range”); Deilke, 682 N.W.2d at 951-55, 952 n.10 (holding that Deilke materially and substantially breached the terms of a plea agreement when he successfully collaterally attacked his previous convictions that were used for sentence enhancement as part of a negotiated plea agreement); People v. McCormick, 859 P.2d 846, 857 (Colo. 1993) (holding McCormick was not entitled to specific performance of a negotiated plea agreement when he materially and substantially breached the agreement by only partially performing his obligations under the agreement by making disclosures to law enforcement that were later discovered to be untruthful); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis.2d 406, 316 N.W.2d 395, 399 (1982) (holding Rivest materially and substantially breached the plea agreement where Rivest was required to testify but testified falsely).

The same is true here. Pleading guilty to two counts of DWR was only part of Baker's consideration under the plea agreement. The most important consideration provided to the State was sentencing enhancement to a felony term of five years in prison for each count—which could only happen if the sentences were, in fact, enhanced to (class D) felony range of punishment. “Specific performance is purely an equitable remedy and must be governed by equitable principles.” Deffenbaugh v. Burre, Tr. of David Kelly Burre Revocable Tr., 705 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting ROH Farms, LLC v. Cook, 572 S.W.3d 121, 125-26 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019)). For Baker to collaterally attack the most important term in the plea agreement to the State is an inequitable attempt to specifically enforce an agreement that Baker has himself materially breached.

Our interpretation is consistent with the direction given to us by the Missouri Supreme Court in Branson v. Shewmaker, 710 S.W.3d 531 (Mo. banc 2025). In Branson, a criminal defendant entered into a plea agreement requiring him to plead to a felony with an enhanced penalty range; he did; then, he collaterally attacked the factual basis for sentencing enhancement. Id. at 533-34. But since he had failed to raise the argument until the appeal of the denial of his PCR motion, the defendant was deemed to have waived the sentencing error, which led him to seek relief via a writ of habeas corpus claiming the same sentencing error. Id. And the Court of Appeals granted relief—though the relief granted was rescission of the entire plea agreement due to the criminal defendant's material breach of the agreement by (successfully) collaterally attacking the enhanced sentencing terms the defendant had agreed to as part of the plea agreement. See id. at 534 n.4.

The Missouri Supreme Court transferred the habeas corpus case from the Court of Appeals and held that the criminal defendant was not entitled to habeas relief because he failed to raise the sentencing error in his direct appeal or in a timely PCR motion, id. at 537-38, but then discussed the merits of the plea agreement breach issue in a footnote:

A plea agreement is a contract․ “If plea bargaining is to fulfill its intended purpose, it must be conducted fairly on both sides and the results must not disappoint the reasonable expectations of either.” Under the plea agreement in this case, the State vindicated its interest in law enforcement, while Branson significantly reduced his sentencing exposure. As the court of appeals recognized, Branson's argument that habeas relief requires resentencing him to a class B felony would result in a material breach of the negotiated plea agreement requiring rescission of the entire agreement, not merely resentencing for a class B felony. Under these circumstances, habeas relief would be a fleeting and pyrrhic victory, for the State would be fully authorized to bring any charges against Branson in accordance with the law.

Id. at 534 n.4 (citations omitted). Although this discussion by our state supreme court may be dictum, it is highly persuasive to our discussion of the present appeal.

We believe the same analysis regarding breach of the negotiated plea agreement applies in the current case. Baker's successful attack of the enhanced sentences entered on his convictions constituted a material breach of the plea agreement. Because rescission of the plea agreement is thus proper, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to enforce the plea agreement. See Stokes v. State, 671 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984) (holding movant “could no longer insist that the state abide by” the plea agreement when “the state in good faith carried out its end of the plea agreement until movant's unilateral decision to abrogate it”).

Baker's point on appeal challenging the trial court's ruling on his motion to enforce plea agreement is denied.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Having determined that the trial court did not err in denying Baker's motion to enforce the plea agreement—and consequently dismiss the resisting arrest charge that was refiled against him—we proceed to review Baker's sufficiency-of-the-evidence point on appeal.

A. Standard of Review

“When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this Court must determine whether sufficient evidence permits a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court accepts as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignores all contrary evidence and inferences. In reviewing whether sufficient evidence supports a criminal conviction, the Court does not act as a super juror with veto powers, but gives great deference to the trier of fact. This Court, however, cannot supply missing evidence, or give the state the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences.

State v. Guthrie, 733 S.W.3d 421, 423 (Mo. banc 2026) (citation modified).

B. Analysis

Following a jury trial, Baker was found guilty of the class E felony of resisting arrest pursuant to section 575.150.² “To prove that [Baker] committed this crime, the [S]tate needed to establish three elements: (1) that [Baker] knew or reasonably should have known that a law enforcement officer was making an arrest or attempting to lawfully detain or stop him; (2) that he resisted this arrest, stop or detention by fleeing from that officer; and (3) that he did so for the purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest, stop or detention.” See State v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 109 (Mo. banc 2016). “A violation of [s]ection 575.150 for resisting arrest constitutes a misdemeanor unless the offense falls under one of its provisions that increases the punishment for the offense to a [c]lass E felony.” State v. Cunningham, 733 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Mo. App. W.D. 2026). Section 575.150.5 enhances the offense of resisting an arrest from a class A misdemeanor to a class E felony when the arrest warrant that law enforcement is attempting to arrest the defendant for is a felony warrant.

In this case, the State charged Baker with resisting an arrest by fleeing, and Baker argues that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial of his flight. He argues that the evidence only showed that he “ran a short distance into an adjacent field when he saw police and stopped within seconds of the arresting officer seeing and communicating with Mr. Baker.” Baker also argues that the evidence presented did not support a finding that he “fled for the purpose of preventing officers from effecting an arrest”; instead, it showed “immediate compliance and voluntary submission once confronted with a clear stop command.” We disagree.

Neither section 575.150.1 nor section 575.150.2 defines “flee.” “Absent a statutory definition, we give the words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning as derived from a dictionary.” State v. Nylon, 311 S.W.3d 869, 879 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). “The American Heritage Dictionary defines ‘flee’ as ‘to run away, as from trouble or danger,’ ‘to pass swiftly away,’ ‘vanish’ or ‘to run away from.’ ” Id. (citing The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 672 (4th ed. 2006)).

Here, the evidence presented at trial shows that Deputy and Sergeant arrived at Baker's home intending to arrest Baker for three active felony arrest warrants. By Baker's own admission, the evidence presented at trial showed that when Baker saw police, he “ran” from the officers, and he continued running even after Sergeant shouted at Baker to stop running. After Sergeant shouted at Baker to stop, the body camera footage showed that Sergeant ran after Baker for over ten seconds before Baker finally stopped and knelt on the ground in compliance with Sergeant's commands. That Baker ran only “a short distance” from the officers into an adjacent field is of no consequence, as running a distance as short as four feet has been held to be sufficient to establish flight under section 575.150.1. See State v. Sonnier, 422 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (evidence that Sonnier physically dragged an officer four feet was sufficient to establish that “Sonnier at least briefly managed to ‘run away from’ ” the other officers who were attempting to apprehend him).

Furthermore, the State presented sufficient evidence that Baker fled from the officers for the purpose of preventing them from effectuating an arrest. After the officers arrested Baker, he asked whether they were arresting him for his outstanding warrants. When Sergeant confirmed that fact to Baker, Baker indicated that is what he had thought. Baker stated that he was surprised they did not come to arrest him the previous week. Baker apologized to Sergeant when he saw that Sergeant had injured his arm running after Baker. Sergeant said, “That's what happens when you run.” Baker replied, “I know[,]” and then complained the charges he was being arrested for should have been charged as misdemeanors instead of felonies. Baker's voluntary comments made after the arrest demonstrate that he knew the officers were there to arrest him when they arrived at his home and that he ran from them in his attempt to flee from the arrest.

Baker's sufficiency-of-the-evidence point on appeal is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State conceded in response to Baker's PCR motion that the number of prior offenses “proven” at the time of Baker's guilty plea were not sufficient to enhance Baker's DWR charges that he pled guilty to. Accordingly, the PCR motion was successful and resulted in Baker's felony sentences being vacated and remanded for resentencing as class A misdemeanors. Baker was eventually sentenced to a jail term of six months with credit for time served.

2.   All statutory references are to The Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as supplemented through September 13, 2023, unless otherwise indicated.

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge, concur.